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Introduction
Homo fibula: we are story-telling beings,1
A few years ago I was reading the Sunday newspaper, The Observer, on a Monday 
evening in Florence and made the disorientating discovery that I was excluded from 
certain conceptions of what it means to be English. Raised and educated as a Catholic, 
I have always felt a little disconcerted by the unfamiliarity of Anglican churches; yet I 
have never felt discriminated against or that I have suffered any adverse affects from 
being an English Catholic (the one clear legal act of discrimination -  the inability to 
marry the future King -  never being of particular relevance). However, on that 
evening in Florence in December 2002,1 read a piece by a columnist and author I 
admire, Will Hutton. Hutton was using the funeral of a friend and colleague to make 
wider comments about the importance of the role of the Archbishop of Canterbury. 
He wrote that, despite a growing secularism in our society, “Our collective 
relationship with the Church o f England runs very deep.” He continued, the Church of 
England “represents, for all its weaknesses, the best of England”. What Will Hutton 
was saying, whether he intended to or not, was that his conception of England does 
not include me (or, o f course, any other religious minority, from Baptists to Sikhs). 
One could imagine that ordinarily this would not matter. Perhaps if I was not living 
abroad and was not so aware o f my Englishness; or had it not been Will Hutton 
making such remarks, but the Archbishop himself, or someone else with whom I do 
not identify as being quintessentially part of the England to which I understand myself 
as belonging, then it is also possible that it would not have mattered. But it did matter. 
Reading and reflecting upon that column was disorientating and a little painful -  
surely they couldn’t exclude me? I am embarrassed to admit that my shock led me to 
the crass insensitivity of bringing up the experience with a compatriot and colleague 
in Florence who happens to be of Asian descent. His reaction to my tale of woe was 
instant and angry: you’ve only felt that once? I’ve felt that way every day of my life, 
he told me.
1 Ben Okri, ‘The Joys of Story-Telling* in Birds o f Heaven. London: Phoenix, 1997.
The point of relating this episode is not to suggest that I have the personal experience 
to embark upon the research presented here; not only would that be absurdly self- 
aggrandising, it would also be wholly untrue as I started this project a full year before 
reading Hutton’s column. Furthermore, as the reaction of my compatriot suggested, 
there are many people out there with a lot more such experience. The point is rather to 
suggest that identity matters, that acceptance in that identity really matters, and that 
those of us who are (relatively) secure in our many identities should not underestimate 
the debilitating impact of ontological vulnerability.
1. Subject and delimitation of this thesis
This thesis does not, however, take Catholics or English Asians as its focus, but the 
most disadvantaged and marginalised group in Europe: the Roma. The daily 
discrimination and violence Roma face in Europe and beyond is well-documented. It 
is not, however, the subject of consideration here. Rather, it is the claim of the 
Romani movement that the globally scattered groups of Roma constitute a non­
territorial nation that is the subject of this thesis. I first encountered the claim to non­
territorial nationhood in a document submitted as part of the Romani delegation to the 
2001 World Conference Against Racism. The incongruence of this claim with the 
centrality o f territory to political organisation and, consequently, to international law 
was striking. Yet, enquires made with my colleagues and with a wider circle of 
Romani leaders about the nature of this claim elicited confusing answers. This thesis 
project began, therefore, with the simple aim of understanding the claim itself: what 
was being asked for? How was a non-territorial nation to be understood? What was 
the claim intended to gain for those in whose name it was being made? In addition to 
questions internal to the nature of this particular claim, the second aim of this research 
was to take an external perspective. I wanted to understand how such a claim would 
be received: to whom was the claim being made? What consequences flowed, or 
could flow, from the status of being a non-territorial nation?
The two main research questions of this thesis are, therefore:
• How should the Romani claim to non-territorial nationhood be understood?
• How can such a claim be situated at the international level?
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While I have drawn the understanding of the nature of the claim from documents and 
statements published by leading members of the Romani movement where they were 
available, and although I have discussed my thoughts on the nature of the claim with 
members of the Romani movement, as well as with a number of the handful of 
scholars working in this area, the result is not the work of an insider in the Romani 
movement. I am not a Romani ‘expert’; nor am I privy to the intimate political 
thoughts of any of the main factions of the Romani movement. This thesis is not an 
attempt to shine light on the Romani movement itself and the outcome is not the 
‘correct’ interpretation of the nature of the claim. It does not seek to a make a case for 
recognising the Roma as a nation, nor does it attempt to argue a line about which 
strategy the Roma themselves should pursue.
Instead, I take the claim of the Declaration of Nation issued at the Fifth Romani 
World Congress to be offering a visionary conception of political organisation on its 
own terms and I attempt to understand it from within contemporary debates and 
developments in the academic world. The assertion that this claim can shed light on 
present-day challenges to political organisation is taken seriously. The Romani claim 
is viewed here as a means by which to examine the claim to recognition and to 
nationhood, and to understand how recognition claims might play out on the 
international stage. This thesis attempts to outline the disempowerment of the Roma 
and other legitimacy-based claims in the international legal order and to suggest how 
such a claim, and its effects, can be understood at the international level.
Further, there are a number of assumptions made in the course of this thesis. They 
should be mentioned here. The first sees this thesis situated in a world in which 
‘spaces of flows’2 -  of people, capital, goods and services, information -  are 
replacing the ‘spaces of place’, in which the dominance of states is being challenged 
both vertically and horizontally. That the nature of governance is changing and that 
new entities and new claims are emerging in this state of flux is not seen as 
controversial and it forms the backdrop to the understanding of the Romani claim and 
to attempts to situate it at the international level. Secondly, the ‘fact’ of human
2 Manuel Castells, The Rise o f the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwells, 1996.
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plurality is taken as being self-evident, or, in the language of Arendt, it is assumed 
that we are living beings, that we inhabit a world of our own creation, and that we 
share the world with others.3 This thesis accepts that a culture is only capable of being 
understood from with its own terms, but does not support a cultural relativist position. 
Instead, I accept that I can only argue from within the position of my own culture; 
where examples are called for, I try as far as possible to draw them from my own 
experience and identity. Yet, whilst accepting that there are no universals to which I 
can appeal, at the root of the arguments put forward is the belief that all human beings 
are bom free and equal in both dignity and rights.
2. Structure of this thesis
This thesis is composed of seven chapters and is divided into three sections. A short 
introduction and brief conclusion begin and end it. The first section presents the claim 
to non-territorial nationhood in the context of who or what the Roma are. It is divided 
into three chapters.
Chapter 1 presents a history of the Roma. It provides an account of the widely 
accepted Romani migration from India 1000 years ago and their journey up and into 
Europe, laying out some of the controversy surrounding the Indian origin thesis. The 
chapter charts the nature of the persecution endured throughout the centuries and 
suggests the means by which Roma came to be scattered throughout the world. The 
aim of the chapter is to provide an historical context into which the claim can be 
situated.
Chapter 2 traces a history of Romani transnational political organisation from the 
beginning of the twentieth century to the most recent international Congress in 2004. 
This brief survey reveals that the Romani Movement has traditionally and self­
consciously framed its claims as national demands. The Movement’s most recent 
claims, including the claim to non-territorial nationhood, are interrogated in an effort 
to understand both the framing and content of these claims. At root of the diversity of
3 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959, (1:7).
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claims being advanced is the belief that Roma constitute a nation; and what is being 
sought is recognition and representation at the international level as such.
Chapter 3 considers the nature and depth of Romani identity. It presents three 
alternative visions of Romani identity and lays out the controversy surrounding the 
Indian origins thesis in more detail. It gives some indication of the diverse archipelago 
of Romani groups before suggesting that the post-colonial reclaiming of identity as 
epitomised by Frantz Fanon and the constant re-positioning of diasporic identity as 
identified by Stuart Hall provide a means o f understanding a claim to an over-arching 
Romani identity. The chapter suggests that while a claim to Romani trans-national 
identity may not resonate deeply among large sections of the Romani population at 
present, it is growing, and the Romani Movement is in a process o f nation-building.
The second section presents the theoretical framework within which the claim to 
nationhood is understood. The Romani claim is firstly placed within the broad 
framework of recognition demands and contemporary understandings o f the politics 
of recognition. Chapter 4 presents an understanding of the recognition dialectic from 
the Hegelian perspective of recognition as the path to freedom, and attempts to 
establish that recognition is vital both for individual personal development as well as 
the ability to function in society. It is argued that where identity is best understood in 
Arendtian terms as a constant re-telling and re-forming of the story of ourselves, 
recognition itself must necessarily be conceived of as interactive, mutual and 
reflexive, capable of taking account of the ever shifting nature of identity. The second 
part o f Chapter 4 considers a number of attempts within political philosophy to 
accommodate recognition demands and highlights the problems o f both the liberal and 
communitarian approaches. Where recognition necessitates active participation on a 
basis o f equality, the chapter concludes that the cultural agonism of James Tully and 
his understanding of politics as a critical activity is best able to offer groups the 
opportunity to contest the recognition they require whilst retaining the centrality of 
the individual to the purpose of recognition. The final part of the chapter highlights 
the danger of promiscuity that flows from taking recognition seriously -  that 
recognition becomes cheap and easy -  and suggests that viewing political freedom as 
the act of contestation can chart a path through the dilemma of promiscuity v.
10
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hegemony. This nature this contestation might take on the international level is picked 
up again in the final chapter.
Secondly in this section, the Romani claim is situated in contemporary considerations 
of nations and nationalism and placed in the space of wider challenges to the 
monopoly of the state. Chapter 5 considers what it means to make a national claim 
and whether it is possible to imagine a non-territorial nation. Two elements of any 
claim -  legitimacy and capacity -  are highlighted and the nature of their relationship 
considered. It is argued that where nations are understood as intrinsically valuable 
communities, the determining factor of the claim to nationhood must be its legitimacy 
and not the capacity it possesses. Where nations are viewed as the primary vehicle for 
the claim to the freedom to be collectively self-governing, the capacity element of a 
national claim — commonly viewed as the ability to run (elements of) a modem state -  
can only be subsidiary to the legitimacy of that claim. It is thus argued that capacity is 
important only in so far as it enables the legitimacy o f a claim to be established. As 
among the variety of roles territory is understood to play in establishing a national 
claim the instrumental part it plays in facilitating capacity is its most important, it is, 
further, argued that where only minimal amounts of capacity are required to establish 
a national claim, territory is not an essential element o f nationhood. The only factor, 
therefore, that should be determinate in establishing a Romani claim to nationhood is 
whether or not the claim has legitimacy in the eyes o f those over whom the claim is 
being made.
The Romani claim is thus understood as a claim to recognition at the political level as 
a group that aspires to collective self-governance, where recognition is vital to both 
the individual and societal development of a human being, and in which recognition at 
the political level is viewed as necessitating active participation. As recognition 
claims are necessarily an attempt to counter the domination of a particular discourse, 
the Romani claim should be seen not as the claim to the paraphernalia of a nation­
state but viewed as demanding the freedom to contest the hegemonic discourse which 
excludes them from participation at the international level.
The third and final section moves the setting of the Romani claim from the realm of 
theory to the international arena. Chapter 6 examines the international legal response
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to, and the existing avenues for recognition for, non-state legitimacy-based claims. It 
notes, first, that nations have no separate place in international law and thus examines 
a national claim to recognition from the perspective of minority rights. Secondly, as 
the claim to nationhood is necessarily the claim to collective self-governance, and as 
the Romani Movement has explicitly articulated their claim in the language of self- 
determination, the chapter considers the development and status of the legal principle 
of self-determination. It concludes that it is territory rather than people that continues 
to underpin the scope and nature of self-determination and, as a consequence, that 
access to participation in international law-making is closed off to a legitimacy-based 
claim such as that of the Roma.
Chapter 7 considers the construction of international personality, as well as o f existing 
theories of recognition in international law. It highlights the acceptance that access to 
the international arena is determined by territory as denoting capacity, and argues that 
both the declarative and the constitutive theory, in focusing on capacity over 
legitimacy, deny the importance of legitimacy for the constitution of international 
personality. The chapter attempts to formulate an alternative conception of personality 
capable of incorporating the wide variety of claims both to legitimacy and to capacity, 
in which all entities have more or less degrees of each, but where legitimacy that 
stems from the claim to original authority is understood to be qualitatively different 
from that which is generated by efficient fulfilment of function. The impact of this 
upon our understanding of sovereignty is examined. The suggestion is made that 
claims to legitimacy should be viewed as claims to self-determination, where self- 
determination is the right to participate, and where the nature of that participation is 
determined by the degree of capacity that an entity possesses. It is suggested, 
ultimately, that the need to take legitimacy seriously entails that at the very least a 
right to self-determination qua participation must entail the right to participate in 
discussions over the nature o f one’s own claim. Finally, two possibilities of discursive 
forums at the international level which would enable a legitimacy-based claim such as 
that o f a Romani nation to contest both the ‘who* and the ‘how’ of participation, but 
as well as the substantive ‘what’, are examined.
On a final note, Ben Okri’s simple yet powerful statements concerning the ‘Joys of 
Story-Telling’ introduce each chapter, giving lie to the childhood comfort that sticks
12
and stones may break your bones but words will never hurt you. In reminding us of 
the unique power words have to shape our lives, his work underscores the 
responsibility that comes with their use. Okri also highlights that, despite their power, 
stories are not immutable and are changed and made their own by each generation. 
His words draw attention to the intimate relationship between human beings and 
stories; in this post-foundational epoch, the need to tell stories about ourselves is one 
of the few links we have to each other across the cultural divide.
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Chapter 1 : A History of the Roma
The greatest stories are those that resonate our beginnings and intuit our endings ...»and dissolve them 
both into one4
The currently predominating understanding of the term Roma (Rroma) is as a 
collective of transnational ethnic groups, mainly concentrated in Europe and central 
and eastern Europe in particular, although scattered throughout the world. It is a word 
used in the singular, yet is an overarching term to describe a variety of groups that 
allegedly all share some common essence, or romanipe (‘Romani-ness’). This section 
is an examination of past and contemporary understandings of Romani origins, of 
Romani mobilisation and of political claims made to date. It is not intended to be an 
exhaustive account; rather, it seeks to serve as an introduction to the complexities and 
controversies that dog the continuing discussion about who or what the Roma are. 
This first chapter provides an historical introduction to the Roma; the second chapter 
an account of past and present political organisation; and the third chapter, which 
completes this section, examines the nature of Romani identity and attempts to assess 
the extent to which any such identity transcends the local.
1.1. Indian Origins
The origins of this people or groups of people have been shrouded in mystery for 
much of their known existence and the confusion is evident in the terms of description 
used both by others and as self-ascription — it was thought, for example, until 
relatively recently that the dark-skinned exotic strangers came from Egypt, the likely 
source of the term ‘Gypsy’.5 That Roma originated in India and migrated westward at 
the beginning of the second millennium -  a theory that burst to light in the latter half 
of the nineteenth-century -  is fast becoming established fact; according to Ian
4 Ben Okri, ‘The Joys of Story-Telling’ in Birds o f Heaven. London: Phoenix, 1997.
5 Whilst the term comes from a probable misunderstanding about origins, it has been by and large 
absorbed as an ascriptive term by large numbers of those whom it purports to describe. It is a frequent 
charge that ‘Roma* is a term only used by the educated elite and not by ‘ordinary’ Roma. The extent to 
which this is true across countries is difficult to assess but there is certainly a degree of truth to it, 
although it is largely country-dependent. As ‘Gypsy’ is a term of offence to many, Roma is mainly 
used throughout.
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Hancock, one of the main proponents of the thesis, it is “beyond dispute”.6 However, 
there is still considerable uncertainty about the Indian thesis, much of which stems 
from the fact that the main evidence is linguistic. It is the formation o f the origins of 
the Romani language that is linked to India and its subsequent development that is 
related to other languages encountered along an hypothesised migration route. While 
linguistic analysis can tell us that the various dialects of Romanes are structured and 
populated so as to make likely an Indo- Aryan birth and a subsequent migration 
through Persia and Armenia, through the Byzantium Empire and upwards through the 
Balkans into western Europe, it cannot of course provide information as to reasons for 
such an exodus, the numbers, the social and ethnic backgrounds of the speakers or any 
detailed timing. All of these factors remain contested, as is indeed the suggestion of 
Indian origins for a bounded ethnic group at all.
Yaron Matras, a Professor of Linguistics at Manchester, has provided a very detailed 
and seemingly indisputable account of the early relationship of the Romani language 
to other diasporic Indian languages, such as Domari.7 Matras has traced the beginning 
of what he terms ‘Proto-Romani’ by comparison with related Indo- Aryan markers to 
what are known as New Indo- Aryan languages. Early Romani, however, is 
characterised by structural innovations and loanwords from Greek — a development 
that he suggests may be traced to the Byzantium Empire and thus as occurring from 
the tenth and eleventh centuries onwards. In addition to the presence of Greek 
influence, the Romani lexicon reveals Persian and Armenian influences. The absence 
of an Arabic influence has generally been understood as evidence either of a 
migration preceding the Islamic Conquests (prior to 700 AD) or of a northern 
migration route through the Pamir, south of the Caspian Sea, through the Caucasus 
mountains, along the Black Sea coast and into Constantinople, a route that receives 
support from the absorption of loanwords of Georgian and Ossetian origin. While it 
was traditionally assumed that these layers were acquired successively in both time 
and therefore geography, Matras argues that it is also possible that the Persian, 
Kurdish, Armenian and even Greek components could have been acquired in close 
spatial proximity in eastern and central Anatolia, with the significant non-Muslim
6 Ian Hancock, ‘The Struggle for the Control of Identity’, (1997) September Transitions 36,42. The 
Chambers Dictionary (1998) identifies ‘Gypsy’ as ‘a member of a wandering people of Indian origin’.
7 Yaron Matras, Romani. A Linguistic Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 18. 
Most of the details from this section are taken from Matras, Chapter 3,14-48.
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population there also preventing Arabic or Turkish from leaving a mark on the new 
linguistic arrival. From this common background, according to Matras, Romani split 
into its various dialects and was dispersed throughout Europe; traditional historical 
records suggest that this dispersal took place from the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries onwards. Matras notes, however, that the fact that current Romani dialects 
shared common structural features at various stages of their early developments need 
not be evidence that Romani was uniform at any stage -  that is, the movement of 
speakers was not necessarily co-temporal or co-ordinated.
The linguistic details are supported by sociological findings. Of central importance is 
the existence outside India throughout the medieval period of various groups of Indian 
origin, notably in the Near East and Central Asia. Such groups specialised in service- 
providing, peripatetic trades such as entertainment and metalwork, and were 
marginalised by the mainstream, settled populations, with interactions between them 
being usually limited to economic transactions. The suggestion of a linguistic link to 
these populations in the mid- nineteenth century was responsible for a direct 
connection being made between the Romani populations of Europe and the castes of 
commercial nomads in India proper. This early interest in Romanes suggested an 
association with a low caste of travelling musicians and dancers, and the term dom 
continues to indicate a caste affiliation in India, referring to a group of people who 
specialise in service- providing occupations such as basket-weaving, smiths, cleaners, 
musicians and dancers. The assertion of a connection is strengthened by the sharing 
by many of the groups classifiable as commercial nomads of Indian origin of a term 
for the designation of outsiders: in Romani, gadzo, in Domari, kazza, for example. 
Moreover, the term for outsiders also often carries the additional meaning of ‘settled’ 
or ‘farmer’, which has been understood as reinforcing the impression of a group or
Q
groups historically self-identifying as non-sedentary. Further, the likelihood of Indian 
service-providing populations migrating eastwards is suggested by the Persian poet 
Firdursi in his work of the eleventh century, Sahname, in which 10,000 Indian 
musicians known as luri are invited to entertain the Persian king Bahram Gur around 
the time 420 AD. The story is supported by Arabic and Persian chronicles of the 
period and is accepted by a number of those writing on the issue as evidence of the
8 Matras, Romani, 15.
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nomadic migration of such groups, if not of Romani ancestors themselves (the timing 
being about 500 years too early).9 Accepting a connection between these various 
groups -  known as the Dom hypothesis -  explains shared socio-ethnic profiles10 while 
nonetheless accommodating linguistic differences by allowing for western migration 
by individual groups seeking employment opportunities at different times.
The necessary oversimplification of the linguistic evidence for the non-specialist 
risks, as Fraser points out, appearing to suggest that hordes of Roma filed out of India, 
stopping at intermissions on the way through the Middle East, before arriving in 
Europe, thereafter splitting off into different groups as some pursued their way ever 
north and westwards. This is unlikely to have been the case if  social organisation
followed an Indian model and the specific characterisations of similar peripatetic 
groups. It seems therefore reasonable to speculate that the linguistic ancestors of 
today’s Romani- speakers did not leave India as a coherent group, but were various 
sub-caste groups, providing specialised goods and services, working in relatively 
small numbers and permanently on the move as specialisation required a wide range 
of potential customers. Such a peripatetic way of life would not have seemed unusual 
to others; in the East, nomadism was widespread, although largely for agricultural or 
pastoral reasons. The continual search for custom and the desire to avoid the period’s 
conflicts, it is to be assumed, led to the arrival of such groups in the Byzantium 
Empire and, from there, to Europe. -
However, while the idea of Roma as descendants o f commercial nomads has gained 
acceptance, other, more controversial, explanations for the linguistic connections 
exist. The Dutch Arabic and Oriental scholar, Michael Jan de Goeje, suggested a 
variation on the caste-origin thesis in a contribution to the Koninklijke Akademie van 
Wetenschappen of Amsterdam in 1875, casting Roma as descendants of a group of 
nomadic entertainers rather than commercial itinerants.11 According to de Goeje,
9 E.g., Hancock accepts the veracity of Firdursi’s writings, but holds that it does not refer to the 
beginnings of the Roma. Hancock, We are the Romani people. Great Britain: University of 
Hertfordshire Press, 2002.
10 Fraser suggests in support of this that ethnic sub-castes relationships, based on work specialisation, 
have more relevance in everyday society than the main castes, and the Dom thesis offers an explanation 
for the distinct boundaries between similar groups, a customary feature of such sub-castes being 
marriage within the group. Fraser, The Gypsies. Oxford: Blackstone Press, 1992,42-44.
11 M. J. de Goeje, Accounts o f the Gypsies in India. Delhi: New Society, 1976.
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these entertainers were part of the camp-followers of a group of warriors, the Jat or 
Zutt, who originated in Sindh (a province of south-eastern Pakistan) and were 
eventually re-settled in the seventh century; de Goeje points to a twelfth-century text 
by the Arab historian Tabari that describes the settlement o f 30,000 of Zutt prisoners 
on the border of the Byzantium empire in the year 855 -  a thesis which apparently 
could fit the linguistic evidence as well as accounting for the range of physical 
characteristics present in modem Romani populations.12
In recent years, the idea of migration occurring because of political unrest has been 
put forward by Romani scholars themselves and has led to the elevation of Roma 
from travelling musicians or trading people to descendants of warrior castes. In a 
1979 article Jan Kochanowski claimed ancestry for Roma with the kshatriyas, the 
second of the four castes of Hindi society.13 Similarly, Ian Hancock, a Romani 
Professor of Linguistics, holds that Roma are descended from the Rajputs, a warrior 
caste. In support of this, Hancock has put forward the suggestion of gadzo as traceable 
to the Sanskrit gajjha, meaning civilian; of goro meaning “slave, enemy, captive” and 
go mi as “one who has surrendered”.14 The defining of the Romani: non-Romani 
relationship by military terms is, according to Hancock, complemented by the fact 
that Romani military vocabulary is of Indian origin (words such as “soldier”, “spear”, 
“sword”, “battlecry”), whereas that relating to metalwork or agriculture, for example, 
has a later ancestry. In an attempt to reconcile the warrior thesis with the social and 
economic features of peripatetic Indian populations, Hancock has proposed that the 
Rajput and their camp-followers of low and untouchable caste moved into Persia 
during the military campaigns against Islam, continuing perhaps as a mercenary force, 
and that as they became further removed from their homeland, caste distinctions were 
overcome in the trauma of separation from India.15 In building this hypothesis, 
Hancock has comprehensively rejected comparison with the Domari -  the Dom thesis 
-  arguing instead that the Dom were low caste camp-followers (entertainers, porters, 
cooks etc), in contrast to the high caste Rajput ancestors of the Roma, although if they
12 Fraser, The Gypsies, 28,
13 Jan Kochanowski, ‘Roma: History of their Indian Origin* (1979) 4 Roma 16.
14 Ian Hancock, The Origins and Westward Migration o f the Romani people. Occasional Paper of the 
International Romani Archives, 1999 (on file with the author); for a synopsis of similar arguments: 
Hancock, ‘The Emergence of Romani as a KoYni outside of India’, in T. Acton (ed.), Scholarship and 
the Gypsy Struggle. Great Britain: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2000, 7.
15 Hancock, ‘The Emergence of Romani as a Kom£ outside of India*, 8-9.
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meventually intermingled in the course of migration the eventual distinction seems non­
existent.16
The Belgium-based authors of the ‘Frame Statute of the Rromani People in the 
European Union* present a variation on both the craftsman and warrior theme. 
According to the Statute, Roma herald from a specific town, Kannauj, the former 
capital of Northern India, which is identified as “the cradle of the Rromani nation”.17 
The migration is explained not as commercial nomadism or as the result of military 
campaigning, but as abduction and captivity. The Statute states that the Kitab al- 
Yamini manuscript identifies 20 December 1018 as the date on which the inhabitants 
of Kannauj were transported by the ruling Sultan to Khorasan, where they were held 
in captivity for several decades for their skills as artists and craftsmen.
The warrior hypothesis and the abduction thesis however present chronological 
difficulties. According to Fraser, the strong presence of Greek in all Romani dialects 
as well as the historical records suggest the presence of Romani speakers in 
Byzantium by the eleventh century at the latest, in order to account for this 
commonality prior to a split in the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. While Hancock 
maintains that descent from the Rajput is consistent with a migration that departed in 
the first quarter of the 11th century18, the lack of Arabic influence and the necessarily 
prolonged presence in the Near East for the absorption of the Persian and Armenian 
influences suggest that migration from India needed to have taken place in the eight or 
ninth centuries. Attempts have been made, according to Fraser, to overcome these 
inconsistencies by suggesting multiple waves of migration connecting an exodus of 
Jats in the eight century with a second wave of Rajputs in the twelfth century, either 
following their defeat in the battle of Taraih in 1192 or earlier, as Hancock argues; 
these separate groups then congregated in Byzantium and there formed a single
16 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism’, Paper presented at the Gypsy Panel 
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Twentieth National Convention, 
Honolulu, November 1988; reprinted in Nationalities Papers, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 1991. Hancock’s 
rejection of the Dom thesis appears to have mellowed slightly with his acceptance of Kenrick’s claim 
that whereas the Dom today are a population of menials, the term 1000 years ago simply meant 
‘person*. Hancock, ‘The Struggle for the Control of Identity’, (1997) Sept. Transitions 36,40.
17 Frame-Statute (Moral Charter) of the Rromani People in the European Union; available at 
http://rinchibamo.free.fr/cm.en.doc. §4 The “Rromani Nation” As It Defines Itself; a)
18 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism’; Hancock, ‘The Emergence of 
Romani as a Koïné outside of India’.
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population where common linguistic features took shape. While this thesis can not be 
ruled out, the suggestion that Roma are descendants of commercial nomads appears to 
make better use of the available evidence.
1.2. A people of Europe
While theories of ultimate origins are forced to rely solely upon linguistic comparison, 
supported by sociological and serological theories19, documenting the history o f Roma 
in Europe benefits greatly from the addition of written accounts; interpretation of 
sources is not always straightforward, however, and much remains supposition.
1.2.1. From pilgrims to persecution
The earliest surviving reference to people likely to be Roma as far west as 
Constantinople is contained in the Life o f St. George the Athonite, written on Mount 
Athos in 1068; in the account, the Emperor Constantine Monomachus, plagued by 
wild animals devouring game in the imperial park, appealed to the help o f “a 
Samaritan people, ... who were called Adsincani, and [were] notorious for 
soothsaying and sorcery.” According to Fraser, the name Adsincani is the Georgian 
form of the Greek Atsinganoi, the term by which the Byzantiums commonly referred 
to Roma. Zigeuner in German, Tsiganes in French, the Italian Zingari and Hungarian 
Ciganyok are all derived from this Byzantium term. The origin of the name has been 
much debated and the commonest view is that it is a corruption of Athinganoi, an 
heretical sect persecuted into near extinction in the ninth century and likely to have 
been applied to the Roma as both groups had a reputation for sorcery and fortune­
telling. Similarly, the legend of Egyptian origin and thus the term ‘Gypsy’ probably 
owed much to the popular medieval belief in Egypt’s association with the occult.21 
Superstition and appeal to the supernatural was widespread at all levels of Byzantium 
society -  a credulity easily exploited by groups of entertainers, bear-keepers, snake- 
charmers, acrobats and jugglers — and the vilifying references in folk literature o f the
19 Evidence o f an Indian connection based upon on genetic (blood) ties will be considered in the second 
chapter of this section.
20 Fraser, The Gypsies, 46. In comparison, Hancock has the migration not arriving in Europe until c. 
1250 (‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism’).
21 According to Fraser, the date of this association is difficult to place but was certainly popular in the 
Byzantium Empire by the fifteenth century.
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period suggest that despite the popularity o f their services, they themselves did not 
enjoy a good reputation, although they were likely to have been only one of the sub­
castes arriving to sell their skills.22
Roma became well- established in the Peloponnese and on a number o f Greek islands 
in the course of the fourteenth century. According to Fraser’s interpretation of the 
limited source material, they demonstrated a decided preference for settling in 
Venetian territories, such as Corfu and the Greek mainland, presumably because of 
the relative peace and stability, free as they were at that time from the threat of 
Turkish invasion. By the end of the fourteenth century, Roma had become 
established throughout the Balkans. Systematic enslavement in the provinces of 
Wallachia and Moldovia meant that for many, migration must have ended here.24 
Traditional Romani skills, such as black-smithing, gave them an economic value that 
was not comparable to any other group and although the Gypsies of the Crown were 
obliged only to pay an annual tribute and could move freely, those belonging to the 
monasteries and estate- owners (.boyars) were chattels of their masters. More fortunate 
Romani groups were recorded in the Hungarian lands during the fourteenth century 
and from there fanned out across central and western Europe over the following 
centuries, leaving a surviving written trace as far north as Scotland, for example, by
*yc
1505. By the beginning of the sixteenth- century it seems that these groups had 
largely departed the Greek territories in advance of the Turkish onslaught. The time- 
lag between arrival in Europe and such records further suggest that these groups were 
migrating independently of one another. The long stay in the Greek lands had a lasting 
and substantial impact, however, upon the Romani language and probably marks the 
end of anything approaching a single language. As Romani was carried onwards in 
Europe, linguistic diversification began in earnest.
Specialisation in the trade of performance, in gullibility and spectacle, continued to 
serve a number of different groups that made their way west and it became known in
22 Fraser, The Gypsies, 48.
23 Fraser, The Gypsies, 49-50.
24 Hancock has suggested that approximately half of the Romani population was taken into slavery, 
although provides no evidence to support this statement. Hancock, We are the Romani people, 29. 
There is no doubt, however, that large numbers were enslaved. Fraser, The Gypsies, 57-59.
25 Fraser, The Gypsies, 111
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the Spanish Romani dialect as o xonxano bard -  ‘the great trick’.26 By the early 
fifteenth century, groups of Romani speakers were no longer unobtrusive but 
appeared to be moving purposefully from town to town and across borders under 
leaders with increasingly impressive titles. Furnished perhaps with the knowledge 
their ancestors had gained of Christianity during their time in the Greek territories of 
the respect and sustenance traditionally (and in some cases legally) due pilgrims since 
the pious times of Charlemagne, these groups began claiming this virtuous status. A 
record in Heidelberg in 1550, for example, describes a wandering band presenting 
letters of safe conduct from Emperor Sigismund detailing how in Egypt their 
ancestors had forsaken the Christian faith, and that as penance they were condemned 
to wander the world in exile for a period of seven years. An earlier chronicle of 1417 
noted the passage of “a certain strange wandering horde of people” through the 
northern German territories of Holstein, Mecklenburg and Pomerania, observing that 
they “travelled in bands and camped at night in the fields outside the towns, for they 
were excessively given to thievery... especially their women.”28 Yet, the same 
account relates that they had letters o f safe conduct from Sigismund and recounts the 
same story of apostasy and penance. Similar accounts o f foreigners led by various 
leaders, styled in the European fashion often as Dukes, arriving with letters of safe 
conduct appear in town chronicles all over western Europe around this time. One from 
Toumai dated May 1421 notes that the Egyptians had privileges so that “none could 
punish them save themselves”; this fact and the sheer strangeness of their fashion and 
lifestyle apparently saw the stunned burghers bestow beer and coal upon them. Yet 
this is not to suggest that such deceptions met with success everywhere. As the letters 
of Sigismund expired (they were also without currency outside the Holy Roman 
Empire), new ones by the Pope came into circulation, but there were nonetheless 
incidents of the strangers being driven from towns for their alleged sorcery, with local 
clerics often acting as the prime instigators of such rejection.
26 Fraser, The Gypsies, 60-83.
27 D.M.M. Bartlett, ‘Minister’s Cosmographia universalis\  (1952) 31 Journal o f the Gypsy Lore 
Society 83, cited by Fraser, The Gypsies, 65. Although Münster completed his work in 1550, it is likely 
that the encounter with the Gypsy pilgrims took place many years previous. Sigismund, King o f 
Hungary, was elected Holy Roman Emperor in 1411.
28 The chronicle is that of Hermann Comerus, cited by Fraser, The Gypsies, 66-67.
29 Fraser, The Gypsies, 70-71.
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*The tide began to turn against these wandering pilgrims about the mid-fifteenth 
century. However clever the original tale of a seven-year pilgrimage had been, it 
could only be renewed so many times before the protective sheen wore off and there 
were only so many towns that could be visited before welcome was no longer 
forthcoming. The German chronicler Aventius, writing in 1522, recounts a tale from 
the Bavarian Chronicle of 1439:
“At this time, that thievish race of men, the dregs and bilge-water of various peoples ... began 
to wander through our provinces under their king Zindelo, and by dint of theft, robbery and 
fortune-telling they seek their sustenance with impunity. They relate falsely that they are from 
Egypt and are constrained by the gods to exile, and they shamelessly feign to be expiating, by 
a seven year banishment, the sins of their forefathers... I have learned ... that they ... are 
traitors and spies.”30
There are numerous such accounts of the declining reception such groups were 
receiving right across the German lands by this time. The Imperial Diet issued edicts 
against them in 1497, accusing them of espionage, in 1498, demanding their expulsion 
as spies, and in 1500, allowing them a brief period to remove themselves from all 
imperial lands after which there would be no punishment for violent action taken 
against them; they were thus outlawed. These groups fared better for longer in France, 
although their presence was by no means frictionless; in the Low Countries they were 
increasingly unwelcome and alms forthcoming rather as bribes to secure their 
departure. Much the same story occurs right across Europe, although Scotland proved 
a safe-haven under the protection of James V until a year before his death in 1541, 
when an Order was issued banishing all Gypsies from the Kingdom within thirty days. 
Such groups do not appear to have arrived in Scandinavia until the first decade of the 
sixteenth century at the earliest, entering from Scotland and England, but there too 
their welcome quickly expired and within thirty years of their arrival royal orders 
were being issued to the effect that all Gypsies were to leave within a specified period 
of time. It was in this period that anti-Gypsism took on an official form.
By the mid- to late-sixteenth century, the Reformation ensured that attitudes towards 
pilgrimage and the Franciscan idealisation of begging and related alms-giving were
30 From the Latin of Johann Thurmaier (Aventius), Annalium Boiorum tibri septem. Cited by Fraser,
The Gypsies, 84-5.
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not what they had been in medieval times. Moreover, papal letters of protection were 
not only losing their protective sheen but had become totally worthless in many places 
as the Reformation took hold, and could even be a source of harm themselves. The 
deep distrust felt by majority settled populations towards nomadic groups was 
increasingly reflected in the harsh arrangements made for poor relief and the pitiless 
penalties enacted against vagrants.31 The belief that the poor were to be supported by 
their own parish while ‘foreign’ beggars were to be sent away without mercy left no 
space for those who lacked a native parish. The huge uncertainties of the long 
sixteenth century -  the wars, famine and disease -  that raged across Europe was 
combined for ordinary people with the loss o f comfort previously to be found in 
‘Popish’ customs and traditions. This hardship, coupled with the sweeping away of 
the belief in salvation through good works in place of faith alone that saw the prospect 
of hope of a better life in the next amidst the drudgery of the present diminish 
accordingly, make the unwillingness of the majority to accommodate the exoticism of 
‘strangers’ and to persecute those who were different unsurprising. This is not to 
excuse the treatment such groups suffered but to place it in context.
The characterisation of Roma as foreigners and the hostility towards them for their 
alleged criminality became entrenched. As repressive measures took hold, they 
produced huge changes in the lives of Roma in Europe.33 In order to survive under a 
system which explicitly sought to deny such groups food, shelter and employment, 
they were forced to adapt. Some found refuge in wastelands and woods, others took 
advantage of the relative lawlessness of border regions to make their home there.34 
The nature of the groups also changed as they fractured into smaller family-sized 
groupings in order to avoid attention, or else banded together in large groups for self­
protection. The denial of means to make an honest living did indeed see a turn to
31 For example, the accession o f Edward VI in 1547 in England saw the enactment of a statute that 
provided for vagrants to be branded on the chest with a *V’ and to be enslaved for two years by any 
willing master by any means that he saw fit. C.S.L. Davies, ‘Slavery and Protector Somerset: die 
Vagrancy Act o f 1547’ (1966) 19 Economic History Review 533,533-49. The difficulty of 
enforcement, however, saw the act repealed in 1549 in favour of earlier statutory provisions.
32 The drama of replacing the leading of a good life as qualification for salvation with faith alone, and 
thus a personally negotiated relationship with God, or in some cases with the belief that one’s cards 
were marked for salvation or damnation already at the beginning of time, should not be underestimated.
33 Fraser, The Gypsies, 176-177.
34 Concentrations of Roma are found about this time (16th century) at the frontiers between France and 
Spain, between the German states, between the Kingdom of Lorraine and the Empire, in the northern 
Marches between Scotland and England and in the easternmost areas of the Dutch Republic.
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criminality for certain of the larger bands and by the eighteenth-century, a number of 
Gypsy brigand gangs had become notorious in the German lands for violent robberies 
and murder. Belief in their inherent asocialibility combined in the course of the 
subsequent four hundred years of European history with religious intolerance for their 
alleged heathen practices and sorcery35 and, later, with racial prejudices. 
Enlightenment thinking failed to make any real impact upon the authorities’ practices 
of repression towards Roma; the role of the ‘noble savage’ in Enlightenment literature 
was, however, a part almost tailor-made for the Roma. The Romanticism of the 
nineteenth- century was responsible for a growing interest in the wild, mysterious and 
the exotic. While this led to an increased interest in studying Romani culture, in 
particular in traditional Romani music37 and in their language38, it also had a darker 
side that saw a return to the role of the Gypsy as linked to the supernatural and 
criminal as an explanation for any mysterious occurrence.39
The European nineteenth-century also bore witness to the huge social and economic 
upheavals of industrialisation. However, Roma, despite now high levels o f 
sédentarisation, by and large avoided regular wage-labour in favour o f retaining their 
traditional economic lifestyle; yet adaptation was necessary and new seasonal rhythms 
and crafts were adopted to take account of the advance of services into rural areas and 
the steady production of cheap factory goods that meant that repair-work and 
tinkering services were no longer in such demand. Nonetheless, in general, Roma 
maintained their independence from the prevailing economic trends and held fast to 
the traditional community ideals that developed in accompaniment to peripatetic self- 
employment. However, the failure to engage in the industrial age and the offence 
caused to Protestant ethical sensibilities by the Romani lifestyle were largely
35 Whether Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox, the ecclesiastical authorities approached die Gypsies with 
undisguised hostility, although they did not fare badly in the Inquisition, perhaps because they were 
considered not as heretics or witches but as exploiters of superstition. Fraser, The Gypsies, 184-186.
36 For example, Goethe’s Gypsy chief in his Gotz von Berlichingen (1773).
37 In the course of the nineteenth-century, Romani musicians rose to prominence and considerable 
acclaim in the Habsburg Empire, Russia and Spain, where ‘Gypsy music’ became the height of fashion 
-  the Hungarian Romani violinist, Jdnos Bihari, for example entertained the statesman at the 1814 
Congress of Vienna and was the primary inspiration for Liszt’s Hungarian Rhapsodies.
38 “The Gypsies’ speech became something of an orchid in the philological garden... seen to have the 
antique beauty of a crumbling ruin”; studies of Romani peaked in the 1860s and 1870s and the 
attraction was strongest in Germany. Fraser, The Gypsies, 197-198.
39 The enduring tale of Gypsies as child-stealers developed in this period, for example; see Cervantes’ 
La Gitanilla and Defoe’s Moll Flanders.
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responsible for the strength of anti-Gypsyism sentiment and the extent of the 
persecution that followed.
1.2.2. The Romani Holocaust (O (Baro) Porrajmos40)
The brutality of the nascent European states in the thousand years since their 
appearance in Europe to those characterised as Gypsies is not disputed41 and they 
suffered a similar fate to other outcasts and scapegoats: the Jews, the Anabaptists, 
witches, and vagrants. In a number of lands, moreover, simply to be a Gypsy was a 
felony punishable by death. They suffered expulsion, enslavement, persecution, 
which later, in common with the Jews, found its zenith in their attempted 
extermination.43
The numbers of those murdered in Nazi- controlled Europe differ considerably, 
ranging from a quarter to half a million, and are ultimately unknowable as accurate 
censuses of ‘Gypsies’ existed neither before nor after the war. The Nazi 
characterisation of race and designation of ‘mixed blood’ would likely have meant 
that in any case many of those selected for persecution would not have recognised 
themselves as Romani. A Gypsy camp was established at Auschwitz- Birkenau in 
1942 and it seems certain that more than 20,000 perished there.44 Outside the Reich, 
survival rates varied considerably across the realm of German influence. The greatest 
losses in relative terms were in the lands of Bohemia and Moravia, where of an
40 The term, controversial but increasingly common, translates as ‘The (Great) Devouring’, and refers 
to the Romani genocide. For details, Hancock, We are the Romani People, 34-52.
41 On the other hand, it should not be overstated either. Hancock’s account, perhaps understandably, 
appears to suggest that those categorised as Gypsies were the recipients of not a single act of kindness 
or benevolence from the moment of their arrival on the European scene (Hancock, Nationalities 
Papers). The alms granted such groups as pilgrims gives lie to such extremism.
42 For details on the Habsburg policy of transforming Roma into ‘new Hungarians’, see Fraser. It was 
also the case in Scotland from 1554 onwards, according to Judith Okely (The Traveller- Gypsies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3).
43 The Romani place in the Holocaust -  the so-called ‘forgotten holocaust’ -  has been largely ignored 
both by the scholarly community and by popular imagination for much of the last 60 years. The stark 
treatment accorded Roma is brought into harsh focus in the obvious comparison with the Jews. Lack of 
acknowledgement of the place of Roma alongside the Jews and others in being singled out for 
annihilation has meant that compensation for survivors has been meagre and barely forthcoming. A 
number of accounts have since gone some way to addressing the balance, however. See Kenrick and 
Puxon, The Destiny o f Europe’s Gypsies. London: Heinemann, 1972; Crowe and Kolsti (eds.), The 
Gypsies o f Eastern Europe. London, 1991; as well as the comprehensive Kenrick (ed.), The Gypsies 
During the Second World War. 2: In the Shadow o f the Swastika. Great Britain: University o f 
Hertfordshire Press, 1999.
44 Fraser, The Gypsies, 264-5.
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estimated 8000 Roma only 600 survived, and in Yugoslavia; Serbia was the first 
country where the ‘Gypsy question’ was deemed to have been solved.45 Roma 
suffered deportation to the camps from across Europe, with only those states that 
retained a degree of independence, such as Bulgaria and Italy, providing any real 
protection to their Romani populations. At the far end of the scale, it has been 
suggested that between 70% and 80% of European Roma died in the Holocaust, either 
directly or indirectly -  a figure o f 500,000 to 1 million dead46; whether this figure is 
accurate or not, the racial selection of Roma, alongside the Jews, for annihilation is 
arguably more important than any tally of deaths.
1.2.3. Post- war responses to the ‘Gypsy problem9
The fact of genocidal persecution afforded Roma no protection after the war. 
Acknowledgement of the existence of a specific collective identity was slow in 
coming on both sides of the Cold War divide.47 While in some cases Roma benefited 
from the individual rights that emerged from the horrors of the Second World War, 
they continued to suffer exclusion and harassment on the basis o f their group identity.
In the post-war world, the majority of those Roma that had survived the genocidal 
policies of the Third Reich and its allies now found themselves under the power of the 
in-coming Communist regimes in eastern Europe. Fraser’s comment on 
Czechoslovakian policy towards Roma, as “typified by a blend of condescension and 
impatience, of paternalism and despotism, of benevolent inactivity and strenuous 
attempts at radical solutions”, serves as a useful guide to the prevailing attitudes of 
Communist authorities across the region.48 Policies were complex, guided by Marxist 
thinking on progress and implemented with the zeal for which Communist planners 
were renowned. Michael Stewart’s work on Hungary, for example, details how the 
response of the police and security forces towards Roma continued along pre- 
Communist lines, with all Gypsies marked out as ‘untrustworthy’ citizens by the
43 Details from Fraser, The Gypsies, 267.
46 See, for example, lan Hancock, ‘Gypsy History in Germany and Neighbouring Lands: A Chronology 
to the Holocaust and Beyond’ (2001) 19 Nationalities Papers 395.
47 For example, Fraser cites a case before the Hamm Court of Appeal in Germany, which pronounced 
in 1959 that a Rom arrested in Poland in 1940, held in custody for five years and whose parents were 
murdered had been arrested on the basis of inherent asocial tendencies, rather than on racial grounds. It 
was not until 1968 that the Federal Court o f Justice overturned this decision. (Fraser, 269).
48 Fraser, The Gypsies, 276-277.
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colour of their identity cards. This contrasted with attempts by other departments of 
the regime to develop a new social policy for Roma, including providing support for 
the establishment of the first, albeit short-lived, national organisation for Hungarian 
Roma.49 The benevolent half o f government policy was, however, generally 
undermined, particularly at the local level, by continuing hostility to Roma as a group.
The general antipathy towards expressions of nationalism was a consequence of the 
ideological commitment to modernise society -  progress that required the common 
effort of the whole population.50 Society needed to be unified, homogenous, directed 
by centrally-co-ordinating authorities, in order to progress in the historical struggle 
against the backwardness and under-development that had plagued central and eastern 
Europe for centuries. For any group to be allowed to form an organisation for the 
promotion and protection of their specific interests they had therefore to overcome 
this hurdle, and Roma, failing to meet the qualifications set by the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine on nationality status, were more at risk of homogenisation than those 
formally designated ‘national minorities’.51 The consequence of this was that Romani 
culture officially became a social problem. Moreover, the Romani economic way of 
life, built around the selling of unique skills, was considered redundant under the new 
system -  entrepreneurial activities did not fit the world of centrally- planned 
Communist economics -  and the continuation of Romani culture was thus perceived 
as no more than the hangover of this defunct way of life.
In Czechoslovakia, for example, the authorities concluded by 1958 that Gypsy group 
identity needed to be destroyed if  they were to progress in step with the rest of 
society; nomadism was outlawed, children were enrolled in school, encampments 
were raided and broken up, horses were slaughtered, caravans burnt, savings
49 Stewart, ‘Communist Roma policy 1945-89 as seen in the Hungarian case’ in Will Guy (ed.), 
Between Past and Future. The Roma o f Central and Eastern Europe. Great Britain: University of 
Hertfordshire Press, 2001,75-6.
50 Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984.
51 Roma had not always been thus treated. The Soviet Union had recognised Gypsies as a national 
minority in 1925, a Pan-Gypsy Union was formed a year later and a Gypsy State Theatre was founded 
in 1931; Romani was used as a language o f instruction in a number of schools and books and 
periodicals were printed. The 1930s however saw a reversal of such policies, none of which were 
revived in the post-war period. The theatre survived, but in 1956 nomadism was outlawed and it was 
from this new climate that the countries o f eastern Europe took their examples. Alaina Lemon, 'Russia: 
politics of performance* in Guy (ed.), Between Past and Future.
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confiscated, and the adults were registered in one place and refused employment 
elsewhere. Although the enthusiasm with which authorities forced integration meant 
‘victories’ were achieved, notably in the rate of school attendance and in certain types 
of employment, it was more likely, according to Guy, that the local authorities 
supposed to be registering and finding work and accommodation for those Roma 
settled in their area simply ignored them. The failure of such schemes to make a 
lasting impression and end the ‘Gypsy way of life’ saw a new scheme of ‘dispersal 
and transferral’ inaugurated in the late 60s, with the idea of spreading the Gypsy 
population as thinly as possible across the whole of the country. The lack of proper 
financing, bureaucratic restrictions, the hostility of local authorities and populations 
and the unwillingness of those transferred to play by the rules forced upon them, saw 
the scheme fail, but not without generating a huge upsurge in racial prejudice. 
Assimilationist policies such as forced sterilization were then introduced whilst, 
paradoxically, segregation in schooling became entrenched.53 -
Similarly Bulgaria conducted a campaign of assimilation which lasted thirty years, 
with the use of the language prohibited, the designation ‘Gypsy’ abolished and those 
with Muslim names being obliged to take Slavic ones.54 The situation in Romania was 
similar; attempts to prevent the traditional nomadic lifestyle saw the secret police o f  
the incoming Communist regime in Romania in 1946, for example, confiscate horses 
and carts of the Romani population.55 Despite some successes, such as enabling more 
Romani children than ever before to complete secondary schooling and go onto higher 
education, assimilationist policies in the Communist east arguably failed to take into 
account the barrier popular anti-Romani prejudice played in the integration of Roma 
into society, and the haphazard schemes that characterised Communist policies 
towards them succeeded rather in fanning the flames of this prejudice.
52 Will Guy, ‘Romani identity and post-Communist policy’ in Guy (ed.), Between Past and Future.
53 For details of segregation of Romani children into schools for the mentally handicapped on the basis 
of their ethnicity, ERRC, A Special Remedy. Roma and Schools for the Mentally Handicapped in the 
Czech Republic. Budapest, 1999. Available at http://www.erTC.org/publications/reports/. Racial 
segregation in education continues across the region; for details on die current situation, 
http://www.errc.org
54 For one Rom’s personal account of being forced to change his name, Ivan Ivanov, ‘Discrimination 
and the Romani complex’ (1999) 2 Roma Rights', http://errc.org/rr nr2 99/meet.shtm 1. accessed 19* 
January 2004.
55 See Franz Remmel, Die Roma Rumäniens: Volk ohne Hinterland. Wien: Picus Verlag, 1993.
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Not all Communist regimes, however, reacted according to this pattern. The Yugoslav 
authorities were considerably more tolerant towards cultural differences, in keeping 
with the ethos of a multicultural federation. In 1981, Gypsies were granted nationality 
status, placing them on an equal constitutional footing to other minorities, such as the 
Hungarians, Albanians and Turks, and conferring cultural and linguistic rights. The 
pejorative cigan was dropped in the media and replaced with Rom; radio and 
television channels began regular programming in Romani. Social and cultural 
associations sprung up in the larger communities and began to participate in local 
politics. Roma continued, though, to occupy the lowest socio-economic rung and 
although Yugoslavia was the one Communist state that did not force nomadic Roma 
to settle, the change in economic climate producing cheap industrialised goods 
frequently meant that their economic way of life ceased to be viable.56
The Romani population of western Europe traditionally differs from the more 
sedentary populations of eastern Europe, but the peripatetic way of life fared little 
better in the West. Although not actively prohibited57, governance systems designed 
for sedentary societies and built on the welfare state model have not been able or 
willing to support a travelling lifestyle. Travellers faced regular eviction and were 
forced to camp in places unfit for human habitation, without running water or sanitary 
facilities. Where the right to follow their traditional way of life was recognised, the 
resources were rarely made systematically available and Roma were subject to swings
f  A
in political climates, often the first to feel the slap of right-wing policies. Education
56 Guy, ‘Romani identity and post-Communist policy’.
57 Although that is not to say that laws prohibiting stopping did not specifically target the Roma. 
According to Klimovd, it was not uncommon for municipalities in France, for example, to pass 
legislation prohibiting Roma from stopping with their caravans in the surrounding area for more than a 
few hours at a time. Ilona Klimova, ‘The Romani Voice in World Politics’, unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2003,51.
58 Using Great Britain as an example, the findings of the UK Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government in 1962 to the effect that “the true gypsies [sic.], or romanies, have the right to follow their 
traditional mode o f life, and they have a legitimate need for camping sites” led to die 1968 Caravan 
Sites Act which made it a statutory obligation for local authorities in England and Wales to provide 
sufficient sites for Travellers. However, cash-strapped local authorities and pressure from local rate­
payers meant that, while the situation certainly unproved, a 1990 Department of the Environment 
survey found that 39% of the travelling community (as recorded by government figures) had no legal 
stopping-place, while of the remainder an estimated third had access only to private sites. Details taken 
from Fraser, 283-4. The 1992 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act granted police and local 
authorities sweeping new powers to deal with unauthorised camping at the same time that the 1968 
Caravans Act and the obligations it contained for the provision of sites was repealed and the funding 
for such sites abolished. The travelling population were victims of the popular right-wing climate that 
prevailed at that time, although the 1992 Act was the cause of huge protests and a House of Lords
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systems struggled to provide for the needs of Romani children, whether it. was 
because of the difficulties of schooling around a travelling lifestyle, or because of 
language difficulties or cultural difference requiring different approaches. In Spain, 
most Roma have traditionally been sedentary and the problem was less one of 
toleration of a separate way of life than of living conditions in the shanty-towns they 
largely occupied. Fear o f efforts towards political mobilisation saw Romani 
organisations banned and closed down in France, as they were across eastern Europe, 
with their leaders frequently questioned by police on suspicion of anti-state 
activities.59 The continuing inability of western European societies to support in 
practice an alternative way of life -  to recognise that equality can often only be 
achieved by difference in treatment -  is illustrated by reference to the United 
Kingdom and the series of cases concerning planning laws, so far unsuccessful, 
brought by English Gypsies before the European Court of Human Rights.60 
Underpinning this unwillingness of the majority of society to provide the necessary 
resources remains the belief in the fundamental asocialibility of travelling groups or 
of Gypsies in general, combined in societies facing large-scale immigration, with high 
levels of xenophobia.
1.2.4. A global people
In much the same way that the Indian origins of Roma has become an established part 
of the perception, certainly from without but also partly from within, of Romani 
identity, so too has the notion of the Roma as a population dispersed throughout the 
world begun to fix itself in the common or accepted understanding of who or what the 
Roma are. This understanding has its roots in the practices of persecution of the 
European states. It was initially the policy of deportation by the emergent colonial 
powers that saw Romani speakers become spread throughout the world. In medieval 
times, expulsion had been more or less a local matter, seeing travellers moved onto to  
other towns, later expelled from whole domains or realms, as suggested by the
revolt, both of which however failed to stop the progress o f the Bill to law. The UK example is 
arguably not atypical of the attitude of northern European governments to travelling groups. Luke 
Clements and Sue Campbell, ‘The Criminal Justice Bill & Public Order Act and its implications for 
Travellers’, in Acton (ed.), Gypsy Politics and Traveller Identity. University of Hertfordshire Press, 
1997.
59 KlimovS, ‘The Romani Voice in World Politics’, 51.
60 For example, Buckley v. UK (1996) and Chapman et a l v. UK (2001). All cases available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.
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Imperial edicts. Certain countries also used concentration as a means of dealing with 
the ‘Gypsy problem’; in the course of 1749, for example, the Spanish authorities 
executed a carefully orchestrated round-up of all the Gypsies in Spain — men, women 
and children — and sent them to forced labour in places of the government’s choosing, 
all their possessions being confiscated and sold.61
During the course of the sixteenth century, however, Portugal developed a policy of 
deportation and was the first country to adopt transportation overseas as a solution to 
the problem of those Roma who had been bom in the country and could not simply be 
expelled to a neighbouring state. In 1574, a Romani man and his family were forcibly 
transported to Brazil, and from that date a Portuguese practice of sending Romani 
women to Africa and men to service in the galleys established itself; large-scale group 
expulsions switched from Africa to Brazil a century later. By the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, groups of Roma were being forcefully rounded up by the 
Portuguese authorities and transported to both India and Africa This practice was 
picked up and copied by other countries. The Spanish sent Roma and others into the 
army, for example, or to holdings in North Africa, but not, interestingly, to the 
American colonies; in 1570, Phillip II forbade Gypsies from entering these areas and 
ordered his officials to arrange them to be shipped back to Spain should they appear 
there. England, however, had no such qualms about the use of the Americas as a 
dumping ground for undesirables and the 1597 Vagrancy Act saw considerable 
numbers of Roma and other itinerants shipped to hard labour in the American 
colonies. There appear to be, unsurprising in connection with the Roma, no figures for 
the numbers of those transported overseas nor any details as to their reception by the 
locals.
While enforced overseas relocation by the colonial powers petered out in the course of 
the eighteenth- and nineteenth- centuries, migration continued.63 The second half of
61 Angus Fraser, ‘The present and future o f the Gypsy past’ (2000) 13 Cambridge Review o f 
International Affairs 17,29.
62 Details in this paragraph are taken from Fraser, The Gypsies, 168-171.
63 Matras has suggested that migration forms a repetitive pattern in Romani history and imagination and 
thus places the movements of the modem era within this context. Yaron Matras, ‘Romani Migrations in 
the Post-Communist Era: Their Historical and Political Significance’ (2000) 13 Cambridge Review o f 
International Affairs 32,34. While there may be some truth to this assertion, there is a danger that it 
may be used to justify the continuing equation of Roma .with nomadism or as an excuse for the policies
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the nineteenth century that saw the abolition of slavery in the lands of Wallachia and 
Moldavia (present- day Romania and Molodova) consequently witnessed a further 
subsequent scattering of Roma across the world as emancipation also effectively 
meant eviction from land and dwellings, a migration known as the ‘great Kelderara 
invasion’ -  the group of Roma involved being primarily the Kalderash.64 In a number 
of European countries, the Kalderash constituted a new stratum of Roma in addition 
to the existing Romani population.65 Those Roma that crossed the Atlantic at that time 
had arguably a greater impact as the overseas expulsees of colonial times had left few 
traces of their presence; the new arrivals established themselves primarily in Ohio, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia and Romani migration kept pace with general immigration 
to the United States.66 A further mass migration occurred during the 1960s and 1970s 
with the opening of the borders of the former Yugoslavia which led to waves of Roma 
exiting those lands, mainly to West Germany. Since 1989, migration has continued 
from east to west, and out of Europe to the New World. The fighting in the former 
Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo, and continuing harassment, violence and social 
exclusion saw large numbers of Roma depart the Balkans and central and eastern 
Europe for western countries, such as the UK, Germany, and Italy. Canada has also 
received large numbers of Roma from central and eastern Europe in the last ten 
years. Thus whether as a consequence of forced transportation and continuing 
persecution either necessitating migration or at the very least making it highly 
attractive, and perhaps, although with some scepticism, because of the hold migration 
has on Romani cultural imagination, there are groups claiming Romani identity 
effectively living scattered across the entire globe.
and persecution that force Roma to seek refuge abroad by reference to their inherent desire to travel, 
and is thus perhaps best avoided.
64 Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, ‘Historical and ethnographic background: Gypsies, Roma, 
Sinti’ in Guy (ed.), Between Past and Future, 35. Fraser suggests, however, that migration patterns do 
not support the widely-held view of a major outflow from Rumania in the 1850s. {The Gypsies, 236).
65 This is arguably the origin of the term ‘Sinti’, which was taken up by those Roma that were already 
present in central European countries, primarily Germany and Austria, to distinguish themselves from 
the newcomers.
66 Fraser, The Gypsies, 234. From the time the migration began in 1815 to the 1880s, the majority of 
Romani migrants came from the British Isles; but from that time until the outbreak of World War I, 
there was a marked shift in general immigration, with the new migrants coming primarily from 
southern and eastern Europe, a pattern mirrored by Romani migrants.
67 Ronald Lee, ‘Post-Communism Romani Migration to Canada’ (2000) 13 Cambridge Review o f 
International Affairs 68. For a brief historical sketch of Roma in Canada, see RCAC Fact Sheet 8, 
available at http://www.romani.org/toronto/FS8canada.html For up-to-date information on current 
patterns of migration and asylum- seeking, http://errc.org/publications/indices/asvlum.shtml
Chapter 2: Romani Transnational Political 
Organisation
A people are as healthy and confident as the stories they tell themselves.68
The collapse of Communism and the emergence of attendant civil and political 
freedoms in eastern Europe marked a new chapter in Romani history. While socio­
economic conditions for Roma have worsened considerably in the countries of the 
former eastern bloc69, the new freedoms (and funding), as well as the intervention of 
the EU, have, by most accounts, re-energised political mobilisation.70 As the title to 
Hancock’s controversial article suggests, the roots of Romani nationalism are, as he 
puts it, in eastern Europe.71 However, while the historical, linguistic and 
anthropological dimensions of the Roma have attracted a not inconsiderable amount 
of attention, there has been, until very recently, little attempt at documenting and 
analysing Romani political organisation.72
In terms of defining Romani mobilisation, Klimova, in her empirical study of the 
Romani movement’s interaction with the United Nations, has classified the Movement 
as a loose transnational social movement, “an action system of mobilised networks of
68 Ben Okri, ‘The Joys of Story-Telling* in Birds o f Heaven, London: Phoenix, 1997.
69 This trend has been well-reported. E.g., Ina Zoon’s country reports under the title On the Margins 
(available at http://www.soros.org") and the UNDP’s 2003 Avoiding the Dependency Trap: The Roma in 
Central and Eastern Europe (available at http://roma.undp.skl. One of the more striking assertions by 
the UNDP is that “by such measures as literacy, infant mortality and basic nutrition, most of those 
country’s [Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia] four to five million Roma 
endure conditions closer to those of sub-Saharan Africa than Europe”.
70 Martin Kovats has suggested, however, that despite the fact that Romani politics has achieved real 
significance only in the post-Communist era, such mobilisation must be seen in terms of the 
development of Romani populations within their respective countries in the socialist era, rather than as 
the gift of an enlightened democratic era. He points out, for example, that access to health care, 
housing, education and employment under socialist regimes enabled Roma to better express their 
needs. Martin Kovats, ‘The Politics of Romani identity: between nationalism and destitution*. Open 
Democracy, 30 July 2003; available at www.opendemocracv.net: accessed 9 January 2004.
71 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism’, Nationalities Papers, Vol. XIX,
No. 3, Fall 1991.
72 The work of Thomas Acton is a notable exception. There have been moves to remedy this lacuna by 
a handful of scholars, notably Ilona KlimovA, The Romani Voice in World Politics (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Cambridge, 2003) (a much shortened version is published with Ashgate, 2005; as 
a consequence, citations refer to the PhD thesis unless otherwise indicated) and Peter Vermeersch, 
‘Roma and the politics of ethnicity in Central Europe: a comparative study of ethnic minority 
mobilisation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in the 1990s* (unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Leuven, 2002). The present author notes with gratitude the willingness of both to allow 
access to their work prior to publication and acknowledges the debt this section owes to their research.
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individuals, groups, Romani and Pro-Romani organisations from several continents 
functioning at all levels up to the global.” This system is based on “a shared belief in 
Romani identity and attempts to improve social and political status and treatment of 
the Romani people all over the world, predominantly by means of organised actions 
targeting the transnational level.” Few of the groups at the local, or occasionally 
even the national, level come under the umbrella of one of the transnational 
organisations but most interact or co-operate with one another or with the wider 
Movement on a more or less regular basis. According to Klimova, this is true also of a 
number of prominent Romani individuals, who are unattached to an organisation as 
such. The extent and nature of interactions between the various actors of the 
Movement have not yet been studied in their own right and hence are largely 
unknown. However, as the above definition suggests, ‘Movement’ should be 
understood as referring to a loose network of organisations linked by a common aim 
but lacking detailed and sustained co-ordination, and with a frequent failure to 
recognise other members of the network. This chapter intends to provide only the 
briefest of sketches as an introduction to the transnational Romani Movement as 
background to the claim to non-territorial nation status.
2 .1. The past of Romani politica! mobilisation
A number of scholars have suggested that Romani political mobilisation began at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Hancock, for example, has claimed that large 
gatherings of various groups of Roma, from the alleged meeting in Switzerland of 
Roma from all over Europe at the end of the fifteenth century to a grand assembly in 
Romania in 1913, mark the beginning of the movement. He is supported in principle 
by the anthropologists Marushiakova and Popov, who locate the roots of the 
movement in the Balkans in a 1905 ‘congress’ held in Sofia. Similarly, Acton cites 
reports in The Times of large conferences held in Germany in 1872 and in Hungary in 
1879.74 Romani language newspapers appeared around this time in Bulgaria, Greece,
73 Klimovâ, 22-28. ‘Pro-Romani* organisations is a term used to denote those organisations established 
or run by non-Roma, although they may employ Roma, whose work is predominantly or exclusively 
concerned with the improvement of the situation of Roma; the Budapest-based European Roma Rights 
Center is the most prominent example of a pro-Romani organisation.
74 The Times, 27 January 1872 and 29 September 1879. Thomas Acton, Gypsy Politics and Social 
Change. London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974,101. Klimovâ has however dismissed claims of early 
international congresses as nation-building myths, suggesting instead that it was only in the 1920s and
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Romania and Yugoslavia and, in 1925, the Soviet authorities allowed the formation of 
a Romani organisation. The first proposal for institutionalising an international 
meeting came from the General Union of Roma in Romania, in which it was intended 
that affiliated groups of Roma in every country would attend. Hancock, calling the 
organisation the General Association of Roma of Romania, has suggested that the first 
international conference took place in Bucharest in 1933 under the title ‘United 
Gypsies of Europe’. He further alleges that among other things, the conference sought 
to establish 23 December as an annual Romani holiday to commemorate emancipation 
from slavery. A flag to symbolise Romani identity was also apparently adopted and 
proposals were made for the creation of a Romani library, hospital and university and, 
for Hancock most importantly, suggestion was made “to institute an international 
program of communication and co-operation among representative Romani groups 
everywhere”.75 According to Klimova, however, no such conferences took place in 
the interwar period -  the Bucharest congress is, she alleges, rather a mythical forebear 
of later congresses.
There is general acceptance, however, that in Poland in the 1920s a Romani family 
persuaded the local authorities to recognise their claim to royal authority over all the 
Roma of Poland, reviving the concept of a King of the Gypsies.76 They were fairly 
successful in their claims, moreover. The enthronement of Janusz Kwiek as Janos I in 
1937 before an audience of thousands had Church approval from the Archbishop of 
Warsaw and various European heads of state were invited.77 The Second World War 
effectively brought the dynasty to an end. Janos was executed by the Nazi occupying 
forces in Poland for refusing to cooperate and, as a symptom of Romani mobilisation 
across the continent in that period, public political organisation went into serious 
decline as Roma were reluctant to draw attention to themselves. Although a new King 
proclaimed himself in the ashes of post-war Poland, he found few followers. In
1930s that Romani organisations began to take on existence in any regular manner (although this 
presumably does not rule out the occasional large meeting).
75 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism*, 10.
76 ‘King of Gypsies’ was apparently an office established in the Polish territories in the 17* century to 
prevent lawlessness among Roma and to collect their taxes. Although the position’s first two 
incumbents were rumoured to be Romani, from 1668 it was an office for the Polish gentry. The office 
ended with the partition of the Polish Commonwealth at the end of the 18* century and was revived by 
the Kwieks in the 1920s. Klimovi, 34.
77 According to Acton, the Polish President attended, although no-one comments on whether any other 
of the invited dignitaries was actually present. T. Acton, Gypsy Politics and Social Change. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974,100.
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contrast, however, to the current claim to non-territorial nation status, the Kwiek 
family took their inspiration from Zionism and developed initiatives for the founding 
of a Romani homeland. Michael Kwiek II had announced in 1934 a plan for creating a 
state for Roma in their ‘original’ homeland on the banks of the Ganges; Joseph 
Kwiek, a cousin and competitor for the throne, declared a plan for a homeland in 
South Africa. Janos I pledged in his coronation address to petition Mussolini for a part 
of the newly conquered Abyssinia as a place where Roma could settle.78 These plans 
came to nothing but were not however forgotten, and according to Klimova, the 
efforts of the Polish ‘Kings’ axe seen as the roots o f the Movement, at least as 
embodied today by the International Romani Union (IRU).79
The ambitions of the nascent Movement had been crushed by the spread of fascism, 
and the Holocaust left it floundering; those that survived were reluctant to publicise 
their identity as Roma. Cultural, religious and political organisations at both the local 
and national level however slowly began to form anew.
The 1960s saw various attempts at establishing an international Romani organisation. 
Many were banned by the incoming Communist regimes of the east and the focus o f 
initiatives shifted to France, where a Romanian Rom, Ionel Rotaru, had declared 
himself ‘the Supreme Chief of the Romani People’ at a public ceremony in 1959. 
Rotaru attracted enough supporters from within the immigrant Romani population of 
France to form the World Gypsy Community. Following on from the ambitions of the 
Kwieks, Rotaru drew up elaborate plans for an autonomous stretch of territory for 
Roma within France , as well as for the establishment of Romanestan in Somalia. 
The formation of a governmental- type organisation in order to campaign for the 
establishment of a Romani state was thus the WCG’s prime objective and Romani 
passports were in fact printed.82 Its plans failed to meet with the approval of the
n  Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism’, 12.
79 Klimov^, 34.
*° According to Klimova, Rotaru petitioned the people of Lyon for land so that Romani tradesmen 
could settle and establish the city as the Romani world capital. Klimova, 43.
S1 Rotaru’s choice of Somalia was based upon his belief that the Roma had settled in Mesopotamia 
following the biblical flood, and from there had settled in Somalia. He further claimed that at that 
moment 35% of Somalis were of Romani descent. There is however no evidence to support any 
connection between the Roma and Somalia. Klimovd, 43-44.
82 The ‘passports’ were printed in Belgium and had, in place of details of national identity, the 
Declaration o f the Rights o f Man. Rotaru was not the only international Romani figure to attempt to
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French authorities, however, and in 1965 the French Government banned the WGC, 
on the stated grounds of security concerns. Following its prohibition in France, and 
the failure to establish a homeland as protection from persecution that Rotaru had so 
desperately sought, the headquarters moved to Vienna and the organisation slowly 
ceased to play an active role in Romani politics.
A number of other transnational associations appeared about the same time, 
demanding various forms of recognition. The International Gypsy Rights Mission 
established itself in Paris in 1968, under the stewardship of a member of the Kwiek 
family, Rudolf Kwiek (Karway). The founding of GIPS AR (the Assembly of Roma- 
Gypsies) followed in 1969, with its headquarters also in the French capital. Although 
neither of these organisations managed anything more than symbolic actions, the 
statements of intent by Kwiek’s organisation in particular are worthy of note in terms 
of contextualising more recent national- political claims of the Movement.
According to its statutes, the International Gypsy Rights Mission represented the
a A
interests of the global Romani population and had a number of specific aims. The 
organisation was to, inter alia, ensure that the appellation ‘Roma’ was to replace 
‘Gypsies’ in official and public discourse85, attempt a statistical survey of Romani 
populations worldwide, broker agreements with individual states concerning Romani 
immigration and cross-border movement and assume responsibility for all Romani 
groups or ‘clans’. To this end, it reserved the right to demand a percentage of the 
income of all employed Roma, as well as the right to represent Roma in any 
negotiations with the officials of individual governments and to approve any 
compensation deal on their behalf. All disputes between Roma anywhere in the world 
were to be referred to a Romani court in Hamburg. Other Mission documents suggest 
that Karway intended to establish Romani embassies in every country in which Roma 
reside, although a trip to London in an apparent attempt to begin this process of 
accreditation was unsuccessful. While some documents suggest a strategy of pursuing 
citizenship in countries of residence and accepting sédentarisation, another demands
produce Romani passports; Rudolf Kwiek (Karway), President of the International Gypsy Rights 
Mission, also issued such documents. Klímová, 45,50.
83 Acton, Gypsy Politics and Social Change, 236.
84 All details in this paragraph are taken from Klímová, 46-51.
83 Klímová has noted however that the organisation itself oddly continued to use the term ‘Gypsy’ not 
only in its name but also throughout its documents and statutes, ibid.
39
that until all Roma achieve traditional citizenship papers (ie from existing nation­
states), they should be entitled to identity papers bearing Romani nationality. Karway 
later also issued passports to this end. The trappings of nationhood and structures of 
governance which Karway sought to establish arguably finds echo in the recently 
articulated demands of today’s international Romani organisations.
Of more interest in terms of concrete achievements, a breakaway faction of Rotaru’s 
WGC formed the International Romani Committee (IRC) (also commonly referred to 
as the Comitee International Rom (CIR)) in 1967. At its founding meeting at 
Fontainebleau, it was decided to set aside the more controversial questions o f 
‘national’ identity, such as the creation of a Romanestan, and to concentrate on 
activities within France. One of the main objectives of the IRC/ CIR in these early 
days, according to Klimova, was rather the settling of the question of reparations for 
Roma relating to wartime activities, with, it is claimed, more than 4000 individual 
compensation requests being collated and submitted to the French Ministry o f 
Veterans and War Victims. In addition to the pursuit of reparations, the IRC sought 
recognition on the international level, establishing co-operation with UNESCO, the 
Council of Europe and with a Vatican Commission dealing with Justice and Peace. 
Moreover, as Romani organisations began to appear across western Europe, attention 
within the IRC turned to establishing themselves as an international co-ordinating 
body. By 1972, according to Hancock, twenty-three national organisations across 
twenty-two countries had been linked under the IRC umbrella.87
A year earlier, 1971, the IRC had held the first World Romani Congress, in London, 
with participants attending from western, central and eastern Europe, North America 
and Asia.88 As well as affirming the Romani flag (with the addition of a red, sixteen-
86 Klimovd, 51-52. Only a few hundred of the applicants were apparently successful in gaining small 
sums.
87 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism*. Klimovd cites various first-hand 
sources as suggesting that the IRC represented 12,000 Roma at that time through direct affiliation 
through their local organisations and a further 45,000 affiliated in a less obvious manner. Klimovd, 57. 
Klimovd, following Willets, notes that the transnationalisation of the Romani Movement occurred 
concurrently with that by similar movements and organisations; thus, it should be seen within the 
context o f wider changes to the global climate in the early 1970s. Klimov^, 36, citing Peter Willets 
(ed.), Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations o f Issue- Orientated Non- 
Governmental Organisations. London: Frances Piter, 1982.
88 The Congress had been in the planning since 1966 but the inability to gain permission for leaders 
behind the Iron Curtain to attend saw it constantly postponed.
spoke charka to the horizontal blue and green bars89) and adopting a national anthem, 
the aim of the congress was made explicitly clear by its chairman. Liégeois cites him 
as declaring that “[t]he goal of this congress is to unite Roma throughout the world ... 
to bring about emancipation as we see it, and according to our own ideals; to advance 
at our own speed.”90 The slogan Opre Roma\ (Arise Roma!) was adopted and April 8 
(the first day of the Congress) declared Romani National Day. In addition, the 
Congress pronounced itself to be the consultative authority of the Romani people in 
relation to the UN and other international bodies, and agreed to send a delegation to 
the UN to push for nationality status.91 According to Klimova’s reading, the 
agreement to request nationality status for the Movement must be distinguished from 
the claim to nationhood. This distinction is apparently based upon the differentiation 
in socialist thought between nations and nationalities, in which the former was held to 
be the apex of ethno-national development and thus deserving of self-determination, 
at least in theory; nationalities, on the other hand, found themselves lower down the 
scale of ethnic ‘development’ and were to be considered only worthy o f autonomy 
rather than outright independence.92 This line of thinking by the Congress was 
obviously heavily influenced by the delegates from central and eastern Europe — the 
realm in which any such claim was likely to be made -  and the awareness that any 
claim to nation status would inevitably raise the controversial issue of territory, a
Q<4
misunderstanding that the Congress apparently wished to avoid.
The International Romani Union (IRU) was formed from the IRC/ CIR in 1977, 
according to Acton and Klimova, rather than the usual date given of 1971.94 A 
permanent secretariat was established, although with no actual physical location. This 
new body organised the second World Romani Congress in 1978, held in Geneva,
89 The adoption of the Chakhra as the centrepiece of the Romani flag highlights the strength of the self- 
understanding of Indian origins, corresponding as it does to that on the Indian National flag. However, 
if Klimov<i is correct and the earlier conference did not actually take place, the flag was presumably 
designed at this point rather than affirmed.
90 Cited by Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism*, 16.
91 Klimovi, 55.
92 Lenin, Critical Remarks on the National Question (1913); 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/cw/voliime20.htm
93 Klimova notes, however, that many of the delegates nonetheless continued to hold that the Roma 
were a nation and that the framing of the claim was thus a political manoeuvre rather than acceptance 
of inferior status.
94 Acton and Klimova, ‘The International Romani Union: An East European answer to West European 
questions?’, in Guy (ed.), Between Past and Future. The Roma o f Central and Eastern Europe. Great 
Britain: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001.
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attended by approximately 120 delegates and observers from over 50 organisations 
across 26 countries, including Europe, India, Pakistan and North America.95 The 
acceptance of Indie roots played a prominent role in both these early gatherings. The 
first Congress, for example, was funded in part by the Indian government and 
representatives from India took part. At the second Congress, according to Hancock, 
Indian links were more heavily emphasised, with the Prime Minister of the Punjab 
and the Punjabian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Education all in attendance. 
Moves were initiated at the second Congress, with the assistance of the Indian 
dignitaries, to gain United Nations’ recognition, and consultative status with the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was granted in 1979. Discussions in the 
plenary centred on calls for recognition from international bodies, as well as the 
familiar call for reparations and the standardisation o f Romanes (the Romani 
language). The Second Congress went further than the First, with the Social 
Commission arguing for the need to upgrade the demands of Romani communities in 
eastern Europe to that o f a national minority of Indian origin, in contrast to the 
decision made seven years earlier in London to avoid contentious claims. According 
to Klimova, the Congress action programme sought recognition of Romani 
‘specificity’ and their right to preserve it.96
The Third Congress in Gottingen, organised by the German Sinte League, was held 
under IRU auspices in 1982. According to Hancock, over three hundred delegates 
from across twenty countries participated.97 The main issue discussed was that o f 
reparations. However, the primary topics of the Fourth World Romani Congress, held 
near Warsaw in 1990, were cultural, specifically the need to create a Romani 
literature, and the Congress was successful in standardising the Romani alphabet and 
initiating the first Romani primer. The Warsaw Congress was, according to Klimova, 
a meeting of intellectuals rather than a political conference; it was nonetheless, not 
unexpectedly due to the then recent geopolitical changes, the most well attended 
Congress o f the four, attracting nearly 500 participants from 27 countries.
95 Klimovâ, 58.
96 Klimovâ, 59.
97 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism’, 19; Klimovâ, on the basis of the 
official report o f the Third Congress, suggests that the participants came from 22 countries. Klimovâ, 
59.
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The Fifth Congress took place in Prague in 2000 and the agenda was dominated by 
the claim of the IRU to a seat at the UN as the global Romani representative, and the 
need for internal structural reform to achieve this.98 Attempts were thus made to 
provide the thirty-year old organisation with a new structure capable of providing 
governance to the group’s disparate constituents. Reforms aimed at creating a ‘semi- 
governmental body’, in the words of Klimova, consisting of an executive, a 
legislative, judiciary and administrative organs -  deemed to be the necessary 
trappings of a nation -  with commissars responsible for portfolios corresponding to 
traditional ministerial portfolios, such as Foreign Affairs99, as well as a court to 
regulate inter-Romani disputes. A new Charter was created enshrining these changes 
and was adopted by the plenary.100 Election procedures were apparently the most 
complicated thus far and an effort was made to be open and fair: nominations for 
positions were taken from the floor of the plenary and voting consisted of an open 
vote among delegates.101 The Congress also issued the Declaration of Nation, 
reproduced here as Annex 1, which contains the claim to non-territorial nationhood.
The Sixth World Congress took place in Lanciano, Italy in the autumn of 2004 but 
little has yet been published on the details of what took place there. The Congress was 
partly marred by the short notice given to delegates ~ a mere three weeks, preventing 
those delegates that need visas to enter the EU or to plan long flights from being able 
to attend — as well as by the absence of the out-going President, Emil Scuka. In his 
absence, a new President, Stanislaw Staniewicz, was elected.
The other main Romani organisation with a voice on a pan-national scale is the 
Romani National Congress, a Hamburg-based break-away from the IRU established
98 Much more was discussed and decided upon, particularly within the structure of the themed working 
groups. For a detailed list of issues, Klimové, 61-65; Acton and Klimova, 168-187.
99 The foil list of Commissar positions follows as it provides a good indication of the predominating 
concerns not just of the IRU but arguably of the Movement as a whole. The Commissar posts are: 
Foreign Policy, Holocaust, Economic Issues, Educational Issues, Financial and Budgetary Issues, 
Human Rights, Romani Language and Language Rights, Management and Informatie [sic.] Systems, 
Media Affairs, and Commissar without Portfolio. The three remaining positions relate to geographical 
concerns, and are: Commissar for Central and Eastern Europe, for USA and Canada, and for Australia 
and New Zealand. Acton and Klimovd, Appendix 1,200.
100 For full text of the Charter and details of the debates surrounding the adopting of the Charter, see 
Acton and Klimové, 179-187.
101 Acton and Klimovi, ibid; the plenary elected the 32 members of the parliament, who in turn elected 
a 14 member Presidium, who were then appointed commissars for specific issues or for geographical 
regions, and a 7 member court. The meeting o f the Presidium was however held in private.
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in the 19080s. It is led by Rudko Kawczynski, whose force of personality has drawn 
an increasing number of young and educated Roma to his side. However, the much 
more recent establishment of the RNC means that it has no addition to make to the 
historical account of Romani claims, although of course it draws upon the common 
history it shares with the IRU. Its recent claims will be considered below, however, 
and are of equal importance to those emanating from the IRU’s Prague headquarters.
Since the 2000 Congress catapulted the Romani Movement on to the international 
stage afresh, their presence there has been affirmed. Romani delegations from across 
Europe, the United States, Latin America and Africa converged on Durban for the 
2001 World Conference Against Racism to promote the Romani cause.102 The large 
and colourful presence o f Roma throughout the weeks of the NGO Forum and 
governmental conference established them as one of the most visible groups present 
in South Africa. However, the inexperience of the majority of the Romani delegates at 
this level and the disagreements between members o f the different factions of the 
Movement ensured that the delegation was not as productive as it might otherwise 
have been.103
Klimova’s detailed analysis of the Movement on the international level has led her to 
conclude that between the rather grand occasions of the Congresses, the IRU’s work 
consists of only occasional meetings of the Presidium and infrequent discussions with 
international organisations or governmental officials; although she does not address 
other organisations, this is presumably also an accurate description of their 
activities.104 It is not the subject of the sketch here to attempt to judge in anyway the
102 M. Goodwin, ‘Visibility on the international stage: The ERRC delegation at the World Conference 
Against Racism’ (2001) 4 Roma Rights 41.
103 The Durban conference was not, however, a great success in general, and the rejection of the NGO 
Declaration by the Secretary-General of the Conference saw the paragraphs therein, drafted by the 
Romani delegation, not repeated in the official, government-drafted, Conference Declaration. All 
documents from the Durban process are available at http://www.racism.gov.2a/substance/confdoc/ For 
an assessment of the effectiveness of the delegation in Durban, Klimovi, Part III: WCAR Case Study, 
279-393.
m  The IRU held a parliamentary session in Skopje in January 2002. Lobbying attempts within the UN 
system have been haphazard, however. Despite gaining second-tier consultative status with ECOSOC, 
as well as with UNICEF and the Department of Public Information (DPI), until the World Conference 
Against Racism in 2001 the Movement had not taken part in any UN conferences, nor made use of 
access to the human rights treaty monitoring bodies until the formation of the ERRC in 1998. (It should 
be noted that the significant involvement of Roma at Durban was largely the result o f non-Romani 
organisations, such as the ERRC and the American Friend’s Service Committee). The Movement has 
also not been able to maintain a permanent representative at the UN and has often relied on non-
success of the Movement in achieving the objectives it has set itself405 -  Klimova’s 
work does this and her analysis is hardly positive. It is perhaps necessary to note 
however that the Movement’s interactions with international organisations, and the 
UN in particular, has not been as productive as they might have been and that this is 
due in part to a lack of human and financial resources.106 While the IRU Charter 
established at Prague provides that membership fees from individual members and 
member organisations are the main source of income, few pay and the organisation 
thus continues to rely on sources such as gifts and state governmental and 
international organisational funding. Meetings thus only take place where specific 
funding can be found, and it remains difficult to attract suitably qualified candidates 
for office if they must be self-financing. Klimova has suggested that “[t]he real 
motivations behind [these meetings] are usually to be found at the nation-state level 
and their results bear only vague resemblances to the declared ones.” Although the 
IRU established a lobbying office in Brussels in 2002 , for example, it survives by 
‘sharing’ the resources of the Transnational Radical Party, headed by a non- Rom, 
Paolo Pietrosanti, who also served as the IRU Commissar for Foreign Policy up until 
2004. The Movement is maintained rather by the efforts of a handful of individuals 
pursuing their own personal interests, such as Holocaust compensation or cultural 
matters such as attempts to standardise the Romani language or establish a Romani 
history.108
Romani representatives of others organisations to present Romani interests at the Secretariat in New 
York; the prestige o f the post, moreover, has meant that there has been much undignified confusion 
about who was entitled to the position. Details in Klimovâ, 155-161.
105 Based on Klimovâ’s research, the main items of concern for the Movement have been recognition, 
Holocaust reparations, the formation of Romani cultural institutions, standardisation of the language, 
campaigning for the promotion and application of individual human rights for Roma within their 
respective countries, questions of cross- border movement such as passports bearing Romani 
nationality and immigration and refugee matters, as well as proposals to address unemployment
106 There is a chronic lack of financial resources at the international level and the funding is generally 
only being made available for specific projects; as a result according to Klimovâ, most of the 
Movement’s funding is found either by its constituent organisations or by private individuals (the IRU 
Presidium, for example, was financed up to 2004 entirely from the pocket of the President Emil 
Scuka). Klimovâ, 66-67.
107 Klimovâ, 64. Acton and Klimovâ have suggested that each Congress took place only as a result of 
the dedication of local organisers, each with their own agenda to fulfil; for example, they suggest that 
the Third Congress was organised by the Verband Deutscher Sinte und Roma in a move to further 
establish themselves in order that they may receive German Government welfare programme funding, 
as well as to consolidate support among their own Sinte constituency. 160-163.
108 Klimovâ, The Romani Voice in World Politics, 17-18. It is should also be noted that nearly ail the 
officials and members o f the IRU hold a number of jobs in addition to their IRU role and are often busy 
working for the Romani cause through their local and national organisations. See also Hancock, We are 
the Romani people, 123, for the practical difficulties that hamper the Movement’s efforts.
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However, the Movement has, according to Hancock’s history of its political efforts, 
seen formal recognition granted the Roma by the UN, international acceptance of the 
global representative role of the IRU and overtures made by a host o f actors, from the 
Vatican and the Pentagon to Helsinki Watch, for information and consultation. Yet 
despite the clear limits to the success of the Movement in realising their demands, 
Hancock concludes nonetheless that the Romani Movement is fostering an emerging 
sense of what he calls Jekhipe (‘oneness’) among Roma around the world -  an 
assertion that shall be considered in the following chapter.109
2,2. An analysis of recent Romani claims
This section analyses the nature of the claims that have been made by the Movement 
in recent years and will examine the initiatives and proposals that are currently being 
discussed in its upper echelons. The various claims will be considered in some depth 
in an attempt to, firstly, unravel what each claim is understood to entail by those 
making it and, secondly, to be able to place it in the context of wider Romani political 
strategy. Non-territorial nationhood will be explored in the light of these competing 
and concurrent demands with the aim of constructing a synthesised analysis of 
Romani political desires and demands.110 Klimova has suggested, based on her 
analysis o f the Movement, that it is in search of an ideology and that as a consequence 
its ideas are incoherent and “open to random influences.”111 Such a conclusion 
appears harsh in light of recent publications suggesting a leadership consciously 
debating appropriate strategies for achieving what is arguably the common aim -  
recognition as a nation. It will be contended here that disagreement between rival 
organisations and the various Romani individuals who walk the international stage are 
to some extent surface disagreements, with differences in terminology masking a core 
agreement over aims and desires.
2.2.1. Conceptions of the Romani Nation
The brief sketch of the Movement presented above suggests that throughout its history 
it has been directed by a nationalist drive. While on one level a main concern has been
109 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism*, 19.
110 Of course, this is necessarily the demands and desires of the Movement and, furthermore, the 
Movement’s elite.
,n Klimovd, 69-70.
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the issue of Holocaust reparations and, more recently, concern for the promotion and 
application of individual human rights for Roma within their respective countries, the 
belief that Roma constitute a nation has been the mainstay of Romani political 
organisation. Underpinning the polite requests for territory, the development of a flag 
and national anthem, the emphasis on the formation of Romani cultural institutions 
and the standardisation of the language, the ‘issuing’ of passports bearing Romani 
nationality and even the self-conscious decision at the First Congress to claim only 
nationality status, is arguably the implicit self-understanding of Roma as a group 
sufficiently bonded by common characteristics to qualify for the epithet ‘nation’. That 
the simple fact of mobilising along ‘Romani’ lines is a national claim of sorts is an 
argument that has been made by one of the founders of the Movement, Ionel Rotaru, 
who defined Romani nationalism as any anti-assimilationist stance that sought to
« 1 A
achieve rights for Roma without abandoning Romani culture. In addition, the 
history of the Movement is replete with explicit claims for recognition as a nation; 
that the claim to nationhood has always been at its core is suggested by the fact that 
one of the first formal contacts with the UN, in 1968, was an IRU petition requesting 
national recognition ofRoma worldwide.113
One could argue that not too much should be made of the persistent articulation of 
nation-type claims. The first half of the twentieth- century saw all minority groups 
viewed within the nationalist paradigm.114 However, the insistence on using the 
language of national identity is arguably significant in the current era in which the 
protection of group- based rights has been eclipsed by the promotion of individual 
human rights. While national claims may not be surprising in the sense that the 
discourse of nationhood will remain the most powerful in the international system as 
long as the nation-state system remains in place, the insistence upon using the 
nationalist discourse rather than choosing to work solely within the nation-state 
systems as either separate minority groups or equality-demanding individuals suggests 
a conscience decision to do so. Indeed, a leading member of the IRU stated at a recent
112 Cited in Acton, Gypsy Politics and Social Change, 230.
113 Klimova, 194. That the UN Archives have no record of such a petition probably speaks to the 
seriousness with which the UN took the Romani Movement at that time.
114 According to Jackson Preece, “[ejven a casual survey of the definitions assigned to minority reveals 
an intimate connection to the concepts of nation and nationalism. The core definition of minority is 
essentially identical to the core definition of a nation”. Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities 
and the European Nation-States System. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998,29.
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meeting of the Movement’s elite that his organisation’s claim to nation status was 
designed to move beyond the understanding of Roma as a minority. Thus, instead of 
Roma being recognised as national minorities within the existing state structure, they 
would be a nation in their own right.115 Moreover, the offer of recognition as an 
Indian minority, with the same status as Indian émigrés, that of ‘Indians abroad’, 
including the right to an Indian passport has been rejected in favour of pursuing their 
own national status, suggesting that belief in a Romani nation is strongly held.116
The belief that Roma constitute a nation appears to have been accepted by all sides of 
the current Romani leadership. At a previous meeting o f the leadership at Krakow in 
2001, in discussion of the IRU’s ideas, the point that other organisations hold it as 
self-evident that Roma constitute a nation was made forcefully by participants, 
particularly the leader of the Romani National Congress.117 Where differences occur, 
it is arguably more a question o f differences in personality or in strategies for 
achieving recognition as a nation. This is not to suggest, however, that there are not 
real differences in how the Romani nation is conceived within the Movement, which 
have clear consequences for the way in which the claim to nationhood is articulated. 
The different understandings can be grouped into two opposing views.118 The first has 
been described as a universalistic position (although perhaps pluralistic might be a 
better term), by which is meant that the Romani nation, although it certainly exists, 
can only be an open, loose identity. Such is the sheer diversity of Romani groups in 
terms of traditions and culture that an attempt to forge a unitary conception o f Romani 
nationhood is held to be fruitless; rather, what binds these groups together is anti- 
Romani sentiment by gadze. This position is most often associated with the RNC, but 
has also been stated clearly by Ian Hancock.119 The second position aims at the
115 These comments were reported in PER, Roma and the Question o f Self-Determination: Fiction and 
Reality, a report o f discussions at a meeting of the Romani leadership at Jadwisin, Poland, 15-16 April 
2002; hereafter ‘Jadwisin Report’. (The report is available on-line at: http://www.per- 
usa.org/Jadwisinl 12 Q3.pdO Nicolae Gheorghe, another Movement leader, has suggested that such 
efforts are misdirected. There appears to be no reason, however, why the two -  national minority status 
within the country of residence and nationhood with international recognition and representation -  
cannot co-exist.
116 The offer came from the Indian authorities during an IRU visit to India during 2001. Accepting 
Indian minority status would of course risk expulsion and a forced ‘return’ to India, a factor o f which 
the participants, were well aware. Details in Jadwisin Report, ibid.
117 PER workshop, Krakow, 9-10 March 2001. Leadership, Representation and the Status o f the Roma. 
Princeton, 2001; available at http://www.per-usa.org/krakow21-2.doc.
118 Jadwisin Report, 15-16.
119 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots o f Romani Nationalism’, 5.
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development of a unified nation, focusing on Romani culture and with a codified 
language and renewed traditions and values; this is the position of the IRU among 
others. This approach views the diversity among the various Romani groups as 
harmful and as a fragmentation encouraged by the gadze. For the claim to self- 
determination to succeed, according to this view, there must be a prior unification of 
culture, a strengthening of national symbols and empowerment for all groups of 
Roma. The differences between these two positions are important not only in terms of 
the type o f nation being sought but also because, based on these understandings of the 
nature of Romani identity, different conclusions have been drawn as to what the main 
interests of the Roma are: the fight against anti-Romani prejudice or the development 
of a unified culture.120 Despite the differing conceptions of Romani identity within the 
Movement, it is worth noting here however that the self-understanding of Roma as a 
nation is not confined to the Romani leadership but, in line with Rotaru’s comment,
171flows throughout the modem Movement.
2.2.2. The European Roma Forum and alternative national claims
The early political claims of the Movement were heavily influenced by the similar 
claims, and later success, of Zionism. The attempts by the Kwieks and by Rotaru to 
persuade powerful states to grant them territory from within their sphere of empire or 
autonomous zones within Europe itself should be seen in the context of the Zionist 
belief in the necessity of a state of their own as the only plausible protection against 
persecution within European societies. Moreover, while claims to statehood have not
120 Much of the history o f antagonism between the RNC and the IRU can arguably be traced to these 
very different understandings of Romani identity and thus the interests to be pursued. Because of the 
fact of daily persecution, the issue is highly emotive; for example, the accusation that while some are 
debating self-determination, for those in grass-roots communities the question is one of survival. 
Moreover, this different understanding of the nature of Romani nationhood is key to a second area of 
dispute between them. The RNC is concerned with involving all levels o f Romani activism, whereas 
the IRU has very much a top-down approach, albeit via the national associations that make up its 
membership. For example, in their 2002 Lodz statement, the RNC stressed that the European Roma 
Forum (discussed below) is concerned with organising bottom-up programmes of actions conceived, 
implemented and empowered by Roma local, regional and national structures. Press Release of the 
Second Roma World Congress, Lodz, Poland, 1-3 May, 2002, email dated 16 May 2002 (on file with 
the author).
121 For a link between the actions of the leadership and the activities of the grass-roots, see Acton’s 
assertion in regard to English mobilisation, that those who paid their subscriptions to the Gypsy 
Council were not nationalists but instead concerned with stopping sites, schooling and civil protection. 
“Nationalism is not the work of the Gypsy Council; rather, it is its inspiration, a kind of faith which 
keeps the officers working when the frequent reversals, failures and backbitings would destroy mere 
enthusiasts.” Acton, Gypsy Politics and Social Change, 235. The extent to which nation-defining myths 
have taken root is considered in the following chapter.
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been publicly articulated since the early days of the Movement in the 1970s122, limited 
territorial claims of a sort continue to be discussed among members of the elite. At the 
Jadwisin gathering, the possibility of demanding territorial autonomy in areas of high 
Romani population concentration was discussed.123 According to the report of the 
meeting, Nicolae Gheorghe, the OSCE Advisor on Roma and Sind, pointed out that in 
areas such as Bulgaria’s Montana region, where Roma constitute almost 15% of the 
population, in Varna, Bulgaria, where they make up 10-15% and eastern Slovakia, 
where they comprise nearly 20% of the population, some form of territorial autonomy 
may be feasible. Moreover, he suggested that in certain localities Roma form 100% of 
the residents and noted that there are large Romani quarters or ghettos in many of the 
cities of central and eastern Europe which could be suitable for a form of self- 
govemance. The example most cited in this regard is the Suto Orizari quarter of 
Skopje -  an independent municipality in which possibly as many as 80% of the 
60,000 residents are Romani and which, until 2005, was governed by a Romani 
mayor. Klimova has suggested that establishment of a Romani enclave in Kosovo has 
also been considered.124 Gheorghe made his remarks within the context of his 
understanding of the EU’s promotion of régionalisation and de-centralisation in 
which, as he sees it, such Romani areas of administrative- territorial autonomous units 
could be tied into a network, electing Romani mayors and councillors, co-operating 
together to develop common policies.125
However, there are significant objections from within the Movement to the vision of 
territorially autonomous units, which appear to take two main forms. The first is that 
appeals for a type of territorial autonomy risk antagonising relations with the gadze, 
particularly where the new-found self-determination of central and eastern Europe and 
of the Balkans makes the questions of territory and autonomy so sensitive at the 
present time. Indeed, this fear seems to not be without grounds.126 Calls for Romani
122 Although the writer Matio Maximoff compared die First World Romani Congress to the first 
Zionist Congress in his closing speech to the delegates in 1971, he announced too that the Congress had 
declared against a Gypsy state. While this was not necessarily the position of the Congress organisers, 
the mainstream line nonetheless became the slogan ‘We must create Romanestan -  in our hearts!*. 
Acton, Gypsy Politics and Social Change, 234.
123 Jadwisin Report, 22.
124 Klimovd, 74.
125 Jadwisin Report, 28.
126 The call in 1991 in the Macedonian Parliament by a Romani member for recognition of Roma as a 
nation and threatening attempts to form Romanistan within the boundaries of the Macedonian state
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territorial autonomy have also been made by racist mainstream politicians, who 
envisage the relocation of Roma to depopulated areas where they would be confined 
within reservations similar to those of Native Americans.127
Related, but not identical, is the belief that non-territorial forms of institutionalising 
recognition are more likely to achieve success. This is perhaps the motivation for the 
European Roma Forum (ERF128) established by a Partnership Agreement with the 
Council of Europe in December 2004. This initiative has its roots in a speech by the 
Finnish President, Taija Halonen, to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
in January 2001, in which Ms. Halonen expressed the need for a consultative 
assembly of Romani representatives on the pan-European level.129 Following the 
report of a working group established under the auspices of the Parliamentary 
Assembly to study the feasibility of such a body, comprising representatives from the 
main Romani international organisations, from governments, the EU, the CoE and the 
OSCE, a joint proposal by the Finnish and French governments emerged in the course 
of 2003 suggesting the Forum be an autonomous body, independent of the CoE, or 
any other international institution.130 In effect, this means formally that the ERF is not 
a consultative body, but is rather registered as a French NGO with consultative status, 
albeit with CoE funding.
The agreed aims of the Forum, as detailed in Article 1(1) of the Partnership 
Agreement with the Council of Europe establishing the Forum, are “to oversee the 
effective exercise by Roma and Travellers of all human rights and fundamental
unless bis calls were heeded apparently led to angry condemnation from all sides. The incident is cited 
by one participant in Jawisin as an illustration o f the risks in such a strategy. Ibid., 24.
127 See in this regard the numerous statements by Vadim Tudor, a front-runner in the 2000 Romanian 
Presidential election and a parliamentary senator, who stated in the Senate in August 1998, for 
example, that his programme for running the country included “isolating the Roma criminals in special 
colonies” in order to prevent the transformation of Romania as a whole into a Gypsy camp.” Cited in 
ERRC, State o f Impunity. Human Rights Abuse o f Roma in Romania. Budapest, 2001,18.
128 The Council of Europe’s website refers to the forum as the European Roma and Travellers* Forum 
and abbreviates it ‘ERIE*.
129 The Council of Europe, with its heavy emphasis upon human rights, is arguably the organisation 
that has been most concerned with improving the situation of Roma, providing for the Specialist Group 
on Roma, Gypsies and Travellers. For details of the relationship between the CoE and the ERF, see 
Miranda Vuolasranta, ‘European Forum For Roma and Travellers: From the Finnish initiative to the 
Franco-Finnish proposal* (2004) Roma Rights; available at http://errc.org/rr_nr4_2003/noteb5.shtml. 
Ms Vuolasranta is a special advisor to the CoE on Romani issues.
130 The report details an agreement on the composition of such a Forum and is known as the Helsinki 
Agreement of 11-12 March 2002.
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freedoms ... [to] promote the fight against racism and discrimination and facilitate the 
integration of these population groups ... and their participation in public life”.131 
According to the CoE website, the Forum will also “make proposals at both the 
national and international level and take part in European cooperation for the 
promotion of the interests of these populations.”132 The Forum’s mandate can be read 
as being in keeping with the Movement’s national tradition, providing a pan-European 
representative body capable of giving Roma voice at the national, European and 
international levels; however, it also meets the demands of those within the 
Movement who feel that the human rights approach is the most suitable for the 
advancement o f Romani interests.
The European Roma Forum has the backing of the Romani National Congress (RNC), 
the second of the two large transnational Romani organisations; Rudko Kawczynski is 
the interim President of the Forum and signed the Partnership Agreement on the 
Forum’s behalf. The ERF could thus be viewed as a rival conception of a Romani 
future to that o f the IRU and the non-territorial nation concept. Support for the 
proposed ERF extends beyond the RNC network, however. According to the report of 
the Jadwisin meeting, a majority of participants welcomed the initiative and saw it as 
opening the door for participation in European institutions at a level of genuine 
decision-making membership, a sentiment echoed at the 2004 World Congress, where 
the IRU shared the stage with the RNC in supporting this initiative. The ERF is seen 
as providing the opportunity for the exercise of Romani self-determination at the 
European level — the Forum holding out the possibility, in the absence of any 
organisation able to speak for all, of offering the Movement an officially- mandated 
representative body capable of transcending traditional divides. The project, however, 
as of February 2006 appears to be stalled. Although elections have been held for 
Forum members from national organisations, the results have been contested and the 
ERF appears to yet begin its work as envisaged under the agreement.
131 Partnership Agreement between the Council o f Europe and the European Roma and Travellers 
Forum, 15th December 2004. Available at httP://www.coe.int/T/DG3/RomaTravellers/
132 As of 7 February 2006, the official ERF website was still not operational, hence the information is 
taken from the CoE website, http://www.coe.int/T/DG3/RoniaTravellers/FERV/default en.asp: 
accessed 7 February 2006.
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The RNC’s endorsement of the Finnish-proposed Forum should be seen in light of 
their call for a European Charter of Romani Rights.133 The Charter is intended, in the 
words of Kawczynski, to “define the legal position of the Roma in Europe and ... 
prevent the legal gaps, which in the past have led to the displacement of Romani 
persons across Europe.” While the Charter seems at first glance more concerned with 
extracting specified rights from governments than concerned with recognition per se, 
Kawczynski begins the report’s conclusion by stating that, “[wjithout the respect o f 
the Roma as subjects of international law, as partners, there cannot be a normal 
coexistence of the Roma and the majority”, suggesting that the RNC’s strategy is 
primarily concerned with gaining recognition for Roma as equals. That the RNC’s 
strategy is explicitly concerned with securing recognition is made clear by the 
apparent awareness that rights alone will not be sufficient to redress the situation of 
Roma:
“The current development in Europe however clearly shows that Roma, 
regardless of their social status, are confronted with overt, anti-gypsy hostility. 
Such hostility cannot be abolished through welfare or development projects. In 
order for social development projects to succeed, Roma must be granted 
guarantees for the protection of civil liberties. This means a change in the 
political status of Roma toward political, social and cultural self- 
determination.”
Thus, the proposed Charter is not purely a paper document, listing the rights 
demanded, but was intended to see established a regular forum in which national 
governments, elected Romani representatives and multilateral organisations could 
come together to resolve problems. Moreover, the Charter as presented by 
Kawczynski demands the right to political representation in the European Parliament, 
the Council of Europe as well as the United Nations, not merely with voting rights, 
but with a right to veto projects and measures that concern the fate of the Roma 
community. The demand in the same report for an acknowledgement of elected 
representatives of the Roma nation -  whatever this may mean -  and for unrestricted
133 Report on the Condition o f Roma in the OSCE Region, OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw, October 2000; 
available online: http://www.romnews.coTn/a/RKreport.htm# Toc496896328. Rudko Kawczynski is 
the author of the report and uses it to outline the concept of a Charter.
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freedom of travel for Romani officials, which is presumably akin to claiming a form 
of diplomatic status, appears to flow from the recognised need for a change in Romani 
political status.
In addition to the freedom of cultural and political organisation, the proposed Charter 
also demands the right to practice and receive language instruction and vocational 
training in the Romani language, but also the right to run an autonomous school 
system. The Charter thus incorporates and combines both political and cultural 
autonomy based on the understanding of the authors that one is not feasible without 
the other. Political recognition is thus held to be the only means of gaining the respect 
necessary for existence in equal dignity with other groups.
Where the first reason for making non-territorial demands is political, the second 
reason for rejecting or moving beyond claims to territory relates to the ideological 
motivation for calling for non-territorial forms of nationhood. The proposal o f a 
Belgian- based collectivity of Romani organisations, the Romani Activists Network 
on Legal and Political Issues (RANELPI), who have drawn up the “Moral Charter of 
the Roma nation in the European Union”, is a good example. The Charter is addressed 
solely to the European Union and requests that the Union “acknowledges the 
existence on the territory of its Member- States of a Rromani nation without a 
compact territory... the European Union declares the Rromani nation living on its 
territory one of the constituent nations of Europe, in full equality from all points of 
view with all the other nations which constitute Europe, irrespectively of their 
possible relations with States and territories.”134 It is less than clear, however, what it 
is that is being asked for, besides equality with other nations. As with a number of 
other similar documents there is a confusion of terminology, with, for example, the 
project of the proposed frame-statute belonging to the Romani people where the main 
claim is that of nationhood. No reference is made to self-determination and it could
therefore be assumed that the use of the term people is not intended to hold legal 
connotations; however, while the document does not self-consciously adopt the
134 §6(a) Project o f a Frame-Statute (Moral Charter) of the Rromani People in the European Union; 
available at http://rinchibamo.free.fr/cm.en.doc.
135 While the Belgian organisations’ demands are superficially akin to the RNC, in that they are 
formulated as a Charter of demands or rights, they are in substance actually based upon a re- 
articulation of the IRU concept of non-territorial nationhood, actually citing the Declaration.
language of international law, the feel of the claims as a whole cannot arguably be 
seen in any other context. Yet, there is no suggestion of a representative body, 
although the chapter on representation and authority within Romani communities 
suggest that serious thought was given to the issue. It is therefore unclear whether the 
claim is for the Romani nation to take its place as the Union’s 26 Member State, or 
whether the request for recognition as a non-territorial nation within the territory of 
existing Member-States would see the Romani nation rather on a par with, say, the 
status of the Welsh or Basque nations.
What all the above claims share, however, is a strong European emphasis; Europe -  
either the European Union or the wider Council of Europe -  provides their framework 
and their demands are conceived almost solely in these terms. This is arguably for 
two reasons. Firstly, that of the limiting nature of working within any framework, that 
one too seldom seeks a place outside it; and, secondly, there are strong practical 
reasons for choosing to claim a non-territorial nation within the structure of what is 
the boldest governance project yet. To note the European nature of these demands is 
not to dismiss them as parochial; on the contrary, there is no reason why such claims 
cannot sit alongside others. It is however to claims of a global nature that this section 
now turns.
2.2.3. A Non-territorial Nation
The Declaration of Nation of the IRU is the only self-conscious attempt to pitch 
Romani demands at an international level. The concept of a non-territorial Romani 
nation first surfaced as a clearly articulated and authoritative claim at the Fifth World 
Romani Congress, in the form of a Romani ‘Declaration of Nation \ 138 Despite the
136 The Charter of Romani Rights does include the UN as an international organisation in which it 
demands representation; however, it is billed nonetheless as a 'European’ Charter.
137 Whilst the Declaration is clearly global in its ambition, the most recent statement from one o f the 
two drafters is purely European in its reach in which he pushes for acknowledgement of the Roma as 
“The first Europeans to be only Europeans ” The present author understands this to be an attempt on 
behalf of the IRU to respond to the ERF initiative and for the present time the primary focus of the 
Movement is undoubtedly on the European level. Paolo Pietrosanti, ‘The Romani Nation or: “Ich Bin 
Ein Zigeuner”’ (2003) 4 Roma Rights; http://www.errc.org/rr nr4 2003/noteb6.shtml.
138 T. Acton & I. Klimovd, ‘The International Romani Union: An East European answer to West 
European Questions? Shifts in the focus of World Romani Congresses 1971-2000’, 13. The Declaration 
is reproduced as Appendix 3 to Acton & Klimovl, 216-217, and is reproduced here as Appendix 1. In 
terms of legitimacy, it is perhaps important to note that, according to Klimovd, although it is claimed 
by the IRU that the Declaration was passed by the Congress on 27th July, the text of the Declaration
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departure of the authors of the Declaration from their positions of authority within the
IRU, one of the first statements of intent from the newly-elected President is to pursue
110recognition for Roma as “a nation without territory”.
The Declaration of Nation (Annex 1) is a rather unfortunate document to be such an 
important vehicle of Romani political demands, suffering from confused drafting and 
poor English. This being the case, unwrapping the statements it contains inevitably 
risks a degree of misinterpretation. While the Declaration does not explicitly renounce 
any claim to territory as such -  the word territory does not appear anywhere in the 
document -  it is understood here that the repeated calls for recognition as a non-state 
nation should be read as a rejection of that basic unit of the international system: 
effective control of territory.140 The document repeatedly stakes the claim to 
nationhood and is emphatic in its rejection of statehood.141 Moreover, this 
renunciation is understood to be liberating.142
Yet non-state nationhood appears to require a strengthening of international law 
against the wishes of states and there seems to be an appeal to an international 
community of individuals against the interests of both states and nations: “A 
transnational Nation as the Roma one needs a transnational rule o f law: this is evident; 
we do believe that such a need is shared by any individual, independently of the 
Nation he or she belongs to”. It is also clear that the authors are self- consciously 
making these claims within the context o f the changes to global governance and
was not available for delegates during the conference and was issued only by the IRU President after 
the Congress had closed. Klimov^ 63.
139 Gratten Puxon, ‘VI. World Congress pledges fight against racism’, posted 10* October 2004 on 
http://www.romea.cz/
140 Such an interpretation is borne out by the subsequent meeting of the Romani leadership at Jadwisin. 
A paper by Sean Nazerali, ‘Democracy Unrealised -  The Roma -  A Nation Without a State’, also 
confirms that the qualitative difference of the Romani claim as regards the claims of other non-state 
groups is that “they neither have, nor do they wish to have, a territory of their own.” Paper delivered at 
the ‘Democracy Unrealized’ conference, Academy o f Fine Arts, Vienna, 23 March 2001 (on file with 
the author).
141 For example, “We are a Nation, we share the same tradition, the same culture, the same origin, the 
same language, we are a Nation.” The authors are not, however, entirely honest in the claim that “We 
have never looked for creating a Roma State”, although of course it depends upon whether the ‘we’ 
refers to the Roma or rather merely to the authors o f this individual document (Scuka and Pietrosanti).
142 “the main caracteristic [sic.] of the Roma Nation ... o f being a Nation without searching for the 
establishment of a State, is today a great, adequate resource of freedom and legality for each 
individual”; it is arguably this that raises the claim to the level of ideology. This ideology, furthermore, 
understands statehood, rather than nationalism, to be responsible for the worst excesses of recent 
history; thus non-territorial nationalism will “not open the Pandora’s box of nationalism.” Pietrosanti, 
‘The Romani Nation or: “Ich Bin Ein Zigeunef” .
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Tsociety wrought by globalisation. Indeed, the Declaration not only places itself 
within the context of these developments, but claims a spot for itself in the avant- 
garde of visions for reform of the international community. The claim is thus, 
paradoxically, both nationalist and cosmopolitan.144
There have been at least two attempts to flesh out the concept of non-territorial 
nationhood. According to Sean Nazerali, a non-territorial nation or state would have 
“an institution of government, a population, but no specific territory. It would be 
sovereign and autonomous, but would share that sovereignty [with] a wide variety of 
other levels of institutions, national, regional and international.” This governing body 
would “work out particular autonomous competencies with other states” based on 
bilateral treaties similar to the Concordats o f the Vatican, the consequence of which 
would be that there will exist a Romani “government capable and authorised to 
negotiate as a formal equal with existing state governments”. As for the practicalities 
of governing a globally-dispersed people, a Romani non-territorial entity would have 
no monetary policy of its own and thus issue no currency, leaving such matters to the 
international financial system. It will have no army or means of implementing its will 
by force. It would determine education policy in a similar way, with an implicit 
recognition of the Romani nation’s intimate relation to the communities which it lives 
among; schooling would take place in the cities, towns and villages of the wider 
community, with secondary education allowing for the realisation of transnational 
elements of study. The establishment of a World Romani University would provide a 
spiritual home for Romani students from all over the world. A Romani legal system
143 “And we do not want a State today, when the new society and the new economy are concretely and 
progressively crossing-over the importance and the adequacy of the State as the way how individuals 
organize themselves.” Sean Nazerali presents a more eloquent statement of how those promoting the 
concept of a non-territorial nation view the international system and the place of such a concept within 
i t  He repeats, for example, the much noted changes heralded by globalisation, such as the loss by states 
of effective control over economic policy and the alleged diffusion of sovereignty both upwards and 
downwards, concluding that “[t]he nation-state as an integrated whole, with few exceptions, is dead” 
and, later, “the state is losing its position as the fundamental building-block [of the international 
system]”. Nazerali, ‘Democracy Unrealised -  The Roma -  A Nation Without a State’.
144 This is true also for the RANELPI’s Moral Charter, sitting very much in the ideological wash of the 
IRU. The Declaration, moreover, while explicitly concerned with claiming nationhood, suggests 
throughout that the realisation of the Romani dream (deliberately aping the language of Martin Luther 
King) as expressed in the Declaration, i.e. as a non-territorial nation, belongs to every individual on 
earth. This internal tension in the document is due in some part to the attempt to reconcile the voice of 
Roma (Scuka) with the ideas of the TRP (Pietrosanti), with the former viewing the Declaration as a 
claim to collective representation of Roma as a nation and the latter understanding the claim to be for a 
form of individual representation at the global level on a non-national basis. See Klimov^, 82.
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would be established, with boundaries of jurisdiction negotiated bilaterally with other 
actors and developing into a transnational system of justice.145 Thus, a Romani 
administration would be based upon the notion of dual citizenship, where they belong 
both to the traditional state in which they reside and to the Romani nation, both of 
which simultaneously govern their lives in a manner similar to the double nationality 
of EU citizens.146
The governing body, despite the obvious technical and organisational difficulties, is to 
be formed by universal suffrage of Roma, with electoral constituencies not necessarily 
conforming to existing national boundaries.147 Determination of membership of a
t  j O
Romani nation is to be based upon voluntary self-ascription. Pietrosanti has 
commented that support for the ERF suggests that the representation of Roma through 
a committee of associations cannot be sufficient; this is precisely the basis of the 
RNC’s proposal as well as the structure of the IRU, however. His suggestion for the 
need for direct democracy obviously begs very real practical problems. ' : <
The Declaration makes no claim to the right of self-determination; indeed, Romani 
claims have not until recently actively used the language of self-determination. This 
reticence is surprising; however the concept of self-determination is believed to have 
underpinned Romani political motivation throughout the history of the Movement.149
145 For a description and analysis of the Romani legal system, see Walter O. Weyrauch, Gypsy Law: 
Romani Legal Traditions and Culture. Berkeley: University of Californian Press, 2001 ; Weyrauch and 
Maureen A. Bell, ‘Autonomous Law-Making’ (1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 323.
146 While such ideas suggest the theoretical feasibility of transnational administration, the important 
practical considerations are yet to be seriously addressed. For example, Nazerali has suggested that the 
Romani administration could be financed by existing states remitting the VAT paid by Roma or that 
Romani-owned businesses would pay their tax to a Romani authority, or that, each existing state would 
hand over a small percentage of its total income tax revenue. While such suggestions are based upon 
existing tax exemptions for foreign nationals or taxation systems (Canada, in the case of the third 
suggestion), they fail to take into account both the fact that Roma occupy nearly everywhere the lowest 
rung of economic status (hence they do not contribute large amounts of VAT revenue) nor that unless a 
Romani administration is intending to run the services of government, such as health care or public 
transport, it would seem unlikely that those that do provide such costly services would be willing to 
forgo certain tax revenues. Cf. Pietrosanti: “The Romani Nation -  and its elected parliament -  will 
obviously not be responsible for those policies that form the pillars of the very existence of states”, and, 
somewhat unhelpfully, “The Romani Nation will have to govern what everyone claims Roma should 
become capable o f governing”. Pietrosanti, ‘The Romani Nation or: “Ich Bin Ein Zigeuner”’.
147 Pietrosanti, ibid
14g Nazerali, ‘Democracy Unrealised -  The Roma -  A Nation Without a State’.
149 For the clear belief among participants that self-determination has always been the principle most 
relevant in terms o f political organisation, see the Jadwisin Report, particularly 23. Prior to this 
meeting, however, the only organisation to have adopted the language of self-determination itself was 
the RNC (e.g. Lodz Congress Press Release). It could be that other members of the Movement held it
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Yet, former President of the IRU and co-author of the Declaration, Emil Scuka, has in 
the past made explicit that the call for recognition of nationhood was not making a 
claim to self-determination,150 That such a claim to nationhood -  one that as noted 
above is seen as requiring the trappings of a state, such as presidents, courts, and 
ministers -  is best viewed, perhaps necessarily, through the prism of self- 
determination is confirmed by Nazerali’s reference to the principle and his appeal to 
the Romani leadership to use deliberately the term ‘people' in their statements and 
declarations; “[tjhough not used in the declaration of nationhood..., a declaration of 
peoplehood should however be seen as implicit within it... The Declaration of Nation 
should therefore in fact be interpreted as being simultaneously a Declaration of 
Peoplehood.”151
However, if most members of the Movement now agree that self-determination is the 
relevant frame for their claims, there nonetheless remains considerable confusion 
within the Movement as to what the principle of self-determination is and how it 
applies. The leadership meeting in Jadwisin suggests that self-determination is in 
general viewed within the Movement as a question of personal autonomy, that is, as 
decision-making power effecting control over one’s life, either as cultural autonomy 
or minority self-governance, or as the right to equal participation in the life of society. 
However, discussions in the Polish town evidenced a variety of understandings of 
how self-determination might apply to the Roma. In the words of the authors of the 
meeting’s report, “[s]ome view it as an individual or even human right, others as 
group or minority rights within a nation-state, and still others as the rights of a people 
and a nation”152 For those within the Movement who wish to pursue the strategy of
to be so self-evident that the question of Romani recognition belonged to such a discourse that it was 
needlessly antagonistic to state it explicitly (cf. Nazerali’s almost casual comment that “the Roma are 
certainly not alone in calling for recognition as a people with a right to self-determination”), or rather 
simply that self-determination was understood to be a demand for a state. But even in the periods where 
Roma were making territorial demands, there appear to have been no calls for self-determination.
150 Moreover, in the most recent statement to come from the duo of co-authors of the Declaration, the 
relevance of self-determination is again denied; however, there is perhaps some confusion as 
Pietrosanti argues that self-determination “is less important than the freedom to choose the democratic 
organisation of co-habitation with others” -  which would serve as a good description of the principle of 
self-determination. Pietrosanti, ‘The Romani Nation or: “Ich Bin Ein Zigeuner”’.
151 Interestingly, Nazerali suggests that the confusion between the terminology of nationhood and that 
o f a people is due to the fact that the Romani language does not differentiate between the terms. This 
can only be a partial explanation as all members of the Romani elite are at least bilingual and will thus 
be familiar with a language in which the distinction does exist.
152 Jadwisin Report, 16. In one sense of course, all of these positions are correct. While self- 
determination is a group right -  officially a right of peoples -  its inclusion in the International Bill of
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Roma as a national minority within their state of residence, self-determination is 
understood as allowing for cultural autonomy and possibly territorial autonomy; 
where the aim is nationhood, self-determination provides international recognition. 
Perhaps the most interesting perspective came from the RNC, whose representative 
viewed self-determination as concerning power relations; simply put, M[t]hose without 
it face oppression”. Defining self-determination as being in a position to make 
decisions oneself, he continued: “[Roma] do not accept non-Roma engaging in 
projects on behalf of Roma, making decisions about what Romani children should 
learn or whether they are a nation or not, sending Roma to participate in wars in 
which they kill each other, or designating their representatives for them.” Rather, 
Roma “want to participate... having not only a voice but the power to determine 
themselves what their role... shall be.” 153
2.2.4. Summary
This brief trawl through the different claims being put forward by various members of 
the Movement suggests a number of common elements between them. Arguably the 
thickest common strand between the differing possible conceptions of a Romani 
future is the claim to recognition of and representation as a Romani nation, at the root 
of which is the claim to acknowledgement of dignity. Even allowing for rather 
different conceptions of what this nation should look like, further commonality 
emerges about how the Romani nation should be made visible: all except the 
RANELPI have clearly stated the need for a representative body, although they may 
differ over the form of representation. Both the RNC’s ERF and the IRU’s national 
claim have suggested the need for an executive governance structure and both claim
Human Rights suggests its place within the human rights stable and its closeness to the right to chose 
one’s own government (Article 2 5 ICCPR) suggests that the practice of it is individual. It could even be 
understood as a minority right, where a group can be characterised as sufficiently oppressed to meet the 
threshold laid down in GA Res. 2625. Chapter 6 considers the application of self-determination to the 
Roma in more detail.
153 Ibid., 18-19. The determination of all the participants to gain more control over the power to make 
decisions in matters related to them is perhaps bom of the failure to achieve this control through efforts 
at greater participation in national politics; where success has been achieved in seeing Roma designated 
as a national minority, the result has frequently been that institutions and structures established act as a 
buffer between Roma and the authorities, easing the path for the latter to avoid their responsibilities. 
Ibid., at 20. For example, see the critical comment on the National Gypsy Self-Government format in 
Hungary: Anita Danka and Nicole Pallai, ‘Legal but Illegitimate: The Gypsy Minority Self- 
Government in Jâszladâny’ (2003) 4 Roma Rights 68. Kawczynski’s comments here tally with the 
Charter’s demand for veto voting rights.
60
recognition as a subject of international law with voting rights for Roma in the 
political bodies of the main international organisations. Moreover, the Movement has 
always sought representation internationally through the auspices of the UN, not 
simply as an NGO or even via the observer status granted liberation organisations, but 
on equal terms with other nations as states. The goal of the Movement has therefore 
always been to gain a place for the Roma as a fully-fledged international actor, but 
one defined by a criterion other than effective control of territory, and current 
demands are a continuation of this.
The Jadwisin seminar suggests that, notwithstanding the establishment of the Romani- 
controlled’ municipality of Suto Orizari, most of the Movement’s current elite are 
suspicious of claiming territorial forms of autonomy, whether on a political or 
ideological basis. All understand self-determination as the relevant framework in 
which to make the Romani voice heard, some explicitly, others indirectly. Moreover, 
every one of the claims articulated in recent years has self-consciously placed itself 
within perceived changes in the wider structure of governance, both at the European 
level and globally. Contrary to the oft-heard claims that Roma wish to isolate 
themselves, therefore, the call for national recognition is a statement of the desire to 
participate in and contribute to the societies in which they live: national, European 
and international.
To summarise, the main political objective of the Movement is to gain official 
recognition of the fact of Romani nationhood and to establish structures so that its 
voice can be heard in a position of equality with other nations, nationally and 
internationally; and that, moreover, the leadership does not consider that a territory of 
their own is necessary to realise this within the framework of self-determination. Thus 
although Klimova has suggested that the importance of the Declaration for the 
Movement should not be overstated as the longevity of its ideas remain to be seen, the 
commonality between the different calls for recognition suggest that the Declaration 
and the ideas it espouses should arguably be seen as fitting comfortably within both 
the past of the Romani Movement as well as within the trend o f current thinking.
The claim to non-territorial forms of nationhood is moreover gaining currency not just 
among the Romani elite, but in the international system as well. The importance of the
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situation of Roma in the European accession process had ensured that the Prague 
Congress was well attended by the media and that the claim to nationhood was 
quickly picked up and broadcast around Europe.154 Since 2000, the claim has been 
repeated in a number of international fora, and was seen particularly in the context of 
the Durban 2001 World Conference Against Racism.155 However, despite the 
language o f Roma as a non-territorial nation surviving the negotiations at the NGO 
Forum in Durban and being present in the NGO Declaration presented to the 
governmental forum, and despite the expectation at the end of the conference that the 
NGO provisions relating to Roma were to be adopted by government delegates 
without alteration, the Romani request for non-territorial nation status is not to be 
found in the final government declaration.156 At least one government has 
nevertheless acknowledged the claim of Romani nationhood. In a memorandum of 
understanding between the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IRU, the Czech 
government accepted the Roma minority o f the Czech Republic as belonging to the 
Romani nation and conceded their claim to non-territorial nationhood as “a reasonable 
point of departure in the present world.”157 Moreover, in June 2001, the then-President 
of the IRU, Emil Scuka, met with the UN Secretary-General at the United Nations 
headquarters in New York and presented him with a copy of the ‘Declaration of
134 For example, ‘”Nous voulons la reconnaissance d’une nation rom non territoriale’”, Liberation, 25 
July 2000; ‘Gypsies in bid for world recognition’, The Independent, 26 July 2000; ‘Los gitanos exigent 
a la ONU que les reconozca como una nación’, El Pais, 26 July 2000; ‘Wie ein Blütenblatt auf grünen 
Grund’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 29 July 2000; ‘Die Roma fordem ihre Anerkennung ais Nation’, Bez, 
29 July 2000; ‘Les Tsiganes réclament la reconnaissance de leur “nation”’, Le Monde, 29-30 July 2000. 
Also, somewhat laten TI sogno dei Rom: “Riconoscete la nostra nazione’” , Corriere della Sera, 8 July 
2001.
133 For example, the following paragraph formed part of the statement o f recommendations by Non- 
Governmental Organisations from Central and Eastern Europe, including the countries o f the former 
Soviet Union, addressed to the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, produced at the 
meeting in Warsaw, 15-18 November 2000. Part o f Article 5 of the statement reads:
“...we recommend that the UN confers the status of a non-territorial nation to the Romani 
people, providing for adequate representation in relevant international governmental organizations.”
The statement is reprinted in full in Roma Rights 4/ 2000, at http://errc.org/rr nr4 2000/advol.shtml.
156 The debacle surrounding the rejection of the NGO Declaration by the Secretary-General of the 
Conference, and the inability of delegates to complete negotiations by the end of the conference, meant 
that final documents were not available until some months afterwards. Although the final draft as 
available at the end of the conference contained the paragraphs relating to Roma as drafted by Romani 
NGO representatives, including the language of non-territorial nationhood, the final Durban 
Declaration, as completed in January 2002, does not. Documents are available from 
http://www.unhch.ch/html/racism/Durban
157 Articles 2 & 3. Memorandum o f Understanding and Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Czech Republic and the International Romani Union, signed on 4 May 2001, Prague. (On 
file with the author.) During the course of the Fifth Congress, delegates took part in a seminar on the 
Romani nation and the accession process in the Czech Senate; however, while the word ‘nation’ 
featured in the IRU programme detailing the seminar, in the Senate’s documentation the word ‘nation’ 
was substituted for ‘minority’. Klímová, 63.
62
Nation’; this meeting represented the first such occasion in which a senior member of 
the UN has met with Romani representatives, suggesting some degree of recognition, 
or at least sympathy, for their claims.158
Other nationalist movements have had considerable influence on the development of 
Romani political demands.159 The designing and adoption of a flag is part of the way 
in which early Romani nationalism attempted to ape classic nineteenth- century 
nationalist traditions such as Zionism. Yet, Romani nationalists of the twentieth- 
century were also quick to see the lessons of the anti-colonialist Black civil rights 
movements.160 In the words of Acton, “third-world nationalism, Fanonism and the 
Black Power writings have given a new language in which to lay claim to self- 
determination and cultural autonomy within someone else’s power structure.”161 The 
incompatibility of Fanonism and Zionism suggests at least one reason for the 
inconsistencies within the Movement, sometimes pursing autonomy within the 
governing structure, at other times demanding a state of their own. National liberation 
movements, such as the PLO and SWAPO, and their relative successes in gaining 
recognition have also provided inspiration for the Movement ; however, theirs is not 
a status to which the Movement can aspire and, moreover, which would not see their 
calls satisfied. Rather, it could be argued that the assured articulation of non-territorial 
or non-state nationalism sees the Romani Movement step out from under the shadow 
of the more vocal nationalist ethoi which were their early inspiration, putting them in 
a position to offer inspiration to others.
158 Headquarters Press Conference by IRU;
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2001 /ROM ANIPC.doc.htm. At the 2001 WCAR in Durban, in 
response to a question concerning the UN’s concern for Roma, Sinti and Travellers, Annan replied that 
he had met with the leader of the Romani people, suggesting that the IRU was successful in persuading 
the UN Secretariat at least of its claim to be the sole representative of Roma worldwide. Personal 
recollection of the author.
139 Acton, Gypsy Politics and social change, 234.
160 Particular lessons have been learnt from the African-American civil rights movement, such as the 
tactics of passive- resistance and high impact litigation. Members of the Romani leadership met veteran 
African-American activists at Szentendre in 1995, for example to discuss the parallels between their 
two causes. Jenne, ‘The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe: Constructing a Stateless Nation’ in 
Jonathan Stein (ed.), The Politics o f National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe. NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2000,206.
161 Acton, Gypsy Politics and social change, 234 (italics his).
162 The similarity of Romani claims to non-territorial nationhood to pre-Zionist Jewish attempts at 
recognition are striking, although those articulating the claim within the Romani movement appear not 
to be aware of this. For details on the development of the concept of non-territorial national-cultural 
autonomy by the Jewish Bund at the turn of the twentieth-century, see Chapter 5, note 403.
63
It is in this light of what the Romani claim can teach us about how we understand 
nationhood, recognition and the nature of a claim to either that it shall be considered 
throughout the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3: On Romani Identity
It is easy to forget how mysterious and mighty stories are.163
Although the historical disputes highlighted in the previous chapter are of obvious 
interest to linguists, anthropologists and historians, they are also of importance in the 
understanding and acknowledgement of Romani identity. Accepting the concept of a 
historical diaspora has by and large meant understanding Roma as a distinct and 
bounded group, an understanding seemingly testified to by the persecution and 
hostility with which they met in Europe; for while there are no historical records 
telling us how those who were labelled Gypsies felt about such categorisation, that 
they were marked out negatively by society is clear. Thus whilst Romani identity is 
not only conceived of in terms of a historical diaspora, the Movement is to a 
considerable degree united in understanding Roma as a distinct ethnic group. The 
varying approaches are laid out below. However, the suggested links to India and the 
proposed history of migration has not gone unquestioned; anthropologists and 
sociologists stand at the vanguard of a reinterpretation, or indeed a denial, of Romani 
history. Following an examination of different conceptions of Romani ethnicity from 
within the Movement, this chapter will sketch some modem theoretical conceptions of 
ethnicity and identity before attempting to assess the strength of pan-Romani identity 
underpinning the claims being put forward in the name of Roma everywhere.
3.1 Conceiving of Romani identity
It has been suggested that all the competing conceptions of Romani identity seek to 
base identification upon external traits, whether defined in racial, linguistic, cultural 
or socio-economic terms. In the introduction to his recent thesis examining ethnic 
politics in the post- Communist countries of central Europe through the perspective of 
Romani political mobilisation, Peter Vermeersch has suggested that 
conceptualisations of Romani identity within the Movement can be divided into three 
approaches: the historical diasporic, cultural and lifestyle affiliations and the 
biological.164 His scheme is followed here, although the extent to which the three
163 Ben Okri, ‘The Joys of Story-Telling* in Birds o f Heaven. London: Phoenix, 1997.
164 Peter Vermeersch, ‘Roma and the politics of ethnicity in Central Europe: a comparative study of 
ethnic minority mobilisation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia in the 1990s* (unpublished 
PhD thesis, University o f Leuven, 2002), 10.
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approaches blend into one another is considerable, with claims frequently combining 
approaches.165
According to Marushiakova and Popov, the wider Romani community is divided into 
“a widespread archipelago of separate groupings, split in various ways into 
metagroups, groups and subgroups, each with their own ethnic and cultural 
features.”166 If this last assertion is correct — that the various sub-groups have their 
own ethnic (although what exactly is meant by ‘ethnic’ is not clear) and cultural traits 
-  then, in the absence of an ability to comprehensively survey those over whom 
claims are being made as to their affiliations, those asserting a common over-arching 
group identity must either claim more in common for these groups culturally than that 
which divides them, or fall back on a thesis o f common origins and a shared biology.
3.1.1. A Diasporic Identity?
The first approach that Vermeersch identifies is the most pervasive at the present 
moment in the Romani movement, that of the historical diaspora, in which Roma are 
understood to be a nation bound by shared historical roots and common patterns of 
migration. It is the most common defence to those that question the existence of a 
distinct Romani ethnicity, although belief in common origins clearly does not 
implicitly imply a homogenous group today. However, as the disputes over the 
linguistic evidence and what it actually can tell us about the speakers of the language 
highlighted in the previous chapter suggest, the diaspora thesis is not without its 
critics. As several of the linguists or historians that Vermeersch holds as advocates of 
the migration hypothesis are in fact keen to stress, there is no known record of a 
migration from India to Europe in the early medieval period that can be connected 
with the ancestors of today’s Romani-speakers; both Matras and Fraser, for example, 
strongly emphasise that a considerable level of caution should be employed when
165 For example, in Frame-Statute (Moral Charter) o f the Rromani People in the European Union, §4, 
the biological is combined with the diasporic. Available at http://rinchibamo.free.fr/cm.en-doc.
166 Marushiakova and Popov are ethnographers who have published extensively on the Roma of central 
and eastern Europe. E. Marushiakova and V. Popov, ‘Historical and ethnographic background:
Gypsies, Roma and Sinti’, in W. Guy (ed.), Between Past and Future: the Roma o f Central and Eastern 
Europe. Great Britain: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001,33.
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considering the extent to which the origin and evolution of the Romani language can 
be equated with the origin and evolution o f Romani- speakers.167
It is this equation of language with its speakers that has provided the basis of the two 
main criticisms of the diaspora perspective, both of which suggest indigenous 
European ancestry to those now identified as Roma The first, by the anthropologist 
Judith Okely researching English Gypsies in the 1970s, does not dispute the linguistic 
evidence as such, but rather questions the idea that today’s Romani speakers are the 
direct descendants of those original linguistic bearers. Okely points out that the 
language could have travelled along the trade routes between East and West without 
the actual coherent migration of a distinct group bearing the language and she accuses 
supporters of the diaspora thesis of assuming that language is transmitted through 
biological descent.168 For Okely, the acceptance of a bounded people of Indian 
descent places a number of different groups under the same heading and sets them 
apart from the European culture around them, of which they are a part. She sees it as a 
process of exotic-fixation -  a phenomenon she dubs an ‘Orientalisation of 
Occidentals’, after Said’s influential thesis, by which she means that western 
reification of ‘the [oriental] Other’ makes them acceptable in a way that 
acknowledgement of their ‘Europeaness’ would not.169 This, according to Okely, 
neglects the history of the different groups within the countries in which they reside.
In her influential 1980s monograph, The Traveller-Gypsies, Okely denies any foreign 
origins to Gypsies. Rather she holds that it is no coincidence that Gypsies ‘emerged’ 
into the light of European society at a time when feudalism was breaking down in the 
course of the fifteenth- and sixteenth- centuries, “when a multiplicity of persons was 
thrown into the market place.”170 She presents evidence from the 14th century of the
167 Yaron Matras, Romani. A Linguistic Introduction. Cambridge: CUP, 2002,14; Fraser, The Gypsies. 
Oxford: Blackstone Press, 1992,10. However, some members of the Movement understand the open 
acknowledgement by the Indian authorities of Roma as an Indian population as corroborating the 
linguistic evidence. Hancock, ‘The Struggle for the Control of Identity’ Transitions Sept 1997 36,43.
168 Judith Okely, The Traveller-Gypsies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
169 Judith Okely, ‘Some political consequences of theories of Gypsy ethnicity’, in A. James, J. Hockey 
and A. Dawson (eds.), After Writing Culture. Epistemology and Praxis in Contemporary Anthropology. 
Great Britain: Routledge: 1997,227.
170 Okely, The Traveller-Gypsies, 227. She suggests that the New Age Travellers that emerged towards 
the end of the last century are themselves in the process of creating their own ethnicity and represent a 
late-twentieth century version of the Gypsies’ earlier formation. She notes that New Age Travellers are
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existence of large numbers of native ‘wayfarers’ or ‘rovers’, including performers, 
peddlers, peasants out of bond, preachers, mendicant friars and pilgrims and from this 
suggests that it is clear that there were plenty of possible indigenous recruits for 
nomadic groups who wished to organise themselves along such economic lines and 
who could use the mysticism associated with calling themselves ‘Egyptian’. Thus, 
“the Egyptian title was nothing but an assumed identity for many persons with no 
foreign origin.” 171 In support of this, she cites a pamphlet written in 1610 that 
suggests any claims of physical differences between the wandering bands and the 
settled population should be treated with scepticism; according to the pamphleteer, 
“they goe alwais never under an hundred men or women, causing their faces to be 
made blacke, as if  they were Egyptians”.172
Okely’s work has a tendency, however, to succumb to the criticisms that she levels at 
others. Her criticisms are based in part upon the contention that linguists, 
ethnographers and activists have dominated the study of the origins of the Roma 
where they are professionally unfit to do so, the task belonging rather to 
anthropologists such as herself. However, the main thrust of her thesis relies on her 
attempts to situate the findings of her fieldwork within an historical background; her 
argument thus relies heavily upon the interpretation of historical sources, an 
undertaking for which it would not be pedantic to argue that she is not qualified, and 
there are key moments in her monograph which leads one to doubt the unbiased 
nature of the sources she selects and the interpretation thereof.173
The second major critique, following similar although more nuanced lines, is the 
product of collaboration between Dutch social historians, Wim Willems and Leo 
Lucassen. Willems’ thesis of Romani identity is based upon his comprehensive 
examination of Gypsy studies itself. His work examines the ‘gypsiologists’ of the
well on their way to becoming a self-reproducing group i.e. the offspring of such Travellers are 
choosing partners from among the group.
171 Ibid., 3.
172 Cited by Okely, ibid., 4.
173 Her willingness to accept the voice of an anonymous pamphleteer as an accurate and unbiased 
source suggests a deliberate suspension of the necessary critical perspective, for example. Acton’s 
suggestion that from the sixteenth- century there is some evidence to cause speculation that a number 
of Gypsy leaders were of non-Gypsy origin may be one explanation for how the opinion that the group 
as a whole only pretended to be of foreign origin began to circulate. Thomas Acton, Gypsy Politics and 
Social Change. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974,98.
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nineteenth and early- twentieth centuries, such as Heinrich Grellman, George Borrow, 
and other members o f the Gypsy Lore Society, an organisation founded in London in 
1888. The first work to posit the concept of Gypsies as one people was that of 
Grellmann, a German historian, published in 1783, Working in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, Grellmann was heavily influenced by the era of romantic 
nationalism in which Herder was to write of the nation, defined by a common 
language, culture and Volksgeist, as the natural political unit and Grellmann’s work on 
the Gypsies is entirely consistent with Herder’s formulations, particularly the notion 
that language is an expression o f all the people.174 According to Grellmann, Gypsies 
were entitled to be considered a Volk because they lived as a state within a state, with 
their own morals and customs, own language, marriage practices and a different 
physical appearance, and for these reasons were inassimilable.
Willems, however, accuses Grellmann of placing all itinerants and similar foreigners 
under the label ‘Gypsy’ and in doing so creating a people that he endowed with a 
common ethnographic profile. It was Grellmann that established Romani as a distinct 
language and, through comparisons with Hindi, identified India as their homeland -  a 
thesis that appeared to fit because of the similarity of their social position in Europe to 
outcasts in Indian society. Despite Grellmann’s claims, accepted in their entirety by 
those scholars that followed in his footsteps, that he had simply retrieved or 
uncovered historical knowledge by scientific analysis of their language, Willems 
contends that, on the contrary, prior to Grellmann’s work there had been no consensus 
on the way in which Gypsies were defined -  sometimes they were vagrants, at other 
times descendents of 15th century pilgrims, elsewhere they were criminals; some 
sources record them as ‘alien heathens’, ‘spies for the Ottoman enemy’ or even 
‘pseudo-Jews’.175
Grellmann was thus responsible, according to Willems, for creating a unity in the way 
that diverse itinerant groups were thought about under the ethnic categorisation of 
‘Gypsy’ -  the view that continues to dominate Romani studies. Thus, for Willems,
174 F.M. Barnard, Herder On Nationality, Humanity and History. Kingston: Queen’s University Press, 
2003.
175 Wim Willems, ‘Ethnicity as a Death-Trap: the History of Gypsy Studies* in Leo Lucassen, Wim 
Willems & Annemarie Cottaar (eds.), Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups. Great Britain: Macmillan, 
1998, 21.
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Romani ethnicity has its roots in this external classification and is the product of a 
process in which academics (the ‘gypsiologists1), the authorities (church and state), 
and the population at large have played a role in the labelling and categorisation of 
various itinerant groups traditionally marginalised by society. Although he 
understands those being defined to have played some part in this process, it is 
assumed that their influence was little. The foreign element of Gypsy identity is 
attributed to the fact that at the time of their appearance in the 15th century, they 
presented themselves as pilgrims from Little Egypt in order to gain safe conduct; ‘in 
reality’, however, they were “thieves in disguise, charlatans and beggars”.176 
According to Willems, “thinking about Gypsies seems to be have been coloured by a 
tradition of imagery that depicted not only groups and ‘heathens’ as foreigners who 
were, as non-Christians, wild and uncivilised” but that this was complemented by 
negative portrayals of Orientals inspired by continuing conflict with the Ottoman 
Empire, as well as popular belief in the existence of an exotic, half-criminal guild of 
beggars, replete with its own language, administrations and customs.177 The 
dependence of these groups upon external categorisation for their identity is suggested 
by the variation in their depiction over time. According to Willems, whereas such 
peoples were initially considered as ‘foreigners’ in the 15th century, in the 16th century 
the emphasis was on their ‘heathen’ condition and ‘criminal way of life’, a change 
attributable to the harshness of the sixteenth- century. By the 17th century, the German 
writers Jacobus Thomasius (1652) and Ahasverus Fritsch (1662) considered Gypsies 
to be simply a social category of outsiders, originating from various countries and 
mingling with indigenous beggars and scoundrels. Willems’ conclusion, similar to 
Oakely, is therefore that ‘Gypsy’ is an invented identity and the bite of his critique is 
that it is a product of the Other’s imagination, not their own.178
Following from their belief that categorisation has been an external process, Willems 
and Lucassen have attempted to place the group of itinerants labelled ‘Gypsies’ within 
the context of European history and contend that the history of this group is much 
more complicated than purely one of persecution. The vital economic role of 
itinerants meant that for the majority of the time they were tolerated and settled for
176 Wim Willems, In Search o f the True Gypsy. From Enlightenment to Final Solution. London: Frank 
Cass, 8.
177 Ibid., 17. 
m Ibid, 308.
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months before moving on, with no major problems with the communities they stopped 
among. According to Willems, “[i]t remains... an open question as to whether the 
‘Gypsy category* actually was the source of much specific trouble and was felt to be 
unusually oppressive.... [i]n contemporary socio-historical research at any rate they 
only make the scene in a context of poverty, mendacity, vagabondage, marginality 
and criminality.”179 Lucassen suggests that the negative image of travelling people 
thus has a methodological and technical basis as most historians are interested only in 
criminality, marginality and poverty where such groups are concerned.180 The one­
sided portrayal of Gypsies in the sources, as vagrants, beggars, heathens, allows for 
the view that they have only ever known persecution and marginalisation, and 
consistently downplays evidence of integration. Willems points to the musical 
tradition Gypsies were able to build up, the prosperity of groups of horse traders, 
occasional absorption into the ranks of the majority, inter-marriage and so on, and 
notes, further, that as no comparison was made in the historical records between texts 
referring to Gypsies and those that refer to groups depicted in similar ways vis-à-vis 
style of dress, physical appearance and manner of trade, and that were felt to be 
threatening in some way, it is difficult to determine which elements were group- 
specific and which might, for example, have reflected general attitudes to newcomers.
However, it is not denied by either that the category of ‘Gypsy* carried seriously 
negative connotations. Lucassen’s consideration of the formation of the category of 
Gypsies begins from the question as to why if itinerants were economically useful, 
they were the subject of such negative categorisation and repressive policies. He 
dismisses the arguments that migrants were parasites and that therefore prejudice was 
justified, or that repressive policies were used to control and discipline people who 
did not fit the ideal of the dominant classes; the first does not fit the evidence that 
migrants served a vital economic role and the latter, while perhaps containing some 
truth, he sees ultimately as a conspiracy theory.181 Whereas Okely placed emphasis on
179 Willems, In Search o f the True Gypsy, 18.
180 Leo Lucassen, ‘A Blind Spot: Migratory and Travelling Groups in Western European 
Historiography’ in Leo Lucassen, Wim Willems & Annemarie Cottaar (eds.), Gypsies and Other 
Itinerant Groups. Great Britain: Macmillan, 1998.
181 Lucassen, ‘Eternal Vagrants? State Formation, Migration and Travelling Groups in Western Europe, 
1350-1914’, in Lucassen, Willems and Cottaar (eds.), Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups. For the 
contrary argument that nomadism or itinerancy is seen as inherently subversive by the settled society, 
see Robbie McVeigh, ‘Theorising sedentarism: the roots of anti-nomadism’, in Acton (ed.), Gypsy 
Politics and Traveller Identity. Great Britain: University .of Hertfordshire Press, 1997.
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the collapse of feudalism, the (not unrelated) key for Lucassen lies rather in the 
development of the system of poor relief in western Europe. By restricting poor relief 
in the 15th century to the local poor, whilst at the same time refusing citizenship rights 
to poor immigrants, a category of vagrants and ‘Gypsies’ was created. This had far- 
reaching effects for the stigmatisation of travelling groups who could expect to be 
reduced to beggary, whether or not they were. The hostility aimed at those included in 
this category is understood as belonging to a general mistrust of itinerants, although 
apparently thè necessity of their economic role meant that most were not the lowest of 
the low in economic terms -  a fact that seems surprising in light of their situation 
today -  but could be compared favourably with the lower and middle classes.182
The change in the 19th century o f linking poor relief to the place where one lived (as 
opposed to originated) no longer made a real difference, according to Lucassen, but 
forced local authorities to move them on rather than become responsible for providing 
support. On-going stigmatisation in 19th and 20th centuries can be linked, especially in 
Germany and France, to the process of state formation; while states became more and 
more dependent upon migrant labour, policies of repression towards vagrants and 
Gypsies became harsher as a consequence of fear of unrest within the upheaval of 
industrialisation. A fear of criminality and the development of centralised police 
forces saw special units established, particularly in Germany, to deal with those 
considered dangerous groups: anarchists, anti-socials, and Gypsies.183 Thus, in a near- 
complete denial of a Romani history, Lucassen and Willems claim that there is no 
evidence that close ties between various groups existed until the genocidal Nazi 
persecution brought an awareness of a collective fate among the many sub-groups, 
and, in the light of this, they accuse the modem Romani movement of combining “the 
idiom of 19th century nationalism with that o f modem anti-racism”.184
182 Willems and Lucassen, ‘Gypsies in the Diaspora? The Pitfalls o f a Biblical Concept’ (1991) 
Histoire Social7 Social History, 260. They note that it was only after the Second World War that many 
were forced into a hopeless social and economic position; while industrialisation presented obstacles to 
certain occupations, others thrived and new ones emerged.
183 Lucassen, “ Harmful Tramps’: Police Professionalization and Gypsies in Germany, 1700-1945’, in 
Lucassen, Willems and Cottaar (eds.), Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups.
184 “It is clear that by lumping together different itinerant groups, with divergent ethnic identities, in 
one racial category, the Nazis not only succeeded in rounding up and killing many of them, but also to 
a large degree stimulated the feeling among their victims that they had more in common than they 
thought.” Willems and Lucassen, ‘Gypsies in the Diaspora? The Pitfalls of a Biblical Concept’, 264.
3.1.2. Identity as Lifestyle
The second approach categorised by Vermeersch is of the Roma as a group typified 
by a common culture and lifestyle, according to which Roma are recognisable by 
virtue of the shared attraction to the nomadic lifestyle, or by reference to common 
cultural practices as evidenced through rules of cleanliness, family customs, musical 
traditions, as well as a similar outlook upon the world -  what in Romani is known as 
romanipé, ‘Romani-ness/ Gypsy-ness’. Such shared attributes are presented as 
objective evidence of ethnic group identity, according to Vermeersch, and while the 
thesis of a common Indian origin is accepted, it is the effect of this upon lifestyle and 
culture that is held to be most significant.185 The lifestyle view as key to Romani 
identity is held, for example, by Werner Cohn, who numbers the ‘essentials’ of the 
Romani lifestyle as the “Romanes language, bride price, ritual feasts, and, 
specifically, Rom business occupations”. He goes onto suggest that “[t]he bride price 
and the ritual feast delineate the internal life of the Rom group; the Rom business 
occupations define the ethos of Rom life”.186 The declaration of a distinct Romani 
way of life has been at the forefront of the claim to those who would position Roma as 
analogous to indigenous peoples and is behind the regular overtures -  sometimes 
strong, sometimes weak -  in favour of a special charter of Romani rights. It is a 
view that has also been endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights in the series 
of cases concerning the responsibility of the British Government for the continuation 
of a Gypsy way of life in the United Kingdom.188
Willems and Lucassen, however, have argued that Romani occupations as such have 
never existed, arguing that all traditional occupations were also practised by non- 
Roma. Further, itinerancy was not historically a special feature of Gypsies but they 
allege that tens of thousands of non-Roma were also itinerant and thus developed 
family structures and occupational habits that assisted life on the road. Those that 
lived this life were, according to Willems and Lucassen, likely to be labelled ‘Gypsy’ 
and have been stuck with the appellation for centuries. Yet, in contradiction of their
185 Vemeersch, ‘Roma and the politics of ethnicity in Central Europe’, 12.
186 Werner Cohn, ‘Letters to the Editor’, Nationalities Papers, Fall 1993, Vol. XXI, No. 2,281-286.
187 See discussion of the European Charter of Romani Rights, Section 2.2.2.
188 Buckley v. UK (1996): “The Court considers that the applicant's occupation of her caravan is an 
integral part of her ethnic identity as a Gypsy, reflecting the long tradition of that minority of following 
a travelling lifestyle.” However, the Court also appears to endorse a biological approach, noting that 
certain applicants are “Gypsies by birth” (See also, Chapman et al. v. UK (2001); Varey v. UK (2001).
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opinion on the role of the Porrajmos in creating a Romani identity, they note that such 
labelling “could easily lead to the development of ethnicity” bound up with traditional 
occupations; “[f]or it was the economic choice of an itinerant profession with the 
family, an overt travelling way of life, that set off the stigmatisation.”189; indeed, “[i]t 
is undoubtedly true that so-called Gypsy groups shared an itinerant lifestyle in the 
past, that there was an ethnic awareness and solidarity within the subgroups and that 
at that internal group level, there was a connection due to the common culture, 
etiquette and relationships”.190 Similarly, Stewart, despite denying Roma ethnic group 
status, details the degree to which Roma in Hungary have deliberately maintained 
their culture and separateness in the face of attempts to assimilate them into
• •  | Q imainstream society.
However, there is certainly a degree to which, as Vermeersch also notes, that 
emphasising this perspective promotes stereotyping of Roma of the kind that sees an 
intrinsic link between Romani identity and anti-social behaviour, albeit perhaps with 
the romantic tinge of horses, hooped earrings and long floaty skirts.192 For example, 
Cohn, a Professor of Sociology, states that Romani occupations are confined to 
fortune-telling for the women and menial trade work, both of which one can 
“characterize as [belonging to] the confidence racket”.193 More harmful is that the 
promotion of Romani identity as a distinct way of life also allows for an entrenchment 
of forced segregation of Roma from mainstream society under the cynical claim that 
the nomadic way of life requires protection; during the 1980s and 1990s, ten of the 
twenty Italian regional governments, for example, adopted laws for the “protection of 
nomadic culture”, building segregated camps to protect Roma from their inauthentic 
desire to live in flats or houses.194 Emphasising the cultural distinctness of Roma also
189 Willems and Lucassen, ‘Gypsies in the Diaspora?’, 9 (emphasis mine). 
m  Ibidy 14.
191 Michael Stewart, The Time o f the Gypsies. Oxford: Westview Press, 1997.
192 For two rather different examples of the classical stereotyping of Roma in mainstream English- 
language culture, see Jennifer Lopez’s video to her single ‘Ain’t It Funny’ (in which Gypsies are sultry, 
rhythmic dancers representing the archetypal romantic free-spirit) and Reginald Hill’s A Killing 
Kindness, (HarperCollins, 1980), one of his Dalziel and Pascoe detective novels, in which the Gypsies 
are dirty thieves and the main Gypsy male character beats his common-law wife.
193 Cohn, ‘Letter to the Editor*.
194 European Roma Rights Center, Campland: Racial Segregation o f Roma in Italy. Budapest, 2000. 
The report notes that such attitudes continue undimmed; the Italian Head of Delegation, Mr. Luigi 
Citarella, stated to the 54th Session of the Committee on the Elimination o f Racial Discrimination in 
March 1999 that Roma, as natural nomads, “preferred to stay in the camps”, despite considerable 
evidence to the contrary.
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risks validating the charge that Romani communities must share responsibility for 
their marginalisation from the mainstream.195
3.1.3. Blood-brothers
The third approach identified by Vermeersch is that of the Roma as a biologically- 
related group, whereby Romani identity is primarily identified by common genetic or 
phenotypic traits. Hancock is the leading proponent of Roma as a genetically bound 
and thus distinct group, who claims, for example, that they made the journey from 
India to Europe ‘intact’ (he writes of a “Romani core of direct retention genetically 
and historically”), and that, while the absorption of outsiders during their travels 
accounted for some variation in certain traits distinguishing one group from another, 
“it has not led to the dissolution of the Roma as a genetically related people”.196 
Hancock cites a 1987 Harvard medical study of Roma in the United States which 
established that -  on the basis of blood group, haptoglobin phenotypes and HLA tests 
-  those examined constituted a “distinct racial group with origins in the Punjab region 
oflndia”.197
Moreover, there is, according to Fraser, rudimentary scientific evidence to suggest an 
ethnic link to the Indian sub-continent, supporting Hancock’s assertion that the Roma 
are the descendants of a coherent original group. Investigations carried out post-war in 
the 1940s into blood groups found that of various samples taken from Romani 
populations in Europe, a level of B gene frequency was discovered at well above 
European levels, it being more than twice as frequent in India as in Europe. While
195 See the editorial in The Guardian, 8 April 2000: “The Roma are perhaps the most singularly disliked 
ethnic group in the world... the Roma too are part of the problem, through the persistence of a culture 
that is as much a source of their marginalisation as is the majority prejudice against t h e m c i t e d  in 
Hancock, We are the Romani people, 60. Hancock has, however, also noted that the reverse is true of 
certain Romani communities, that one legacy of enslavement is an over-reliance on the non-Romani 
world, both in terms of material goods and prestige. Ibid., 97.
196 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism’, Nationalities Papers, Vol. XIX, 
No. 3, Fall 1991,3,8.
197 Ibid. Hancock goes on to cite approvingly the English Appeals Court decision in CRE v Dutton 
(1988) ([1989] 1 All ER 306), which ruled that Gypsies formed “a distinct racial group [which...] had 
not lost their separate identity”. Moreover, the belief that Roma made the migration intact leads 
Hancock to explain differentiation between groups as a survival strategy in the hostile European 
landscape, small groups being better able to live unobtrusively on the fringes o f society.
198 Studies cited by Fraser, The Gypsies, 24. Rhesus frequencies were also found to be consistent with 
an Indian origin. For more scientific detail, see K.N. Sareen, ‘The role of biochemical genetics in 
tracing the origin of a human group’(1976) 2(1) Roma 41; cited in Hancock, We are the Romani 
people, 70-71. Hancock cites several genetic studies in this later work, which all point in the direction 
o f a direct genetic link to India.
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this may be encouraging for those advocating the genetic line, further studies on 
Roma -  in Britain, Sweden and Slovenia -  found results that deviated from the earlier 
studies while still differing significantly from patterns in the surrounding 
populations.199 The difficulties of such physical investigations highlight the problems 
inherent in deciding who belongs to a given group; as Fraser points out, only one 
marriage in a hundred with a non-Romani since any migration would have brought the 
present proportion of non- Indian ancestors to just over half the current population. 
Population genetics are thus suggestive, but not conclusive.
The concept of genetic kinship is, however, increasingly controversial. In a number of 
different fields of study, the concept of ‘race’ as a purely biological category has been 
the subject of urgent debate and is certainly no longer accepted unquestioningly.200 In 
addition, despite the difficulties of determining genetic inheritance, particularly where 
one relies on factors such as blood groups or physical characteristics, there is clearly 
something disturbing to talk about identity as being genetically- related; replacing the 
word ‘dissolution’ with ‘dilution’ in Hancock’s assertion above, for example, would 
make many people at the very least deeply uncomfortable, with all its attendant 
associations with social Darwinism and, of course, Nazi eugenics. Indeed, the use to 
which Grellmann’s work was put by founding members of the Gypsy Lore Society 
was explicitly based upon rudimentary genetic determinism. The failure of 
Grellmann’s theories to accord with their fieldwork observations saw the differences 
attributed to a lack of authenticity among some sub- groups. They were not ‘real’ or 
‘pure- blooded’ Gypsies. According to George Borrow, author of Lavengro (1851) 
and The Romany Rye (1857), it was only very rarely that one met a member of the 
ancient race. This concept of a true but all but extinct ‘noble savage’ type of Gypsy 
was picked up by Robert Ritter, a youth psychologist and criminal biologist, who was 
to become the foremost Nazi eugenicist. Ritter’s early work sought to divide peoples 
into ‘natural’ and ‘cultured’; Gypsies, as part of the former, were compared to hunters 
and gatherers and were deemed incapable of keeping up with the pace of civilisation -  
the stagnation in their mental development explained their parasitical behaviour and
199 Fraser, The Gypsies.
200 Academic uncertainty concerning race has long been recognised by the courts; for example, in 
Ealing Borough v. Race Relations Board, the House of Lords ruled that there is very little, if any, 
distinction to be made in biological terms between so-called races, and that it would thus be unwise and 
most undesirable to make membership o f a particular group dependent upon any form of biological 
proof. [1972] Law Reports, Appeal Cases 342.
restlessness. Moreover, the unacceptable mixing of Gypsy blood with German blood 
produced a group much worse than the ‘true Gypsies’ because their potential for 
deviance was strengthened by German cleverness and boldness. Ritter’s research 
established that 90% were of mixed blood and it was the alleged impurity of Romani 
blood that apparently served as one of the prime justifications in Nazi ideology for the 
Porrajmos.201
However, despite the ethical concerns, claims of genetic relationship are seen by 
some, such as Hancock, as necessary to addressing the historical stigmatisation of 
Romani culture and their way of life as inherently inferior precisely because Roma are 
deemed not to constitute an ethnic or racial group, thus allowing their existence to be 
explained away as social deviance and criminality. The strong desire to gain 
acknowledgment of the separate biological status of Roma is arguably a response to 
the attitudes of Communist authorities; the denial of national minority standing and 
the subsequent suppression of Romani culture represent a more immediate memory of 
persecution for the majority of Roma than the experience of racial selection under 
Nazism. Moreover, an ethnic emphasis and the biological understanding this term 
commonly retains is understandable in light of recent denials of the racial nature of 
crimes against Roma in certain countries o f central and eastern Europe on the basis 
that Roma do not constitute a distinct racial, ethnic or national group.202 Many Roma, 
particularly in central and eastern Europe, remain darker-skinned than the majority 
surrounding population and are thus easily identifiable as such to racist attackers.203 
Yet, the actual consequences of pushing the understanding of Romani as a bounded 
genetic group may be that, to the ears of those who wish to hear a particular message, 
it will be confirmation that the existing connection believed by many between Roma 
and social deviance is in fact innate, that it is in their very blood.204
201 Willems, ‘Ethnicity as a Death-Trap: the History o f Gypsy Studies*.
202 For details of cases from the Czech and Slovak Republics in which courts have dismissed charges 
for racially-motivated homicide on the basis that Roma are not a racial group, Gioia Maiellano, ‘The 
Penumbra of Race’ (2000) 4 Roma Rights; at http://errc.org/rr nr4 2000/legal defence.shtml# 1 Orev
203 Hancock cites a 1992 study by Mastana and Papiha that finds that there has been considerably more 
inter-marriage with non-Roma in western Europe than in the east, claiming to explain the difference in 
external appearance between Roma in eastern Europe and those in the west (Hancock, We are the 
Romani people, 71). This is not to suggest that appearance is a hard and fast guide even in CEE to who 
is and who is not Roma but political correctness should not blind to the fact that the majority 
populations believe that they can identify Roma on the basis of skin-colour.
204 The belief in the defining importance of genetics led Roma directly to mass sterilisation, live 
experimentation and concentration camps. It is not difficult to understand the reluctance of many —
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3.2. The Romani archipelago
The strong desire to uncover a common origin or a biological identity is arguably 
driven, at least in part, by an acknowledgment of the real differences between those 
groups that place themselves, or are placed by others, under the heading of ‘Roma’.205 
The complexity of the internal subdivisions between groups categorised as Roma are 
of real importance in understanding any attempt to mould a common identity and 
some space is thus given here to providing an impression of the nature and degree of 
those differences.
If one accepts the Indian thesis, the differences seen today can be explained both by 
reference to the likely migration pattern of commercial nomads -  that of distinct but 
similar groups with cultural practices based around the skill-set they possessed -  as 
well as to a post-migration history that saw considerable variation in practices of 
persecution as the boundaries of Europe’s nascent nation- states slowly solidified. The 
centuries of forced assimilation and repression have, it is argued by many, impacted 
greatly on the creation of this myriad o f Romani groups from once similar customs. 
The attacks on Romani language and culture, including in some countries a ban not 
just on the traditional nomadic lifestyle but on being Romani itself, differed in 
intensity from country to country and have resulted in a number of substantive 
differences between Romani groups both within and across borders.206 The 
prohibition of the use of the Romani language across much of western and central 
Europe and particularly those areas under Habsburg rule has had, for example, a 
considerable impact upon the continuing use o f the Romani language; whereas more 
than 70% of Hungarian Roma (the Rumungri) use Hungarian as their mother tongue, 
in Macedonia the vast majority of Roma speak Romani as their first language. Those 
groups, for example, that suffered enslavement in the Danubian provinces of
perhaps fair to say, mainly non-Roma -  within the Romani movement to pursue the genetic strategy in 
search for greater recognition. However, the work o f Okely, Willems, Lucassen and others has also 
attracted strong criticism as providing succour to those who would see Roma as belonging to a socially 
deviant subculture.
205 Marcel Courthiade provides a detailed and helpful breakdown o f the rromane endanti (Romani 
groups) into stratum and sub-groups within them on the basis of historical background and linguistic 
features. Courthiade, ‘The Rromane Endaja\ available online at http ://www.dromedu- 
forum.org/fiteet/The%20Rromani%20Endaia%20fgrouPsl%20bv%20dr%20Marcel%20Courthiade-pdf 
accessed 22 March 2004.
206 For a survey of the different anti-Gypsy laws brought in across Europe in the early modem era, see 
Fraser, The Gypsies, 129-189.
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Wallachia and Moldovia are different to those that did not and within those that were 
enslaved, patterns of division are largely determined by the various categories created 
during slavery, an example being the Vatrashi -  a name derived from the Romanian 
word, vatra, meaning ‘fireplace* and hence domestic slaves (they are also known as 
kherutno, ‘those who live in houses*). Repressive practices and attempts at 
assimilation continued throughout the twentieth century. If one accepts the indigenous 
European thesis, however, the existence of this archipelago is explained by the fact 
that the various groups never shared a common history.
The grind of daily marginalisation and on-going fear of violence has also had a 
considerable impact on Romani lifestyles and identity, with a number of groups 
seeking to distance themselves from the label ‘Roma*. The Ashkalia of Kosovo are a 
prime example of a group ‘understood’ to be Roma by external observers but who 
themselves do all they can to decry any such association. Numerous Muslim 
Romani communities are also engaged in distancing themselves from identification as 
Roma or Gypsies. Many, especially in Bulgaria and eastern Macedonia, speak 
Turkish, being bilingual Turkish/ Romanes, and thus claim affinity with the Turks. In 
Kosovo and western Macedonia, identification with the Albanian community 
dominates, although there are a number of Romani communities in Kosovo who 
identified with the Serb population and suffered persecution at the hands of 
triumphant Albanians as a consequence following 1999 and NATO intervention. 
This desire to affiliate to a different minority is a consequence of the permanent 
historical exclusion of those labelled Roma or ‘Gypsy’; although the Balkan nations 
are historic enemies, they are of equal standing, whereas the Roma are the community 
of the lowest standing, “incompatible with the others”, according to Marushiakova 
and Popov.209
207 They have, for example, established their own political parties, such as the Ashkalia Democratic 
Party o f Kosovo, formed in December 1999. The persecution of those held to be Gypsies by both the 
Albanian and Serb communities in Kosovo — each side considers the Roma to have collaborated with 
the other—makes perfectly understandable the reluctance to be associated with the categorisation.
208 The ERRC has extensively detailed the acts of violence and oppression against Kosovo’s Romani 
population, including the Ashkali and Egyptians: http://errc.org/publications/indices/kosovo.shtnil. 
including the most recent Roma Right quarterly, which focuses exclusively on Roma in Kosovo.
209 Marushiakova and Popov, ‘Myth as Process’, in T. Acton (ed.), Scholarship and the Gypsy Struggle, 
85. Also, Ger Duijzings, ‘The Making of Egyptians in Kosovo and Macedonia, in C. Govers and H. 
Vermuelen (eds.), The Politics o f Ethnic Consciousness. London: Macmillian, 1997.
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The rejection of attempted affiliation by other minorities has seen the search for a 
non-Romani identity lead some groups to develop new or fall back upon former 
designations as a means to scraping their social status off the floor; the Albanian­
speaking Yevgil Egyptchani in Albania or the Egyupti in Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Serbia are good examples. Similarly, where Turkish- speaking Roma have not been 
accepted as ‘Turks’ by the surrounding Bulgarian population or the Bulgarian Turks, 
some have simply called themselves millet (‘people’) or ‘Muslims’.210 The confusion 
as to who belongs to the heading ‘Roma’ concerns not just those who seek to deny 
such affiliation but also those who are denied it; groups who practice a traditional 
travelling lifestyle, such as the Yeniches who travel through Belgium and France or 
the Woonwagenbewoners in the Netherlands, have been categorised as indigenous by 
the authorities and are thus denied ‘foreign’ Romani status.211 However, there have 
been cases in which Romani identity has provided protection or opportunities, as 
Willems and Lucassen have alleged. Indeed, Willems has gone so far as to suggest 
that various itinerant groups are ‘hiding’ behind the label ‘Gypsies’.212
The identity of Romani subgroups has not only been shaped by fear (or opportunity), 
however, but has also developed in a perhaps less negative dialectic with the 
communities surrounding them.213 Roma traditionally differed, and to a certain extent 
continue to do so, in religious belief according to the country in which they reside and 
to their relationship with the different ethnic groups they lived among. The main 
difference between Romani groups in the Balkan Peninsula, according to 
Marushiakova and Popov, for example, is that of religious affiliation -  either Islam 
(Xoraxane Roma) or Christianity (Dasikane Roma) — and they constitute more or less
210 Marushiakova and Popov, ibid, 86. Such is the desperation to adopt another identity that groups 
also adopt/ create a history; the Usta Millet in area of the town of Dobritch have recently claimed 
descent from an unknown tribe of blacksmiths from Afghanistan whom they allege were the most 
famous of the gunsmiths under the Ottoman Empire, for example.
211 The uncertainty is also suggested by the varying ‘group’ titles used by the international community; 
‘Roma, Sinti and Travellers’ was the accepted form of address at the World Conference Against 
Racism, whereas the CoE uses Roma/ Gypsies and Travellers. It is not simply national authorities, 
however, that reject the inclusion of travelling populations. There are many within the Romani 
movement who do not accept the inclusion of Travellers or their association with Romani suffering. 
This was made clear at the World Conference Against Racism by a number of Romani activists. See 
Klimovd for an account of the confrontation between the European Roma contingent and 
representatives o f the Irish Traveller movement, Part III: WCAR Case Study.
212 Willems, In Search o f the True Gypsy, 2.
213 Although, one should not forget die power differential traditionally present between the 
communities and the impact such a factor plays in any dialectic between them; nevertheless, this is 
perhaps true of any interaction and there is a danger of overplaying it.
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autonomous groups within each locality, being divided at a number of hierarchical 
levels as well as internally divided into various sub-groups.214 In addition to 
differentiations imposed or influenced by outsiders, traditional internal differences 
such as occupation are also at the root of quite fundamental variations in culture and 
behaviour. Moreover, the seemingly limitless proliferation of communities is 
aggravated by the majority populations using an identifying name other than the self­
appellation of the group; the Ruduraf Ludura are one such meta-group, spread 
throughout the Balkan Peninsula, also known as Kopanari (cradle-makers), Koritari 
(trough-makers), VJasi (Wallachians), Karavlasi (black Wallachians) and so on by the 
surrounding majority communities. However, the Ruder a have maintained a number 
o f intergroup divisions based on traditional occupations — for example, the Lingurara 
(spoon- makers), Ursara or Mechkara (bear-trainers) -  as well as on regional features 
— such as the Monteni or Istreni. The Rudera are interesting on another level, 
however. They have ‘forgotten’ their mother tongue of Romanes, speaking their own 
dialect of Romanian, and have also apparently ‘discarded’ certain other ethnic and 
cultural traits, and have thus been described by ethnographers as “inclined to change 
their ethnic allegiance”215; for example, the Rudera often present themselves as Vlaxs 
(Old Romanians), although some groups chose to distance themselves both from 
Romani as well as Romanian identity.216 Many other groups have, however, to 
varying extents maintained their own distinctive cultural traits; for example, in 
Romania, the groups and subgroups of the category Leyasha.
214 Marushiakova and Popov, ‘Myth as Process’, 36; they provide examples of subdivisions at several 
levels dependent on specific features in the countries of the former Yugoslavia: Arli, Gurbeti, 
Dzhambazi, Bugurdzhi, Muhadzhiri, Gabeli, Chergara, Khanyari, Tamari, Romtsi, Slovenska Roma. 
There are apparently corresponding differences between Romani groups in Bulgaria and Albania. 
Courthiade alleges, however, that such names are not an accurate guide to religious denomination as 
often the groups in question have adopted a different faith after being named. Courthiade, ‘The 
Rromane Endaja\
215 Marushiakova and Popov, 'Myth as Process’, 37; they designate this ability or inclination “preferred 
ethnic identification”. There is, however, a tinge of cynicism that hangs about such a statement and it is 
perhaps worth bearing in mind that many indulge in ‘preferred ethnic identification*, such as a child 
bom in England to English parents but brought up in Scotland choosing to identify themselves as either 
English or Scottish.
216 The confusion is not assisted by the practice of dissembling or giving the ‘expected answer* in 
dialogue, particularly with outsiders. According to Courthiade, “a Rrom from Northern Hungary may 
self-identify as Muzsikus to local peasants, as Romungro to other Rroms... as Magyar Cigany to the 
authorities and as Karpdti Rrom to ethnologists” and “when using these names, he/ she will conform to 
the interlocutor’s expectancies in order to achieve the best possible dialogue with him.” ‘The Rromane 
Endaja’.
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Even within a single country, there can be a variety of groups and subgroups, 
highlighting the fact that Roma are no respecters of state boundaries. Hungary 
provides a good example of a country that appears at first glance to possess a fairly 
homogenous Romani group, and indeed, the vast majority of Roma living in Hungary 
belong to the Rumungri — a settled group that no longer speak Romani as noted above 
and, according to Marushiakova and Popov, have lost many of their ethnic and 
cultural characteristics.217 However, there are also small numbers of Romani­
speaking Rumungri, mainly in eastern Hungary, as well as very small numbers of 
Slovensko Roma and Vlashika Roma, the latter divided into the sub-groups Lovari, 
Kelderari, Churari, Drizari, Posotari, Kherara, Cherara, Khangliari, Tsolari, 
Mashari, Bugura. A community o f Romanian-speaking Boyasha with its own sub­
divisions also finds its home in Hungary. Moreover, Rumungri (also known as 
Ungrika) are also found in sizeable numbers in southern Slovakia and Transylvannia, 
sub-divided amongst themselves into Romani-speaking and Hungarian-speaking 
groups. >
Marushiakova and Popov point out that while the Rumungri have lost their language 
and many of their cultural traditions, other subgroups have maintained the use of the 
Romani language and preserved not only traditional cultural ways, but also the 
institutions of internal governance, such as the public tribunals: the Kris of the Olah in 
Central Europe, the Meshariava of the Kardarasha of Bulgaria and the Sendo or 
Syondo o f the Russian or Polish Roma.218 The closed nature o f Romani communities 
has nonetheless not prevented the intrusion of modernity and few groups remain 
orthodox in their practices, adhering to the strict standards of traditional Romani 
purity laws, despite the popularity of the self-appellation Rom Tsiganyaka (‘true 
Gypsies’) among many groups and sub-groups. Moreover, different groups 
experience varying levels of acceptance by the surrounding population and although 
they all suffer discrimination where understood to be Romani by their neighbours, at
217 Marushiakova and Popov, ‘Myth as Process*, 39.
218 Marushiakova and Popov, ibid., 39. For an interesting comparison of the two main forms of Romani 
law -  the feud and the kris -  see Acton, Caffrey and Mundy, ‘The Theory o f  Gypsy Law’ in Acton 
(ed.), Gypsy politics and Traveller Identity. Great Britain: University of Hertfordshire Press, 1997.
219 0 . Weyrauch and A. Bell, ‘Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the “Gypsies’” (1993) 103 Yale 
Law Journal 323,342-252. For details o f Romani purification traditions as they relate to food, see 
Milena Hubschmannova, ‘To Eat is to Honour God: Xhaben -  Pat’iv le Devleske’, in T. Acton (ed.), 
Scholarship and the Gypsy Struggle. Great Britain: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2000. Also, see 
Hancock’s chapters ‘Cuisine’ and ‘Health’ in We are the Romani people, 80-90.
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the very least they face different types and scales of problems. Wealth, for example, 
can vary dramatically within Romani communities, from those who barely subsist to 
those that live in palatial houses as the richest, family in the neighbourhood. This 
picture is further complicated by the suggestion that Romani groups in the former 
Communist countries of central and eastern Europe also assert a strong sense of 
belonging to the state in which they live -  a layer of civic pride apparently lacking in 
the Roma of western Europe and north America.220
The historical lack of unity between the various sub-groups, even to the extent that 
some groups refuse to recognise themselves or others as Roma, is perhaps best 
suggested by the allegation that the Romani language contains no traditional word, it 
has been suggested, to refer to the Roma as a whole.221 The large discrepancy that 
usually exists between government statistics on the number of Roma resident in a 
given country (where authorities keep ethnic data) and the figures suggested by 
Romani groups or activist organisations is further indication that there is no clear 
accepted understanding as to who or what is Romani.222
Indeed, given the more likely assumptions about their early origins -  that of small 
groups, dispersal, nomadism -  it could perhaps be considered surprising if these 
various groups, despite sharing a common language, had maintained a sense of shared 
culture. Although the diaspora is frequently compared to that of the Jews, indeed the 
Jews were the mould for Grellmann’s classification, the Roma had no priestly caste 
and thus no custodians of tradition, no written language, no texts that enshrined a 
shared corpus of beliefs or morality. Romani identity has, of course, been fashioned 
and re-moulded under a multitude of influences. They have assimilated innumerable 
elements from those around them which bear no connection to India and they have
220 This is suggested by Marushiakova and Popov, 'Myth as Process’, 41.
221 The term Rroma does not express feelings of belonging to a Romani people, but simply describes 
someone who is not gadzé, deriving from ‘Rom’ -  ‘man’ in most dialects. Similarly, words which 
could be translated as ‘nation’ are actually a modem extension of meaning for words traditionally used 
only in reference to one’s particular tribe or group; so, for example, vitza, often translated as ‘nation’, 
refers to one’s extended family -  my people. Other translations for ‘nation’, nacija and nipo, are Slavic 
and Hungarian imports respectively. Moreover, the term gadzé is not used to refer to all non-Roma, but 
to a specific group of non-Roma in some form of relationship with the Romani group in question; so 
that, as a rough illustration, where in England the author is gadzâ, in Macedonia she is simply a 
foreigner.
222 For the difficulty in collecting statistics on Roma, see 2 Roma Rights (2004); also PER Report, 
Roma and Statistics (2000); available at http://www.per-usa.org/reDorts/PERStrasbourg.pdf
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ceased to be in any recognisable way Indian, if indeed their origins ever lay in that 
direction.223 Yet, as Fraser has commented, “one cannot cease to wonder at their 
extraordinary tenacity.”224
Yet as a consequence of the undoubted and quite fundamental differences between 
different Romani groups, Marushiakova and Popov have labelled recent attempts to 
use the term ‘Roma’ for all subdivisions, and related projects such as the attempted 
standardisation of the Romani language, as little more than the nationalist efforts of a 
thinly educated layer of what they term in a  derisory manner, ‘professional Roma’.225 
According to the anthropologist Michael Stewart, the Gypsies he lived amongst in 
Hungary did not consider themselves to possess a homeland, did not dream of one nor 
of claiming any territory; from this, Willems and Lucassen have concluded that the 
obsession with origins is not theirs and that “[w]hat makes them [Roma] special is 
that they are quite happy in this condition.”226 On the basis of his fieldwork, Stewart 
asserts that Roma do not have an ethnic identity, concluding rather that their identity 
is constantly re-constructed in the present in relations with those around them, not 
something inherited from the past.227 Wemer Cohn has waded into the debate, stating 
with certainty not just that “there are no meaningful loyalties beyond the extended 
family” but that talk of ‘Gypsy nationalism’ can only elicit among Roma “merriment 
or scorn and, in any case, lack of comprehension.”228 Moreover, what empirical 
evidence there is of feelings of (political) identification among Roma -  electoral 
success of Romani political parties in the countries of central and eastern Europe — 
would suggest that there is little interest in supporting parties that seek to represent the 
Romani community as a whole. It is appreciably harder to acknowledge a claim to 
recognition of a transnational identity where there is a fundamental lack of a sense of 
unity between Romani communities even in the same country. Furthermore, the 
dispersal of groups all over the world across the centuries coupled with the relative 
poverty and poor education that plagues Romani communities nearly everywhere, has
223 It appears to be accepted knowledge among interested academics that the vast majority o f Roma 
have no knowledge o f their alleged Indian origins; the truth of this is impossible to verify.
224 Fraser, The Gypsies, 44.
225 Marushiakova and Popov, ‘Myth as Process’, 49.
226 Willems and Lucassen, ‘Gypsies in the Diaspora?*, 6
227 Stewart, The Time o f the Gypsies, 28.
228 Cohn, ‘Letter to the Editor*.
229 Vermeersch, ‘Roma and the politics o f ethnicity in Central Europe*.
84
meant that many continue to be ignorant of communities claiming kinship in other 
countries, particularly where those countries are on other continents.230
Nor are non-Romani ethnographers and sociologists alone in holding that Roma as a 
meta-group does not exist. A prominent Hungarian Romani activist, Angela Kocze, 
stated in a public debate on the future of the Romani movement: “ ...one unified 
Romani community does not exist in Europe, although there are many different 
Romani groups, each with its own distinct culture and community history. There is 
only one common feature of Roma: the oppressed identity...”.231 Similarly, the leader 
o f the Romani National Congress has commented: “One must accept that the Roma 
are diverse, hold different traditions and cultures, and that any attempt to forge a 
unitary nationhood out of them is fruitless.”232 And yet, their identity and culture 
remain sharply distinct from the gadze that surround them and upon whom they are 
dependent for their economic livelihood.
3.3 . A Pan-Romani identity?
How then are we to understand Romani identity, assuming that we are to suggest that 
it exists at all?233 While the nature of identity will be considered in greater depth in a 
subsequent chapter, it is worth making a few brief remarks about the nature of group 
identification on the basis of social identity theory in order to contextualise the most 
likely sense of Romani identity, before considering whether or not a pan-Romani 
identity can be said to exist. In this regard, post-colonial identity is instructive in 
understanding the process of Romani national claims.
3.3.1. Ingroup/ Outgroup Distinctions
Much research on the nature of identity has suggested that the relative influence of the 
group to an individual’s identity is flexibly influenced by the context. Identity is
230 The transformation in global communications, bringing ease of access to information, is changing 
this, but slowly; that subsistence Romani communities in central and eastern Europe do not have access 
to the internet, for example, can be safely assumed.
231 The participants comments have been published in ‘The Romani movement: what shape, what 
direction?’, (2001) 4 Roma Rights 28, available on-line at http://errc.org.
232 Statement by Rudko Kawc2ynski at a workshop in Krakow, 9-10 March, 2001; published by Project 
on Ethnic Relations, Leadership, Representation and the Status o f the Roma. Princeton, 2001.
233 Klimovâ bas asserted, for example, that ‘Roma’ is a upolitical term”; The Romani Voice in World 
Politics, 13 (emphasis hers).
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variable and at any one time different aspects of our identity may come to the fore, 
whether a form of social identity, relating to our group membership, or as a form of 
role-playing, for example, as a customer or as a professor before a group of students. 
In a claim arguably key to an understanding of Romani identity, social identity theory 
suggests that whereas the presence o f members of an ‘outgroup’ raises the salience of 
our ‘ingroup’ identity; where only members of the ingroup are present or relevant in a 
given context, the meaningful distinction for identity is between sub-groups or 
individual members of the ingroup.234 Where national identity is only strongly felt in 
the presence of those who are not, in my case, English; for Romani groups, the bond 
they share is only strongly accentuated in the face of non-Roma A Romani national 
identity, it can be suggested, is therefore no different from other national identities; 
while individuals of more established national identities do not put their national 
identity above all other aspects of their identity most of the time, nor do members of 
Romani groups.
3.3.2. Post-colonial Identity
While ethnic identification can be understood in teims of a constant comparison of 
cultural similarities and differences at varying levels of consciousness, it is suggested 
that those groups or societies coming to terms with long-term oppression have slightly 
different needs. The attempt by mainstream Romani scholars and activists to 
institutionalise the diasporic thesis of Romani origins arguably fits well into the 
mainstream post-colonial understanding of identity, as epitomised by those such as 
Frantz Fanon. In this conception of identity, it is the rediscovery of cultural identity as 
reflecting a common historical experience that provides members of such a group 
with a stable and unchanging frame of reference and meaning, and that has been the 
building block of post-colonial societies coming to terms with the colonial legacy. 
Fanon wrote of “the secret hope o f discovering beyond the misery of today, beyond 
self-contempt, resignation and abjuration, some very beautiful and splendid era whose 
existence rehabilitates us both in regard to ourselves and in regard to others.” As 
Walzer notes, nations that are forced to endure oppression, servitude or exile over a
234 Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, ‘Collective Identity: Group Membership and Self- 
Conception* in Hogg and Tindale (eds.), Blackwell Handbook o f Social Psychology: Group Processes. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. H. Hausendorf and W. Kesselheim, ‘The Communicative construction of 
group relationships. A basic mechanism o f social categorization’ in A. Duszak (ed.), Us and Others. 
Social Identities across languages, discourses and cultures. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002.
235 Fanon, The Wretched o f the Earth. London: Penguin, 1963, 170.
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long period of time accommodate themselves to their suppression by telling stories 
that explain their weakness -  the Jewish story of exile being “punishment for their 
sins” being a good example. Those that wish to liberate such nations must thus 
develop, according to Walzer, a different historical literature, one that celebrates 
‘heroism-even-in-defeat’ or claims a stubborn resistance to their oppressors in order to 
point to a national revival.236 The attempt by some to gain acknowledgment of 
migrating ancestors as warriors can be seen as sitting within such rehabilitatory 
desires.237 The actual veracity of the diasporic claims are thus irrelevant; arguably 
such origin claims are less important in terms of the hidden experiences being brought 
to light following ‘colonial’ oppression than they are with the production or 
modification of identity through the re-telling.
The ‘re-’telling of origins can therefore be seen as a reclaiming by Roma of their 
identity. Stuart Hall has suggested that the relationship between cultural identity and 
historical experience has as a flip-side rupture and difference, whereby “identities are 
the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves 
within, the narratives of the past.”238 The rejection of the dominant narrative in which 
Gypsies are portrayed as vagrants, beggars and thieves can be understood as, what 
Hall has termed, an “inner expropriation” of their identity.239 In this process of inner 
expropriation, cultural identity is not fixed; it is neither universal nor transcendental, 
nor does it possess fixed bearings.240 Yet cultural identity has its histories, narratives 
o f the past that have a real symbolic effect. Hall uses the relationship of a child to its 
mother, as “always- already after the break”, as a metaphor for our relationship to the
236 Michael Walzer, “Every national-liberation movement has to rewrite the history of the nation it aims 
to liberate.” Walzer, ‘History and National Liberation’, in Shapira and Penslar (eds.), Israeli Historical 
Revisionism. From Left to Right. London: Frank Cass, 2003,1.
237 The attraction of elevating those claimed as ancestors from a “motley band o f minstrels and low- 
caste vagrants”, as Fraser has put it, to high-caste warrior status is clear and understandable. The 
Gypsies, 26.
238 Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, in Jonathan Rutherford, Identity. Community, Culture, 
Difference. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990,225.
239 Ibid., 226. The relevance of the comparison is supported by the assertion of a Romanian Romani 
activist, Delia Grigore, that the Roma enslaved in the Romanian lands internalised their inferiority. 
Grigore, ‘The Romanian right and the ‘strange’ Roma’. Open Democracy. 28 July 2003. 
http://www.opendemocracv.nel/debates/article.isp?id=10&debateld=96&articleld=1387: accessed 9 
January 2004.
240 Hall cites Derrida’s attempt to capture a sense of difference that is not pure ‘Otherness’ with the 
word dfferance — a concept according to Hall remains suspended between the French verbs ‘to differ’ 
and ‘to defer’. As one shades into the other, an understanding is created in which meaning is always 
deferred.
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Tpast -  a past always constructed through a mixture of memory and myth. The attempt f 
to provide Roma with a basis of their identity, whether through narrating an early ( 
common historical experience or by emphasising cultural or biological features they | 
share is a reclaiming of their identity from the control o f others. Hancock is clearly ¡
very much aware of the destructive power that comes from controlling another’s |
history; in presenting his history of Romani nationalism, he writes, “[p]art of the |
process of devaluing a people entails eradicating or trivializing their history and (
i I
aspirations”. Hall’s conception of identity not as an essence but as a positioning j-
means that there is always a politics of identity, an on-going debate on relative (
>
positionings. \
I
' Í
Hall’s experience of an Afro-Caribbean identity, in which he grew up in Jamaica but |
t
has lived his adult life in the UK, has led him to redefine our understanding of \ 
diasporic identity in way that emphasises a necessary diversity. Using the French j
Caribbean as an example, Hall suggests that while there exist profound differences |
/
between, say, Martinique and Jamaica, in which the boundaries of difference are \i
continually repositioned in relation to different points of reference, in relation to the i
developed world, they occupy the same position on the periphery, and yet stand j
differently in comparison to that Other, having negotiated their economic, cultural and (
political independence differently. Yet, in relation to other peoples of Latin America, (
they are, however, fellow islanders with a very similar history. Hall uses the word |'
‘diaspora’ in relation to people of the Caribbean, but he uses it metaphorically rather (
than as the traditional reference to a scattered group longing for return to a sacred '<
homeland. This customary definition he sees as the imperialising, homogenising ¡'I
belief in ethnicity. Instead he defines the diasporic experience as one marked by the \
recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity o f experience, defined by •
hybridity -  an understanding of identity that exists through, rather than in despite of, 1
difference. While Hall understands this to be the hallmark of a diasporic identity such ,
!
as his own, it is perhaps also a way in which to understand all cultural identities in 
multicultural societies. British culture, as any other, is constantly being produced and 
reproduced, absorbing difference and undergoing repeated transformations as a
241 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots o f Romani Nationalism*, 6.
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consequence.242 The complexity of commonality of feeling that exists for Hall in his 
identity as a British Afro- Caribbean is helpful in attempting to understand the 
relationship between the different sub-groups categorised under the generic heading 
‘Roma’.
3.3.3. Romanipe as a source of pan-Romani identity
Those who seek to question the existence of Roma as a meta-group capable of 
providing any meaningful focus of identification are arguably correct to suggest that 
there is at present no strong sense of unity among Roma and that very few are active 
in the politics of the Romani movement. It would not perhaps be an exaggeration to 
suggest that few are even aware of the Movement or the leaders at the international 
level that claim to act in their name.243 The use to which linguistic evidence has been 
put in attempting to determine the ethnic and social backgrounds of the outcasts lends 
credence to those who see the quest to reveal the origins of Roma as being at heart a 
nation- building exercise. However it would be wrong to over-play this. There is also 
much that the different Romani groups share and hold in common. It is equally as 
arguable that Roma do largely share common cultural traditions, a common history — 
at least as common as that the Jews share, for example and perhaps most 
importantly a common language. It can be argued that even where considerable 
numbers have been forcefully divorced from the Romani language, the cultural 
conventions which underpin language remain, so that where two groups of Roma 
require translation they are arguably speaking the same language.244 This is true even 
for Romani groups as far separated as South America and Africa are from Europe, for 
some degree of a common bond does seemingly exist.
242 John Arlidge has suggested that the ability o f  modem British identity to absorb and adapt has itself 
become part o f  that identity -  an idea presented in the assertion that youth culture in Britain is 
ethnically ambiguous. See ‘Forget black, forget white. EA is what’s hot*, The Observer, 4 January 
2004.
243 Misgivings about the so-called Romani movement (‘the Gypsy industry*) are presented by  Ian 
Hancock, a Romanichil and former IRU representative to the UN, in his contribution to ‘The Romani 
movement: what shape, what direction?’, (2001) 4  Roma Rights 18. Hancock’s attitude is perhaps 
surprising in light o f  all that he has done to shine light upon the historical and linguistic origins o f 
Roma as a common people.
244 J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Moreover, Roma are 
not the only group for whom division is a problem; the Kurdish people do not share a common 
language, do not belong to a single ethnic group and are riven with internal quarrels and ancient 
rivalries. Yet there are arguably few who would suggest that die Kurds are not a  nation.
245 These assertions are largely based on the author’s own experience watching different Romani 
groups from all over the world interact and work together at Durban, and her conversations with
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This common bond is perhaps best summed up by Hancock’s observation that while, 
“[m]embers of one group might deride members of another group as not being real 
‘Gypsies’, and when pressed will say it is because ‘they are not like us’... when asked 
whether they are Gypsies or gadzé they will say they are Gypsies.”246 Hancock’s 
claim is not that Roma share a sense of being a single people but that the fundamental 
nature of Romani identity is the division o f the world into Roma and gadzé and that 
from this flows the related notion of fomanipé (‘Romani-ness’). While few groups 
have retained the strict tenets of ritual purity, non-Roma and non-Romani behaviour 
are nonetheless, according to Hancock, considered as threatening to fomanipé and 
thus to be avoided.247 Romani children are taught about the non-sanitary and poor 
behaviour of gadzé and gadzé culture; for example, in Romanes the words for man, 
woman and child differ according to whether the reference is to Roma or gadzé and 
spending too much time with non-Roma is considered a harm that can only be 
rectified by spending time with other Roma. Thus, it is not crucial which features the 
various groups purportedly share, but what all are not. Hancock concludes that 
“fomanipé may be seen as the Gypsies’ transportable homeland.”248 One member of 
the Romani leadership has similarly described the nature o f Romani identity, as “a 
diaspora living somewhere in the air.”249
Yaron Matras has noted that while the system of terms for ‘nations’ is of mixed origin 
in Romani and although the term exists in opposition to what is non-Rom, it is 
nonetheless widespread as a  ‘cover- ethnonym’, with group-specific ascriptions 
following geographical, religious or occupational specificities. On this linguistic 
basis, he notes that Romani self-ascription may be layered. It is suggested that this is 
the key to addressing Romani identity, as it arguably is for the identity of any
Romani colleagues there, and are no more scientific than th a t They are, however, impressions shared 
by others.
246 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots o f  R om ani Nationalism ’, 5.
247 A good comparison would be with non-Orthodox o r lapsed Jews. Simply because they have failed to 
maintain or have no desire to maintain the strict practices o f Orthodoxy does not o f course entail that 
such people cease to be Jews or have more in com m on with gentiles than with their fellow (orthodox) 
Jews.
248 Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots o f  Rom ani N ationalism ’, 6.
249 Ondfej Giña, cited in Jenne, 'T he Roma o f  Central and Eastern Europe: Constructing a Stateless 
Nation’ in Jonathan Stein (ed.), The Politics o f National Minority Participation in Post-Communist 
Europe. NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000,205.
250 Matras, Romani: A Linguistic Introduction, 26.
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individual. The fact that a person may belong to the Hungarian- speaking Rumungri, 
while simultaneously identifying with the Hungarian state, does not prevent the 
development of a sense of belonging to a wider group such as one encompassed by 
the term ‘Roma’.251 Indeed, Marushiakova and Popov, despite their condemnation of 
attempts to suggest a unity amongst Roma, nonetheless define Roma as an “intergroup 
ethnic community1’.252 Courthiade has suggested that authorities have a tendency not 
simply to over-emphasise the differences between Romani sub-groups -  which he 
suggests is “radically contrary to the Rromani tradition” -  but that it forms part of a 
deliberate political strategy; thus, the differentiation by those in power between old- 
settlers and newcomers, for example, the distinction made between Magyar Cigany 
and Olah Cigany in Hungary.253 On the basis of his research, Couthiade has 
concluded that, “[t]he various groups and sub-group identities make up indeed a 
cultural wealth, but they should not be exaggerated at the expense of the feeling of 
Rromani commonality”. In accepting Hall’s definition of a diasporic identity as 
defined by hybridity, it is possible to conceive of a Romani identity that derives its 
strength precisely from its heterogeneity in its difference from the out-group, gadzé.
Willems has argued that the primordial standpoint dominates Romani studies. 
Criticisms of the diasporic thesis seems to be reducible to a rejection of the belief that 
Romani ethnic identity is “an incontestable given”, in the words o f Willems. Indeed, it 
has been argued by a number o f competent commentators that the term ‘Roma’ is 
itself intimately connected to the cause of political mobilisation; the use of the term 
thus cannot be neutral and is necessarily bound up with the question of historic origins 
and the existence of the group as a distinct ethnic entity. However, to accept the 
existence of Romani identity does not require acceptance of a primordial perspective 
that sees Romani identity as forged for all time in a migration across the Asian and 
European landmass. Moreover, both the Okely and the Willems/ Lucassen critique 
appear to gain much of their steam from the rejection of and indignation at the
251 This is especially true i f  one thinks o f  the ability o f  different groups to identity with a state, or of the 
implicit belief that membership o f  the human race is normative rather than the purely biological 
embedded in western culture and global diplomatic- speak.
252 Marushiakova and Popov, ‘Historical and ethnographic background: Gypsies, Roma and Sinti’ in 
W . Guy (ed.), Between Past and Future, 33.
253 Couthiade, ‘The Rromane Endaja\
254 Peter Vermeersch, ‘Roma and the politics o f  ethnicity in Central Europe, 6. Klimovd has made a 
sim ilar point, as have Marushiakova and Popov.
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concept of the ‘true Gypsy’. One can, however, also reject the notion of the ‘true 
Gypsy’ as a product of its time, that o f romantic nationalism, and as inherently false, 
without needing to accept that Romani identity is solely an imposition by others upon 
random itinerants. All identity is forged and the reasons for that forging is not the 
most important factor if the people concerned take the identity unto themselves. 
Further, the claim that the primordial standpoint dominates claims of Romani identity 
is arguably belied by belief in the concept of romanipe as the defining aspect of 
identity, which is neither a biological nor an historical given. It refers rather to a 
strong cultural bond, and delineates a community of shared meaning. In this context, 
whether one can ‘prove’ a shared ethnicity on the basis of an historical diaspora or 
whether blood underlies a national claim is irrelevant.
It should be noted that the work of Willems and Lucassen is historical in nature and 
thus the role of Roma themselves in fostering a Romani identity necessarily remains 
outside the scope of their consideration, the Romani perspective being almost totally 
absent from the historical sources. Even where one accepts the Willems/ Lucassen 
thesis that Romani identity was formed to a large extent by external categorisation -  
so that the term ‘Roma’ is in a sense a negative identity tool -  it does not make it any 
less powerful. Indeed, the historical evidence they present suggests that sustained 
categorisation over time can generate strong ethnic group feelings. If persecution 
forged the Roma, they then are no different from many former colonial identities, 
which owe their existence to the drawing of a border on a map by a civil servant 
sitting in London or Paris.
It is clear that there is no cut-and-dry way, no unproblematic means, of defining 
Romani identity. Yet this is true of ethnic identities in general; attempting to define 
what it means to be English, for example, has become almost a full-scale industry in 
the last few years if the number of works produced on the subject is anything to go 
by. Similarly, there is little sense o f unity among English people and while we may 
not be divided along such seemingly clear-cut lines as ethnographers have suggested
255 Acton’s understanding o f  Romani identity, fo r example, is precisely as one generated by the 
perception o f  outsiders that the various groups constitute a  unity o f sorts. Acton, Authenticity,
Expertise, Scholarship and Politics: Conflicting Goals in Romani Studies. Inaugural Lecture. 
Greenwich University Press, 1998, 11.
256 For example, Jerem y Paxman, The English. London: Penguin, 1999.
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is the case for Roma, fundamental divisions exist between north and south, urban and 
rural, between classes or different political affiliations, to say nothing of the 
multinational/ multicultural mosaic that exists across Britain as a whole. Even those 
institutions -  the monarchy, Parliament, the English football team -  that traditionally 
formed a focal point of identity equally form an axis of division. The point is that, 
although it is of importance to be aware of the cultural variations among groups that 
designate themselves or are designated by others as Roma, there cannot help but be a 
whiff of something unpleasant in an overdue emphasis on such differences. As all 
ethnicities are created and identities forged, there is nothing natural about ours and 
nothing unnatural about any current attempts to suggest or justify a common feeling 
among Roma. Hall’s understanding of identity as a positioning reveals the nonsense 
that is the criticism of those that accuse the Romani movement of seeking to construct 
a  Romani identity from the myth of Indian origins; all identities have such a 
relationship with their past.258 Thus, where Roma claim an Indie past, the Indian 
authorities acknowledge their Indian roots and the ‘fact’ of Indian origins is 
increasingly accepted in the international community, wherefore should such an 
identity claim be negated for lack of historical evidence?
It is interesting that despite criticisms over the question of whether Roma should be 
understood as a homeland-less diasporic group, the majority accept the definition of 
Roma as an ethnic group; those such as Stewart appear very much to be in the 
minority. The constructed nature of ethnicity ensures, that the appellation is of course 
meaningless in itself; its significance lies in the heavy weight accorded those feelings 
o f identity and belonging that are deemed to be ‘ethnic’. Vermeersch has suggested 
viewing Roma as “a category” and not “as an entity in reality”. Romani identity thus 
becomes “not a matter of biology, lifestyle, descent, or any other ‘characteristic’; but 
rather, the product of classification struggles involving both classifiers and those
257 The ueasiness that attaches to any questioning o f the existence o f  Romani identity is related in part 
to  the fact that it is has systematically been considered o f lesser worth than other identities. For 
example, in the socialist states, the Marxist- Leninist theory o f the hierarchical development o f  society, 
from  tribe to nationality, to nation, saw Roma deemed too primitive to be considered even a nationality. 
They were thus denied the rights o f  minorities recognised as nations or nationalities.
258 The British relationship to the events, perceived experiences and victories o f  World War II arguably 
present a classic modem example o f  the dialogue between the past and the endless process o f  becoming 
o f  current identity. Modem British culture is steeped in direct and more subtle references to the 
perceived nobleness o f  British conduct during the Second World War.
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classified”. The emphasis on a classification perspective allows one to remain 
sensitive to the fact that the same group of people are often identified differently by 
different observers and by themselves, a particular concern with the wealth of 
plurality associated with the heading ‘Roma’. Yet while there may be something 
deeply unsatisfying for liberal cosmopolitan academics about ethnic claims, it is a 
powerful language to appropriate in terms of recognition claims and, moreover, is 
simply a way of saying that there are crucial differences in the socialisation process 
between groups. If individual Roma feel different from those around them, 
sufficiently different that the majority culture is effectively alien to them, whether that 
is expressed in terms of ethnicity or culture -  putting questions of essentialism to one 
side — appears semantic.260
Moreover, there is a suggestion that Romani communities — those who have never 
heard of the IRU or the ERRC, for example -  have taken unto themselves the thesis of 
Indian origins. Marushiakova and Popov in their research into the process of myth 
creation among Romani communities in the Balkans, typical apparently of ‘historical 
neo-mythologising’ in the region, have concluded that the ‘Indian thesis* has achieved 
widespread penetration in Romani folklore, beginning gradually in the early twentieth 
century, picking up speed with the advancement of the international Romani 
movement in the 1970s and finally reaching near saturation following the changes in 
1989 that allowed for western publications to circulate freely.261 The seminal work by 
Donald Kenrick, From India to the Mediterranean, first appeared in a Bulgarian 
translation in 1998, for example, and has already inspired Romani poets to create 
myths and legends based upon its historical narrative. Thus, whether or not the belief 
that there exists a group, ethnically- bound, that can be traced by means of language to 
an Indian beginning is acceptable to academics becomes, quite literally, academic. 
The ancient legends of the founding o f England were highly instrumental in forging 
an English nation anew out of the divide between the Norman invaders and the native
259 Vermeersch, ‘Rom a and the politics o f  ethnicity in Central Europe’, 14.
260 Cf. Stewart, w ho suggests that achieving acceptance o f  the label ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘social’ risks 
supporting the rightist assertion that cultures are closed and internally coherent systems. Stewart, 
‘Communist Rom a Policy 1945-1989 as seen through the Hungarian Case* in Guy (ed.), Between Past 
and Future.
261 M arushiakova and Popov, ‘Myth as Process’, 81-2,87. One legend heard by Marushiakova and 
Popov concerns a  ch ie f Berko who fought in India before bringing his arm y westwards to new lands 
and established the tow n Berkovitsa, in  north-west Bulgaria. It is worth noting that the legends remain 
very much influenced by  the surrounding m ajority culture, despite the adoption o f Indian ancestry.
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population but no-one would suggest today, for example, that there is any historical 
evidence to substantiate them.262 It was not the historical truth of these legends that 
mattered but that people believed them. Similarly, it has been reported that 
photocopies, in varying degrees of completeness, of the seminal study of Romani Law 
by Weyrauch and Bell in 1997 in the Yale Law Journal have been circulating widely 
among European Romani intellectuals 263
In terms of assessing the strength of pan-Romani identity, the geographical scope of 
the Movement is a reminder that although participation may not be deep it is certainly 
broad. The IRU’s website for example claims representative affiliation from 
organisations in 33 member and 19 candidate countries.264 The fact, for example, that 
there are groups in Latin America and Africa asserting their Romani identity — a pan- 
American Romani congress is being planned as of late 2005 -  and that they are 
claiming affinity with Roma in Europe and the rest of the world, as suggested by calls 
to hold the next World Congress in Mexico, would suggest that those removed from 
Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth century managed to establish themselves 
there as distinct and passed this distinctness onto their descendents.265 While there is a 
continuing debate within the Movement as to whether Romani identity is primarily
262 Anthony Goodman, ‘G od’s Own People: The English and their Neighbours in the Middle A ges’, 
Inaugural Lecture, University o f Edinburgh, 1994 (on file with author). It is interesting that the notion 
o f  the Roma as God’s Chosen people can apparently be found throughout the Balkans today, 
suggesting perhaps that Romani nation-building is following the same path as the English and French 
before it, (Details in M arushiakova and Popov, ‘Myth in Process’, 92).
263 T. Acton, S. Caffrey and G. Mundy, ‘Theorising Gypsy Law’ (1997) 45 American Journal o f 
Comparative Law 237,237.
264 The list Klimovd provides o f  affiliated countries is as follows: Albania, Austria, Belgium, 
Belorussia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. The candidate countries are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Iran, Lebanon, New Zealand, 
Portugal, Spain, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. Klimova cites the IRU website as her 
source, but the present author has been unable to locate a website for the IRU using the reference 
Klimova provides, nor using ‘Google*. It appears that the IRU have been off-line for more than a year. 
Klimovd notes that previous long-term members have been excluded -  most notably India, the US and 
Australia -  and others, particularly two with large Romani populations -  Hungary and Spain -  have 
been relegated to candidate members; this is probably connected to the fact that they were not 
represented in Prague at the Fifth Congress. Klimovd, ‘The Romani Voice in W orld Politics’, 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University o f  Cambridge, 2003), 65. The extent to which there are active 
associations outside Europe is worthy o f  comment; see the list o f  associations available at Patrin (up­
dated last in 2002 only): http://www.eeocities.com/-patrin/orgs.htm.
265 The persistent assertion o f  Romani identity is particularly noteworthy in the countries o f Latin 
America, where claiming indigenous status would appear to be much more rewarding at the present 
time. Hancock, We are the Romani people, 26-28.
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European or Asian266, it is arguably a non-debate; they can be and are both, and the 
extent to which they are one or the other will depend upon the context.
Acknowledging a form of pan- Romani identity does not require accepting that 
romanipé forms the only horizon of significance, nor that for the majority of Roma 
the matter of identity is secondary to the pragmatic concerns of basic subsistence on a 
day-to-day basis. Support for a claim to recognition arguably requires only that it 
constitutes a significant horizon of significance; understanding the basis of Romani 
identity as the fundamental distinction between Roma and gadzé entails that wherever 
such individuals are confronted by gadzé, their self- identification as Roma comes to 
the fore.
It should however be stressed that this work is not concerned with showing that a 
‘sufficient’ sense of pan-Romani identity exists in order to give merit to the claim to 
non-territorial nationhood. Legitimacy, as shall be discussed, is of course of vital 
importance, and legitimacy is to a large degree premised upon the strength of identity 
among a group, but identity is not necessarily linked to ethnicity. Further, a claim to 
recognition is not possessed of an all-or-nothing nature, and even were one to accept 
that those making this particular claim have failed to build sufficient legitimacy 
among those identifying or identified as Roma, it would not be a reason to fail to take 
Romani claims seriously. Claims are only ever more or less successful and where one 
would place the Romani claim on such a continuum at present is arguably less 
interesting than the nature of the claim itself. The next section considers a theoretical 
framing of the claim.
3.4. The Romani Movement as Identity- Building: a short riposte
There is something distasteful about the manner in which the debate concerning 
Romani identity is often conducted and it is worth a short response. For example,
266 A. Mirga and N. Gheorghe, The Roma in the Twenty-First Century: A Policy Paper. Princeton: 
PER, 1997; at http://www.per-usa.org/21st c.htm  A lso  Hancock, ‘The Struggle for Control o f 
Identity’. While noting that Roma are as European as any other group, Hancock emphasises the global 
diasporic and the increasing levels o f  contact betw een trans-continental groups via die internet (79).
267 This author has been struck by the vitriolic exchanges in the pages o f  Nationalities Papers (a  
selection were printed in Vol. XXI (2), Fall 1993) sparked by the Hancock article referred to 
throughout this section.
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Okely notes caustically that the claims of ‘Romani’ nationalism, at least as heard in 
Great Britain, were actually articulated by non-Romani activists who have nonetheless 
assumed a leadership role in the Romani movement. She continues in a mocking tone 
that Macedonia was the destination being muted for the realisation of Romanstan and 
comments that, “[gjiven the relative silence on the subject among the mass of 
Gypsies, this was in effect the ethnocentric imposition of a sedentarist model upon a 
traditionally nomadic people.”268 She suggests too that the symbolism of flags and 
national anthems were equally an imposition by Giogios (the Romanichil dialect for 
gadzé), and that Gypsies themselves rarely responded to them. The move she sees 
from nationalism to ethnicity and human rights is a product of the changed climate in 
the late 1980s and since, and is one in which the thesis of Indian origins continues to 
have, in her words, ‘political mileage’. For Okely, “[indigenous, European ancestry 
is not seen as a politically useful route to recognition”.
While the academics accuse the activists of allowing passion to blind reason, they 
themselves seem no less absolute in the certainty of their opinions, applying liberal 
doses of sarcasm to their discussions of others’ work; the nature of Okely’s comments 
on the role of non-Roma in promoting the Romani cause and the almost gleeful 
insensitivity of Willems and Lucassen in discussing the role of the Nazis in fostering a 
sense of identity serve as good examples. Similarly, Cohn is not satisfied with 
questioning the academic skills of those who support what to him can only be the 
myth of Romani nationalism but assigns bad faith motives to their efforts, labelling 
them the ‘Boasters’, the ‘Scribblers’ and the ‘Promoters’.270 In this vein, Jenne 
comments that “Romani activists often appear less concerned with ‘authenticity’ 
regarding the actual nature of their present identity than they are with constructing an 
identity that is the most useful in formulating and advancing collective interests.’ 
What such academics appear to be asking for is a recognition of doubt in placing the 
origins of identity, but the academic niceties of openness to contraiy opinion is hardly 
the manner in which identities are bom.272 The perspective of these writers is one that
268 Okely, ‘Consequences o f  theories o f  Gypsy ethnicity’, 230
269 Okely, ibid,
270 Cohn, ‘Letter to the Editor’.
271 Jenne, ‘The Roma o f  Central and Eastern Europe: Constructing a Stateless Nation’, 205.
272 As Walzer writes, “Nationalism is a  burden for people whose nation-state is, so to speak, already 
achieved” and the ability to  entertain ‘revisionist’ accounts belongs to identities secure in themselves -  
for all their doubt as to what it entails, the English identity, for example, has established itself. Romani
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juxtaposes an objective rational academic view with the passion of the activists. Jiri 
Lipa, for example, has accused Hancock’s article o f being “calculated to appeal to 
emotion rather than to logic”.273 They appear horrified that ‘the historical’ and ‘the 
political’ have been mixed; “historical knowledge (or lack of it) and political aims 
have inevitably become intertwined by the leaders o f these parties and social 
movements.”274 Yet such a perspective is clearly nonsensical. That, as Hancock has 
stated, “[pjart of devaluing a people entails eradicating or trivializing their history and 
aspirations”, should not prevent consideration of Romani history and identity- 
formation by both Roma and non-Roma, but it should nonetheless guide it.
If myths of Indian origin, if indeed they are myths, are useful in gaining recognition, 
protection and autonomy, whether because they build positive feelings of 
identification as Roma among Romani communities or because of gadze desires to 
exocticise the Other, it would be odd to decry the Romani leadership for supporting 
them. Indeed, as Karl Deutsch noted, a nation is “a group of people united by a 
common dislike of their neighbours and a common misperception about their ethnic 
origins”, albeit that in the Romani case of course, it is rather a common dislike shared 
by their neighbours.275 Moreover, as Hall’s work suggests, all identities involve 
positionings and for post-oppression groups in particular a reclaiming of their 
identities is a necessity. Thus that the Romani Movement, in its broadest sense, is 
clearly in a process of reclaiming Romani identity via the creation or re-telling of 
positioning narratives is neither surprising nor deserving of the vitriol it has attracted.
identity is at the early stage o f its journey and, as such, cannot be expected to confront historical 
‘truths’. Walzer, ‘History and National Liberation’, 4.
273 J. Lipa, ‘Letters to the Editor’, Nationalities Papers, Fall 1993, Vol. XXI, No. 2,269-272.
274 Willems and Lucassen, ‘Gypsies in the D iaspora?’, 6.
275 Quoted in Bart Driessen, A Concept o f Nation in International Law. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Instituut, 1992,9.
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Section 2
ii
f]
i.
Chapter 4: Recognition: Theories and Practice
It is through the fictions and stories that we tell ourselves and others that we live the life.276
N o man is an island, entire o f itself.277
It has been asserted that the Romani claim to nationhood is first and foremost a claim 
to recognition. If this is the case, the Roma find themselves in good company; the 
politics of recognition dominate current considerations of inclusive political 
participation. A deluge of claims sits alongside a normative shift in political theory. 
The demands for inclusion by groups as diverse as anti-colonial movements, 
feminists, gay rights groups, and all manner of those designated national, ethnic or 
cultural minorities have changed the way in which we conceive of social justice. The 
emphasis is arguably no longer on economic and material redistribution; although 
such demands have not disappeared, they have become subsumed in a more profound 
claim for societal equality based upon recognition of and respect for difference. 
Rousseau-type conceptions of the body politic have been sidelined as recognition 
theorists return to the polis of ancient Greece and Kantian respect is eschewed in 
favour of Hegelian-based recognition.
While it has long been appreciated that the approval of one’s fellow man has been a 
driving force of history -  concepts of courage and honour are arguably as old as 
records of man’s interaction with one another -  what is understood by honour has 
changed over the centuries. In ancient times, honour related to the worth of the 
individual and was judged according to one’s deeds; one thinks of the willingness to 
face down impossible odds and die in the so doing typified by the great warrior heroes 
such as Achilles or Coriolanus. In the Middle Ages, honour was related to birth rather 
than character or deeds. However, the concept of recognition as it is used today in the 
political theory or legal literature bears little resemblance to such notions of honour. 
The medieval world in which one’s place was a given has been replaced by the 
belief, at least in the western world, that who one is is determined less by a rigid
276 Ben Okri, ‘The Joys o f  Story-Telling* in Birds o f Heaven. London: Phoenix, 1997.
277 John Donne, M editation XVII, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions (1624). (Ed. Andrew Motion, 
Great Britain: Vintage Press, 1999).
278 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’ in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculhiralism: examining the 
politics o f recognition. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992. Although this should not be 
overstated, as Taylor has a tendency to do. There w ere always those that bucked the trend.
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social structure or the glory-based heroism of Homer than by the cultural groups to 
which we belong and what we chose to do with that inheritance. Recognition, as the 
term is used in contemporary thinking, fundamentally concerns identity and is thus 
more than our standing in the eyes of others; it is rather the means by which we know 
who we are and who others are in relation to us.
The aim of the first part of this chapter is to consider what recognition is and why it 
matters. The second part will consider what a claim to recognition implies and 
examine recent attempts to theorise a politics of recognition. The suggestion will be 
that recognition is so crucial because of its relationship to the autonomy of the 
individual. This relationship exists on two levels: the first is that of the psychological, 
and the role recognition plays in the development of the self; the second that of the 
political, and the ability to participate in determining the rules that govern us. The two 
parts of the chapter correspond to the psychological and political aspects of 
recognition.
4.1. Recognition and the Situating of the Self
It has long been accepted that identity is not as uncomplicated or transparent as once 
thought; it is, rather, deeply complex and multi-tiered. Indeed, there are as many 
theories of identity as theorists. Identity has filtered across the disciplines throughout 
the social sciences and humanities and through into the vernacular, filling the space 
vacated by the great meta-narratives. Identity talk is everywhere.279 However, while 
one of the strongest characteristics of modernity is the rise in awareness of ourselves 
principally as individuals and the related failure to connect to a wider context280, the 
understanding of our ‘selves’ as ultimately social, with our identities intimately and 
necessarily bound up with the communities and cultures in which we live, has begun 
to taken on the mantle of received opinion.281 The Cartesian thinking self, who 
inhabits his own personal realm and is formed both prior to and independent of
279 Brubaker and Cooper, ‘Beyond “identity’” (2000) 29 Theory and Society 1.
280 The inability to connect to moral horizons w ider than ourselves is identified by Taylor as one o f  the 
three malaises o f  modernity. Taylor, The Ethics o f Authenticity, Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University 
Press, 1992.
281 David Bakhurstand Christine Sypnowich (eds.), The Social Self. London: Sage, 1995.
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interaction with others and that for so long dominated philosophical enquiry, has 
arguably been decapitated in favour of the situated self.
An understanding that the self is necessarily formed in interaction with others was 
developed by Hegel in the context o f the post-Kantian acceptance of subjectivity. 
Hegel’s account of recognition is concerned with situating the individual in the world 
— what Honneth has recently referred to as pre-cognitive recognition -  and gives the 
concept much o f its moral force. Recognition in its contemporary usage appears to 
owe its conceptualisation almost entirely to Hegel and what follows is a necessarily 
simplistic and limited rendering o f Hegelian recognition theory.282
4.1.1. The Hegelian Dialectic and the Path to Freedom
Recognition for Hegel is central to his conception of ethics and for the attainment of 
ethical life; as such, the concept is his most important and appears throughout his 
works. This latter point is important in redressing the negative account of Hegelian 
recognition taken by scholars from the Phemonology o f Spirit, which represents the 
most explicit rendering of the concept. The Phemonology is an introduction to Hegel’s 
system o f philosophy and takes a sceptical approach to the forms of consciousness; 
the emphasis is on negativity and self-subversion and recognition is accordingly 
presented in terms of struggle and domination. It is the failure to achieve recognition 
that is emphasised. However, in the works grouped together in the Encyclopedia, a 
more positive account of the necessary process of recognition is discemable. What 
follows is a general consideration of recognition in the Phemonology in the light of 
Hegel’s other writings.
Building on the work of Fichte and Schelling, Hegel conceives of subjectivity as 
inter-subjectivity. Hegel’s self is a restless, driven, negative identity that transcends 
itself through the desire for the other to the point that the other is no longer external to 
the self but mediates the relation of the self to itself. The dialectical process that 
consciousness undergoes in the course o f the Phemonology is one of realisation that
282 This section relies heavily upon Robert R. W illiams, Hegel's Ethics o f Recognition. Berkeley: 
University o f  California Press, 1997; but also, T e n y  Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology. The Sociality o f 
Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Paul Franco, Hegel's Philosophy o f Freedom. 
Yale: Yale University Press, 1999; Allen Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.
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its knowledge does not correspond to any reality outside of itself, independent of 
itself, but is something to which it is related. Thus where the mark of ‘consciousness’ 
is the presumption that our experiences are the result of forces external to us, what is 
learnt in the dialectic of consciousness is that “consciousness of anything presupposes 
some sort of active self-relation to it, that ‘consciousness’ is always a form of ‘self- 
consciousness’”.283 The general form of dialectic progression begins with a form of 
reflective life (the will) considering certain beliefs and actions to be authoritative 
reasons; this reasoning generates within itself sceptical objections (generating its own 
‘negation’) so that the ‘will’ is unable to reassure itself that the reasoning that it takes 
to be authoritative is in fact so. Such scepticism leads to a transition and the new form 
of reflective life takes its current reasoning to have been necessary to resolve the 
previous issues that were self-undermining, which in turns generates its own 
scepticism and the progression continues. This compulsion is internally-generated.
While this dialectic of scepticism leads to self-consciousness, self-consciousness is 
not full selfhood. Hegel characterises self-consciousness simply as ‘desire’, so that 
where ‘consciousness’ sought truth in the world external to it, self-consciousness in 
the form of desire seeks certainty of itself by negating all otherness. However, self- 
consciousness’ desire cannot be sated by mere objects; such satisfaction is but 
fleeting. It is in the endless pursuit of satisfaction that self-consciousness becomes 
aware of the independence of the object and that, crucially, such independence means 
it can achieve satisfaction only when the object affects the negation itself. The only 
object that can effect such a transformation is another self-consciousness and thus it is 
only in being recognised by another self-consciousness that it can achieve the self­
certainty it so desperately desires. The two self-consciousnesses encounter each other 
' seeking recognition of their existence.
Recognition can, however, fail and the famous example of the failure to overcome 
desire and achieve recognition is that of the master and servant in the Phemonology. 
In the Phenomology, as is well-known, the encounter of the one with the other results 
in a life-and-death struggle between them, stemming from the understanding of both 
that satisfaction of their desire can only be sated through negation of the other; each
283 Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy o f Freedom, 88
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thus risks his own life in seeking to negate, i.e. kill, the other. One outcome of this 
struggle is that one or both parties is killed, but where they both survive, it is because 
one prefers servitude to death and the resulting relationship is thus one of 
subordination -  that of the master and the servant -  in which one receives recognition 
from the other, without granting reciprocal recognition in return. Such recognition is, 
however, famously flawed, for the recognition the servant can offer is ultimately 
worthless. Only another self-consciousness of equal stature can provide the self- 
certainty that the one is seeking and the master’s victory is thus a pyrrhic one.
However, although recognition is the encounter between two self-repulsing negative 
selves, it does not entail that the relation to the other is inherently negative.284 Hegel 
provides additional modes of recognition which do not generate opposition or where 
such opposition is transcended, such as in the constitution of family relationships or in 
the affirming recognition that exists in forgiveness. Whilst it is desire that drives the 
self towards the other, the shock of the initial encounter must be transformed from a 
desire to conquer the other to desire for the other if genuine recognition is to occur.
Recognition of the self is thus a state of mediated self-identity, in which knowledge of 
the self thus must pass through the other; in the famous terminology, the self is only 
for itself by being for another and is only for another by being for itself. The self is 
subject in that it recognises the other and object in that it is recognised by the other. A 
self cannot be in isolation; nor is there another path to oneself accept through the 
inter-subjective mediation of another.285 Recognition is thus a process of mutual
284 Williams has persuasively argued that the fixation in Hegelian recognition on the necessity of 
recognition as a struggle resulting in the oppression o f one by the other is a  result o f  a flawed 
interpretation in the hugely influential account o f  Alexander Kojeve in the first half o f the twentieth 
century. He counters that recognition is a  general concept o f  intersubjectivity in Hegel’s thought, in 
w hich the master-slave dialectic does not exhaust the possibilities for recognition. The background o f  
the Phemonlogy as a state o f  nature in which individuals confront one another without the mediation o f  
social institutions is one explanation for the struggle that results; the search fo r recognition entails a 
great risk and is yet necessary, resulting in the attem pt o f  each to dominate the other. But there is no 
suggestion that where background conditions are m ore civilised that the process o f  recognition must 
pass through a  stage o f  struggle or o f domination. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics ofRecognition, 10-13,60, 
67.
285 In the account o f  the master and the servant, the servant ‘comes to* him self/ herself not though the 
process o f  inter-subjectively mediated recognition b u t through self-sacrifice and labour. The emphasis 
placed by influential interpretations o f the Phemonology on the master-slave relationship distort 
Hegel’s development o f  recognition in later works; while in the Jena works labour stands as an 
independent dialectic o f  relation, alongside symbolic representation and  interaction, these were unified 
in the concept o f an inter-subjective Geist, depriving labour o f  its independent role. According to
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constitution, or, in Hegelian terms, a ‘doubling’ of self-consciousness. The mediating 
role each plays in reflecting back the self to itself means that both depend not only on 
their relationship with each other but on the relation of the other to itself i.e. the self­
understanding of each. Neither can change without altering the self-conception of the 
other. Hegel’s doubling of consciousness has led to the criticism that recognition -  in 
achieving a union -  fails to respect difference, necessarily repressing it. However, 
Hegel follows Schelling in maintaining the ontological separation of subjects, so that 
intersubjectivity precludes direct access to or knowledge of the other. The two self- 
consciousnesses do not merge and form one, but maintain their distinctness -  their 
ego -  while only being able to know themselves through the confirmation and 
mediation of the other: the union -  the concrete universality o f the ‘We’ -  is a 
differentiated one.286
The process of recognition must thus follow three stages: firstly, the initial encounter 
in which the self loses itself before the other through its inability to see anything but 
itself in the other; secondly, the attempt to cancel this loss, which can itself take two 
forms: either elimination or domination of the other, or an accommodation with the 
other. For Hegel, if the self is to ‘return’ to itself from its ‘othered’ state, it must 
abandon attempts at mastery and control and take the second of the two paths. This 
entails the third and final stage of recognition: releasing the other and allowing it to go 
free. The consequence of the process is that the negative self-repulsing aspect of 
desire is ‘decentered’ and ‘relativized’ by contact with the other and ‘enlarged’ and 
‘legitimated’ by the other’s recognition.287 The inter-subjectively mediated return to 
self is only possible with a mutual releasing of each other, of allowing the other to be, 
a state not of indifference but freedom through each other. According to Williams, 
“[gjenuine recognition ... involves the mutual mediation of freedom”.288
The accounts of recognition and freedom thus merge, so that the being at home in 
other (bei sich im Anderen) is not a limitation to one’s freedom but the actualisation of
Habermas, labour was subsequently subordinated to  recognition and the ability o f  the slave to self- 
liberate was re-written. Williams, ibid., 66, citing Habermas.
286 In Williams’ helpful phrasing, “the subjects remain independent in their identity, and are identical in 
their independence”, ibid, 73. The union is thus not a  fusion but a relationship, but necessarily a  close 
one.
287 Williams, ibid, 56-7.
288 Williams, ibid, 10.
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it: recognition becomes the practical realisation of freedom. Yet, freedom cannot be 
achieved through domination or violence. Recognition is thus paradoxically 
necessary, yet cannot be coerced. If  coerced, it is inauthentic and cannot achieve its 
aim. It must be freely given by the other, who in turn must be allowed his/her 
freedom. Freedom in and through the other is not simply a question of allowing the 
other to be or of being open to the other, but also of affirming the other as they 
determine themselves to be. The releasing of the other also confirms both its identity 
and its difference in that identity.
Hegel’s concept of freedom is a state not located within the self but realisable only in 
a relation in which being-for-other is being-for-self; so that freedom, like the self, is 
intersubjectively mediated and is knowable only in the setting of the social. While for 
Kant, union constituted a limitation on freedom, Hegel viewed autonomy as not only 
realisable but only knowable via co-existence in a community. Individuals are not 
prior to community but abstract from a larger social whole in which union and 
autonomy are not alternatives but are the necessary components of a comprehensive 
intersubjective concept of freedom.289 Relation with the other is not to be conceived 
as a limitation on freedom but as the necessary condition of it; in Hegel’s words, 
“since freedom consists in my identity with the other, I am truly free only when the 
other is also free and recognised as such by me.”290 Genuine freedom is thus a state of 
being at home with one’s self in the other (bei sick in anderen zu sein). The 
relationship of freedom to recognition is such that what the self is searching for, 
according to Williams, is not recognition as such -  i.e. recognition of the mere fact of 
one’s existence -  but the recognition o f one’s autonomy.
The Hegelian self, therefore, is one that is reflexively constituted and radically 
contingent upon the actions of others.
4.1.2. The Social Self, Identity and the story that we tell ourselves
Hegel’s dialectic of recognition has received considerable support from psychologists. 
Self, in the discipline of psychology, is held to be acquired, an acquisition that ties the
289 Williams, ibid., 80-1.
290 Williams, ibid, 82.
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individual to those around it and makes them part of the self thus created. Children 
become entangled in the webs of meaning into which they are bom through the 
language they take on. They construct those meanings for themselves not simply by 
learning the name of an object or thing but by observing the way in which those 
around them act towards such objects; thus by absorbing the relationships between 
words and actions, and between the system of labelling things and the range of acts 
that are socially possible within that world. Each child is an object within this 
construction, so that each child learns the meaning of their self in the same way that 
they leam the meaning of any other object: it is found in the way that others act 
towards it292 Thus self-definitions are profoundly shaped by the world into which we 
are bom; for some social psychologists, the group and the individual are inseparable, 
at least in terms of value assignation by the individual293 In the words of Habermas, 
one becomes “individualized only through a process of socialization”.294 That 
individuals are ‘made9 through a complex process of socialisation is no longer 
shocking and Taylor has confidently suggested that the “fundamentally dialogical 
character” of human life is its most general feature.295
That the self is a social construction sustained within a social situation is not to 
suggest that its formation is not highly complex or that each self is not an active 
participant in the creation of his or her own self. Identity is not simply that which is 
created for us by others; like a ball of clay, it has its own ‘properties9 but is given 
form by others. While our personal identity is deliberately developed in contrast to 
our social identity — it defines what marks one as an individual off from the 
community, the sense of self one constructs over time -  it is created in the context of
291 John P. Hewitt, Self and Society. A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology. Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon, 1997 (7th ed).
292 In the words o f  Hewitt, “Although individuals do develop defences against definitions they do not 
like, and although they acquire some degree o f autonomy from others, people nevertheless generally 
m ean to themselves what they mean to others, because they see themselves as others see them.” Hewitt, 
ibid., 81. In reacting against die characters we are assigned as children, we reaffirm the importance of 
those early definitions.
293 This is apparently true even o f  the individualistic societies of North America, Europe and the 
Antipodes. Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, ‘Collective Identity: Group Membership and Self- 
Conception’ in Hogg and Tindale (eds.), Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
294 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State*, in Gutmann ( e d . ) ^ v r  
Multiculturalism: examining the politics o f recognition, 113.
295 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f  Recognition’, 33.
7the web of meanings that mark our social world.296 There is thus something inherently 
contradictory about an assertion of difference; by asserting our difference from others, 
we are necessarily acknowledging our interdependence on them. Yet culture is neither 
a given nor can it be said that we participate in it voluntarily. We do not simply adopt 
our culture wholesale but interact with it, within it, but it always defines the 
boundaries of possibility for us and therefore we can not eschew it or pick another one 
we like the look of better. We can learn languages and chose to live in any other 
country that will allow us to, but we cannot, it seems, ever throw off entirely the 
trappings of our native culture.
The relationship of the self to identity is not, therefore, straightforward. Yet identity 
seems fundamental to any understanding of recognition. As any attempt to lay down a 
definitive explanation of identity is a hopeless task, given the complexity and multiple 
disciplines involved in the field, this section will simply attempt to give a simple 
indication of the way in which identity is understood here because it is important for 
the understanding of recognition developed.
In attempting to understand the relationship between self and identity, cognitive 
psychologists have identified narrative as the crucial link between identity and the 
self. According to cognitive psychologists, “both memory and self are constructed 
through specific forms of social interactions and/ or cultural framework that lead to 
the formation of an autobiographical narrative.”298 McAdams sees adolescence as the 
period in which individuals seek to integrate the disparate elements of their life -  their 
roles, talents, natural tendencies, experiences, social involvement -  both 
synchronically299 and diachronically300 into “a patterned configuration of thought and
296 Taylor, The Ethics o f A uthenticity.
297 There are o f  course those that attempt to step beyond their national origins in terms o f  their lifestyle !
and imagination. See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative* in Will |
Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights o f Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. However, the
bond between an individual and his o r her culture, while not pre-determining, is an enormously ,
powerful force which few choose to resist. This does not suggest that identity is not responsive to I
external forces o f  change; but wearing Italian shoes, American jeans, eating French food or learning |
Japanese does not constitute an abandoning o f  one’s culture horizons. It is rather a re-defining o f  one’s ,
cultural understanding from within the boundaries o f  those horizons. I
298 Robyn Fivush and Catherine A. Haden, ‘Autobiographical M emory, Narrative and S e lf ,  in Fivush |
and Haden (eds.), A utobiographical Memory, Narrative and the Construction o f a Narrative Self. j
Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2003, vii. I
299 i.e. across role and relationship inconsistencies; e.g., talking to my colleagues depresses me but I (
feel happy when with my friends. j
I
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activity” that provides their life with a degree of “psychosocial unity and purpose”.301 
This is done by constructing a narrative from a series of self-defining stories which 
create “an internalized and evolving self’ across both contemporaneous and temporal 
contradictions. We endow these stories with symbolism, integrative themes and 
personal meanings that make sense of us to ourselves as we look back at our past, 
consider the present and anticipate the future. This explanatory configuration is, 
according to McAdams, identity, and provides the individual with a specific niche for 
the self in the wider world.
While individuals may not have the tools to construct identity until adolescence, the 
process begins in childhood through parental guidance in the development of personal 
memory. Parents impart the narrative structures of their culture to the child which are 
the fabric from which they form their identity. While it may therefore seem that we 
can choose who we are by choosing which stories to rank as self-defining, the choice 
is not altogether free. The culturally-determined structure of a narrative, the way in 
which choices about which stories to select are situated within a social and historical 
context that make some choices more appropriate than others, better or worse than 
others, and that choices are constrained by the different options open to an individual 
by way of gender, social class, ethnicity, and so on, all entail that each individual’s 
construction of their narrative cannot be boundless. All cultures tell stories but what is 
understood to be a good story thus depends on the culture in which it is being told. 
Our story is inherently social.
If  our identity is a story of ourselves that we tell and re-tell all our lives, identity 
cannot be conceived of as static; it is rather inherently dynamic, constantly shifting as 
new experiences and interactions continue to shape our personal narrative. The 
modem emphasis upon ‘individualized identity’, in the words of Taylor302, sees the 
self as a reflexive project that is very much work in progress.
The Arendtian conception of the human condition provides a similar understanding of 
identity. For Arendt, the answer to the question ‘who are you’, can only be answered
300 i.e. in time; e.g. I used to  enjoy the company o f  others but now I am very antisocial.
301 Dan P. McAdams, ‘Identity and the Life Story*, in Fivush and Haden, Autobiographical Memory, 
Narrative and the Construction o f a Narrative Self 188.
302 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f  Recognition’, 28.
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1through speech and action303, for these are the modes in which men appear to one 
another qua men. It is in acting and speaking that we reveal our unique individual 
personality to the world. Famously, humans undergo a second natality as they enter 
the public realm; with word and deed we clothe the naked self that marked our first 
birth. Yet, for Arendt there is something inadvertent in the revelation of one’s self. 
The ‘who’ that emerges from our words and deeds is hidden from the self doing the 
revealing. We must reveal ourselves anyway, for it is only through public disclosure 
and corresponding recognition that we achieve presence in the public realm, which for 
Arendt is the purpose of human existence. While we may not agree with Arendt that 
the purpose o f human existence is life in the public realm, her claim that “nobody is 
the author or producer of his own life story” seems intuitive: the self is the hero, but 
not the author. The reason for this is that we are not the masters of our own actions, 
which is not to say that we are not responsible for our actions, but rather that action is 
by nature “boundless”. Action acts upon others capable o f their own actions, who 
react and thereby begin a new action. “[T]he smallest act in the most limited 
circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and 
sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation.”304
However, it is not just for the actual self that the revelation is ungraspable. Arendt 
understands that the moment at which we attempt to pin down someone’s identity or 
character through words, “his specific uniqueness escapes us”.305 She notes the 
impossibility o f “solidify[ing] in words the living essence o f the person as it shows 
itself in the flux of action and speech” while insisting upon the inevitability o f 
disclosure in any action of men, no matter how worldly the task at hand. No-one, it 
seems, can capture the essence of an individual, Arendt asserts that the full meaning 
of an individual life -  the identity of the hero of a particular story -  can only be 
understood at the end. Individual human essence thus only comes into being when life 
has departed, when there is nothing left but a story; famously, Arendt asserted that
303 Action, for Arendt, (and speech is ultimately a  form o f  action) consists o f  the exercise o f freedom in 
the world, where the world is understood as a form  o f  the ancient polis. Identity for Arendt is 
necessarily a public identity. Arendt, The Human Condition. N ew York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959.
304 Ibid., 170. This is arguably the theme o f much o f  Greek literature, e.g., Antigone.
305 Ibid.
306 Ibid., 161-3. “Every action must ‘contain’ the agent’s identity somewhat in the sense that a bank 
check [sic.] must bear a  valid signature for it to  be recognized as such” , in the words o f  Tsao. Roy 
Tsao, ‘Arendt Against Athens’ (2002) 30 Political Theory 97 ,104.
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only he who does not survive his great self-defining act can be the master of his own
A M
identity. Thus while identity is a life-story with the self as hero, that identity is 
never knowable and the implication is that to attempt to grasp it, to fix identity, is to 
impose a form of death.
Recognition must, therefore, grasp the nettle of temporality. If identity is the whole of 
a life-story, the identity of the living is only ever contingent, temporal. Any form of 
recognition must therefore incorporate this understanding of the radical contingency 
of identity and thereby the interdependence of our identity with others without merely 
paying lip-service to it.
4.1.3 Charles Taylor’s authenticity in horizons of significance
Charles Taylor has set the agenda in the field of recognition for many years, providing 
a contemporary understanding of the Hegelian dialectic. Much commented upon, his 
writings continue by and large to define the terms in which recognition is 
understood.308 This section traces his arguments.
Taylor’s theory of recognition can be seen as containing two vital stages. The first 
stage is that of the dialectical nature of identity -  understood to be the defining 
characteristics of what makes an individual unique - ,  that who we are is determined 
by not just by our relationships with significant others on an intimate level (parents,
• 1AOsiblings, wider family and friends), but also, significantly, on a broader public level.
It is this broader societal level that sees the encounter between two individuals in the 
Phenomenology transposed to a group level. It is not only the nature of the dialogue of 
recognition with those around me that determines who I am, whether I consider 
myself a coward or clever or ugly -  the constant repetition of moral judgements to a 
child that determine how they see themselves and which one can never really shake 
off -  but also the attributes that I share with those intimate others -  my skin colour,
307 Achilles is the example Arendt uses; Coriolanus would be another.
308 See, The Ethics ofAuthenticity; The Sources o f the Self: The Making o f Modem Identity. Cambridge 
M a.: Harvard University Press, 1989; and ‘The Politics o f  Recognition*. For a  sharp critique o f his 
ideas, see, in particular, Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003.
309 The term ‘significant others’ is that o f  George Herbert Mead’s; M ind Self and Society. Chicago: 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1934.
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my language, my religion, my Weltanschauung -  those characteristics that are 
necessarily group-based and normally congregate under the general heading of 
‘culture’.
This first level connects to his development o f ‘authenticity’. Taylor follows Herder in 
suggesting that each of us has an original way of being human, or in Herder’s words, 
“each person has his or her own measure” so that, in Taylor’s voice, “there is a certain 
way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way... this 
gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my 
life, I miss what being human is for me.”310 One’s own original way of being is 
something that one can only discover oneself, and the articulation of that self­
understanding is to realise a potentiality that is all one’s own. It is this that gives 
authenticity enormous moral significance. Thus, “being in touch [with oneself] takes 
on independent and crucial significance. It comes to be something we have to attain to 
be true and full human beings.”311
However, in discovering our measure, we are not acting in isolation. If the first step is 
the role of recognition in constituting ‘authentic’ identity on both the personal and 
public levels, the second concerns the link of identity to human agency. Taylor’s 
understanding of human agency follows from his belief that our ability to weigh up 
the qualitative value of our various desires, to assign worth to our motivations -  what 
he terms, partially following Frankfurt, second order strong evaluations -  are not only 
the mark of humanity, what separates us from the beasts, but that bereft of the ability 
to make such evaluations, our personal existence shatters.312 Not only is the capacity
310 The Ethics o f Authenticity, 28-29; italics his. H erder was also the first to suggest that just as each 
individual has an authentic identity, our own particular way o f  being -  an essence -  so do the groups, 
cultures and nations to which we belong. A ccording to Taylor’s interpretation o f Herder, a  Volk should 
be true to itself; G erm ans should no t try to be inevitably second-rate Frenchmen but must develop their 
own way o f  being.
311 The Ethics o f Authenticity, 26.
312 Taylor, ‘What is Human A gency?’ in Human Agency and Language. Volume 1 o f Philosophical 
Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University P ress, 1985,15-16,34. Frankfurt identified a  key 
distinction between first- and second- order desires. The former defines the ability to choose to satisfy 
certain desires over others, an ability the hum an anim al shares with a number of others; the latter, 
corresponds to our allegedly unique ability to  evaluate those desires. (H. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom o f the 
will and the concept o f  a  person’ (1971) 67 Journal o f Philosophy 5). Taylor extends Frankfurt’s 
scheme to encompass weak and strong second order evaluations, those in which we are solely 
concerned with outcom es (what do I most feel like right now: eating lunch or going swimming?) and 
those in which we decide upon the quality o f  m otivation (I shall go swimming because I wish to be fit 
and healthy and eat lunch afterwards, despite th e  fact that I am hungry now).
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for strong evaluation considered by Taylor to be essential to the sort of depth we hold 
elementary to humanity but these ‘fundamental evaluations’ are also inseparable from
i
the individual self because they define not simply what a self desires, but what kind of i
- ^ 1 ^  ilife they desire, “what quality of agent they are to be”. For while our first-order j
desires -  our biological needs -  are given, those of the second-order are not merely |
given, but are also endorsed by the individual and hence engage our responsibility. ■
Taylor’s point is that although these second-order desires form the horizons of 
significance within which we operate -  whether an action is deemed shameful or the 
relative values accorded such things as courage or love - ,  the existence of which is 
not chosen and whose development is a group activity, we engage with these horizons 
and make our own choices within them. To do otherwise, and act outside this j
structure, would be ‘inauthentic’. !
I
i
The crucial point in Taylor’s argument is rather that not only do we act within these J
cultural or community standards but that we can only act within this cultural frame; in I
Taylor’s own words, “our existence as persons, and hence our ability to adhere as j
persons to certain evaluations, would be impossible outside the horizon of these 
essential evaluations”.314 The importance of this horizon for Taylor is that its loss is 
disorientating and disaggregating, leading to an ‘identity-crisis’ of terrifying 
magnitude. Whether or not one accepts the strong concept of agency and recognition 
that Taylor develops, the social self arguably does mean that the group defines the 
boundaries of possibility for the individual.315 What lifts a group to the level of 
‘encompassing’ for Margalit and Raz is that it defines the boundaries of its members’ 
world. According to Margalit and Raz, “[flamiliarity with a culture determines the 
boundaries of the imaginable. Sharing in a culture, being part of it, determines the j
limits of the feasible.”316 !
313 Ibid., 34.
314 Ibid., 34-35.
315 This is, o f course, a generalisation. There will always be some who are able over the course o f 
decades to step out from the culture in which they were formed in their childhood, or who never quite 
m ade the connection in their youth (see Waldron, note 297). However, die cost involved means that it 
is arguably sufficiently true for most individuals to survive generalisation,
316 Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National Self- Determination’ (1990) 87 Journal o f Philosophy 
439,449 .
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It is this link between authenticity and agency that gives recognition in Taylor’s 
account its extraordinary moral force. If one accepts the dialogical character of human 
existence, o f the self as necessarily situated, the judgement of others matters in 
forming me; and if  the point of my individual existence is to give expression to that 
individuality within me, the role of others in determining whether or not my life will 
be meaningful is a vital one. Further, as my life is inevitably wrapped up with the 
cultural community to which I belong, the importance of the way in which ray group 
is judged necessarily also shapes how I view myself and my search for the authentic 
me. The Cartesian turn to subjectivity and the loss of certainty in the external world 
that are such defining features of modernity sees authenticity become the path of 
men’s existential search for deliverance. Defining our identity reaches to the heart of 
the meaning of our existence. Where our forebears sought salvation in sacrifice and 
worship, good works and faith, we are to find it within ourselves. In Taylor’s words, 
“To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by 
the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which 
I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be 
done, or what I endorse or oppose.” Thus, where someone defines themselves as 
European, Catholic or Romani, they are not merely saying that they are attached to the 
European, Romani or spiritual way-of-life, but that these categories provide them with 
a frame within which they determine the meaning of their life. Moreover, that the self 
and its identity are necessarily situated means of course that the marking of a different 
identity can only be done in the context of a specific situation, so that in asserting a 
separate identity, one is necessarily and at the same time asserting the context. While 
this is true of the individual within a community, it is also the case for groups within a 
multi-cultural grouping. Thus, where Hungarian Roma assert their Romani identity 
they are, in part, at the same time necessarily asserting their Hungarian identity. When 
I assert my Englishness, I am co-temporaneously also asserting whatever I understand 
to be in opposition to it. Any account of recognition must necessarily take into 
account the refracted nature of identity.
4.1.4. Misrecognition or Why Recognition Matters
Where mutual recognition is understood as the process not simply by which we come 
to know ourselves, but how we come to be who we are, where it is the means by
317 Taylor, Sources o f the Self 27.
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which we have the freedom, space and security to discover what it is to be ourselves, 
the possibility of misrecognition creates a frightening scenario. Taylor has suggested 
that the inwardly-derived, personal, original nature of identity entails that recognition 
cannot be automatic and is more complicated than times past in which one’s public 
identity was by and large determined by one’s place in society. The understanding 
that identities are formed in open dialogue has “considerably raised the [political] 
stakes. Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic 
society. Its refusal can inflict damage.”318 Misrecognition, the refusal or failure to 
recognise an individual or group as an equal and as they see themselves, can thus 
inflict enormous psychological harm on both an individual’s identity and a collective 
identity. In perhaps his most famous sentence, Taylor writes, “misrecognition shows 
not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with 
a crippling self-hatred” and thus, “[d]ue recognition is not just a  courtesy we owe 
people. It is a vital human need.”319 Where recognition, following Hegel, is seen as 
crucial in enabling the development of full human subjectivity, misrecognition 
arguably leaves that subjectivity stunted and deformed, such that Hegel asserts that 
verbal injury or insult is a ‘universal crime’; it is a linguistic symbolic violence that 
negates the other while presenting the outward appearance of non-violence and 
recognition. “The word of abuse transforms the victim’s totality into a nullity.”
That misrecognition inflicts harm appears now to be widely accepted. But what is the 
nature of the harm that is inflicted? Taylor understands recognition to be linked to
318 The Ethics o f Authenticity, 49.
319 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f  Recognition’, 26. The notion that lack o f  recognition inflicts a form o f  
violence upon the psyche finds support in scientific research and a number of recent studies suggest 
that rejection is not only akin to physical harm but actually impacts upon physical well-being. In an 
article published in the New Scientist on 9* October 2003, scientists at the University o f  California 
found that brain scans revealed that social exclusion triggers a reaction in two regions o f  the brain also 
activated by physical pain. The article, entitled ‘Rejection really hurts’, quotes one o f  the scientists as 
saying: “The need for social connectiveness isn’t just something self-help authors cooked up. It’s a  
basic need programmed into a  primitive part o f  our brains like thirst and pain and hunger.” An earlier 
study by the University o f  Wisconsin, published in the New Scientist on  2nd September 2003, has linked 
negative emotions to a lowered immune system and an investigation by the Case Western Reserve 
University of Ohio, reported in the New Scientist on 15* March 2002, registered ‘dramatic’ decreases 
in  IQ  and the ability to reason analytically linked to social rejection, as well as an increase in 
propensity to violence. The project leader is quoted commenting on his team’s findings, “To live in 
society, people have to have an inner mechanism that regulates their behaviour. Rejection defeats the 
purpose o f  this, and people become impulsive and self-destructive.” Such behaviour, it could be 
argued, is seen in traditionally marginalised groups in society, whether it be an impoverished 
underclass in mainstream society or a racial or ethnic group battling historic exclusion. All articles 
accessed New Scientist website, 10* October 2003.
320 Philosophic des Geistes, 1805/06,215; cited in Williams, HegeVs Ethics o f Recognition, 104.
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agency in the strong sense -  the ability o f the individual to act -  and the achievement 
of authenticity. Recognition has thus been understood by both its supporters and 
detractors as falling within the parameters of ethics, of the good life, in contrast to 
questions of justice.321 The harm of misrecognition is understood by Taylor and a 
number of other recognition theorists such as Honneth, as well as Habermas, in ethical 
terms, as denying the subject the capacity to find their own authenticity and achieve 
the good life, however they define it. Nancy Fraser has however sought to place 
recognition claims within an expanded conception of justice and, in her words, to 
“resist the turn to ethics”, removing recognition politics from the dominant 
inheritance of Hegel and placing it instead within that o f Kant. Fraser’s approach 
rejects the emphasis on the psychic element of recognition over the social, seeing 
recognition instead as a question of social status. In this status model, misrecognition 
is not understood to deform group identity but implies social subordination; 
recognition, therefore, “is a remedy for social injustice, not the satisfaction of a 
generic human need”, aimed not at proclaiming an equal worth of the devalued 
culture, but to establish parity of participation in society.322 For Fraser, misrecognition 
is wrong not for the psychological injury it inflicts but because it constitutes an 
instance of institutionalised subordination and such social arrangements are “morally 
indefensible whether or not they distort the subjectivity of the oppressed. 
However, while Fraser’s emphasis on the social subordination element of recognition 
is welcome, her account fails to give sufficient explanation for why it is that social 
subordination or rejection matters, why equality is held to be such a fundamental 
value.
Yet, the strong concept of authenticity is not fully shared here either, as it seems, at 
least to this author, too deterministic in its view o f the relationship between culture 
and the individual. Further, the notion o f an authentic way of being appears to suggest 
an end goal that an individual can know and is searching for, rather than allowing for 
a form of identity that acknowledges the radical contingency of interaction and 
therefore of identity itself. There is arguably a fine line between accepting that
321 Nancy Fraser m akes this point forcefully. Fraser, ‘Recognition without Ethics?’ in Scott Lash & 
Mike Featherstone (eds.) Recognition and Difference. London: Sage, 2002 ,26
322 Fraser, ibid., 30.
323 Ibid., 27. Fraser thus does not deny that misrecognition m ay have the psychological affects ascribed 
to it but holds rather that this not the best approach.
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identity is a pre-requisite for agency and failing to acknowledge that we can never 
know what authenticity is for us. The failure of recognition undoubtedly affects the 
ability of an individual to function in the social setting, however, and what both Fraser 
and Taylor are attempting to articulate is this sense that recognition impairs the 
functioning of the individual within society.
This impaired functioning should be understood both as a consequence of 
psychological harm and of the negative affect on security of being, and, hence, on 
one’s ability to participate in the social realm. Hegel’s account of recognition, in 
which misrecognition inflicts psychological harm by rendering the individual unfree, 
is instructive here. It is suggested that there are two elements to this, corresponding to 
the accounts of positive and negative liberty given by Berlin. The relationship 
between recognition and agency and between recognition and ontological security can 
be understood through the lens of negative liberty: that the failure to accord 
recognition limits agency, complicating the relationship between the individual and 
their culture, as well as limiting their freedom of movement in the wider social world. 
The lack of security of being that misrecognition engenders, places constraints upon 
the ability of an individual to pursue their life and their own individuality. 
Recognition, or rather misrecognition, is therefore, as Jason Lindsey has highlighted, 
also linked to physical security.325 Those who lack recognition, who are not viewed as 
equals, are more likely to be victims of discrimination and of acts of violence. Lack of 
recognition also affects the distribution of goods within society, creating a circle of 
deprivation and despair in which those on the margins are socially rejected because of 
the consequences of social deprivation, and remain impoverished because they exist 
on the margins.326 The combination of poverty and rejection also hinders political 
participation in the formal institutions of governance.
324 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts o f Liberty* in Berlin, Liberty, Henry Hardy (ed.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002.
325 See Jason Lindsey, ‘Conceptualising Demands for Recognition as Ontological Security*, 
unpublished paper, available on-line at
http://www-politica]theorv.dk/conference/,res/napers/5202003145058JLindsev%20Paper.pdf. The 
Roma, unfortunately, provide good examples o f  this. See http://errc.org for a quarterly report on the 
violence o f  which Roma are victims throughout Europe.
326 In Douzinas* words, “Lack of assets not only leads to  poverty and material hardship but also 
excludes people from universality and the recognition it bestows.” Costas Douzinas, ‘Identity, 
Recognition, Rights or W hat Can Hegel Teach Us About Human Rights?’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law 
and Society 379,389. This is not the case for all those that claim recognition, however.
117
Security of identity in society and belonging is of fundamental importance to our 
well-being. It is intuitive that anyone who has felt excluded from an identity group to 
which they feel strongly attached will experience a powerful sense of disorientation 
and loss. Recognition, then, is vitally connected to our individual self-esteem and self- 
respect. Misrecognition robs us of our dignity; it can render us, in our own eyes, 
worthless. Dignity cannot be conceived of in the abstract but is a product solely of 
social interaction; it is personal. It is perhaps most noticeable in its absence, in 
relationships that seek to dominate and shame: in the power of the torturer over his 
victim, of a man humiliated before his family, of a woman at the hands of a violent 
partner. There can be no dignity in situations of oppression327 and part of the desire 
for recognition is less a desire for dignity than the desire not to be robbed o f it.
Recognition is also, however, the process in which we come to know ourselves and 
realise our full potential as individuals. It is this freedom of self-development that 
Berlin, following Hegel, Green and Bosanquet, labelled ‘positive freedom’ -  a 
concept which has striking similarities with Taylor’s consideration of authenticity. For 
Berlin, we are not only not free where there is a constraint holding .us back -  negative 
liberty -  but also where we are not able to fully realise our potential -  where we are, 
in his words, an object rather than a subject. In Berlin’s words, “I wish, above all, to 
be conscious o f myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for 
my choices and able to explain them by reference to my own ideas and purposes. I 
feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I  
am made to realise that it is not? Although Berlin at first appears to be referring to 
being one’s own master, or, later in the essay, the notion of self-mastery, these are 
both elements o f negative liberty whereby the self is either constrained or places 
constraints upon itself in order to control its passions. However, following Skinner’s 
reading, Berlin’s intention with the concept of self-mastery was in fact self-realisation
327 W ole Soyinka, ‘The Quest for Dignity’ lecture in Climate o f Fear. The Keith Lectures 2004. Great 
Britain: Profile Books, 2004,92-4. Soyinka argues that is thus misplaced to talk o f dignity in situations 
o f suffering; for as Soyinka has put it, “[w]hen the being that is labelled ‘slave’ acquires dignity, he has 
already ceased to  be a  slave”.
328 For an account o f  the development o f positive freedom from Hegel to  Berlin, see Quentin Skinner, 
‘A  Third Concept o f  Liberty’, London Review o f Books, Vol. 24, No. 7 ,4  April 2002.
329 Berlin, ‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty’, 178, (italics mine). What Berlin’s phrasing nicely captures is that 
this freedom, o r ontological security, is never achievable but that there is nonetheless a  world o f  
difference between the master and the slave in whose relationship one attempts to off-set the 
contingency o f  action and o f  being by imposing those costs on the other. For such an interpretation o f  
the master-slave dialectic, see M arkell, Bound by Recognition, 102-112.
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and the freedom to become the best self one can330; there are thus, Skinner adds, as 
many forms of positive freedom as there are human beings. Berlin himself, despite 
noting that, “[t]he lack of freedom about which men or groups complain amounts, as 
often as not, to the lack of proper recognition”, denies that recognition itself is a form 
of freedom, although “it is something no less profoundly needed and passionately 
fought for by human beings”. However, his understanding of positive freedom as 
the idea of the self at its best captures the concept of authenticity in its meaning here, 
as the opportunity to tell the best stories about ourselves one can. As Berlin wrote in 
1958, “Paternalism is despotic, not because it is more oppressive than naked, brutal, 
unenlightened tyranny ... but because it is an insult to my conception of myself as a 
human being, determined to make my own life in accordance with my own (not 
necessarily rational or benevolent) purposes ...If I am not so recognised, then I may 
fail to recognise, I may doubt, my own claim to be a fully independent human 
being.”332
Misrecognition of a group, then, can deny its individual members the ability to fully 
realise themselves and thus takes away a vital element of their freedom, imprisoning 
them as the master does the slave.333 The best known example of this is perhaps the 
harm done by colonisation.334 Not only did the colonial powers strip the lands they 
invaded of natural resources and enslave parts of their populations, they inflicted 
enormous psychological harm as well. According to Stuart Hall, a defining part of the 
colonial experience, and arguably of all subjugation, is the ability o f the dominant not 
only to establish a category of Other of those they are oppressing but to subject them
330 Berlin notes that this conception of freedom is the antithesis to the Kantian doctrine o f human 
freedom, whereby the freedom o f human beings is internal and requires no public recognition. Berlin, 
‘Two Concepts o f  Liberty’, 202, note 2. In contrast, Hegel captures the paradoxical situation in which 
the ability to be free occurs only through a process that is the antithesis o f  autonomy.
331 Berlin, Ibid, 201,204. His denial o f a link between recognition and liberty proper appears to be 
largely due to his understanding o f  recognition as concerning group identity and desires rather than o f  
an individual member of a  group.
332 Berlin, Ibid, 203.
333 W e should, however, be careful about assuming that all misrecognition is automatically harmful. 
Occasionally misrecognition may be felicitous for an oppressed or weaker party and may win them 
gains they would not otherwise have achieved; one thinks perhaps o f the way o f  w hich indigenous 
groups have gone from being backward in the eyes o f  the international community to being viewed as 
the possible saviours o f our planet. Both I would suggest are examples o f  a failure to listen to 
indigenous peoples themselves and of projecting our own fears and desires upon them ; in the latter 
case, however, it has gained indigenous groups in north America and Australisia a  considerable amount 
o f  self-government.
334 It was Frantz Fanon who did most to elucidate this psychological element o f  colonialism. ‘On 
National Culture*, The Wretched o f the Earth (1963). London: Penguin Classics, 2001,169.
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to that knowledge and to force them to experience themselves as ‘Other’.335 The 
colonialists constructed an elaborate narrative of those they subjugated as backward, 
uncivilised barbarians, something less than fully human and this is a legacy -  a self- 
narrative -from which now independent people continue to struggle to free 
themselves.
Recognition is thus a vital process in the constitution of the self and the development 
of that self in the story of our lives. The necessary situation o f the self in a culture that 
frames and shapes an individual’s self-narrative implicates cultures and such 
encompassing group identities in the process of recognition. Much like long-term 
verbal or physical abuse leaves an individual psychologically wounded, fearful and 
debilitated in terms of their ability to act, the failure to accord a group equal respect 
and recognise them as free and equal can cause similar injuries to individual 
members: members may be rendered deeply insecure, an insecurity that inhibits them 
from acting and thereby denies them choices available to others. The lack of 
recognition arguably, then, renders one unfree by erecting barriers to full functioning 
in the social realm, and hinders the exercise of positive freedom in the journey of 
one’s life.
Recognition, as described in this first part of the chapter, is simply the on-going 
never-achievable desire for ontological security, for a secure realm in which one can 
be free. What groups that claim recognition in all its various forms, from nationhood 
to demands for greater respect, are asking for, therefore, is not simply recognition -  
that they have already -  but a  re-positioning of the recognition dialectic that sees the 
relationship become one of equal mutual respect. Recognition is mutual respect at its 
most fundamental level, without which there can be no equality and no dignity. The 
dynamism of the dialectic o f recognition entails, also, that recognition is necessarily 
active. How we are to understand equality and participation at the public level is the 
subject of the second part of this chapter.
335 Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora’, in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), Identity. Community, 
Culture, Difference. London: Lawrence & W ishart, 1990.
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4 .2  R e c o g n i t io n  a n d  th e  P o i i t i c a !
The main challenge of contemporary political philosophy is arguably the attempt to 
deal fairly with what is widely accepted as the fact of plurality. The recognition 
discourse is re-defining the terms of this debate, but any consideration of what form 
recognition should take must necessarily chart a course between group rights and the 
rights of the individual, between communitarian tendencies and the basic tenets of the 
liberal faith. The remainder of this chapter attempts to do that, although in very 
limited fashion.336
The suggestion will be that although liberalism, currently the dominant political 
discourse, is right to locate the basic moral unit as the individual, it is incapable of 
dealing appropriately with the degree to which each individual is situated in his or her 
cultural milieu. Similarly, while recognition claims tend towards communitarian-type 
arguments, it is important not to loose sight of the purpose of recognition -  the well­
being and freedom of the individual. The aim is to find the best balance possible 
between acknowledging the situated self and maintaining the place of the individual 
as the centre of concern, whilst simultaneously acknowledging that a fair balance is 
unachievable and that the best we can do is to acknowledge the tendency towards 
hegemony and the corresponding need to keep any system open to contestation. This 
section very briefly charts the attempts of a number of theorists to locate an equitable 
balance, before considering in greater depth the work of James Tully, whose attempts 
to keep open the possibilities to challenge both the procedural and normative 
foundations of society strike this author as the most likely to provide opportunities for 
genuine recognition.
4.2.1. A Liberal Response
The great success of liberalism has been its founding belief in the freedom of 
individual conscience and the corresponding right of the individual to choose his or 
her own beliefs and way of life. This realm of freedom is protected by individual 
rights against the state, whose role it is to provide a neutral public forum in which 
individuals from a wide variety of cultures and beliefs can come together to organise a
336 The account given is strictly limited to the impact such considerations have on the process of 
recognition. Inevitably, nuances and refinements of individual theories are excluded.
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1common political life despite possibly widely diverging opinions of the good life. By 
making rights the means of defining social interaction, liberalism has attempted to 
limit public interaction to these boundaries.337
While recognition concerns appear to have redefined justice for many liberals, so that 
liberalism’s normative aim is no longer primarily the eradication of material 
inequality but the need to achieve equality through a focus on mutual respect338, the 
basic principles of the freedom of the individual as paramount, and the neutrality of 
the public arena remain at the core of liberal recognition attempts. Collective 
deliberation in the political arena is not a good in itself, therefore, but a means to 
safeguard the private autonomy of its members; and while liberals have long 
acknowledged the importance of an inclusive form of politics, they have traditionally 
sought to achieve this through difference-blind policies at the public level that 
emphasis the equal citizenship of all and safeguard the private autonomy of each to 
live their own conception of the good. A number of progressive liberal theorists have, 
however, sought to develop a politics o f recognition, arguing that not only are group- 
based rights not a breach of the liberal faith but are quintessential to achieving liberal 
justice. Two such accounts will be considered here with the aim of considering 
whether a group-based rights approach in which difference is tolerated can offer 
genuine recognition.
A. Special status rights
Will Kymlicka has famously argued for the necessity of ‘special-status’ for national 
minority groups to supplement individual human rights in a multi-national society.
He justifies this difference-based approach and the breaking down of the traditional 
barrier between public and private on the basis of individual choice, which he 
suggests can only be meaningful in the context of cultural membership; access to
337 E.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
338 Alex Honneth, ‘Recognition or Redistribution? Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of 
Society’ in Lash and Featherstone (eds.), Recognition and Difference. Convincing accounts of the 
internal relation between recognition and distribution struggles have been put forward by Tully, 
‘Struggles for Recognition and Distribution’ (2000) 7 Constellations 469, Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking 
Recognition’ (2000) 3 New Left Review 107 and ‘Recognition without Ethics?’; and Iris Marion 
Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference. New Haven: Princeton University Press, 1990. The 
internal relation between recognition, distribution and representation is picked up in chapter 7.
339 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995.
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one’s culture is a prerequisite of individual freedom for Kymlicka. Private acceptance 
of different cultures is not sufficient and is why instead political recognition is 
necessary. Appealing to arguments of equality, historical precedent and the value of 
cultural diversity, Kymlicka makes the case for special rights for certain groups.340 
The institutionalisation of difference is necessary, according to Kymlicka, to ensure 
adequate recognition for minority groups in the face of a superficially neutral politics 
that is in fact, and can only be, discriminatory. Kymlicka thus justifies the granting of 
different rights and entitlements on the basis of individual autonomy. The right to 
cultural identity is an individual right: the right to a culture, not to a particular culture,
•  •  341i.e. mine.
While the rights that liberal minority rights will allow go so far as forms of self- 
governance for certain groups such as indigenous peoples, the basis of Kymlicka’s 
theory is that internal claims of the group must be separated from the external claims 
minority groups make. The latter refer to claims the group makes for representation 
and recognition against the wider society, while internal claims concern internal 
restrictions upon behaviour and beliefs of members of the group. These internal 
restrictions cannot be tolerated in a liberal society.342 The tolerance Kymlicka offers is 
thus a limited and specific version of tolerance i.e. solely that which respects and 
furthers the autonomy of the individual. Co-existence with non-liberal minorities is to 
be accommodated by a modus vivendi in which liberalism is not forced upon national 
minorities, particularly those that are entitled to self-governance rights, but under 
which liberals have a duty to speak out against illiberal practices. Non-liberal 
minorities are thus to be tolerated, but not accepted.
While this brief synopsis does not do justice to Kymlicka’s theory, there are clearly a 
number of problems with a liberal theory of minority rights for any recognition 
dialogue. Firstly, a rights-based theory fails to take sufficient account of the
340 The rights one is entitled to depend, according to Kymlicka, on the group’s status as a national 
minority, a religious or ethnic minority, or immigrant See, in particular, Multicultural Citizenship, 26- 
33.
341 Part of the compromise Kymlicka makes in attempting to reconcile special provisions for groups 
with the liberal platform of equality is to emphasis freedom; but by viewing the importance of culture 
as sustaining the ability to evaluate and chose among various life options, freedom becomes the ability 
to chose one’s culture. See Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, ‘Liberalism and the Right to 
Culture’ (1994) 61 Social Research 491.
342 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 35-44,151-172.
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1participatory element of recognition, providing instead a pre-packaged parcel of 
special rights and privileges for those groups claiming recognition. Such an approach 
arguably leads to political stasis, as interests and identities become entrenched, 
imprisoned in the definitions that legal provisions require. In seeking a once-and-for- 
all recognition embedded in constitutional rights, either to equality or to special 
exclusions or privileges, the risk is run o f reifying a single interpretation of identity, 
closing off the possibilities of change via interaction with others. Rights necessarily 
express and uphold pre-existing identities, and the idea of identity developed in this 
chapter suggests that recognition is inevitably belated and therefore cannot be 
captured in a rights form.343 The law necessarily generalises and, as Douzinas writes, 
“the universalizing logic of the law always fails the uniqueness of the other”.344 The 
desire for the other always remains one step ahead of the law. A right to be different 
does not necessarily imply active engagement that recognition requires; it can also be 
isolating, alienating, and coercive, acknowledging difference and seeking to preserve 
it by separating it off from ‘normality’.345
A rights-based approach also suggests an imposed solution. While a group may 
express its preferences and while these preferences may be taken into account, the 
relationship between state and claimant group is not an equal one and therefore any 
agreement is unlikely to have been achieved in equal negotiations. Where genuine 
recognition in the public sphere is participation as equals, progressive liberalism 
cannot accommodate it, for the emphasis is on rights and not on the openness of and 
equality in participation itself. Rights may be part of the recognition process, but legal
343 In MarkelPs words, following Arendt, “action forever outruns the relations of recognition out of 
which it emerges” and it that therefore, “cannot insulate us against the surprises and reversals of action 
in which we lose ourselves, sometimes pleasantly, sometimes catastrophically”. Markell, Bound by 
Recognition, 94.
344 Douzinas, ‘Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can Hegel Teach Us About Human Rights?’, 403.
345 Povinelli has provided a quite devastating account o f the engagement of Australian multicultural 
self-understanding with the Aboriginal Other via the courts. She notes that in their recent decisions on 
native title, courts first delineate the differences between ‘Australian’ and Aboriginal cultural systems 
and practices, while simultaneously establishing a formal value relationship between types of 
Aboriginal cultural performance; they then tie the recognition o f native title rights to the judicial
judgment of how successfully Aboriginal groups perform their ‘difference’. Her dissection of the hailed j
Mctbo decision suggests a case framed not as a grappling of two cultures over conceptions of land, .
society, ownership etc but as a moral dilemma for Anglo-Celtic Australians in which Aboriginal I
culture is simply a mirror. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, ‘The State of Shame: Australian Multiculturalism |
and the Crisis of Indigenous Citizenship’ (1998) 24 Critical Inquiry 575, esp. 588-591. j
f 
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recognition must be only a link in the chain of the on-going negotiation of 
recognition.346
Finally, while a weak version of toleration is undoubtedly vital in plural societies, and 
while relativism has no place in recognition, toleration, as liberalism’s earliest 
exponents were well-aware, is also the expression of power.347 By ‘allowing’ a group 
to choose its way-of-life, the majority declares itself master and thus explicitly denies 
genuine recognition to others. Further, tolerance is inherently negative, keeping the 
Other at arm’s length distance, and passive, in contrast to the positive public and 
active acceptance that recognition requires348 Engagement between the liberal 
mainstream and ‘non-liberal’ cultures, where such terms define the encounter, can 
only be a civilising mission.
Indeed, any engagement with other cultures where the standard of normality is 
liberalism cannot begin to address domination where liberalism itself is the 
hegemonic discourse.
B. Habermas and constitutional patriotism
Habermas has sought to avoid many of the critiques levelled at the liberal theory of 
minority rights in his insistence upon the necessity of deliberation in any conception 
of liberal democracy. While his approach is rights based, he not only by and large 
avoids the critique of rights outlined above by recognising the need for a 
counteraction to the universalising and deterministic logic of the law, which he sees as 
provided by the open deliberative forum of civil society, but makes a solid argument
346 Douzinas has noted that while rights constitute bargaining chips in negotiation o f identity, the 
dialogue of construction of that self with others takes place against “the monologue of legal 
subjection”. Douzinas, ‘Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can Hegel Teach Us About Human 
Rights?’, 386. This is not to suggest of course that rights are not an important and necessary part of 
public recognition; legal recognition is an important part of Hegelian theory and thus of more recent 
theorists of recognition such as Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition (Tr. Joel Anderson, MIT Press, 
1996), and Douzinas himself. It is rather to suggest that rights alone cannot be sufficient.
347 “Toleration is not the opposite for intoleration, but is the counterfeit of it Both are despotism.” 
Thomas Paine, The Rights o f Man, Part 1, (1791) (London: Penguin Classics, 1984).
348 This is hardly surprising as the liberal doctrine of toleration aims at neutralizing such difference 
from the public arena. See Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, ‘Toleration as the Public Acceptance of 
Difference’ in Rainer BaubOck and John Rundell (eds.), Blurred Boundaries: Migration, Ethnicity, 
Citizenship. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998.
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for the necessity of a legally-based approach to living together in a multicultural 
society in which there is necessarily no agreement on common values.
Habermas insists that the liberal theory of rights can incorporate the entrenchment of 
difference and, like Kymlicka, insists that it must do so in order to call itself liberal.349 
Like Kymlicka he relies upon an argument for individual freedom but takes a slightly 
different approach. Habermas seeks to remind us of the (full) Kantian concept of 
autonomy, which requires that only to the extent that individuals understand 
themselves to be the authors o f the laws that govern them in their private lives can 
they be autonomous.350 A politics of recognition must necessarily foster and protect 
therefore the identity formation of the individual in all the contexts in which it takes 
place. When the theory of rights is correctly understood, it must protect the integrity 
of the individual in the context o f their formation in the public sphere. Indeed, 
because protection of the individual depends upon guaranteeing the integrity of the 
culture, or ‘life context’, in which they have formed their identity, the democratic 
process of actualising individual rights to equality necessarily implies guaranteeing 
the co-existence of different ethnic and cultural groups. For Habermas, all that is 
required is the actual realisation of a system of rights.351
It is in this context that Habermas has developed his theory o f deliberative democracy, 
in which individuals are only free to the extent that they can participate in the forms 
of communication that determine the collective action of society. Public spheres and 
civil society act as the forum in which public opinion is formed via communicative 
action and in which voices of protest can be heard and can act as correctives to the 
universalising tendency of the legal order.352 While rights may be both universalising 
and individualising, they are situated in a political context in which the continual 
determination of the common good takes place, and their value is seen in their ability 
to secure the public space of deliberation.
349 “We call a political culture ‘liberal* to the extent that it operates through symmetrical relations of 
reciprocal recognition -  including between the members o f different identity-groups”. Habermas,
‘Equal Treatment o f Cultures and the Limits o f Postmodern Liberalism’ (2005) 13 The Journal o f 
Political Philosophy 1,15.
350 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’, 112.
351 Habermas, The Inclusion o f the Other. Edited by C. Cronin and P. de Greiff. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1996, Ch. 8: ‘Straggles for Recognition in the Democratic State’, 113,207-208,210.
352 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Tr. William Rehg). Cambridge Ma.: The MIT Press, 1996, 
302-314.
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Habermas recognises that modem law is formal, individualistic, coercive, positive and 
procedurally-enacted, but argues it is that that renders it legitimate. Modem law in 
fact guarantees freedom because it is a system of norms that are both coercive and 
positive, safeguarding the autonomy of all citizens equally.353 This legal 
constitutionalism is supported by a democratic reflexivity, which itself is the basis 
upon which law is formed. However, a formal legal institutionalisation of democracy 
necessarily presupposes shared general background assumptions about the conduct of 
political life.
Yet Habermas’s attempt to reconcile the multicultural nature of society involves an 
abandoning of the link between the development of democracy and the nation, for to 
cling to the nation as a pre-constituted entity would be to undermine the autonomy of 
the people as a self-governing entity and would exclude those ‘citizens’ that were not 
members of the nation. The ‘we-perspective’ that makes self-determination 
possible is provided rather by membership in the political culture of society. 
Citizenship is separated from membership of the nation and the political acts as a 
shared “common horizon of interpretation”, rooted in a  collective interpretation of 
constitutional principles from the perspective of a shared historical experience.355 
Citizens thus have access to the on-going discourse on their political self- 
understanding through debates on current issues. Diversity and differing conceptions 
of the good life remain distinct from the overarching political culture, which does not 
“detract from the legal system’s neutrality vis-à-vis communities that are ethically 
integrated at the subpolitical level.”356
Constitutional patriotism is thus generated by a procedural consensus in which all 
participate and together define their common character. At the pragmatic level, the 
consensus is translated into binding decisions that can be implemented, and the law 
supports and sustains the two levels of moral and political discourse -  the political 
and sub-political. Norms are valid only where they have been agreed to by all those
353 Ibid AS 1-455.
354 Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe’ (1992) 12 
Praxis International 1; Th. Mertens, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Citizenship: Kant Against Habermas’ 
(1996) 4 European Journal o f Philosophy 328,334-340.
355 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition’, 134.
356 ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State’, 225.
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affected, and where participation in the formation of that agreement has been equal 
and fair, so that all have had the same opportunity to not simply set the agenda of the 
debate and question it, but to question the terms of the debate itself. All must have had 
the opportunity to speak up, where ‘all’ includes any group or person as long as they 
can justifiably show that they are affected by the proposed norm.357 While Habermas 
acknowledges that ideal speech conditions are unlikely ever to be achieved, the notion 
of a deliberative forum retains a degree of openness, although the need for the 
formation o f a consensus, not simply on the practical decision but on the reasons for 
that decision, remains. Where the complex cultural mix of society inevitably means 
that citizens are unlikely to find consensus on values, they must find one in a 
legitimate process for the enactment of laws.358
Yet in this model, the relations of recognition can only be promoted indirectly by the 
public systems of politics and law and, hence, such dynamics are relegated to the 
space of civil society and thus to the private interaction of individuals. By relegating 
our identities to civil society it ultimately fails to allow claimant groups to contest the 
basic governing norms of society. The assumption that all the groups in society can 
and do share a common set of interpretation tools means that deliberation in this 
model does not go all the way up; the debate is defined by the appeal to this public 
reason. Where one doubts that this common horizon exists or that the appeal to this 
horizon is stronger than the cultural identities we are supposed to have left behind, 
there is a danger that the legitimacy of norm formation to which Habermas appeals is 
often little more than the ability of the majority to assert their culture and beliefs and 
to force others to accept it.359 Habermas’ understanding of socialisation as a process in 
which the individual aligns his interest with that of the collective interest appears to 
require assimilation to the dominant culture. The model of constitutional patriotism, 
although it appears to avoid the inflexibility of a rights-based model, in basing an 
inclusive democracy on appealing beyond our identities to create a common political 
identity, seems unable to move beyond the co-opting language of politics and 
constitutionalism.
357 Between Facts and Norms. See also, Seyla Benhabib, ‘Deliberative Rationality and Modes of 
Democratic Legitimacy’ (1994) 1 Constellations 30.
358 This is similar to the Rawlsian claim for impartiality of the justification process of norms, not their 
application and differential effects. See, Habermas, ‘Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of 
Postmodern Liberalism’, 10.
339 See Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso, 2000,102-104.
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4.2.2. The Politics of Difference: a Communitarian approach
Charles Taylor’s ‘politics of difference’ is precisely an attempt to acknowledge the 
importance of one’s own particular identity in the public sphere.360 Where the politics 
of recognition is essentially a cry for equal treatment, the politics of difference is a 
call for the recognition of the unique identity of the group in which it is the difference 
itself that is important and that is entrenched in rights. The politics of difference is, 
however, more than simply positive discrimination, but allows groups the right to take 
measures to ensure their continued survival that other groups might not be allowed.361 
It is here that Taylor parts company with the liberal progressives, although not, he 
claims, with liberalism. By highlighting the particularity of the individual, Taylor 
justifies an appeal to the unique identity of both individuals and groups. However, by 
placing groups and individuals in a position of equal importance, he sets up a clash 
between the rights of the individual and collective rights where a choice will have to 
be made in each instance between the two. The politics of difference thus recognises 
the importance of the group by allowing it to take special measures to ensure its 
survival which may disadvantage individuals both within and without the group 
concerned.
Although Taylor insists that the politics of difference sits within the liberal tradition, 
privileging the determination of the group to survive over the choices of individuals is 
normatively objectionable for those that view the individual as the relevant moral unit. 
Whilst Taylor argues that the politics of difference can be liberal if it respects 
diversity within its midst -  for example, if it allows, and presumably supports, 
English- speaking schools for the children of traditional English speakers in Quebec -  
the burden of exclusion has simply been shifted to a different group on a local level. 
While the English- speaking culture of Quebec, to say nothing of indigenous culture,
360 Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’.
361 The example that Taylor uses is that of the legislation in Quebec forbidding children of 
Francophones and immigrants to be schooled in English. Whether or not the parents of these children 
wish to have their children educated in the majority language (at least for Canada and one that is 
currently the dominant global language) is irrelevant for Taylor as the collective goal of the survival, 
indeed flourishing, of the French language, and hence Quebec’s identity as French-speaking, takes 
precedence in this instance. ‘The Politics of Recognition’, esp. 58-61.
362 Taylor holds that the politics of difference can be accommodated within a non-procedural 
liberalism: MA society with strong collective goals can be liberal... provided it is also capable of 
respecting diversity, especially when dealing with those that do not share its common goals”, ibid., 59.
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may be allowed rights in the private sphere, the privileging of the French language 
denies equal recognition of the special contribution of non-French speakers to the life 
of Quebec in much the same way that French-speakers were/are within Canada. As 
Habermas has noted, recognition is meant to protect the identity formation of 
individual members of a culture, not resort to “a kind of preservation of species by 
administrative means.” The politics of difference, in acknowledging that 
recognition demands require a place in the public sphere, nonetheless fails to find an 
appropriate balance between the importance of a particular culture and the rights of 
the individual.
Moreover, in assuming that what requires recognition is actual difference itself, 
Taylor reifies group-identity, detaching it from the individuals for whom 
misrecognition is so damaging. Not only does this fall into the same inflexibility trap 
as the liberal rights-approach, but leads him, as he honestly acknowledges, down the 
path of needing to recognise not simply the importance of other cultures for their 
individual members but their equal worth in comparison with each other.364 This 
insistence upon the need for recognition o f the equal worth of each culture requires us 
to gain an accurate knowledge of the other(s). On the practical level, as Taylor 
accepts, this would entail a detailed study of each and every culture -  a feat beyond 
even the most dedicated anthropologist. On the theoretical level, there are two failings 
with this approach.
The first is that it judges another culture by the terms of our own cultural 
understanding. While we are rarely able to step outside our own cultural horizons, 
Taylor’s approach reads as a form o f quasi-cultural imperialism. The second 
problem is linked to the unknowability o f  identity. Viewing recognition as requiring 
respect for one’s actual identity denies the dialectical nature of recognition itself. 
Recognition is not a question of examining a culture until we find that it has achieved 
as much as our own; nor does it require that one holds that each and every culture has 
their own Tolstoy. Recognition requires instead that one respect and value the
363 Habermas, ‘Struggles for Recognition*, 130.
364 ‘The Politics of Recognition, esp. 63-64,68-73.
365 As Berlin notes in his reading of Giambattista Vico’s Scienza nuova, “each [culture] has its own 
gifts, values, modes o f creation, incommensurable with one another: each must be understood in its 
own terms -  understood, not necessarily evaluated.” Berlin, ‘The Pursuit o f the Ideal’ in The Proper 
Study o f Mankind. UK: Chatto & Windus, 1997, 7.
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individual as an equal, which necessarily involves respecting their choices and the 
culture that makes that individual who he or she is. Thus we respect a culture for the 
important role it plays in its members lives, regardless of whether we think that it has 
produced a writer as good as Shakespeare or a composer of the equality of Mozart, or 
whether we have much awareness of its particular details at all. Recognition, as it is 
understood here, is not linked to respect for another’s identity or the acceptance of the 
equal worth of another culture in comparison with one’s own, but finds its base in the 
Kantian categorical imperative to respect individuals as ends in themselves.
4.2.3. Recognition and Agonism: politics as a critical activity
Another attempt to interrogate the relationship between the individual and the group 
from the perspective of freedom is that of James Tully.366 Whereas a liberal theory of 
minority rights emphasises the importance of equality before the law, Tully, like 
Habermas, locates democratic legitimacy in the co-equality o f the two republican 
principles of equality before the law and self-governance. Where Tully parts company 
with Habermas and other deliberative democrats is in the extent to which he holds that 
culture plays a part in the ability o f a citizen to participate in the public forum from a 
position of equality and thus his understanding of what self-rule requires. Tully’s 
approach entails a turn towards cultural agonism as a means of providing a dynamic 
sphere of ‘mutual recognition’ in which all groups can contest the recognition they 
require, but whilst retaining the centrality of the individual to the purpose of 
recognition.
366 ‘Introduction’ in A-G. Gagnon and J. Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: CUP, 
2001.at 5-7. Tully, ‘Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity* (2002) 30 Political Theory 533. 
“Practices of governance imply practices of freedom”; indeed, politics should be orientated towards 
“freedom before justice”, so that freedom becomes the condition for any concept o f justice, 541,551. 
There are other models that address the critiques raised in relation to Habermas* constitutional 
patriotism, such as Dryzek’s discursive democracy or Fraser’s participation parity approach, and that 
are in essence very similar to Tully’s form of cultural agonism. C.f. Dryzek, “Democratic politics ... 
should involve the creative questioning of identities through encounter with disparate others. This is 
not a deadly struggle, more a matter of play; what matters is that the game never ends.”, 58. John S. 
Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
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A. Freedom and the prison-house of language
Tully begins from the premise that culture is “an irreducible and constitutive” 
component o f politics.367 One cannot remove culture from politics because it is 
necessarily ever present in the language we use through the inherent understandings 
and hidden conventions that govern the way in which we use language. The terms we 
use, the way in which we speak of things, while on the face of it neutral, are governed 
by layers of cultural understanding.368 Language, in its thickest sense, holds us captive 
according to Wittgenstein, and if the majority are unaware of their imprisonment in 
language, it is by no means a benign captivity for groups of a different culture.369 The 
failure to acknowledge the cultural bias of the language we use and the conventions it 
represents, and to make room for other languages, thus constitutes a grave injustice.
But the failure to acknowledge the exclusionary nature of the modes and norms of 
discourse is not simply an act of oppression in the personal individual way that Taylor 
portrays it, although it is that too; nor is it solely the impairment of functioning in 
society. Rather, the failure to acknowledge the role culture plays in communication 
and participation has dark implications for one’s ability to be free in society. For if 
there can be no neutrality, if  to be forced to live a culture that is not one’s own can be 
a prison, the failure to give space to that other culture denies its members equal 
participation in the political life of the community. It denies, in short, such individuals 
citizenship and this lack of citizenship in turn denies individuals a say in the making 
of the rules that govern them. Those that have not consented to the rules but are 
nonetheless bound by them are not free.
367 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995,5. Politics is used in its 
more comprehensive meaning, so as to include the basic laws and governing institutions of society.
368 Tully’s thinking is based on an application o f Wittgenstein’s method, developed in Philosophical 
Investigations, of resolving philosophical dilemmas by revealing the unseen conventions that govern 
language and arise in any discussion of a problem and its possible solutions. Tully explores this in 
Strange Multiplicity, 35-57.
369 Tully uses the example of the relationship between Nora and Thorvold in Ibsen’s The Dollhouse to 
illustrate his point “Nora is trying to say something that is important to her, but the dominant language 
in which Thorvold listens and responds misrepresents the way she says it, what she is saying, and her 
understanding of the intersubjective practice in which she speaks.” Tully, ‘Political Philosophy as a 
Critical Activity’, 537.
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Membership in a given polity is defined by Tully in terms of the two concepts of free 
peoples and free citizens.370 A ‘free people’ becomes such by adhering to two 
principles in equal measure: the rule of law (what he refers to in another essay, 
following Benjamin Constant, as the freedom of the modems), whereby all are 
equally subject to the law, and self-rule (the freedom of the ancients, in Constant’s 
terminology371), whereby citizens impose the law upon themselves.372 A ‘free people’ 
achieves the higher status of ‘free citizens’ by subjecting themselves to the law 
through their own participation. The key element of citizenship is thus participation, 
and freedom, what he has most recently termed ‘dialogical civic freedom’, is found in 
the act of participation itself.373 This conception of self-rule is based upon the 
principle of ancient constitutionalism, quod omnes tangit -  that what touches all must 
be approved by all. Where a group in society are equally subject to the law, but do not 
have the opportunity for an equal say in the formation of those laws, they are not free. 
They cannot be citizens, if citizenship is achieved only through engagement in the 
process. They are, rather, subjects -  subject to the law and domination of others.
This understanding of what it is to be a free citizen is not solely a negative form of 
liberty -  freedom from constraint -  and this is worth drawing out. What Tully implies 
by using the language of Constant is that form of freedom which is to be found in 
Roman law, what Skinner has termed a third concept of liberty.374 When English 
parliamentarians attempted to shrug off the yoke of the royal prerogative, they, 
unknowingly, appealed to an understanding of freedom found in the Digest -  that, in 
the words of Skinner, “freedom is restricted not only by actual interference or the 
threat of it, but also by the mere knowledge that we are living in dependence upon the 
goodwill of others”. To be a slave is to live one’s life at the mercy of another, no
370 Tully, ‘The Challenge o f Reimagining Citizenship in Multicultural and Multinational Societies’ in 
Catriona McKinnon and Iain Hampsher-Monk (eds.), The Demands o f Citizenship. London: Continuum, 
2000,213.
371 Benjamin Constant, ‘The liberty of the ancients compared with that of the modems', in B. Constant, 
Political Writings (tr., ed. B. Fontana). Cambridge, 1988.
372 Tully has also used the terms “principle of constitutionalism” to describe the rule of law and the 
“principle of democracy” to denote self-rule. See Tully, ‘The Unfreedom of the Modems in comparison 
to their ideals of Constitutional Democracy’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 204. He has more recently 
expressed this by drawing out the dual quality of norms as both normalising and normative. It is the 
normalising aspect, whereby a rule of recognition, whether formal or informal, institutionalises certain 
behaviour by all involved that constitutes the injustice of misrecognition.
373 Tully, ‘Recognition and Dialogue: The Emergence of a New Field’ (2004) 7 Critical Review o f 
International social and Political Philosophy 84.
374 Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’.
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matter how well one is treated. Rights cannot compensate for the lack of self- 
governance.
Relationships, all relationships including of course those of governance, are 
discourses of power, in which agents act upon the action of others. Tully’s 
understanding of recognition is an elaboration of this most influential of Foucault’s 
observations.375 For Tully, recognition struggles concern the way in which we view 
each other as members of any given polity and how we collectively govern ourselves. 
It is the combination of these two elements -  recognition as the demand for self-rule 
and the understanding that culture is ever present in our interactions with others -  that 
renders the need for a radical reconceptualisation of the politics of recognition.
B. Freedom as the act of contestation: a version of cultural 
agonism
Tully’s claims about culture go deeper than merely asserting the ever-present nature 
of culture in political life. Instead, he makes the claim for cultural identity as 
‘aspectivaT. Where Taylor views identity as being orientated in determined horizons, 
the loss of which provokes an earth-shattering identity crisis, the aspectival approach 
sees cultural horizons change as one moves about, so that how one comprehends and 
relates to otherness is internal to one’s own identity. Similarly, “the experience of 
cultural difference is internal to a culture.”376 An outsider thus cannot begin to 
understand the perspective of the other, but that perspective will change according to 
the situation. How, then, are we to communicate at all?
Wittgenstein exposed what he called “our craving for generality”, by which our 
contempt for the individual case sees us chained to the attempt to find the 
commonality in all applications.377 As one definitive meaning of a term is forever 
unobtainable, the Wittgensteinian approach seeks understanding through connections 
created in the dialogical contrast and comparison of concrete examples. Language in 
the hands of Wittgenstein became a game in which meanings were the on-going 
outcome of a perpetual batting back and forth between users of their meaning of a
375 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power* in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (ed.), Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
376 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 13.
377 Strange Multiplicity, 105.
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term, from which a collective meaning coagulates.378 While there is no general 
meaning for a term, word or concept, but as many meanings as users, meaning 
becomes comprehensible in a stable and unified language-game situation. In this way, 
understanding one another without needing to comprehend what is said in terms of 
one’s own language of re-description becomes feasible. We negotiate from the 
position of our own experience, in the knowledge that it is unique to us, but remain 
open to the perspective of the other. We must strive for ‘reflective disequilibrium’ -
the ability to see our community from multiple perspectives. This ability to change 
perspectives, to step out of ourselves -  as far as that is possible -  and see aspectivally 
is, according to Tully, acquired only in the course of participating in intercultural 
dialogue. We must listen to the stories that others tell about themselves and about 
others, give our own stories in response and it is in this process that the common and 
interwoven paths of our multiplicity are revealed to us. It is arguably this that has led 
Tully to a version of cultural agonism.
Both a Wittgensteinian approach to language and mutual comprehension, and the 
awareness that the experience of difference is internal to a culture, demanding an 
aspectival approach to politics, entails that there are no shared norms and no universal 
principles to which either side can appeal.382 The purpose of negotiations is to bring 
the different sides together to uncover the differences and similarities and to find 
institutions and processes together which can accommodate both. It requires that
378 Philosophical Investigations, 138-42,243-275; Marie McGinn, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical 
Investigations. London: Routledge, 1997.
379 As Berlin notes in his reading of Vico, such reasoning does not need to lapse into relativism, for 
relativism occurs when one accepts that there is nothing more to be said than that comparison of this 
nature is fruitless. Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’.
380 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 25.
381 Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau are the most articulate exponents of what can be termed 
‘political agonism’ -  an attempt to restore the balance of liberal democracy, a historic articulation in 
which “liberalism was democratized and democracy liberalised”. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 3. 
Agonism, according to Mouffe, does not flinch from acknowledging the violence of the moment o f 
decision and thereby attempts to prevent it from becoming a lasting hegemony. Yet whereas 
antagonism takes place between enemies who share no common symbolic space, agonism takes place 
between “friendly enemies” who share a common symbolic space but who wish to see this space 
organised in a different way. (Mouffe, 13). Tully’s articulation of a cultural agonism would however be 
an affront to Mouffe who sees competing collective confrontation as a means o f preventing the, as she 
sees it, dangerous rise of identity politics. The Democratic Paradox, 104. Also, Mouffe (ed.), 
Dimensions o f a Radical Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. London: Verso, 1992.
382 In this way, Tully differs significantly from the Habermasian presumption that different groups can 
agree on shared constitutional principles and unite under a constitutional patriotism. As Tully 
succinctly puts it, the search for universality is a dead-end alley; the world is a multiverse, and hence 
constitutional dialogue must also be. Strange Multiplicity, 131; ‘Introduction’ in Multinational 
Democracies, 20.
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nothing is fixed or pre-decided before the parties come to the negotiating table.383 
Instead, even the rules of the game, indeed especially the rules of the game, are open 
to discussion and dissent. The only meta-principle in these negotiations is that of audi 
alteram partem, that one must listen to the other side and treat reasonable identity- 
and culturally-related differences with respect.384 There is no definitive form of 
recognition that the negotiations are searching for, no fixed telos, so that dialogue is 
not a means to a consensus but the end in itself.
Where identity is not isolated but intersubjective, the process of interaction itself must 
therefore be continual, taking account of the fact that identity does not stop 
developing, cannot be fixed. As mutual recognition is always less than perfect, we 
have to keep working at it. Where agreement is reached, the disagreement that will 
inevitably remain, both over interpretation and from the fact that dissent will never be 
fully resolved , entails that an agreement cannot be the end of the matter but must be 
open to challenge from the moment o f its inception; the range of issues that are the 
subject of deliberation are also subject to change over time.
It is through a process of continual negotiations that our identity as free citizens is 
thus formed and our sense of belonging to one people — a free people in Tully’s 
terminology -  is generated. For Tully, if  citizenship is an activity, then citizenisation -
383 It appears to be generally accepted in the field of social psychology that “a central element of 
relationships in all societies is that people negotiate” and that the three strategies of concession-making, 
contending (attempting or resisting persuasion) and problem-solving (attempting to locate options that 
satisfy all parties) occur in all cultures. Peter J. Camevale and Kwok Leung, ‘Cultural Dimensions of 
Negotiation’ in the Blackwell Handbook o f Social Psychology: Group Processes. Edited by Michael A. 
Hogg and R, Scott Trindale. Oxford; Blackwell, 2001,482. Hence, it could be suggested that 
negotiations are not in themselves culturally biased, although the specific format maybe e.g. a table v. a 
canoe.
384 Some authors have noted that deliberation itself is exclusive in that it imposes a particular kind of 
deliberation upon participants i.e. a discourse that is logical, reasoned and dispassionate (e.g. Young, 
‘Communication and the Other Beyond Deliberative Democracy* in Seyla Benhabib, Democracy and 
Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.). It is for this reason that Diyzek takes the 
term discourse, in which he includes forms o f communication such as argument, rhetoric, humour, 
emotion, storytelling and gossip. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, 1. Some 
representatives will always be more articulate than others; but by placing an emphasis on the discourse 
as continuous and open, it seems less likely that a quick-witted, articulate individual will gain an 
advantage in the conversation over a lengthy period, as those who are less articulate have time to gather 
their thoughts and the opportunity to insert themselves in the on-going discussion.
385 Tully gives three reasons why reasonable disagreement will always remain. Firstly, there are always 
asymmetries in power and influence; secondly, the identities of those involved in the discussions will 
alter as a result of them in unpredictable ways; thirdly, as in any game, there is room for manoeuvre in 
the interpretation of the agreement reached and the interpretation held by the various parties will not be 
accepted by all. ‘Recognition and Dialogue: The Emergence of a New Field’.
136
the perpetual becoming of membership in a polity -  can only take place through 
discussion, with reasonable disagreement flowing throughout and at every level of 
politics. The requirement that all voices be heard applies to all claims, regardless of 
their status as ‘historically present’ or recent immigrant groups, but mandates, too, 
that disagreement must flow not only at the level of inter-cultural dispute but at the 
intra-cultural level as well, so that dissent within the group making the claim and 
within the members of the majority group itself is also given voice.
Recognition struggles in constitutional democracies are thus struggles, according to 
Tully, over four dimensions. Firstly, recognition claims involve claims for recognition 
as membership of that identity in the polity itself; secondly, they involve the relations 
o f governance, including all laws, procedures and patterns that determine the political 
life of a community; thirdly, claims contest the institutions and procedures of 
democratic deliberation itself; finally, recognition struggles contest the basic norms, 
values and principles to which members appeal in determining the first three.386
A claim to recognition is thus a claim to participate in society as equal citizens, where 
participation will vary according to the particulars of each claim. National groups or 
aboriginal peoples may claim political institutions; minorities, such as linguistic or 
religious groups, women and others seek participation on equal terms in ways that 
positively recognise and affirm them. What these multifarious groups share according 
to Tully is the desire to rule themselves in line with their own ways and customs in 
mutual mediation with others. The claim to recognition is thus the antithesis of 
independence claims or isolationist desires. Indeed, isolation is simply not possible 
according to Tully, and we need to move away from a conception of cultures as 
hermetically sealed off entities seeking independent self-rule. Rather, cultures are 
‘densely interdependent’, overlapping, interactive, internally heterogeneous, 
transformed and re-negotiated both by their members and through interaction with 
non-members. The search cannot be, then, for a neutral forum or for a model in which 
each culture can maintain its traditions and customs, independent from others, but for
386 Tully, ‘Struggles over Recognition and Distribution’, 472-3. The norms contested in recognition 
claims play out in a wide variety of fields and are regulated and enforced in any number of formal and 
informal ways, as Tully makes clear. Also, Tully, ‘Recognition and Dialogue: The Emergence of a 
New Field’.
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a scheme in which different groups and cultures perpetually work towards a mutual 
recognition in which their dense interdependence is acknowledged.387
C. Promiscuity v. Hegemony: making recognition meaningful
A number o f criticisms can and have been levelled at Tully’s version of cultural 
agonism. One of the most significant relates to the position of the state as mediator 
in negotiations. The allegation is that cultural agonism fails to challenge the 
hegemony of the state. For Hegel, Sittlichkeit and thus the achievement of recognition 
between free and equal selves and the freedom that the relationship of recognition 
entailed were only possible within the structure of the state. Tully’s model of 
constitutionalism, it can be suggested, makes the same ‘mistake’. Certainly in Strange 
Multiplicity the state is to act as a moderator in negotiations between indigenous 
groups, Quebec and the rest of Canada. Yet the state is not, cannot be, neutral389 and, 
in this example, in fact represents the non-indigenous, non-Quebec part in the 
negotiations. To a certain extent, however, this is inevitable. The representative of the 
majority, at least in democracies, is the state; the asymmetry of power between the 
majority and groups claiming recognition will not disappear even in situations of 
agnostic negotiations.
A different but related problem is that for negotiations of this type to function, there 
will need to be penalties for disengagement or refusing to take part. Tully’s actors are 
trapped together in a canoe and need to negotiate their necessarily common future. 
The sheer investment demanded of all parties in negotiations in much bigger boats, 
however, means that powerful players may not be persuaded of the benefits of taking 
part -  indeed, for them, participation may entail more losses than gains -  and
387 Thus in advocating the need for a neutral forum, cultural agonism differs, say, from a ‘politics of 
presence* as advanced by Anne Phillips, in which it is the presence of members of disadvantaged 
groups in the institutions of society and governance that is sought Yet, the presence of different groups 
will not change the co-opting structures themselves. Anne Phillips, The Politics o f Presence. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995.
388 1 gratefully acknowledge discussion with Kirsty Gover on a number o f these points. See, also, 
Markell, Bound by Recognition, 187-189.
389 Markell argues convincingly against both the assumption of the state as a transparent medium and 
against the characterisation of the state as always already sovereign. He argues that the state appears to 
transcend recognition struggles by establishing itself as the hegemon amidst the social, representing its 
identity as authoritative fact, whereas the invocation o f state sovereignty is no difference from other 
recognition claims and, further, it ignores the way in which the state gives active shape to the ‘people’ 
in its continual work of claiming recognition of that identity. Markell, ib id , 26-28.
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therefore they need to be convinced that to be outside negotiations is to drown, 
figuratively speaking. A not-taking-part will, most likely, not be penalty enough for 
those that are sufficiently powerful to play the master at the expense of others. The 
more important question then is how to ensure the involvement and continued 
involvement of all parties, powerful and less so. It is suggested that to ensure willing 
participation of all, negotiations will need to be authoritative i.e. the process will take 
important decisions. Such authority will need to be granted by some entity, whether it 
be the state on the national level, or, on the international level, that the role is played 
by the illusive ‘international community*. The necessary institutional role as convenor 
and mediator of negotiations, as well as authorising power, whether state or 
international organisation, need not be a major stumbling block, however, as long as 
the mediator does not claim neutrality, and as long as the role itself, as well as the 
outcome of negotiations, is open to contestation. In stressing the understanding that 
there is no normativity, no inevitability, in the status quo, Tully’s later work arguably 
makes the best of the necessary involvement of institutions and the fact that the 
playing field is never level.
A further difficulty related to the permanent danger of failing to recognise hegemonic 
practices concerns the nature of agonistic forums themselves. An agonistic forum in 
which debating identity is the explicit purpose runs the risk o f highlighting and 
concretising irreconcilable differences, reifying identity and achieving little. Further, 
making recognition the focus of negotiations not only highlights discord, but requires 
that each participant define their identity prior to inclusion in the process, so that 
identity is understood as an historically given set of facts about who we are -  a set of 
facts that not only precedes us but that governs our actions, determining when we are 
acting authentically.391 To a large extent, however, these dilemmas are unavoidable. 
One possible suggestion for overcoming this is to avoid forums that deliberately serve 
to highlight differences and focus instead on the practical problems that we share by 
virtue of living together. Where one understands identity as dialogical, as resulting 
from action rather than merely being revealed through action, prior recognition 
inevitably constitutes misrecognition. The nature of identity seems to necessitate the 
conclusion that recognition cannot be achieved by reaching for it but that the
390 See Markell’s interpretation of the master/ servant dialectic. Ibid., 96-97.
391 Tully, too, suggests that negotiations begin with mutual recognition. Strange Multiplicity, 119.
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relationship o f identity to action entails that genuine recognition comes about only by 
acting together. A focus on the practical appears to be a way of moving beyond the 
problems of recognition without abandoning the concept as unworkable.
Another serious criticism that can be made of cultural agonism relates to the danger of 
promiscuity -  that in it, recognition is loose and cheap, and thus rendered 
meaningless. For negotiations to be meaningful, they cannot be open to all that claim 
the desire to enter. The canoe cannot accommodate an infinite number of passengers 
without sinking. Members of a golf club in rural Gloucestershire may feel that they 
are misrecognised if the club is not allowed to take part on behalf of its members in 
discussions concerning global warming -  an issue which they are obviously affected 
by (changes in global weather patterns mean too much rain and a flooded golf course, 
for example). For these men and women being a golf-player and in particular being a 
golf-player at this specific golf club is a defining aspect of their identity.
Tully has noted the difficulty that where one views claims not as belonging to a 
certain type o f identity politics, but as claims concerning current norms of mutual 
recognition, it can be extended to any kind of dispute.393 Every constitution of an 
entity or forum necessarily involves exclusion, however; every decision an act of 
violence, as Mouffe has reminded us. While the golf club is obviously a tongue-in- 
cheek example, taking Wittgenstein’s investigations into language and meaning 
seriously means accepting that exclusion cannot be straightforward. Indeed, it follows 
logically from a combined understanding of misrecognition as a grievous harm and of 
the irreducibility o f cultural difference that recognition must be available to all who 
claim it. To refuse recognition, to impose standards for recognition on the shape or 
type o f entity that claims it, necessarily constitutes cultural domination. However, 
recognition is not to be found in free-for-all inclusion either.
The problem is therefore to find a means of allowing wide participation in the 
knowledge that it cannot be limitless, without perpetuating the type of oppression that
392 Arendt, The Human Condition; see infra section 4.1.2. See also Fraser’s emphasis on participation 
parity as a means o f side-stepping the problem of recognition. Parity is both an objective and subjective 
condition: the former concerns the distribution o f material resources such as to ensure means by which 
adequate voice can be given; the latter requires that institutional arrangements express equal respect for 
all participating cultures and ensure social esteem for all. Fraser, ‘Recognition without Ethics?’, 29.
393 ‘Recognition and Dialogue: The Emergence o f a New Field’.
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the various theories of recognition sought to overcome in the first place. The ability to 
contest each and any of the rules of society does not entail having one’s demands met. 
Rather, it implies the right to have one’s claim heard and listened to in a spirit of 
mutual interdependence. Recognition, then, at its very minimum is the right to 
contest, to attempt to de-stabilise the hegemony of the status quo. Criteria for 
participation must be set, but these criteria must be open to challenge and the 
challenges must be taken seriously, for the cost of exclusion for a group or entity in 
terms of recognition may be very high. Nor are challenges necessarily confined to the 
procedural; but, as Tully’s breakdown of recognition struggles into four types 
suggests, recognition struggles about the ‘how’ of participation necessarily call into 
question the values and principles that underpin the ordering of society. Such 
recognition struggles also therefore impact upon matters of redistribution -  the ‘how 
much for whom’ questions.
4 . 3 . S u m m a r y :  T h e  r a d ic a l  c o n t in g e n c y  o f  r e c o g n i t i o n
This chapter has attempted to suggest that recognition is no less than the currency of 
human interaction; for Hegel, “the human being is itself the movement of 
recognition”.394 Recognition is thus necessarily reciprocal and mutual. In society, the 
relational nature of recognition means that it can never be a simple dialectic struggle 
between two individuals, between a claimant group and the establishment, but as 
Tully, has put it, recognition is a multilogue.395
Recognition is to be found in participation, in the continuous conversations and 
dialogues that establish the rules and norms that govern a given polity and the policies 
that implement them. For Tully, it is only in participation in agonistic negotiations in 
which all ‘languages’ can participate as openly and fairly as possible that freedom is 
to be found. While this form of freedom, following Berlin, can be characterised as 
negative, Taylor has demonstrated the crucial importance of public recognition for 
positive freedom, of enabling a group and members of that group to become who they 
are. Yet, while recognition provides the space for identity-formation -  an Arendtian 
space of appearance -  and, as such, is the pre-enabling condition for identity, it cannot
394 Philosophie des G e is tes, 1805/06,197; Williams, Hegel’s Ethics o f Recognition, 101.
395 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 131.
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involve a recognising of identity. Rather, while ontological security cannot be 
achieved, it can be more or less present, and viewing recognition as participation 
seeks to avoid the trap of attempting to realise our identity, suggesting instead the 
security to be found in inclusion, in which our different cultures are equally respected. 
Only where such a degree of security is present can we be both free from oppression 
and free to develop ourselves and to tell the best stories about ourselves possible. The 
positive freedom emphasised by Taylor and the negative freedom highlighted by 
Tully are both present in Hegel, and Hegel remains important in reminding us that 
recognition needs both in our attempt to understand and institute a politics of mutual 
recognition. Ultimately, the validity o f a norm of recognition is determined by its 
normative potential, rather than by its normalising force, that is by the degree of 
dialogical freedom of those subject to it.396
Agonistic deliberation places a great deal of faith in the highly transformative 
potential of politics. The effort demanded is great and the price for failure is high for 
all, although the burden is carried in the main by the most vulnerable. The struggle for 
recognition is not about the status o f one group or a ‘type’ of groups, but the nature of 
reciprocal recognition entails an altering of all the relationships within the given 
polity; no entity or individual is transcendent to the struggle and is thus unaffected by 
changes to the players in the field. There is a sense in which agonistic deliberations 
are not natural for human beings, standing in sharp contrast to territoriality and the 
fencing off of what is mine. It is something instead that we have to continually strive 
for in the knowledge that we will never get it right. According to the writer Ben Okri, 
“[t]he fact of story-telling hints at a fundamental human unease, hints at human 
imperfection. Where there is perfection there is no story to tell.
However, in seeking to undermine the hegemonic order, recognition must be a 
struggle and not take the easy path o f meaningless recognition for all. Promiscuity of 
recognition is not an answer. Yet, in order to overcome the hegemony of a static 
pattern of power relations, we must keep the boat moving. Our journey is a 
fundamentally different one, then, to that of Odysseus’, for in order that our polities
396 Tully, ‘Recognition and Dialogue: The Emergence of a New Field’, 100.
397 Tully, ibid., 88.
39S Okri, ‘The Joys of Story-Telling’, Fragment No. 18.
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meet the critical challenge there can be no final resting place, no homeland for which 
we aim, despite a yearning for stability like Odysseus’ yearning for Ithaca.399 Tully 
has used the figure of an athlete limbering up for combat as the image of agonistic 
recognition.400 Perhaps a more appropriate image of participants in a recognition 
dialectic in which identity will always outrun the bounds of recognition is that o f an 
individual stepping up to the day, in the knowledge of and ready for the contingency it 
will bring, with the motto ‘Come What May’ on her lips.
399 Jon Ulster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment and Constraints. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. Instead of the traditional pre-committing nature of 
constitutionalism, therefore Tully offers the image of a chain of dialogue with each agreement being a 
link in the chain; Strange Multiplicity
400 ‘The Unfreedom of the Modems in comparison to their ideals of Constitutional Democracy’, 219.
143
Chapter 5: The possibility of non-territorial 
nationhood: contradiction or vision?
It was in books that he first learnt of his invisibility. He searched for himself and his people in all the 
history books he read and discovered to his youthful astonishment that he didn’t exist40'
The self-conscious and persistent decision of the Romani Movement to claim Romani 
nationhood and the recent consensus within the Movement that the Romani nation as 
a whole is -  can only be -  a non-territorial and dispersed nation require some attempt 
at situating this claim within recent discourses on nations and nationalism. A number 
of nationalist demands within developed liberal constitutional states have, over the 
last 30 years, adapted to take account of the modem challenges facing the nation-state 
and have developed a sophisticated form of nationalist claim capable of sitting within 
a state constitutional order. This sub-state nationalism, or neo-nationalism, is an 
attempt to establish a rival but non-exclusive site of authority inside the state; it 
demands recognition of a distinct national identity and greater autonomy within the 
constitutional order while reaching out for participation in the supra-state structures 
and dynamic sectorial networks that are widely perceived to be challenging the 
competence of the state to govern.402 The Romani Movement is thus not alone in 
putting forward a national claim that does not aspire to statehood. However, while the 
nation-state is facing a multiplicity o f rival claims to its traditional authority and while 
the de-territorialisation of influence over many of the most important aspects of our 
lives continues apace, all commentators apparently remain insistent that our primary 
sense of belonging must remain a territorial one, whether it be state territory or non­
state territory. Thus although the Romani claim can be viewed as part of the trend 
away from statehood, it is alone among contemporary claims in seeking a nation 
without territory.403
401 Ben Okri, Astonishing the Gods. London: Phoenix, 1995,3.
402 Michael Keating, ‘Nations without States: The Accommodation of Nationalism in the New State 
Order’ in Michael Keating and John McGarry (eds.), Minority Nationalism and the Changing 
International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Keating, Plurinational Democracy: 
Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 200. Stephen Tierney, 
‘Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation- 
State’ (2005) 54 International Comparative Law Quarterly 161.
403 For the development of the concept of non-territorial national-cultural autonomy by the Jewish 
Bund at the turn o f the twentieth-century as an attempt to reconcile the growth of Zionism and socialist 
ideals, see Henry J. Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia From Its Origins to 1905. California: Stanford
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People and territory are obviously intimately connected and have over many hundreds 
of years defined and shaped each other. However the uniting of fixed territorial 
borders with exclusive political belonging that marked the arrival of the modem has 
moulded the limits and shape of political organisation for centuries, determining 
understandings of the nature and look of both nations and states. The political has 
become entwined with territory -  distinct from cultural identities that do not require a 
territorial attachment. Identity without any attachment to territory, not even of a 
diasporic nature, cannot therefore be viewed as a national identity.404 Such reasoning 
would see the claim to non-territorial nationhood as necessarily contradictory, an 
attempt to extend the boundaries of a nation to the point of rendering the concept 
meaningless.
This chapter will attempt to suggest that while territory is instrumental, it is not an 
indispensable element of the political aspirations that are so fundamental to the 
definition of a nation. Three points will be suggested. Firstly, the nation is an 
intrinsically valuable community to the individuals that belong to it; indeed, it is the 
primary vehicle of our social imagining. The second point is that a nation is solely to 
be defined as a group that aspires to collective self-governance. Finally, it shall be 
argued that while territory is instrumental in facilitating the development of that 
aspiration, and although territory features strongly as a symbol of nationhood, it is not 
inherent to national claims. It shall be argued that capacity is relevant only in so far as 
it facilitates the establishment of the legitimacy of a claim. The belief in the necessity 
of territory is, rather, underpinned by an undue emphasis on the importance of 
capacity in establishing a national claim. However, where capacity is no longer 
viewed as a separate element from the legitimacy of aspirational claims to nationhood, 
territory cannot be held to be an essential element of nationhood.
University Press, 1972; and Zvi Gitelman (ed.), The Emergence o f Modem Jewish Politics. Bundism 
and Zionism in Eastern Europe. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. For non-territorial national 
autonomy as developed by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, see Ephraim Nimni, ‘Nationalist 
multiculturalism in late imperial Austria as a critique of contemporary liberalism: the case of Bauer and 
Renner’ (1999) 4 Journal o f Political Ideologies 289.
404 E.g. A.D. Smith, National Identity. London: Penguin, 1991,21. Smith also requires ethnic groups to 
have some attachment to territory to qualify for the description of ‘ethnic’.
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5 .1 . T h e  N a t i o n  a s  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  v a lu a b le  c o m m u n i t y
Nations have long been understood as the primary community of political 
membership, from the earliest records of the Middle Ages (even, perhaps, 
antiquity405) to the Enlightenment, in which the Crown was replaced by the people as 
the vehicle of political autonomy. Empire and the potent force of nationalist sentiment 
spread the nation-state model to the rest of the world and global political organisation 
remains enthralled to the belief that mankind is fundamentally divided into nations 
and that these nations possess a territorial homeland. While it is now generally 
accepted that national identity is a work of collective imagination and thus is no more 
natural than any other form of identity, the nation is likely to remain the basis of our 
primary political belonging for the foreseeable future. This is not something 
necessarily to be lamented. Indeed, this section will present reasons for taking 
national claims seriously.
There are two types of argument customarily put forward for the need to respect 
national groups. The first concerns the importance of national identity for the 
individual. The argument that liberal nationalists make is that national identity is a 
fundamental part o f individual self-identity; that, for whatever reason, as individuals 
we identify with a national group and this identity must be respected. The second type 
of argument can be characterised as communitarian and presents the case for the value 
of the group collectively. As Aristotle notes at the outset of The Politics, all 
associations come into being for the sake o f some good.406 It is this second argument 
that is considered first.
David Miller, in his comprehensive attempt to rehabilitate the nation, has made the 
point strongly that nations are not inherently unethical communities, that, rather, they 
are indeed intrinsically valuable communities.407 In addition to making the individual 
argument, he argues for nations as ethical communities on the basis of the 
relationships o f mutual trust and feelings of solidarity that are, he suggests,
405 See Steven Grosby, ‘Borders, Territory and Nationality in the Ancient Near East and Armenia’
(1997) 40 Journal o f the Economic and Social History o f the Orient I .
406 The Politics, Bk. 1, Ch. 1, 1252a2-3. (Tr. Ernst Barker, Oxford University Press, 1995)
407 David Miller, On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Also Margaret Canovan, 
‘Patriotism is Not Enough’ (2000) 30 British Journal o f Political Science 413.
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intrinsically valuable in themselves. There are slight variations on this argument. 
Others present a view in which they suggest that national feelings of solidarity 
produce objective goods, such as the survival of one’s culture or language, the 
creation of democratic institutions and so on, all of which other nations may also have 
achieved but what is important is that it is the relationships within the group that have 
produced and sustained these particular goods.408 Similarly, Miller argues that only a 
nation can generate the feelings of solidarity in which deliberative democracy is 
possible.409 Miller suggests that it is, in part, an understanding of nations as 
“communities of obligation” in the sense that members recognise and act upon their 
bonds to one another that justifies self-governance, for if social justice is to be 
effectively discharged, duties must be assigned and enforced.410
Such arguments highlight the intrinsic value of the nation from the perspective of the 
goods it produces, but liberal nationalists have sought to reclaim nationalism from the 
communitarians.
In the attempt to reconcile group rights with the liberal tradition, many scholars have 
emphasised the importance of the group to individual well-being. There are a number 
of ways to make this connection. One is to highlight the importance of the group to 
individual feelings of self-worth. Margalit and Raz take this line, for example, arguing 
that individual identity is intrinsically bound up with the group and that the esteem 
with which a group is held in society deeply affects the self-respect of the 
individual.411 Others, such as Kymlicka and Taylor, highlight the link between culture 
and autonomy. Where culture provides the ‘horizons of significance’ within which 
individuals are able to make choices about their version of the good life, individual 
choice is dependent upon the presence of a societal culture, according to Kymlicka.412 
If culture provides the structure in which individual autonomy is meaningful, it makes 
sense that it deserves some form of recognition and protection.
408 See Moore for discussion of Hurka’s version of the argument Margaret Moore, The Ethics of 
Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, Chapter 2.
409 Miller, On Nationality, 92,96.
4,0 Miller, ibid, 83.
411 Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘On National Self-Determination’ (1990) 87 Journal of 
Philosophy 439.
4,2 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995,75-80; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
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The connection to autonomy made by liberal progressives has, however, faced severe 
criticism. If a culture does not allow individual autonomy, is the suggestion to be that 
the culture is worthless and should not be granted protection or accorded some form 
of recognition?413 It is counter-intuitive that only those cultures that cultivate 
individual autonomy give meaning and structure to people’s lives; the evidence is that 
people feel very attached to even those cultures that deny them those individual rights 
that are the mainstay of liberal politics. Further, placing the emphasis on the link 
between culture and autonomy can also fail to provide sufficient connection between 
self-government and culture. As Moore rightly highlights, the assumption of the 
liberal progressives is that cultures, and therefore nations, are significantly different to 
one another. Moore gives the example of Canada and the U.S. to illustrate that this 
need not be the case. Culturally there is little dividing line between the two societies 
and, on this basis, it would be difficult to make the case that if the two countries were 
to become one, members of either would be rendered ‘unautonomous’. Ignatieff s 
exposition of what he terms the ‘narcissism of minor difference’ similarly suggests 
that interpreting national claims through the prism of cultural difference is 
distorting.414 Culture is not to be seen as synonymous with nation. This distinction 
sees Moore put forward an argument concerning fairness as reason for the legitimacy 
of national claims, that it is privileging of one particular national identity by the state 
that is unfair.415
However, the autonomy argument does not necessarily have to be so shallow as to 
exclude non-liberal cultures. Whether or not one views the importance of the group as 
stemming from the framing structure it provides for individual lives or for the role it 
plays in the individual’s sense of self-worth -  the reason for its importance is of less 
concern than what that importance entails — the issue may nonetheless be seen as one 
of autonomy. The preceding chapter sought to make clear the impact of 
misrecognition on both the positive and negative freedom o f the individual. But a case 
can be made for taking national claims even more seriously than other group-based
413 See Moore, The Ethics o f Nationalism, 55-56.
414 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour. London: Vintage, 1999. Ignatieffhighlights the cultural 
similarities of Croats and Serbs, and the fact that their common culture did not prevent a violent 
assertion of national self-determination, suggesting that it was rather the similarity that was responsible 
for the brutality of the conflict.
415 Moore, The Ethics o f Nationalism, 60.
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claims. National claims are necessarily claims about a group’s public life. Thus even 
when individuals cannot enjoy the benefits of membership of any group without being 
allowed to express it publicly or when denied full participation in the public arena, 
national identity is privileged because it cannot be a private identity in the way that 
religious, sexual or even ethnic identities can all be to a certain degree. Nations are the 
means by which individuals express the desire to rule themselves, one of the most 
basic freedoms of all. As Moore comments, “there is a non-derivative value attached 
to ... control over our lives”.416
To summarise the arguments presented as to why national claims are so important: 
nations are intrinsically morally valuable communities. This is so either because they 
produce valuable goods, such as solidarity and bonds of mutual trust as well as 
ensuring the survival of one’s culture; or, the line adopted here, because of the 
extreme importance that individuals assign to them, whether this be for the part 
national communities play in individual self-understanding or for the link between 
autonomy and culture that has been suggested. As Karl Renner wrote in 1899, it “[t]he 
individual’s right to self-determination [that] constitutes the correlate of the nation’s 
right to self-determination”417, where self-determination is the most powerful 
recognition claim that can be made. Ultimately, nations are o f such importance 
because they are the means by which claims to self-governance are made, but they 
bear that task because they are communities of such value to individuals that we 
choose to make claims to the governance of our lives through them. Where nations are 
the medium of the freedom of self-rule, to deny national-self-determination is, then, to 
deny a group this freedom. Claims to nationhood are therefore ultimately- necessarily 
-  claims to original authority. As the vehicle o f political claims to self-governance, 
national claims cannot be dismissed lightly.
As a final suggestion for why we must take national claims seriously, Ernst Renan’s 
famous description of the nation as a daily plebiscite makes explicit the extraordinary 
effort required in making and sustaining a claim to nationhood. National claims are
416 Moore, following Nielsen, ibid, 29; Kai Nielsen, ‘Secession: The Case of Quebec* (1993) 10 
Journal o f Applied Philosophy 29.
417 Karl Renner, ‘State and Nation (1899)’ in E. Nimni (ed.), National Cultural Autonomy audits 
Contemporary Critics. London: Routledge, 2005.
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not for the frivolous.418 For a group to make and sustain the effort to have their voice 
heard is perhaps the final reason for taking all claims to the authority to self-govem 
seriously, no matter how unconventional they may look.
5 . 2 .  T e r r i t o r i a l  B e lo n g in g :  t h e  m o n o p o l i z a t io n  o f  p la c e  b y  t h e  
s t a t e
There is little doubt about the importance of land in the imaginations of men. Exile as 
the greatest punishment that a community can bestow upon an individual is perhaps a 
universal cultural phenomenon, and one captured in recent times by the sense of 
displacement and dislocation of those that through migration leave their home for a 
foreign land.419 Our attachment to territory arguably began as the need for physical 
and economic survival. We all must all be located somewhere on the surface of the 
earth and our security is only assured if  we can say that this is our space, these our 
borders, and defend them. Moreover, we depend upon the land to feed us, and in the 
wake of the agrarian revolution that allowed mankind to multiply and fill the earth 
freed of the restraints of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, that dependence grew. These 
basic needs mean that it is no surprise that classical political philosophy sees the 
beginning o f political community as the defining of its physical borders: only within 
the confines o f the city-walls, for example, can the public good be defined.420 The 
appropriation of land by the individual has been suggested as the moment at which a 
member of the collective became a citizen in Roman political thought;421 and 
Rousseau similarly suggested that, “The true founder of civil society was the first man 
who fenced in a piece of land, thought o f saying ‘This is mine’, and came across 
people simple enough to believe him.”422 The association of the word ‘settlement’ 
with Lockean values, under which the proper use o f land is to inhabit, enclose and to
418 Keating, ‘So many nations. So few states. Accommodating Minority Nationalism in the Global Eta’, 
in A-G. Gagnon and J. Tully (eds.), Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, 61; Plurinational Democracy, 5.
419 See, for example, Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands. Great Britain: Granta, 1991.
420 For Arendt, the Greek polity “was quite literally a wall, without which there might have been an 
agglomeration o f houses a town... but not a city, a  political community.” The Human Condition. New 
York: Doubleday Anchor, 1958,63.
421 Territory marked the shift from Aristotle’s zoon politikon to the Roman legalis homo: “[h]umans 
appropriated the earth, and in doing so became persons and citizens”. See J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Ideal of 
Citizenship Since Classical Times’ in R. Beiner (ed.), Theorizing Citizenship. Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1995,45.
422 Discourse on the Origin o f Inequality. Part II, 54. (tr. Franklin Philip), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994.
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till the land, in contrast with the improper use made of land by those that merely 
‘wander* over it, dominated the understanding of man’s relationship to land until the 
second half of the twentieth century.423 That national communities have been created 
and sustained on the basis of historical co-existence on a portion of the earth, that the 
position of individuals within the legal system and within society have largely been 
defined by their ownership of that land, is reflected in the continuing importance of 
property in our legal systems, in our sense o f political community, in our sense of self 
Physical boundaries matter to us. Human beings are arguably bound just as other 
animals by the principle of territoriality.424
The connection between territory and political community is not merely that of 
security and economic dependence, but there is a strong sentimental attachment to the 
land itself. Land provides a sense of continuity of culture, tying us to our ancestors 
and linking us to a collective future. There is something powerful and primordial in 
the understanding of a place as the place which is the realm of one’s being, as the 
theatre in which the historical memory and meaning that binds a group was acted out. 
Charles I was executed here, Shakespeare was bom in this house, the Battle of 
Hastings took place on this field. The institutions to which members of a nation form 
a common attachment are also physically located: churches, pilgrimage sites, 
universities, theatres, galleries and so on. Territory often as much marks the bounds of 
one’s imagination as it does the physical extent of political community. The land not 
only links us to the presence of our ancestors, but our shared culture has, moreover, 
physical referents: rivers, hills, the sweep of the land but also the man-made -  
architecture forms a backdrop to the self-definition of a community.425 The land, 
including its buildings, is thus a symbolic space with huge emotional significance and 
frequently becomes a shorthand description of the nation itself: few commentators are 
able to define the English nation but our culture is replete with eulogies to the English
423 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘People and Boundaries: An “Internationalized Public Law’* Approach’ in 
Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds.), Slates, Nations and Borders. The Ethics o f Making 
Boundaries. Cambridge University Press, 2003,303-4.
424 See the assertion by Michael Walzer’s that to tear down the walls o f the state would not create a 
world without walls, but “a thousand petty fortresses”. Walzer, Spheres o f Justice. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1983,39.
425 In Philip Roth’s latest novel, when a Jewish-American family wish to convince themselves of their 
American-ness at a time when they feel this identity to be threatened by rising anti-Semitism they take 
a trip to Washington to view Capitol Hill and the capital’s other landmarks. For the Roth family, those 
buildings symbolise the liberty of the American Constitution and what it means to them to be 
Americans. Roth, The Plot Against America. London: Vintage, 2004.
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countryside.426 For our ancestors, land was significant because they farmed it427, or, if 
they were aristocratic, their lands defined their political and social identity428; for us, it 
maintains its significance, eulogised in our literature and art.
Moreover, if  territory is the physical aspect of the life of the community, it not just 
reflects but also conditions the identity o f the community. The English sense of being 
an island (albeit that the island is not all theirs) is an undoubtedly strong feature of 
English identity, and one that has been reinforced over the generations as the seas 
acted as protection to would-be invaders from the Spanish Armada, to Napoleon, Nazi 
Germany and now, as some would see it, an over-zealous ‘Europe’. The English 
inability to articulate their national self-identity is often ascribed to a quiet confidence 
bom of nearly a thousand years of national formation uninterrupted by invasion. 
Similarly, place gives national identity part of its form. It has been suggested that the 
rhythm of Jewish culture is tied to the seasonal rhythms of the Eastern 
Mediterranean429; it is clear that their lifestyle, diet, and other important facets o f their 
common identity would be different had the Jewish people established themselves 
originally in another place.
Territory is thus a concept without which it is difficult to make sense of the way in 
which human history has unfolded. Yet to what extent is this a consequence of the 
monopolization of political life by the state? Boundaries are undoubtedly important as 
the means of organising social space, and thus of creating political life, but do these 
boundaries need to be physical borders and does the space inside them need to be a 
monopoly? The state-defining exclusive relationship between a single political entity 
and a territory is a contingent one, the product of a certain historical era, and not a 
God-given form of political perfection. Recent scholarship has been at pains to 
emphasis that political organisation has not always been territorially-based. A
426 E.g. from Gaunt’s deathbed lament for ‘this blessèd plot, this earth, this realm, this England’ in 
Richard / / to  Constable’s Haystacks.
427 Vattel, for example, in his authoritative The law o f nations, or the principles o f natural law, 
determined that “The cultivation of the soil is an obligation imposed upon man by nature” and, 
following, seems to suggest that in ‘failing’ to cultivate the land, Aboriginals could not be considered 
nations as they claimed, but were simply savages. Tr. Fenwick, Washington: Carnegie Institute, 1902, 
1.8.81.
428 As the future Henry IV insists following the death of his father in Shakespeare’s Richard II, he is 
not Hereford but Lancaster, and will only recognise an address as such. Act 2, Scene 3, lines 69-73.
429 George H. White, Nations, States and Territory. Origin, Evolutions and Relationships. U.S.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004,38.
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historical examination of the correlation between rule and territory, for example, has 
led Ruggie to follow Giddens in defining a system of rule as being compromised of 
“legitimate dominion over a spatial extension”, where ‘spatial extension’ need not be 
exclusively territorial.430 Place is not necessarily territorial.
Prior to the neatness of the Westphalian model, the Europe of the Middle Ages 
formed an intricate web of over-lapping and intersecting competences and authority -  
a sprawling mass of small polities: of city-states, bishoprics, noble fiefdoms, towns 
and guilds, all providing alternative sites of authority which intersected and 
occasionally clashed with that of Kings and Emperors claiming personal authority 
over a people or territory and with the Church that claimed imperium over all of 
Christendom.431 Such patterns of governance find reflection in the relationship of the 
EU to the Member States, which sees a division of competences, albeit within a 
clearly defined territory, on a functional basis.432 ‘Europe’ is less a physical territory 
than a social process in which boundaries are defined by their fluidity and space is 
being redefined by the European discourse.433 Similarly, a federal state such as 
Belgium uses a multi-dimensional division of political space in order to maintain a 
balance between the distinct language groups that make up the country; political 
division occurs both along territorial lines, but also along language lines.434
Outside Europe, political organisation has frequently developed and maintained a 
pattern governed by alternative concepts of space. Nomadic life sees place defined by 
traditional migration routes rather than exclusive ownership of land. Nomadic 
existence is not entirely foreign to Europe, as Romani history in Europe makes clear, 
but like the Roma, concepts of common land and traditional rights o f way fell victim 
to land ownership, whether public or private. Land also has a different meaning for
430 John Gerrard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’ (1993) 47 International Organization 139, 148.
431 Jan Zielonka, ‘Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration’, in Joerges, M6ny and Weiler 
(eds.), What Kind o f Constitution for What Kind ofPolity: Responses to Joschka Fischer. Florence, 
RSC, 2001.
432 See, for example, Rainer BaubSck, Transnational Citizenship. England: Edward Elgar, 1994.
433 Anssi Passi, ‘Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and 
Identity* (2001) 8 European Urban and Regional Studies 7. ‘Europe’ is also being expanded beyond its 
frontiers, as Member States demand that prospective immigrants complete immigration tests before 
leaving their home country.
434 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977.
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indigenous forms of political organisation, frequently being viewed as sacred but not 
exclusive.435 Further, political space is not always a reference to the land. According 
to one account, in Maori culture although Earth is the mother of all, the victory of 
humanity’s ancestor over all his brothers, bar his brother the wind, entails that 
descendants of humanity are the chief o f the environment o f both land and sea. Land 
is thus not separated from the sea for political and sentimental attachment.436
There have also been several examples of explicit attempts at non-territorial group 
autonomy within Europe, suggesting that the Westphalian model has not always been 
as neat as it sought to insist.437 The Ottoman millet system is the classic example of 
governance based on the personality principle, in this case religion; from as early as 
the fifteenth century, different religions, such as Greek Orthodox, the Catholic 
Armenians and the Jews, were allowed the freedom to administer their own affairs in 
the realm of religion, education and family matters, including questions of marriage, 
divorce and inheritance.438 The Jewish community of the Polish- Lithuanian 
Commonwealth were also the beneficiaries of a considerable degree of autonomy in 
the governance of its own affairs up until the years immediately preceding the Third 
Partition, which ended the independence of the Commonwealth. Governing bodies 
were established at the level of local communities, which then sent representatives to 
regional and national Jewish councils; these bodies had responsibility not merely for 
religious matters but also for family, housing and economic matters. They acted as tax 
collectors and as interlocutors between the community at its various levels and the 
authorities. Further, the Magyars, the Szekels, the Saxons and the Romanians were all 
recognised as nations in the Transylvanian diet under the Austria-Hungarian Empire, 
but the inclusion of the Saxons is striking as, unlike the other three, they were 
scattered across a wide geographical area. Accepted political claims to self-
435 Perry Dane, ‘The Maps of Sovereignty: A Mediation* (1991) 12 Cardozo Law Review 959.
436 See Hong-key Yon, ‘Maori Identity and Maori Geomentality* in David Hoosen (ed.), Geography 
and National Identity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
437 The examples are taken from John Coakley, ‘Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The 
Strategy of Non-Territorial Autonomy’ (1994) 15 International Political Science Review 297. Also, 
Sarah Abrevaya Stein, ‘The Permeable Boundaries of Ottoman Jewry* in Joel S. Migdal (ed.), 
Boundaries and Belonging. States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
438 Although Gypsies were occasionally singled out for attention by the Ottoman authorities, they were 
not granted any form of self-administration, categorised instead largely by their religious denomination. 
Fraser, The Gypsies. Oxford: Blackstone Press, 1992, 171-176.
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governance have not thus always come packaged as a territorial nation in the form of 
a state.
Similarly, in the inter-war period, national groups in Europe benefited from a number 
of the increased pressure upon states to allow national minorities some degree of 
autonomy. The Estonian Cultural Autonomy Law of 1925 allowed any ethnic group 
of more than 3000 to establish itself as a separate legal entity, levy taxes on members 
of the group, and to take control of the group’s affairs in the areas of education, 
culture, libraries, theatres, sports, museums and youth affairs. The German and Jewish 
minorities established their own Cultural Councils in 1926.440 In the present-day, 
indigenous self-governance is frequently non-territorial, for example the Norwegian 
Sami Parliament, where inclusion is based on the personality principle.441 Another 
form of personality principle is the consociational model of governance, which has 
been remarkably successful in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria and which 
continues to maintain a precarious balance in Belgium.442
Moreover, there have always been de-territorialised systems of law and governance 
beyond the state, the most famous perhaps being the lex mercatoria, a system of law 
established by the custom and usage of those trading across borders, firstly in Europe 
from the twelfth-century and later, from these origins, globally, although many others 
are now developing.443 Our attention is drawn to the changing conception of space 
and place by the emergence of the internet, which has seen the creation of a ‘realm’ 
divorced from territory, in which location is important, but where that location is 
virtual rather than primarily physical.444 Territory continues to matter, as hardware 
and users are always necessarily physically located and traditional sovereigns are yet
439 In this regard, see Tierney, ‘Refraining Sovereignty?’, 168-9.
440 Coakely, ‘Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of Non-Territorial 
Autonomy’, 307-308.
441 Anne Julie Semb, ‘Sami Self-determination in the making?’ (2005) 11 Nations and Nationalism
531.
442 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration, 25.
443 For example, the emergence of what Teubner has dubbed lex sportive intemationalis. See Gunther 
Teubner, ‘“Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’, in G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law 
Without a State. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1997,3-4; also B. L. Benson, ‘The 
Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law’ (1989) 55 Southern Economic Journal 644.
444 David R. Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and Borders — The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’, (1996) 48 
Stanford Law Review 1367. Also, Ralf Michaels, ‘Territorial jurisdiction after territoriality’ in Piet Jan 
Slot and Mielle Bulterman (eds.), Globalisation and Jurisdiction. The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2004.
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to concede that the virtual realm is beyond the extent of their regulatory authority;445 
yet the battle is over the control of access to information, over borders of a virtual 
realm and not the physical.
The understanding that a necessary feature of a nation is the attachment to a particular 
and exclusive portion of the globe stems from the historical understanding that a 
nation was a nation-state in waiting, thus that national sentiment necessarily required 
self-determination where self-determination required independence and statehood. 
Nation has necessarily been defined by its close relation to statehood, and the strong 
link between territory and identity is in part related to state control of social practices 
and the apparatus of identity. The dominance of the nation-state has, moreover, forced 
all other groups to justify their sense of self in relation to it. As this bond is 
increasingly perceived to be weakening in the face of the challenges of globalisation, 
it is appropriate to re-conceive nationhood free from the dominant shadow o f  
statehood. If we can imagine the existence of nations without states, we no longer 
need to define nationhood by the requirements of the nation-state. A nation-as-state 
required that the boundaries of the nation be co-terminus with the administrative 
borders of the state and, where they were not, the imagined boundaries of the nation 
had to be extended to be so.446 Territorial belonging as the sole basis for political life 
has sought to edge out competing conceptions of the organisation of political space. In 
this, it has been remarkably successful, but not wholly so and challenges to the state 
from above, below and horizontally are highlighting the difference between place and 
territory. If territory is not the only means of conceiving of political organisation, why 
is it so widely perceived to be vital to claims to nationhood?
5 . 3 .  U n p a c k in g  th e  m e a n in g  o f  t e r r i t o r y
Nationalism scholars, it seems without exception, hold territory to be vital to any 
understanding of what it means to be a nation; territory need not be exclusively held 
or cherished, but it must be there. This section will attempt to strip back a nation to its 
vital ingredients and thereby to unpack what vital role territory is understood to play
443 Laurence Lessig, ‘The Zones o f Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 1403; Jochen von 
Bemstoff, ‘Democratic Global Internet Regulation? Governance Networks, International Law and the 
Shadow of Hegemony’ (2003) 9 European Law Journal 511.
446 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1991 (revised ed.).
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in constituting a nation. It will use the work of two contemporary scholars of note to 
do so: Michael Keating and Margaret Moore.
5.3.1. Imagining the Nation and Claiming It
For both Keating and Moore, although they dress it slightly differently, the crucial 
element of nationhood is choosing to identify as a nation and asserting that identity on 
a wider plane. Moore emphasises the subjective component of national sentiment, 
following other theorists such as Ernst Renan, Yael Tamir, and David Miller among 
many others. She suggests that the ability of its members to sustain a shared image of 
themselves as a nation is essential to definitions of nationhood, noting that the list of 
objective features that are frequently drawn up by those seeking to construct a 
definition of nation -  language, history, culture, a shared public life -  are important 
only in so far as they foster and sustain the most important element: national identity. 
So-called ‘objective’ factors may give the nation vital nourishing roots but they only 
give rise to nationhood when a group self-consciously takes them up. Similarly, 
common values may be a vital part of constituting the social trust that is necessary for 
accepting the ups and downs of the democratic process; a common language for both 
social and political communication; a common history, replete with both successes 
and tragedies, for its ability to foster the bonds of mutual trust. However, although 
important, such features cannot be part o f the definition itself, as a nation may be able 
to constitute and sustain common feeling without them.447
Keating places less emphasis on the frilly subjective, asserting that a nation must be 
historically constituted as a self-governing community.448 Moore is similarly wary of 
appearing to suggest that nations can be plucked out of thin air in the absence of a 
shared history or culture; but emphasising the subjective does not, however, do away 
with these elements. It does though mean a refusal to draw up a checklist of criteria so 
that where one is missing a group does not ‘qualify’ for nationhood. Nations do not 
come from nowhere but are generated by a group itself from a shared historical,
447 The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Rights o f Minorities in Upper Silesia case 
declared that identity could not be subjected to “objective” determination. Rights o f Minorities in 
Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (1928) P.I.C.J. Ser. A Judgements, No. 12; this point is made in 
Nathaniel Berman, ‘A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the Limits of 
the Interwar Framework* (1992) 33 Harvard International Law Journal 353, 379.
448 Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy, 3.
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cultural, social or institutional base over a considerable period of time. Moore thus 
notes that there is a need to distinguish between ‘imagined’ communities, in 
Anderson’s felicitous phrase, and ‘imaginary’ ones.449 But what is important in a 
nation is that a nation is collectively imagined by its members, and not the actual 
conditions that make that imagining possible.450
However, an ethnic group also shares the same objective features that are linked with 
nationhood and also imagines itself into being. It is thus the nature of the image that a 
group constructs that is important. A nation imagines itself as a nation. A nation is 
necessarily a political dream, in which the degree of cultural difference from a 
neighbouring group is not of real importance. According to Moore, what is distinctive 
about nations is their political self-consciousness.451 Nations partake with ethnic 
groups in the shared myths, history, common characteristics, culture, language, and so 
on, but it is the way in which nations frame their aspirations that distinguishes them 
from ethnic groups. For nations aspire to political autonomy; they use the framing 
language of self-determination to assert their claim to original authority.
Similarly, while Keating understands the nation as lying at the intersection between 
identity and territory, entities such as the German Länder possessed of clearly defined 
borders and a sense of political identity (in the case of Bavaria, one might say a strong 
sense) do not constitute nations because they do not assert themselves as such.452 
“One can talk of nationalism in Scotland, Wales, or Quebec”, according to Keating, 
“since these places are widely recognised as nations, the population see themselves as 
such, and they have established nationalist movements with defined agendas.”453 For 
Keating, the crucial differences between the claims of an ethnic group and of a group 
that we can rightly call a nation is the claim to self-determination, whereby the claim 
being made is addressed in the main to the supra-state level; although claims to self-
449 Moore, The Ethics o f Nationalism, 13; Miller too has claimed the need for historical continuity in 
creating the bonds that bind us. (Miller, On Nationality, 23-24).
450 Anderson, Imagined Communities. Anderson, for example, suggests that boundaries of national 
communities have been largely shaped by vernacular reading communities from the age of print. 
However, this one criterion does not explain the border between England and Scotland, for example, 
and an illiterate group that has no reading culture should not be denied the ability to make national 
claims on this ground alone.
451 Moore, The Ethics o f Nationalism, 5-9.
452 Keating, ‘Nations without States*, 22-23.
453 Keating, ‘Nations without States’, 23.
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determination do not need to result in actual statehood, “[national claims situate the 
territory or group as a subject of the international order”.454
However, despite emphasising the subjective as the defining element of nationhood, 
Keating and Moore nonetheless hold territory to be a vital element of what it means to 
be a nation.
5.3.2. Territory and the Nation
One of the reasons for Keating’s work being of particular interest here is that he has 
comprehensively charted the separation of nation from state in the development of 
non-state nationalism. Taking the nationalist movements of Scotland, Quebec and 
Catalonia, he has convincingly situated them within the challenges to the nation-state 
and the corresponding transformation and dispersal of governance functions that 
globalization and European integration have brought.455 Where the state is no longer 
the sole repository of government, Keating has described a space as opening up in 
which other forms of political loyalties can assert claims without needing to demand 
full statehood; in his own words, “nationality claims may be treated as a form of 
normal politics, rather than as zero-sum claims immune to compromise.”456 However, 
although identifying as a nation and claiming it on the international stage are the sine 
qua non of nationhood, Keating nonetheless sees territory as playing a vital function 
in constituting and sustaining national claims. Keating similarly views the new 
nationalisms as contesting the state in its physical territory and normative space, 
rather than seeking an identity beyond the territorial; thus, a “new politics of 
nationalism has emerged in which territorial societies are reinvented and rediscovered, 
below, beyond and across the state system.”457
While noting that the monopoly of the state in defining territory and its meaning has 
disappeared, Keating holds that control of territory retains its importance on the basis
454 Keating, ‘Nations without States’, 24.
455 It should be noted that Moore has made similar points. Moore, ‘Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, 
and Minority Nationalism’ in Keating and McGarry (eds.), Minority Nationalism and the Changing 
International Order.
456 Keating, ‘Plurinational Democracy in a Post-Sovereign Order’, Queen’s Papers on 
Europeanisation, No. 1/2002.
457 Keating, Plurinational Democracy, 17.
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of a re-territorialisation of politics. There are three grounds of this re- 
temtorialisation: functional, political and nonnative.459 Keating asserts that while the 
territorial borders of the state may have lost much of their significance due to the 
globalization of trade, communications and the related development of a form of 
global culture, the economic re-structuring which is a particular feature of the national 
claims of groups he has studied are necessarily territorial. Further, he asserts that 
territory has proved to be the most fertile ground for culture and language policies. 
Cultural identity in this new nationalism requires an economic base, while a strong 
cultural identity in turn underpins national economic development in the face of 
global markets. Similarly, Guibemau has argued that in order to consolidate a specific 
national identity, a nationalist movement must control two key systems: media and the 
education system, in order to foster and maintain “a situation in which the language 
and culture of the nation are employed and cultivated by a large majority of the 
population on a day-to-day basis”.460 In nearly all cases, control of the education 
system and media will at the very least require territorial concentration and a degree 
of territorial autonomy. The strength of common identity necessary for a group to 
desire nation status is, such an argument suggests, still only capable of generation 
where the group has a territorial base with which to sustain its ‘national* difference.
Secondly, according to Keating, territory is politically necessary as the basis for 
governing institutions such as the administration of government, justice, and, in 
certain parts o f the world, the welfare state. Keating suggests that there has 
consequently never been a non-territorial government.
Thirdly, territory is normatively necessary as the basis o f a nation allows for a non­
exclusive non-ethnic form of nationalism. Keating notes that nearly all of the 
nationalist movements in western Europe and Canada have moved from ethnic 
nationalism to civic nationalism and are thus increasingly emphasising the territorial 
nature of their claims.
458 For a similar claim, see Luis Moreno, ‘Local and Global: Mesogovemments and Territorial 
Identities’ in W. Safran and R. Mdiz, Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies. London: 
Frank Cass, 2000.
459 Keating, ‘Nations without States’, 26-28.
460 Montserrat Guibemau, Nations without States. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999,157.
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In Keating’s arguments for the functional and normative necessity of territory, its role 
is almost purely instrumental. It has no value in the conception of nation in and of 
itself. Its role is rather that of fostering national identity, whether through providing an 
economic reason for gathering supporters to its banners or through developing 
common feeling via education and the media. As regards the normative argument, 
territory allows a claim to be dressed in the internationally acceptable language of 
inclusion, thus giving rise to a greater chance of being recognised. Yet no national 
claim is territorial, no nationalism is ‘civic’. Nationalism is always about 
exclusiveness based on commonality of feeling and territory simply allows nations to 
determine easily the degree of inclusiveness to outsiders they will tolerate. In an era in 
which ethnic nationalism is ‘bad’, territory allows this sleight of hand. Keating’s 
argument for the necessity of territory for political reasons is more complex. It is 
certainly the case that administrations need clearly defined borders; but it is precisely 
function in the form of territorial administration that the state contributes to the 
nation-state relationship. Discussions about nations are conducted in the shadow of 
the state and almost inevitably end up being unspoken discussions about the 
functionality of the state. It is the intuitive sense of the importance of territory that 
sees nations as necessarily on a path towards independent statehood. The political 
necessity argument for territory being a prerequisite is rather an argument about 
statehood, not about nations. Functional capacity is important, but it is not a 
prerequisite to making a national claim.
Moore also appears to be making a functional argument about the necessity of 
territory. Unlike Keating, who gives clear reasons for continuing to hold territory as 
essential to a national claim, Moore does not explain her move from defining the 
nation by purely subjective criteria to defining it as “a territorially concentrated group 
of people who aspire to or accept a common mode of conducting their collective 
affairs”.461 It seems from the structure of her argument however that territory acts as 
the bridge from an imaginary to an imagined nation. It shall be suggested in the 
section that follows that the gap between imaginary and imagined is not one of 
capacity but of legitimacy. Territory, therefore, cannot act as a bridge, and cannot 
fulfil the role that Moore appears to assign it.
461 Moore, The Ethics o f Nationalism, 15.
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Thus, in conclusion, both Keating and Moore understand territory as vital to the claim 
to nationhood. However, the role they see territory as performing in a national claim 
is an instrumental one; territory is not crucial it is own right, for sentimental purposes, 
for the independent part it plays in identity itself, but is viewed similarly to the other 
check-list characteristics: for its enabling effect in being able to foster and sustain 
national identity. The difference with territory is, however, that it is seen by Keating 
and Moore as the one essential enabling characteristic.
5 . 4 .  N a t io n h o o d  a s  s e l f - c o n s t i t u t i n g  s e l f - g o v e r n a n c e
The understanding of nation that is put forward here builds upon the definitions of 
Keating and Moore. Like Moore, it considers the defining element of a nation to be its 
political aspiration to self-govemance. The claim to nation status is thus understood as 
a political claim to determine one’s own future together. It is a claim to original 
authority. It is a claim to a degree of self-determination, where self-determination is 
not viewed solely as a claim to independence or statehood but allows of degrees; 
where ‘international’ politics, as Keating suggests, is not a zero-sum game but is 
viewed as a stage in which a variety of actors play a variety of roles, some small some 
large, but all important in communicating the play. What makes an encompassing 
group a nation is the activation of that right to self-determination.
Like Keating, the role of the claim itself in defining a nation is also stressed here. As a 
claim to original authority, a national claim is necessarily a claim to self-constitution. 
The act o f self-creation remains elementary to a nation where it is understood as 
primarily defined by its claim to self-govemance. It is the act of claiming nationhood 
that is vital in enabling a group to constitute itself as such. Marx and J.S. Mill among 
others understood that only by forging one’s own destiny through revolution could a 
people become worthy and capable of self-rule. Rather than revolution, however, it is 
a plausible claim to nationhood itself that is understood here as self-constituting. What 
is meant by this is that, firstly, any claim to nationhood as a claim to original authority 
is inherently a statement of self-constitution -  original authority can never be 
devolved or granted but can only be declared. Any such claim cannot solely be self-
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A f f íconstituting, however, as it necessarily requires recognition. A claim to nationhood 
is always thus a claim to recognition as a self-governing, self-constituting entity. 
Secondly, plausibility may depend upon the demonstration of both legitimacy and 
capacity; however, these two elements are not of equal importance in weighing up a 
claim to nationhood.
5.4.1. Legitimacy
If a nation is important because it is an inherently valuable community, legitimacy 
concerns the extent to which a group is indeed valuable to its members. If a group 
lacks legitimacy in the eyes of its members, it is not a nation. For Mill as well as 
Rousseau, it was consent that established a demos.46* Hence, legitimacy as used here 
does not refer explicitly to a group’s internal democratic values, or necessarily to 
values of good governance such as transparency or accountability.464 It is not 
determined by other criteria, such as whether a claim is ethnically-based or not, or 
whether the internal rights of women are respected according to liberal standards. 
Kymlicka, for example, has insisted upon two fundamental limitations on his liberal 
conception of minority rights; for Kymlicka, for a minority group’s claim to special 
status to be legitimate it must respect individual freedom within the group — a group 
cannot restrict the civil and political rights of its members — and it must promote 
equality between groups. In contrast, the concept of legitimacy developed here does 
not take account of the opinions and creeds of outsiders, except to the extent that they 
influence the standards by which members of the group determine what they mean by 
legitimacy. Democratic accountability and respect for the rights o f women may well 
be an important aspect in establishing legitimacy amongst all members of a group, 
but, equally, they may not. In the same way that while it is not understood here as 
necessary that a nation forge itself in blood, it is undeniable that a widespread support 
for violent struggle, to kill and be killed, can be interpreted as strong legitimation for 
the claims being made. Similarly, the means by which a group chooses its leaders — 
violent oppression aside -  is understood to be their own business: the consent of the 
governed comes in a number of formats. However, if members o f the group prevent a
462 This important point shall be taken up in Chapter 7.
463 J.S. Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’ in J.S. Mill, On Liberty and Other 
Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
464 See, Thomas M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance* (1992) 86 American 
Journal o f International Law 46.
465 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Ch. 8.
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meaningful sense of autonomy for others within the group, it would certainly bring 
the legitimacy of the group into question. If a nation is important because of the role it 
plays in the lives of individual, for there to be a consistency of purpose, the value of 
the nation must extend to all individuals within the group and there must be a degree 
of critical self-inquiry from within about the extent to which this is the case.
Furthermore, legitimacy requires a strong sense of commonality. If a claim to 
nationhood is to be mounted and sustained, it will require considerable investment 
from group members and may entail difficulties and hardship in the struggle to have 
their claim heard. Members of the group must consider the claim worth the difficulties 
and the sacrifices involved. However, the strength of this bond is not determined by 
territory, although it is almost certainly facilitated by it. A nation is not defined by its 
borders but defines itself by its borders.466 Boundaries are omnipresent, but what form 
those boundaries take, what marks the collective self off from others, is the choice of 
the entity or polity concerned.
The glue that binds a group together, what constitutes the primary group bond, is 
neither soli nor sanguinis but shared meaning, so that what matters most in terms of 
identity is rather the social distribution and expression o f meaning, or, in other words, 
culture.467 Culture is understood here, following Hannerz, as the internal world of 
ideas, experiences and feelings and the public expression of that world, in which the 
cultural flow concerns the extemalisation of meaning and the interpretation of these
I/O
expressions by others in a continual, dialectical process of producing meaning. 
Culture cannot, unlike the administrative apparatus of a state, be rigidly defined by 
territorial borders; although the physical existence of cultural interlocutors determines 
that a culture must have spatial existence, that space is both neither fixed nor static, 
but mobile, fluid and receptive and responsive to change. Culture is not bound by 
physical borders but goes where its members go, blurs and meshes with other cultures,
466 This is a problem that goes back to the earliest attempts to define political community and to the 
traditional dichotomy formed around the distinction between jus soli and jus sanguinis.
467 The characterisation of a nation as a community of communication follows the understanding of 
language and meaning as a set o f social practices developed notably by Wittgenstein in his comments 
on private language (Philosophical Investigations) and German thinkers from Weber to Habermas have 
all sought to understand society as webs of signification.
468 Ulf Hannerz, Cultural Complexity. Studies in the Social Organization o f Meaning. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992.
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so that borders become points of transition rather than barriers.469 It is thus not 
external attributes such as territory -  although territory has often played an important 
role in the generation and sustenance of the webs of common meaning -  that 
constitute the strength of commonality that Vico and Herder described as the spirit of 
the people. The importance of territory in the minds of men has thus been that it is a 
space in which value-orientation becomes normatively fixed, in which the social 
distribution of the modes of meaning are distributed. However, if a group can achieve 
this common feeling, can spin a web of shared meaning, without an exclusive 
territorial space in which to construct it, the possession of or occupation of territory 
becomes incidental.470 It is ultimately in this way that the insecurity of limitless space 
is made knowable; physical borders are enablers in the process but are not vital to it. 
As the title words o f one of the most popular hits of the 1980s, ‘Wherever I lay My 
Hat That’s My Home’, suggests, home is anywhere but one has to first understand 
what a hat is and what it symbolises.471 The Roma may be one of the very few groups 
that have managed to maintain a strong sense of commonality despite the best efforts 
of far more powerful cultures to break their bonds and assimilate them, but that is a 
testament to their tenacity not to their non-existence472
It should be noted that the importance of mutual recognition within a group of a 
shared meaning is that it provides a basis for legitimacy, not that it can be used to 
provide a seemingly objective criterion by which to judge a nation -  a shared web of 
meaning does not define a group as a nation. It is, rather, necessary in order to 
generate the desire amongst a group to constitute itself as a nation. To be clear, shared 
meaning, an encompassing culture, is necessary for a national claim to be mounted, 
but the grounds for legitimacy are for the group themselves to determine. Requiring
469 Charles Westin, ‘Temporal and Spatial Aspects of Multiculturality’ in R. Baubôck and J. Randell 
(eds.), Blurred Boundaries: Migration, Ethnicity, Citizenship. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998.
470 The modem complex flow of information, ideas, people and goods see other webs of shared 
meaning being spun by all sorts of communities of interest, from professional to business, religion to 
protest, that transcends borders.
471 For consideration o f how a nation may be spun on a non-territorial basis, see Karl Renner’s 
exploration of the personality principle. Renner, ‘State and Nation (1899)’, 29.
472 For details of the cultural means Romani communities have adopted to maintain the distinctiveness, 
see Michael Stewart, ‘The puzzle of Roma persistence: group identity without a nation’, in Thomas 
Acton and Gary Mundy (eds.), Romani culture and Gypsy identity. Great Britain: University of 
Hertfordshire Press, 1997.
473 By suggesting that the borders of shared meaning constitute the boundaries of a nation -  admittedly 
messier than the neat lines of a traditional map -  one equally avoids the now dubious ascription of 
nationality on the grounds of race or ethnicity, (although there will be occasions, and the Roma are
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that a claim to nationhood resonate deeply among the members of any given group 
making a claim to nationhood ensures that a nation cannot be the sole handiwork of an 
ambitious political leadership or that it systematically discriminates against parts of 
the group. Further, the benefit o f viewing the collective will of a group through the 
concept of legitimacy rather than via that of subjectivity is arguably that, whereas 
subjectivity concerns the extent to which a group imagines itself to be a nation, 
legitimacy requires additionally that the nature of the claim, its content and format, 
and the perceived legitimacy o f the leadership making it, are also continuously 
evaluated.
In examining the justifications given for Israeli jurisdiction over Eichmann in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt defined territory as both a political and a 
legal concept in addition to being a geographical one. Despite her earlier insistence 
upon the necessarily bounded nature of political community, territory, for Arendt, 
“relates not so much, and not primarily, to a piece of land as to the space between 
individuals in a group whose members are bound to, and at the same time separated 
and protected from, each one by all kinds of relationships, based on a common 
language, religion, a common history, customs and laws.” Arendt continues, “No 
State of Israel would ever have come into being if the Jewish people had not created 
and maintained its own specific in-between space throughout the long centuries of 
dispersion.”474 Ian Hancock has similarly spoken of romanipe as the “Gypsies’ 
transportable homeland”.475 It is the formation and maintenance of this ‘in-between 
space’ that is the basis of legitimacy and thus of a nation. It might more often than not 
be geographically territorial, but it does not have to be so.
5.4.2. Capacity
If one understands the primary borders of a nation to be those of shared meaning, 
what matters most for such a group is the transmission of that meaning. Territory
possibly one example, where the boundaries o f shared meaning map more or less the delineation of an 
ethnic group). What is important, however, is that it need not necessarily be the case. It is full 
comprehension of and participation in spinning the web that determines membership.
474 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality o f Evil (1963). England: Penguin, 1994, 
262-3. My attention was drawn to Arendt’s unorthodox definition o f territory by Th. Mertens, ‘The 
Eichmann Trial. Hannah Arendt’s view on the Jerusalem Court’s competence* (February 2005) 
German Law Journal (www.germanlawioumal.comT
475 Ian Hancock, ‘The Eastern European Roots of Romani Nationalism’, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 
XIX, No. 3, Fall 1991,6.
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undoubtedly plays an important role in facilitating that goal; but how important is 
capacity in establishing a national claim? A national claim is necessarily a claim to 
political self-governance, and there is thus implicitly a capacity element to any such 
claim. Capacity is understood it seems, for example by Keating and Moore, as 
establishing a plausibility test for nations.
A group is self-constituting because it can articulate a collective voice. A nation, the 
forum in which one takes collective decisions about the way in which one lives one’s 
life, is necessarily, as Margalit and Raz have highlighted, a community beyond the 
face-to-face.476 Renan’s ‘daily plebiscite’ description emphasises the active nature of 
membership in a nation; as Tully phrased it, citizenship is an activity. All these points 
suggests a need for collective deliberation and decision-making capacity, as well as 
the ability to articulate the collective voice and the nation’s interests. This is a 
minimum that a group must achieve in order to establish a legitimate claim. Modem 
mass communication tools -  email, faxes, the Internet, mobile phones and wireless 
satellite connections -  mean that communication and virtual deliberation (which all 
deliberation beyond the face-to-face is in one sense) is relatively cheap and effective 
to set up.477 A culture is necessarily socially distributed and thus the means by which 
a culture is distributed arguably also provides a pre-established network o f 
communication and interaction in which deliberation as a nation can be conducted.
However, the ability to muster capacity must not be over-played. The more complex 
services we expect from the state — law and order, systems of education, healthcare, 
and transport, international representation, etc. -  are extremely difficult to achieve, 
and necessarily presume the ability to levy taxes. Where we accept that a claim to 
nationhood is not implicitly a claim to statehood, that nations exist without states, 
self-governance is a relative term and does not imply that a self-governing entity must 
provide the full paraphernalia of the modem welfare state to its members in order to 
have its claim heard. Territory plays an extremely important facilitating role in 
establishing the legitimacy and the capacity that establishes the nation as a state; for 
example, Moore has attributed the failure to revive the minority nations in France —
476 Margalit and Raz, ‘On National Self-Determination’.
477 For example, see ‘Inuit language finds home on net’, BBC News Online, 3 November 2004. There 
is of course die problem of being on the wrong side of die digital divide, which large swathes of the 
Romani population undoubtedly are.
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Normandy, Brittany, Aquitaine, Languedoc and Burgundy -  to an early incorporation 
into the French state in the late Middle Ages, and the consequent lack of any 
institutional base from which to launch a claim. But while this illustrates the role of 
territory in facilitating an institutional base, it also illustrates the inability of these 
nations to sustain a strong feeling of separate-ness without it. Other groups may not, 
for whatever reason such as the strength of hostility of the majority, require an 
institutional base to maintain their sense o f themselves apart. Capacity is only 
important in so far as it perpetuates the value of membership in the nation.
Governance, as global interdependence is making us increasingly aware, is a question 
of degrees and different actors claim and fulfil different competences. Quebec may 
claim the capacity to manage its own economy within NAFTA and within the dictates 
of the global economy, and may experience an upsurge in identification with the 
national claim from a grateful ‘citizenry’; the Welsh nation may claim, via the Welsh 
assembly, that they have decision-making capacity over the income it receives from 
Westminster; the Palestinian nation may control certain domestic systems, such as 
they exist, while lacking the ability to secure its borders against Israeli incursion or 
collect its own taxes itself. While a national claim carries the normative implication of 
the right to self-determination, the exact political implications depend upon the 
aspirations of the individual group and its political circumstances.479 As Keating 
notes, the claim to sovereignty may not involve a claim to a sovereign state “but [to 
claim] to insert themselves into the new complex webs of authority.”480 In this vein, it 
is suggested that the alleged ‘re-territorialisation’ in a number of contemporary 
national claims, should be understood as attempts of these nations to establish the 
legitimacy of their claim to nationhood; other nations may however choose to 
establish legitimacy in different ways.
Moreover, models of non-territorial autonomy allow for the development of capacity 
without territory; as section 5.2 sought to show, history offers a number of examples 
in which political self-governance was made a reality without reference to territory as 
an organising medium. Similarly, the model o f non-territorial national autonomy
478 Moore, The Ethics o f Nationalism, 16. Moore also notes that these nations lack a social base, and it 
may well be that minority nationalism in France is unrecognised primarily because it lacks legitimacy.
479 Keating, Plurinational Democracy, 5,26.
480 Keating, Plurinational Democracy, 28.
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proposed by Renner and Bauer and based on the ‘personality principle’ was to be 
made reality via nations as legally guaranteed corporations. These public bodies were 
to be endowed with legal personality and hold the sovereign competence with regard 
to national-cultural affairs, organising their own educational systems and forming an 
autonomous legal system, paid for by levying taxes on their own communities.481
Thus, where Keating and Moore view territory as instrumental to nationhood, not 
merely as symbolic of the nation, but also as functionally and logistically 
instrumental, the claim made here is that where nations are a good in themselves 
because of their overwhelming value to individuals, only legitimacy can be the 
determining element of a claim. Keating and Moore set the capacity generating 
potential of territory as a plausibility test for a national claim, but the suggestion here 
is that capacity can establish plausibility only in so far as it has an internal relationship 
to legitimacy. That is, the legitimacy of a claim does not appear from nowhere — 
Moore’s imaginary nation -  but begins in the cultivation of a collective framework o f 
belief. Belief in existence as a nation gains momentum because the aspiration is 
imaginable and a degree of capacity is important in kick-starting and facilitating that 
momentum. Plausibility can only be determined by those who believe. There is thus 
no ‘objective’ level of plausibility that a claim can be required to demonstrate beyond 
the decision capacity that underpins the collective sense of aspiration. Capacity is 
therefore necessary only to the extent that it enables a group to imagine a collective 
identity, a collective good life, and in which the group can imagine a fuller sense of 
that collective life. Capacity is a part of legitimacy in the claim to nationhood and not 
an equal element alongside it.
Thus, in place of Moore’s suggestion that we need to distinguish between nations that 
are successful political communities and nations that aspire to be482, a continuum of 
more or less plausible claims to nationhood, where plausibility is considered through 
the ability of a claim to muster and sustain legitimacy, is suggested instead. Territory 
can be important but it is not instrumental to the definition of a nation, because 
functional and logistical capacity is not.
481 Nimni, ‘Nationalist multiculturalism in late imperial Austria as a critique of contemporary 
liberalism’; also, Nimni, ‘Introduction: the national cultural autonomy model revisited’ in Nimni (ed.), 
National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics. London: Routledge, 2005.
482 Moore, The Ethics o f Nationalism, 36.
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It is thus wrong for others to disparage legitimate national claims that aspire to 
nationhood because these claims are built into the effective sense of who the 
individual members are. The documents laying out the doctrine of self-determination 
make clear that the level o f development of a people cannot be viewed as an obstacle 
to self-determination precisely because it is the generation and maintenance of belief 
in being a nation that constitute nationhood.483 What a national claim requires, what it 
is seeking, and what capacity hopes to establish the grounds for, is recognition. While 
Chapter 4 sought to suggest the importance of recognition to the well-being and 
autonomy o f the individual, this chapter has hoped to demonstrate what it is that 
makes national claims special, no matter how unconventional they appear, and thus 
the additional danger o f hegemony where national claims are rejected or 
misrecognised. Legitimacy-based claims are not a question of ‘being deserving’ but of 
the recognition of self-constitution.484 What such claims do not entail, of course, is the 
right not to be disappointed. As national claims are necessarily a claim to the surpa- 
state level, the final section seeks to plot a course at the international level through the 
hegemony/ promiscuity recognition quagmire that this section sought to sketch. It is to 
the existing avenues of recognition for national claims in the international order that 
this thesis now turns.
483 G.A. Resolutions 1514 and 1541; see Section 6.3. infra for consideration of the principle of self- 
determination.
484 For a consideration of ‘ethnic autonomy* from the perspective of entitlement see William Safran, 
‘Spatial and Functional Dimensions of Autonomy: Cross-national and Theoretical Perspectives’ in W. 
Safran and R. Maiz, Identity and Territorial Autonomy in Plural Societies. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
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Section 3
Chapter 6: Nations and Territory in International Law: 
defining the problem
To poison a nation, poison its stories. A demoralised nation tells demoralised stories to itself.485
The claim to recognition as a non-territorial, necessarily cross-border, nation leads 
Roma to the realm of public international law as the most appropriate stage upon 
which to make their claim. Notwithstanding the desire of some within the Romani 
community to push primarily, if  not solely, for recognition as a European minority or 
nation, the self-understanding of the claim to non-territorial nationhood as a claim of a 
global nation places it beyond the European realm.486 Where a claim to recognition is 
necessarily a claim to recognition of one’s autonomy, a claim to nationhood is a claim 
to autonomy at the international level.487 How, then, does international law deal with 
such claims?
Where the preceding chapter sought to make the case for the importance of national 
claims to the individual well-being of those on whose behalf such claims are made, 
and thus the primacy of legitimacy over capacity, this chapter considers the extent to 
which international law is capable o f recognising national claims that are not 
packaged in the nation-state mould. To what extent can international law currently 
satisfy the implicit claim to (degrees) of self-governance inherent in the demand for 
recognition as a nation? There are at least two elements that need to be considered. 
The first is the degree of autonomy to which non-state groups can reasonably aspire 
under current international law provisions; the second, related, is the level at which 
the active participatory element of a recognition claim can be fulfilled in international 
law.
485 Ben Okri, ‘The Joys of Story-Telling’ in Birds o f Heaven. London: Phoenix, 1997.
496 This of course does not exclude a second claim at the European level. As Chapter VII will argue, 
there is no reason why an individual can not make multiple claims to recognition.
487 All claims to recognition contain a claim to autonomy; if, as was suggested Hegel’s dialectic 
indicates, the claim to recognition is the claim to recognition of one’s autonomy -  the ability to 
negotiate one’s position with the Other, with society, from a position o f equality, where equality is not 
material but mutual recognition -  one cannot be free without being self-governing, whatever form this 
may take. See section 3.1. infra.
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International law has had a long-standing interest in the protection of non-state 
groups. Indeed, one could note that modem international law locates its origins in a 
settlement primarily designed to defend collective religious rights, namely, of course, 
the legendary Westphalian settlement.488 Prior to Westphalia, the desire of 
international lawyers to protect the most basic rights o f indigenous populations in the 
New World spurred the development of what we would today understand as 
international law, and a similar concern for minority groups in the inter-bellum period 
constituted the beginning of the contemporary human rights movement. This 
humanitarian impulse to protect at least the basic right to existence of non-state 
groups has been a dynamic force in the development of international law.
However, the case shall be made that rather than legitimacy, it is the possession and 
effective control of territory that dominates interpretations o f the claim to original 
authority. Thus, where an essential part of the process o f gaining mutual recognition is 
understanding the multiplicity of ways in which exclusion takes place, the aim of this 
chapter is to work through the ways in which international law excludes a group such 
as the Roma from participation on a basis of mutual recognition. It begins with an 
examination of the place of the nation in international law; considers the benefit to 
groups claiming recognition of international minority rights in the autonomy and 
participation that they seek; and, finally, expands to consider self-determination and 
the ways in which the construction of the right to self-determination and the interplay 
of representation and territory contained therein, work to exclude all that do not fit the 
traditional paradigm of a people in exclusive control of a given territory.
6 .1 . T h e  P la c e  o f  th e  N a t io n  in  in t e m a t io n a i  L a w
The preceding chapter suggested that the nation was the prime vehicle of our political 
imagining. This section will consider in brief the place of the nation in intemationai 
law.
488 Natan Lemer, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2003 (2nd edition), Chapter 1.
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M i f B ü m o p ------------------------------------------- r
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I
6.1.1. Nations as States
The well-known statement by Oppenheim that “States solely and exclusively are the 
subjects o f international law” in his 1905 classic, International Law, succinctly 
summarises the traditional approach of international law to the nature of
i O A
subjecthood. States, not nations, were the first and only subjects of what can be 
recognised as international law490, it being the slow genesis of the state and its unique 
coagulation of government and territory that augured in the development from the 
entangled web of medieval relationships to the Law o f Nations. States emancipated 
themselves from their ties to the Church and the Holy Roman Empire and declared 
themselves equal in rank and dignity alongside each other. They proclaimed 
themselves sovereign and, via imperialism, imposed this structure of international 
order upon the rest of the world. The restricted nature of international legal I
personality in classical international law had much to do with the restricted nature of j
international law itself. From the inception of what was recognisably international law |
to the period following the First World War, the Law of Nations was the relationship |
between sovereign entities in the prosecution of their affairs. States, then, are the I
traditional sovereigns, but where does this leave the nation? The nation did not exist j
as a separate entity under the Law of Nations491, although the humanitarian impulse |
which has always been present in international law has meant there has certainly been |
concern since the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for the protection of non- I
state national groups.492 j
I
The changing understanding of the nature of the relationship between ruler and ruled, |
between government and citizen, in the wake of the French Revolution saw the I
process begin by which states sought legitimacy from the nations or peoples they |
489 Oppenheim, International Law (1“ ed., 1905), Vol. I.
490 In contradiction, near limitless range of actors in the European medieval era operated in a world in 
which the line between ‘national’ and ‘international’ interactions was constantly blurred. Wilhelm G. 
Crewe, The Epochs o f International Law. Tr. Michael Byers. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000,61-74.
491 The etymology of the Law of Nations would appear to be a ‘mistranslation’ of ius inter gentes or ius 
gentium, the Law of Peoples, rather than anything to do with nations. The lack of relevance of nations 
in international law in this early period is signalled by the near total silence which this question 
receives in the literature. Most authors simply presume the existence of states as the only subjects of 
the international order, even where the subject of their enquiry is nations. E.g., Bart Driessen, A 
Concept o f Nation in International Law. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1992.
492 In tracing the history of interventionism, Crewe suggests that states were capable of intervening in 
the internal affairs of other countries, and did so regularly, both for reasons of state and on 
humanitarian grounds. The Epochs o f International Law.
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claimed to embody. The entrenchment in the international system o f the nation-state 
as the basic moral unit came about, according to Nathaniel Berman, in the course of 
the inter-war years. In the wake of the First World War, the nation was seen as 
offering an alternative vision of the source of foundational authority in international 
law;493 nineteenth-century liberal nationalism became thus a  serious rival to the 
positivistic understanding of the state as the foundational unit of the international 
legal order. According to Berman, interwar writers, motivated simultaneously by their 
faith in liberal nationalism and their fearful recognition of nationalism’s dark side, 
attempted to situate the nation as an intermediate category between the individual and 
the state; their aim was to use the nation and a new awakening of the international 
order to operate a pincer-type manoeuvre on states and their positivistic nature. Where 
the nation was necessary to unleash the creativity and energy of the state from the 
mechanistic attitude of the state apparatus, the international order required new 
doctrines and institutions in order to keep the explosive unpredictability of nationalist 
forces in check.
The move to elevate the nation to foundational status found an ally in the active 
intervention of the new international court. The nation, in the words of Berman, 
*‘demand[ed] interpretation”494 and, when the opportunity arose in the Polish 
Nationality Case (1923), the Greco-Bulgarian “Communities’’ Case (1930), and the 
Minority Schools in Albania Case (1935), the PCU took it.495 Berman’s analysis 
demonstrates that the Court in each of these cases located the nation as the prime unit 
of concern, in each case in the face o f the ‘statist’ opposition of one of the parties. 
Yet, the Court also asserted its right to determine the boundaries of the nation and the 
provisions applying to it, in keeping with the perceived intermediary role of the
493 Article 91 of the Versailles Treaty authorising the transfer of territories from the defeated Germany 
to the new Polish state reflected die new outlook; according to Berman, Article 91 illustrates, “the new 
respect for subjective choice, legitimation of state power on the basis of the state’s conformity to the 
‘nation’, and the new identification of individuals on the basis of their objective membership in such a 
‘nation’”. Nathaniel Berman, ‘“But the Alternative is Despair”: European Nationalism and the 
Modernist Renewal of International Law’ (1993) \06 Harvard Law Review 1792,1800-1,1830-1832.
494 Berman, “‘But the Alternative is Despair”’, 1807.
495 Advisory Opinion No.7, Acquisition of Polish Nationality (1923), P.C.LJ. (Ser. B), No. 7; Advisory 
Opinion No. 17, Interpretation of the Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal 
Emigration (Question of the “Communities”) (1930) P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 17; Minority Schools in 
Albania Case (1935) P.C.LJ. (Ser. AJB), No.64.
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nation.496 The nation, at least in the eyes of the inter-war writers that Berman 
highlights, became the justifying basis for the continued existence of the state, yet its 
foundational authority was to be kept in check by the international order.
Ultimately, however, the nation had no independent position separate from the state. 
Either the nation was presumed to motivate or legitimise the state, or those that did 
not constituted minority nations, possessing merely the right to petition the League of 
Nations. The era of nationalism did not change the nature of personality in the 
international order de facto  -  it was states that were and remained sovereign -  it did 
though arguably change the moral basis of personality: where the state had previously 
represented the ruler on the international stage, from the French Revolution onwards, 
it became increasingly accepted that the state was the representation of a particular 
nation. The losers in this monogamist co-joining of the nation and the state were 
offered a limited degree of protection, but those without a mother-state to protect their 
interests were particularly vulnerable -  a fact which the League’s minority protection 
regime sought to address.498
In the post-Second World War period, nationalism was in disgrace; the nation was 
deemed the instigator of enormous suffering and misery, and no-one was concerned to 
highlight its creative energies in San Francisco. Nor was the new Court so eager to 
recognise the nation as being of prime concern. Yet, the new organisation was named, 
like the League of Nations before it, the United Nations and its Charter was 
proclaimed in the name of the peoples of the world. Like the League, however, it is 
only states that can be members. This understanding that sees the state as the 
embodiment of the nation continues to affect profoundly the way in which authority 
and personality are conceived in international law. The ‘losers’ continue to be denied
496 Berman asserts that this alliance between international authority and nationalist desire was boldly 
reasserted by the Permanent Court of International Justice’s judgement in the Minority Schools in 
Albania Case (1935), which saw the Court insist upon its own interpretation of the Albanian 
Declaration while deferring to the national group’s definition of its own requirements. Nathaniel 
Berman, ‘A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the Limits of the Interwar 
Framework’ (1992) Harvard International Law Journal 353,370-2.
497 Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism. San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1973.
498 There was arguably an element of social Darwinism at work in inter-war views of minority nations 
and the idea that the survival of the fittest meant that a nation needed to forge itself, fight for the right 
to exist, and those that failed to make it were unworthy of survival. The League’s attempts appear all 
the more worthy when considered in such a climate. See, Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities 
and the European Nation-State System, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
international subjecthood. Before turning to consider what international law does for 
those nations that have not established/ been co-opted by a state, it is helpful to 
consider the types of nations under consideration.
6.1.2. Nation Types
In the preceding chapter, nations were considered from a theoretical perspective in 
which all nations are necessarily equal because of the importance they play in the 
individual’s life and where all individuals are presumed equal. However, as the 
foregoing synopsis of the nation suggests, international law is in the paradoxical 
situation that the recognition of some nations as subjects of international law as states 
has necessarily meant the denial of others.
Four types of nations can perhaps be distinguished.499 The first is the victorious 
nations, those that formed the largest or most powerful group within a state’s territory 
and were chosen to embody the identity of that state. The identity of these nations 
became the ‘national’ identity of the state concerned; for example, the relationship 
between the Prussian nation and the nascent German state prior to the Fourth 
Republic. Federal or consociationalist type states, in which two (Belgium) or more 
(Switzerland) nations or parts of nations form the governance of a state on an 
equitable basis -  ‘good’ multinational states -  could perhaps constitute a fifth type, 
but as these nations have achieved self-governance, if sometimes precarious, and have 
representation at the international level, they are included in the first type. This type 
also includes those nations forged by a nation-state, where a particular identity has 
expanded to become a more inclusive identity, in so far as one can talk, for example, 
of the German nation, the Swedish nation, and so on.
The second type is what were termed ‘minority nations’, or in more recent parlance, 
‘national minorities’. These are the groups that found themselves on the wrong side of 
a border and were thus separated from ‘their’ state; these are not strictly nations but 
rather parts of a nation. They are, however, the prime focus of most minority rights 
agreements.
499 The following typology is not meant to suggest that nations are immutable nor that the category 
nations fmd themselves in does not cause them to adapt and form new identities.
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The third type are those nations that are situated solely on the territory of one state -  a 
type of intra-state nations — but that are not represented on a basis of equality in the 
governance of the state; the Maori in New Zealand or the Bretons in France are 
examples among the many. The border of type 3 from type 1 nations in multinational 
states is, however, fuzzy and most definitely not static as the task of being a good 
multinational state is an on-going, shifting and never quite achievable one, in line with 
the nature of the recognition dialogue.
The final type concerns those nations that are situated across one or more borders and 
are trans-border nations; these are groups such as the Roma, the Saami, the Kurds, the 
Basques. These last two types of nation, lacking a state to embody them and denied 
participation on a basis of equality in the state in which they find themselves, have 
been denied self-govemance, as well as representation and participation at the 
international level. It is to these groups that the analysis here is addressed. These type 
3 and type 4 nations are considered not as nations demanding collective self- 
govemance but as minority groups.500 This chapter thus turns to a consideration of the 
capacity o f international minority norms to offer recognition to a non-state, and 
ultimately a non-territorial, nation.
6 . 2 .  A  n a t io n  a s  a  m in o r i t y  g r o u p
The Treaty System of minority protection established by the League of Nations, 
which formed one of the defining features of international law in the inter-war period, 
ceased to exist with the (formal) collapse of the League in 1946.501 The system that 
emerged from the San Francisco Conference establishing the new United Nations, as 
is well-known, marked a substantial shift from group protection to individual rights. 
The shift in focus saw collective rights shunned in favour of an understanding of 
violations o f human dignity based upon a group characteristic through the alternative
500 » « »It is as a series of minority groups that the Roma are considered by the individual countries in which 
they reside (e.g. under the 1993 Hungarian Minorities Act (LXXVII) they are listed as a national 
minority), but also by international organisations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
501 The minorities* treaties lost their force either because of desuetude or clausula rebus sic stantibus -  
a substantial change of circumstances, rendering a pre-existing obligation mute.
178
lens of an individual right to non-discrimination on the grounds of racial, ethnic, 
national, religious or cultural origins.502
6.2.1. The International Treaties503
As human beings, members of a non-state group such as the Roma are o f course 
entitled to the protection offered to all under individual human rights measures, 
without discrimination. Equality and non-discrimination are considered the 
foundations of the human rights regime and, as principles, have clearly attained the 
status of custom and are thus binding on all. The human rights treaties thus provide 
strong guarantees against racial discrimination in the form of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and the protection 
these provisions offer can be hugely important for minorities, at least as a statement of 
principle. For example, Article 5(c) of ICERD and Article 25, in conjunction with 
Article 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
guarantee rights of individual political participation, both in the right to vote and the 
right to stand for election or serve in the public service, without discrimination of any 
kind. Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) guarantees the right of individuals to participate in cultural life and of 
parents to select education for their children according to their convictions.504 The 
ICCPR, moreover, provides for the protection of activities important to the
502 A further indication of the marked nature of the shift can be seen in the fact that anti-Semitism does 
not appear anywhere in the post-war documents, despite widespread knowledge of the Holocaust and in 
contrast to inclusion of the Jews in five of the fifteen inter-war minority treaties. Anti-Semitism did not 
make a re-appearance at the international level as an object of concern until the 1990 Copenhagen 
Document. Lemer, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, 130-137.
503 This section does not consider regional human rights or minority norms and European instruments 
are beyond the scope of this work. Nor does it consider conventions and documents solely related to 
indigenous peoples. The Indigenous Populations’ Working Group is considered in the following 
chapter, but for reasons of process not because of the substantive norms it contains.
504 Article 15 (1) (a) and Article 13 (3) respectively; however, Article 13(3) caters only for the moral or 
religious convictions of the parents, and not, for example, for linguistic preferences. The ICESCR 
contains the same non-discrimination provision as its sister treaty, and the substantive rights contained 
therein must be read through this filter. Moreover, the Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social 
Rights has demonstrated genuine concern for the application of the treaty to minorities and indigenous 
peoples; general information is requested, for example, on the main ethnic, linguistic and religious 
groups and in regard to substantive provisions, such as Article 6, the right to work, requests 
information on vulnerable groups. Annex IV to the Report on the Fifth Session of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1990), Revised Guidelines regarding the form and content o f 
reports to be submitted by State parties under Articles 16 and 17 o f the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/199I/23. Also, Athanasia S. Akermark,
Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law. The Hague: Kluwer, 1997.
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perpetuation of a minority or non-state groups’ way of life, such as Article 18, 
guaranteeing the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion which includes 
the right to manifest one’s religion individually or collectively. Article 22 recognises 
the right to freedom of association, which guarantees the right of minorities to form 
societies dedicated to cultural expression or for the protection and promotion of their 
interests.
However, if  non-discrimination provides the first part of any attempt to ensure 
minority protection, the second must be that of special measures specific to the needs 
of non-state groups.505 A range of human rights treaty provisions apply to minority 
groups. It is Article 27 ICCPR that provides the backbone of minority rights in 
international law.506 It stipulates that “persons belonging to ... ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities ... shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members o f their group, to enjoy their own culture, to ... practise their own religion, 
or to use their own language”. It has been described by Thomberry as a hybrid right, 
which benefits only individuals but yet can only have meaning through collective 
exercise.507 Yet the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has been clear that the article 
does not grant collective rights, and communities are denied locus standi to bring
(AA
complaints under the optional protocol.
In being denied collective interpretation, the substance of Article 27 is virtually 
indistinguishable from the rights enjoyed by all and thus, as Thombeny implicitly 
suggests, is rendered largely meaningless as a guarantor of special measures.509 In 
addition, the criticisms of the negative language of the provision are well-known.510 In 
phrasing Article 27 as denying states the liberty to prevent minority groups from
505 The minority protection regime is intended to achieve four things: protection of existence, and 
against non-exclusion, non-discrimination and non-assimilation. Asbjom Eide, Commentary to the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to national or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/2, para. 3.
506 Thomberry has described Article 27 as *‘carr[ying] a great burden in international law”. P. 
Thombeny, International Law and the Rights o f Minorities. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991,135.
507 Thombeny, ibid., 173.
508 General Comment No. 23 (50) (art 27) (Fifteenth Session, 1994); http://www.ohchr.org/.
509 Everyone has the right to freedom of religion and its collective practice under Article 18 ICCPR, the 
right to freedom of association under Article 22 ICCPR, the freedom to partake of culture under the 
ICESCR, and the right to be free from discrimination on all three grounds listed in Article 27, under 
Article 2 in both the ICCPR and ICESCR
510 See Thomberry, International Law and the Rights o f Minorities. The negative language is somewhat 
made good by insistence on the need for positive measures in General Comment 23, although General 
Comments do not constitute an authoritative interpretation o f the treaty.
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practicing their own culture, religion or language together, it explicitly does not 
impose any positive obligations to assist or to recognise the identity of any group.511 
Thus, while Article 27 guarantees a right to identity, it is a passive, individual right. 
This approach, in providing an individual right to identity, fails to grasp the 
importance of group culture to individual identity: the protection of individuals of 
minority groups requires protection of their identity, not the abstract right to an 
identity. Where recognition is the process of mutually seeking and acknowledging a
group or individual in all their uniqueness, recognition cannot be the right to an 
identity in its generic form. A right to identity, if such a right can be understood to 
exist within the meaning of Article 27, cannot thus be understood as providing 
recognition to minority groups.
The weaknesses of Article 27 -  its individual nature and passivity -  could be 
improved by a proactive Human Rights Committee. However, the HRC, despite some 
optimistic interpretations of recent HRC case-law, has not shown itself willing to 
construe the terms of Article 27 generously nor to provide minorities with concrete 
rights to participate in public life or the ability to take decisions vitally affecting their 
own interests where those interests conflict with the majority’s interest. Article 27 
explicitly does not include any mention of the right of a minority group to effective 
and fair participation in public decision-making and, more specifically, in decisions 
that vitally affect its way of life. The HRC has addressed the issue of participation in a 
General Comment, however, and concluded that Article 27 “may” require authorities 
to take positive measures to ensure the participation of minority groups in the exercise 
o f their cultural rights.513
Attempts to gain greater access to public decision-making and to gain control over 
important decisions fundamentally affecting their way of life have seen minority 
groups turn rather to Article 25. These attempts have not met with great success.
511 The finding in J.G.A. Diergaardt et a l v. Namibia that the confiscation by the state of all property 
collectively owned by the community and thus o f the means to a collective economic livelihood and the 
economic, social and cultural identity that that underpinned did not constitute a breach of Article 27 
illustrates the weakness of the right to identity contained therein. J.G.A. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia,
25 July 2000, HRC Communication, no. 760/1997, CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997.
512 Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, ‘Liberalism and the Right to Culture* (1994) 61 Social 
Research 491.
513 General Comment 23(50), para. 7. The General Comment, bizarrely, was not addressed to religious 
and linguistic minorities, although this is irrelevant in the context of this work.
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Although willing to recognise the right of an individual member o f a minority group 
to stand for public office514, the HRC has been far less willing to stretch the 
boundaries o f Article 25 and consider a right of participation for minority groups. In 
Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, the Human Rights Committee did not find for the 
Mikmaq tribe following their exclusion from a constitutional conference on the rights 
o f Canadian Indian communities because participation had not been “subjected to 
unreasonable restrictions.”515 As representatives of some indigenous peoples were 
taking part in discussions (notably the Métis, the Inuit, and the Assembly of First 
Nations principally to represent non-status Indians), it was permissible under the 
terms of the Covenant for the Canadian government to exclude a group that wished to 
be included in important discussions about the future of Canadian interaction with 
indigenous peoples, including the specific treaty relations between the Mikmaq and 
the state. Following Mikmaq, minority groups can be denied the right to be heard on 
issues which impact fundamentally upon their way of life and hence their identity, as 
long as similar groups are represented.
Further, the HRC has also not been eager to recognise the desire o f some groups for 
elements of self-governance. Self-govemance, as shall be considered in the 
subsequent chapter, necessarily implies an element of sovereignty, an ability to draw a 
line in the sand and say ‘no further’. In a decision which goes to the obligation upon a 
state not to deny the continued existence of a culture, in Lansman v. Finland the HRC 
denied the existence of a right of members of the Sami to decide themselves upon the 
use of their traditional land, finding instead that a threat to a traditional economic 
activity, although it falls within the concept of culture as laid down in Kitoff16, 
requires only consultation by the authorities and does not grant a group the right to 
veto plans that could have considerable impact upon their way of life.517 While the 
HRC appears to have laid down stricter standards of consultation in a later
514 See Ignatane v. Latvia, 25 July 2001, HRC Communication no. 884/1999, CCPR/C/72/D/884/1999.
515 Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada HRC Communication no. 205/ 1986, CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986, 
para. 6. The Committee apparently did not consider how unreasonable the Mikmaq found it to be 
excluded.
5,6 Kitokv. Sweden. HRC Communication no. 197/1985, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985.
5X1 Lansman v. Finland. HRC Communication no. 511/1992, CCPR/C/57/1/1996. The case concerned 
the quarrying o f stone in the traditional breeding grounds of the reindeer herds upon which the 
continued existence of the way of life of this group of Sami relied.
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communication , the inability of a group to refuse to accept the decision of the 
authorities where that decision impacts directly upon them renders them unable to 
effectively manage a common life. This is not of course to suggest that non-state 
groups should hold veto rights over issues that affect them, or necessarily veto rights 
at all. It does mean, however, that the state representing the majority cannot possess a 
veto right either, and that consultation must be conducted from a position of equality 
for both.
6.2.2. The 1992 Declaration
The 1992 Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities519 represents considerable advances on the issue 
of acknowledgment of the collective identity of a minority group, on representation 
and control over issues of importance to minorities. The minority rights contained in 
the Declaration fit, however, as the title indicates, within the San Francisco system of 
individual rights. This is not surprising, not least because Article 27 was taken as the 
inspiration for the new document.520 It is, further, not legally binding and thus has no 
enforcement mechanism similar to Optional Protocol 1 of the ICCPR, although the 
fact that it was adopted by consensus in the General Assembly provides it with a 
certain moral weight. Its non-binding status is one explanation for the positive 
language of the provisions.
According to Article 1(1) of the Declaration, States are required to (“shall”) “protect 
the existence and the ... identity of minorities ... and shall encourage conditions for 
promotion of that identity.” The decision not to emphasis the individual nature of this 
right could be read as noteworthy, as the familiar phrase “persons belonging to” 
appears in every other article, as well as in the title. The choice of language is indeed 
significant according to the accompanying commentary; Article 1 represents a duty of
518 The case concerned the impact of the introduction of fishing quotas and an alteration to the pre­
existing Maori fishing rights, as agreed in the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act of 
1992, upon the traditional Maori way o f life, the HRC noted, “the acceptability of measures that affect 
or interferes with the culturally significant activities of a minority depends on whether the members of 
the minority in question have had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process in 
relation to these measures...”. Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, HRC Communication no. 547/1993, 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, para. 9.5.
519 32 ILM9\ 1 (1993).
520 Eide, Commentary to the UN Declaration, para. 3.
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the state towards minorities within its territory and these duties are deliberately 
formulated in part as duties towards a collective. According to the Chairperson of the 
Working Group on Minorities, “[w]hile only individuals can claim the rights, the 
State cannot fully implement them without ensuring adequate conditions for the 
existence and identity o f the group as a whole.”521 Article 1(2) requires legislative 
measures to achieve this. Moreover, Article 4(4) requires states to take measures, 
albeit with the caveat “where appropriate”, to encourage knowledge of the history, 
traditions, language and culture o f minority groups within the wider population. Such 
measures, if  carried out, could work to facilitate an understanding that is part of 
mutual recognition.
An important advance for claims to participation is to be found in Article 2 o f the 
Declaration. Article 2(2) provides the right “to participate effectively in cultural, 
religious, social, economic and public life.”522 Moreover, Article 2(3) grants 
minorities the right “to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where 
appropriate, regional level”, and the commentary to the Declaration suggests that this 
implies the need for minority groups to be involved at the initial stages of decision­
making and not simply consulted at the final moment of a decision where compromise 
is unlikely. This provision is somewhat undermined, however, by the sub-clause that 
follows, “... in a manner not incompatible with national legislation”. This sub-clause 
notwithstanding, the commentary notes that Article 2 requires effective channels of 
communication between minorities and Governments, and it requires representation in 
legislative, administrative and advisory bodies, as well as a general presence in public 
life. It also encourages a decentralisation of powers to allow for degrees of self- 
governance.523
Other provisions are phrased in less positive language. Article 5 requires that national 
policies be designed and implemented with “due regard” for the interests of members
521 Eide, ibid., para. 14.
522 My emphasis. The growing understanding that ensuring effective participation in public life is key 
to a pluralist society is suggested by the drawing up under the auspices of the OSCE of the Lund 
recommendations on the effective participation of national minorities in public life, which were 
subsequently adopted by the Working Group on Minorities of the Sub-Commission in 1999 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/21). The Lund recommendations are available at 
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/lund.htm.
523 Eide, Commentary to the UN Declaration, paras. 42,44,46.
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■ of the minority, a statement which could be interpreted as no more than is accorded
j  the majority -  the view taken by Eide524 -  but which is therefore arguably lacking in
| equal recognition. This flavour is repeated in Article 4, in which signatories are
j exhorted to take measures “to create favourable conditions to enable persons
| belonging to minorities to express their characteristics...”, and in Article 4(5), states
j “should consider appropriate measures” to enable participation of minority groups in
* economic development.
I
i
[ But there is much that is encouraging in the Declaration, and in particular in the
commentary that accompanies it. Recognition of the collective identities of non-state 
| groups represents real progress and the participatory rights, if implemented, could go
[ a long way to providing a degree of mutual recognition to non-state groups.
| 6.2.3. Minority Rights as Recognition for Nations
Collective rights sit uneasily within the framework of modem international law. The 
fear of collective rights is a product o f Europe’s recent fascist past and the emphasis 
on groups, superior and inferior. In the building of the post-war international 
framework, fascism was countered almost subconsciously by valuing everyone for 
their individuality.525 The consequence is that where the Nazis arguably saw only a 
Jew standing before them and not his humanity, international law, and human rights 
law in particular, has an equal tendency to refuse to see the Jew.526
Notwithstanding the suggestion that a strategy of pursuing Article 25 in conjunction 
with Article 27 might yield better results for groups demanding greater participation 
rights527, neither Article 25 nor 27 ICCPR provide for collective rights to participate
524 Eide, ibid
525 Guyora Binder, ‘The Case for Self-Determination*, (1993) 29 Stanford J. In t’lL  223.
526 . .abstract concepts have in the past only too often presented great dangers to the enjoyment by 
individuals o f  their human rights and fundamental freedoms... A ‘people* is no less an abstraction 
it cannot in reality consist of anything more than the individuals who compose i t” (Sieghart, The 
International Law o f Human Rights, 1983, at 368; quoted in van Boven, ‘Human Rights and Rights of 
Peoples’, (1995) 6 European Journal o f International Law 461). Sieghart’s concern is typical of the 
fear that granting rights to groups will give legitimacy to human rights violations of the individual.
527 Annelies Verstichel, ‘Recent Developments in the UN Human Rights Committee’s Approach to 
Minorities, with a Focus on Effective Participation’, (2005) 12 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights 25. Verstichel notes a growing awareness of the need to focus upon participatory rights 
for minority and indigenous groups, yet rather optimistically concludes from the decision of the HRC 
to consider Article 25 (the right to political participation) in light of Article 1 (the right to self-
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in the democratic system, and the provisions of the Declaration provide no 
enforceable rights. Further, the provisions of the Declaration do not allow for groups 
claiming nationhood to come to the table to re-negotiate the table itself: they provide 
for (non-enforceable) rights to participate within the structures established by the 
majority.
The conclusion cannot be other than that both Article 27 and the 1992 Declaration, 
although they recognise the separate identity of minorities, and in the case o f the latter 
their collective identity, and seek to protect difference, offer only passive recognition 
within a framework established by the majority. Minority protection provisions are, in 
general, limited in substance and application, handicapped further by the 
unwillingness o f the most important o f the enforcement bodies to take a stronger line 
against states in advancing the protection of minorities. Further, the minority rights 
contained in both Article 27 and the Declaration apply only to individual members o f 
a group and are not accessible to the group as a collective entity. That a group has a 
collective existence and requires recognition as such is an idea that does not sit easily 
within the existing framework o f international human rights law, Article 1 of the 
Declaration and certain regional instruments not withstanding. Not only has the 
assumption that group rights would be taken care of automatically through individual 
human rights protection not delivered530, but the main international minority provision 
in force fails to recognise group identity as collective, arguably a harm in its own 
right.
Moreover, recognition if it is to be effective must be active. While individual and 
minority rights are intended to allow members o f minorities to enjoy and participate in 
their culture in the private realm, they are not intended to allow them to exercise any
determination) and an individual concurring opinion by one member of the Committee in suggesting 
that the body should not place undue emphasis on the individual nature o f the guarantees provided by 
Article 25 that these represent notable steps toward guaranteeing participatory rights for minority 
groups. Both incidents were findings in favour of the state party, however. (Gillot v. France, HRC 
Communication No. 932/2000, CCPR/C/75/D/932/2000, and J.G.A. Diergaardt et al v. Nambia, 
Communication No. 760/1997, CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997, respectively).
52S In this regard, see the unnecessarily limited decision o f Bcdlantyne et a l v. Canada that determined 
that English speakers in Quebec were not entitled to invoke the provision as, although a linguistic 
minority in Quebec, they constituted the linguistic majority in Canada as a whole. 1 IHRR 145 (1994).
529 Notably, the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (1982) 2 1 1LM58.
530 See Ian Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law’, in J. Crawford (ed.), The 
Rights o f Peoples. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
IS6
real control over their lives or to participate in the public life of the wider community 
on mutual terms. Individual participatory rights cannot be sufficient guarantee of the 
protection and representation of minority interests, as the will of the majority will of 
course prevail. The limitations of the minority protection regime entail that an 
encompassing group cannot ensure the survival of an attribute fundamental to their 
being as a group. There is little place within the regime for non-state national groups 
as equal participants in discussing and deciding upon matters that affect them, nor a 
guarantee of a place at the table for more general public discussions, and arguably 
there will not be until it is acknowledged that what those claiming recognition are 
seeking is not simply the right to be allowed to continue existing but self-governance. 
The nature of the rights reviewed suggests that minority groups are not viewed as 
equal occupiers of a territory, as equal interlocutors in the daily deliberation about the 
common future of life in that territory. This does not mean that minority rights are not 
well-meaning, but that they were designed to preserve groups rather than to enable 
their full participation on the understanding that these groups have something to offer. 
Recognition requires mutual respect not toleration. This can only be achieved from a 
position of equality along the lines elaborated in Chapter IV, not from a position in 
which One or the Other is designated a ‘minority’.
The minority protection regime creates one further obstacle to recognition o f a 
Romani nation. The current human rights regime, although it accepts the existence of 
considerable numbers of transnational minority groups, places no obligation upon 
states to co-operate to ensure communication and facilitate group identity across 
borders. However, even were such a clause to place obligations upon a state existed, it 
would be unable to incorporate a group as transnational in scale as the Roma.
Ultimately, the minority rights currently on offer in international law provides a non­
state nation neither the autonomy that it requires nor the recognition that most groups 
are actively seeking. While the Declaration does however offer some hope for those 
nations that exist primarily on the territory of one state, were the Declaration to morph 
into hard law, the world of the nation-state has traditionally been one in which the 
winner takes (nearly) all. Nowhere is this more visible than in the interpretation of the 
principle of self-determination. Where nations seek meaningful recognition, it is not 
to minority rights but to self-determination to which they turn.
6 , 3 .  C o n s t i t u t i n g  o n e s e l f  a s  a  N a t io n :  S e l f - D e t e r m in a t io n
No principle of international law is more contested or controversial -  so begin nearly 
all accounts of the right o f self-determination. It is certainly true that short of 
agreement on the fact that self-determination has forced its way into the lexicon of 
international law, there is no consensus on whether in the post-colonial world it 
constitutes lex lata, lex feranda, or lex specialis , although Crawford seems to have 
been most adroit with the observation that self-determination is lex obscuraP2 
Brietzke has chosen to label it lex imperfecta, although one wonders which legal norm 
is not. It has been proclaimed a right erga omrtes and an essential principle of 
international law, and thus presumably a peremptory norm.534
Despite the confusion, when groups claim recognition as a nation, it is the right to 
self-determination that they have in mind. The statement of an aboriginal officer to 
the UN Human Rights Commission Working Group sums this up well: “[I]t could be 
said that at the heart o f all the violations o f our human rights has been the failure to 
respect our integrity, and the insistence in speaking for us, defining our needs and 
controlling our lives. Self determination is the river in which all other rights swim.” 
The combination of vague legal status and emotive power has made it the claim of 
choice for embattled groups seeking a voice on the international stage. Despite this, 
the Romani Movement chose to take on the language of self-determination
531 Robin White, ‘Self-Determination: Time for Re-Assessment?’ (1981) 28 Netherlands International 
Law Review 147
532 James Crawford ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and 
Future’, in P. Alston (ed.), Peoples ’ Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001,10.
533 Paul Brietzke, ‘Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict’, 
(1995) 14 Wisconsin International Law Journal 69, 85.
534 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, ICJ Reports (1970), 32. The ICJ determined that 
self-determination constitutes a rights erga omnes and proclaimed it an essential principle in East 
Timor (Portugal v. Australia). All case-law from http://www.ici-cii.org/ Brownlie, for one, has 
suggested that self-determination constitutes jus cogens. Principles o f Public International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990 (4th edition).
535 Quoted in C. Scott, ‘Indigenous Self-Determination and Decolonization of the International 
Imagination: A Plea’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 814, 814. Such an approach has been 
criticised by Philip Alston (‘Peoples’ Rights: Their Rise and Fall’ in Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights, 261) 
as bearing little relation to die historical facts of self-determination. Alston takes issue with the 
suggestion that without self-determination other human rights have little meaning. While it is certainly 
the case that the right to self-governance is co-equivalent to human rights, without the freedom of self- 
government, the individuals of those groups are denied recognition and are reduced to domination 
regardless o f human rights, which is the point that the aboriginal spokesman appears to be making.
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surprisingly late in its history.536 However, self-determination, and its application to 
non-state groups such as the Roma, is shrouded in confusion.
Much of the uncertainty is understood, at least by lawyers, to arise from the confusion 
in the popular imagination between the moral/ political principle of self-determination 
and the legal right, and most legal accounts attempt to separate out the lex feranda 
from the law as it stands. Yet dismissing the political principle of self-determination 
does little to resolve the difficulty in pinning down a single legal norm of self- 
determination that can be applied to any situation. It is arguably, however, precisely 
this search for a single norm, and the corresponding failure to distinguish between 
rules and principles, that sees accounts of self-determination descend into confusion: 
if self-determination is simply a rule that applies only to colonial peoples, how does 
one explain the language of the right, that is, it applies to everyone? If self- 
determination applies to everyone, how is it that, in practice, it is denied to most? It is 
thus worth being clear on the legal terminology. The account of self-determination 
given here relies on Dworkin’s famous answer to Hart’s conception of law as a 
system of rules by developing the distinction between legal rules and legal principles 
in any given system of law.537 Dworkin grants both equal importance but different 
functions. Rules, according to Dworkin, apply in an all-or-nothing fashion; they lay 
down to whom, in what circumstances and how they apply. Principles contain a 
generally accepted statement that argues in a given direction but does not determine a 
particular decision; they are observed, according to Dworkin, because the standards of 
justice or morality require it. Principles can conflict and still be valid; rules cannot 
conflict and both survive. Principles thus possess an element that rules do not: a 
relative weighting. Where a rule does not exist or is not fully determinate, courts use a 
weighing of principles to develop a new rule. This distinction sees principles, 
according to Crawford, play a general function in translating moral and political 
rationales into international law. This account thus follows Crawford, Cassese and 
Knop538, among others, in viewing the right to self-determination as both a principle
536 The present author is at a loss to explain the reluctance within the Movement until very recently to 
talk the language of self-determination. For details of the claims, Chapter 2.
537 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is Law a System of Rules?’ and H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals’ in Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy o f Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
538 For a discussion of the distinction between right and principle as it applies to self-determination, see 
Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge
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and a set of rules, in which the general principle serves as a guide to interpretation and 
application of the rule.539 It is perhaps the only interpretation that allows one to make 
sense o f the legal approach to self-determination. It does not, of course, remove the 
indeterminacy.540
This account, then, views the history of the development of the right to self- 
determination from the perspective of both principle and the rules which apply in the 
application and enforcement o f that principle. It aims, further, at understanding the 
relationship of people and territory that self-determination represents in order to 
understand what the law as it currently stands offers a non-state group such as the 
Roma.
6.3.1. Charting the interpretative history o f self-determination
Most accounts, having acknowledged the controversial area into which they are about 
to wade, trace the concept of self-determination back to the revolutions of the late 
eighteenth century and the nationalist movements they generated in their wake. The 
point at which self-determination became a part o f international law is, however, as 
one might expect, contested. David Harris tells us that self-determination is not to be 
considered a legal principle until its inclusion in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter, as 
one of the guiding purposes o f the new organisation.541 According to Oppenheim, 
however, it should be considered a legal principle only from the time of its appearance 
as Article 1 in the 1966 twin Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on
University Press, 2002,30-38; Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995,132-3.
539 Arguably, much of the confusion around self-determination is related to the insistence on viewing 
self-determination as a right. Thus, the ‘right’ is viewed here as both a principle and a rule, and not as 
inherently a trump. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. Great Britain: Duckworth & Co., 
1977, in particular Chapter 7.
540 While Crawford and Schächter agree that self-determination is both a principle and a right, 
Crawford views the right as fully determined, whereas Schächter holds that there are few rules and the 
principle predominates. See discussion in Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination, 30-38.
541 Despite Woodrow Wilson’s enthusiastic endorsement at Versailles, self-determination does not 
appear in the Covenant of the League o f Nations (although it might be considered implied in the 
provisions of Article 22) and the Commission of Jurists formed to consider the claim of the Aaland 
Islanders to self-determination denied that the principle was applicable. Report of the International 
Commission of Jurists in the Âaland Islands case, L.N.OJ., Special Suppl. No. 3 (1920). David Harris, 
Cases and Materials on International Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998 (5th edition), 113.
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Economic, Cultural and Social Rights.542 Crawford is rather more circumspect, and 
provides a window between the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Territories (G.A. Res. 1514) and the 1971 decision by the International Court 
of Justice to overturn an earlier decision and revoke South Africa’s mandate over 
South West Africa, justified by reference to the right of its inhabitants to self- 
determination, within which he suggests self-determination became increasingly 
accepted as a principle of international law.
Regardless of the exact moment at which it established itself as a legal principle, the 
1960 Declaration has been crucial in expanding the meaning of self-determination -  
the text o f the UN Charter itself offering few clues -  and it is upon this document that 
the UN’s decolonisation policy was based.544 Article 2 famously provides: “All 
peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”545 Already however there were attempts to limit its application. Article 
6 of the Declaration qualifies the right with the condition that, “Any attempt aimed at 
the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country is incompatible with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations.” Thus, the 1960 Declaration is normally interpreted to imply that self- 
determination applies to colonial peoples only within existing colonial boundaries, the 
principle of uti possidetis.546 Following the 1960 Declaration, there is hardly any 
dispute that the ‘peoples’ in question include trust territories and non-self-goveming
542 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim's International Law. Volume 1: Peace.
England: Longman, 1992 (9th edition).
543 Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’, 16- 
17.
544 The Resolution was adopted by 89 votes to none against, with nine abstentions (Australia, Belgium, 
Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the UK and the US). Nevertheless, despite 
the lack of unanimity, the ICJ in 1975 considered self-determination in the colonial context to be a part 
of customary international law, based in no small part on the 1960 Declaration and the practice it 
inspired. Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1975), para 56.
545 G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), G.A.O.R., 15th Session, Suppl. 16,66 (1960).
546 It is worth noting that this was a restrictive interpretation fully endorsed by the Organisation for 
African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 in no small part to fight the anti-colonialism battle and to 
promote the right to self-determination of African peoples. The OAU came out strongly against the 
Biafran claim to self-determination, for example, and strongly supported the Nigerian claim to integrity 
of its borders. See Steven C. Roach, ‘Minority Rights and an Emergent Right to Autonomy: A 
Historical and Normative Assessment’ (2004) 11 International Journal o f Minority and Group Rights 
411,421-424. Uti possidetis was declared a general principle of international law by the Badinter 
Commission in Opinion No. 2, reproduced (1993) 3 European Journal o f International Law 183-4, 
although not uncontroversially.
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territories as established under the UN Charter and that they were the intended bearers 
of the right as expressed there.
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States (G.A. Res. 2625) repeats almost exactly the 
wording of the earlier document in relation to self-determination, but made a number 
of crucial and well-known additions. While the 1960 Declaration suggests that the 
only legitimate outcome of self-determination is “complete independence” (Article 5, 
G.A. Res. 1514), the Declaration on Friendly Relations, repeating the wording o f G.A. 
Resolution 1541, provides three acceptable outcomes: “The establishment o f a  
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an 
independent State or the emergence into any other political status determined by a 
people...”. Self-determination, therefore, is not to be equated with independence, 
but with the right to choose.
The second much quoted part o f the 1970 Declaration concerns a limitation clause 
similar to that found in Resolution 1514. However, rather than issuing a blanket 
refusal to allow the dismemberment or interruption o f the territorial or political unity 
of an existing State, the limitation offers protection only to “...States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle o f equal rights and self-determination o f 
peoples ... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.” The 
inclusion of this clause, as Crawford points out, would have been superfluous if  self- 
determination applied solely to colonies and colonial people. The wording of this 
clause was clearly chosen with the apartheid regime of South Africa in mind — 
independent but in the minds of many subject to ‘alien domination’ -  but was also 
concerned with the status of occupied territories following the cessation o f m ilitary 
hostilities, as evidenced by the many General Assembly resolutions referring to
547 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 1970. Res. 2625 was adopted without a vote. While most former colonies 
opted for independence, examples of integration with another state include the decision of North 
Cameroons to join Nigeria; an example of free association could be the Cook Islands and New Zealand. 
Some dependent territories chose to remain so; for example, Gibraltar with the United Kingdom.
548 Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’, 31. 
The inclusion of this phrase suggests that by 1970 it was already accepted that self-determination was 
applicable outside the context of salt-water colonialism.
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Palestine.549 Self-determination, at least as a principle, thus appears to have stepped 
beyond its colonial roots.
The interpretation that self-determination applies beyond the colonial context is 
supported by Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants, in which Article 1(1) echoes the 1960 
Declaration statement that “All peoples have the right to self-determination”. As 
Crawford notes, ordinary treaty interpretation ensures that it cannot be considered 
limited to colonial peoples; nor simply to those subject to subjugation or alien 
domination. There is no attempt to limit the provision thus and the singling out of the 
peoples of colonial territories in Article 1(3) suggests that the “all peoples” of Article 
1(1) is intended to mean just that.550 There is thus a strong case for suggesting that 
self-determination is applicable in situations other than those of decolonisation. 
Indeed, the ICJ ruled in 1995 that self-determination “is one of the essential principles 
o f international law”551, suggesting a continuing applicability.
Self-determination may be one of the most essential principles in the international 
legal lexicon, but to whom does the right apply? Or, when is it a rule? In one of his 
earlier works, Crawford is clear that the subject of the right to self-determination 
belongs solely to trust and mandated territories, and territories treated as non self- 
governing under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. One could also, although Crawford 
does not, suggest that oppressed peoples as defined by the 1970 Declaration are also 
rights-bearers.552 There is on-going debate about whether oppressed minority groups 
could fall within the terms of the right and thus be entitled to independence, so that 
where they are prevented from a meaningful exercise of their right to self- 
determination as part of a larger unit, they become bearers in their own right -  the so-
549 Just one resolution prior to 2625, the Security Council dealt with the policies of apartheid (2624 
(XXV), and three resolutions later, it considered ‘The situation in the Middle East* (2628 (XXV)), 
condemning the continuing Israeli occupations in contravention of G.A Res. 242 (1967), suggesting 
that these issues were very much on the Security Council*s mind.
530 For more details, Crawford, ‘The Right o f Self-Determination in International Law: Its 
Development and Future’, 27.
331 Case concerning East Timor, ICJ Reports (1995), 102. It is however worth noting that this case, as 
all the others considered by the ICJ, concerned the situation and status of a former colonial territory. 
The assertion that self-determination applies outside the colonial context is now also supported by the 
so-called Helsinki Declaration; although it is not legally binding, it constitutes an important statement
of opinio juris.
532 Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 84-118.
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9called ‘positive’ aspect o f the safeguard clause.553 The Supreme Court of Canada in its 
advisory opinion concerning the right of Quebec to secede from Canada followed the 
1970 Declaration in suggesting a second categoiy o f bearers o f the right to self- 
determination.554 The European Court of Human Rights was less reticent than the 
Canadian Supreme Court in identifying in Loizidou v. Turkey an emerging consensus 
that self-determination can be used as a means o f counteracting certain types of 
human rights abuse.555 Most commentators, however, suggest a high threshold of 
abuse before a group or ‘people’ could be considered ‘internally colonised’ and thus 
entitled to invoke the provisions of G.A. Resolutions 1541 or 2625.556 An 
understanding of Article I that views it as incorporating the principle that everyone 
has the right to self-determination rather than the rule is thus probably the best, 
although slightly sideways, interpretation.557 Self-determination as a rule thus applies 
solely to colonial peoples within colonial boundaries.
Principles, however, are over-lapping, contradictory and clashing. Where self- 
determination is not a rule, it conflicts with a number o f well-established and equally
533 Weight has been lent to this theory by the actions o f the UN, authorised by Security Council 
Resolution 688, which saw intervention in Iraq on behalf of the Kurdish population in May 1991 in a 
clear breach of Iraq’s territorial integrity and political unity. Moreover, the establishment of the so- 
called ‘safe havens’ by the United States and the UK could constitute further evidence in this direction. 
In addition, there is considerable evidence that some states encouraged secession from the former 
Yugoslavia, e.g. by premature recognition. Such examples however suggest that an already existing 
situation of instability and upheaval may be required to persuade the international community that 
secession is an option.
554 The lack of a right to secession for minorities “places no obligation on minority groups to stay part 
of a unit that maltreats them or in which they feel unrepresented”, according to Higgins. Rosalyn 
Higgins, Problems and Processes. International Law and How We Use It. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994,125. However, elsewhere Higgins has been less accommodating. Indeed, elsewhere Higgins has 
been clear that those groups that fall under Article 2 7 ICCPR cannot be peoples within the meaning of 
Article 1. The terms are, for Higgins, mutually exclusive. Higgins, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the 
Right to Secession: Comments’ in C. BriSlmann, R  Lefeber and M. Zieck (eds.), Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff^ 1993.
553 Luizidou v. Turkey, Judgement of the ECHR, 18 December 1996. See Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Wildhaber in particular, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
556 E.g. White, ‘Self-Determination: Time for Re-Assessment?*. Moreover, several commentators have 
also noted the possibility that recognition of the different groups within a territory may actually 
constitute a  breach of the safeguard clause in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, which requires 
states “to represent [...] the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed 
or colour.”
557 Crawford, The Creation o f States in International Law, 101; Knop, Diversity and Self- 
Determination, 34. Cassese, however, appears to disagree, stating that only self-determination applying 
in a colonial situation is to be considered a general principle of international law and thus the 
continuing right to self-determination is applicable to those states, and only to those states, that are 
signatories to either of the 1966 Covenants. Cassese’s opinion would appear to characterise self- 
determination as a rule, but one that is clear that different bearers have different outcomes. Cassese, 
Self-Determination o f Peoples.
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much cherished principles, such as those of territorial integrity and of non­
intervention. Whilst the principle of non-intervention, as found in Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter, is not applicable in situations of colonial oppression558, the ordering of 
international legal principles becomes much less clear outside the certainties of the 
application of the right to self-determination as a rule in the situation of 
decolonisation. One winner though appears clear. The principle of territorial integrity 
effectively trumps that of self-determination; there is no right to secession in 
international law.559 The most recent statement of that victory was made by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in its finding that where a government of a state is 
representative of the people as a whole, without discrimination, the state “is entitled to 
the protection under international law of its territorial integrity”.560
The principal means by which the principle of self-determination is reconciled with 
that of territorial integrity -  the relative weighting of the principles -  is through a 
restricted interpretation of ‘peoples’, so that it is understood only in terms of the 
population of an already constituted State. According to Higgins, the references to 
self-determination in the UN Charter should only be understood as a corollary to 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as providing the right of a people of a state to be 
protected from the interference of others in their affairs.561 She concludes, that faced 
with the two possibilities that ‘all peoples’ refers either to the entire people of a state 
or that it implies all distinctive groupings based either on ethnicity, race or perhaps 
religion, all the relevant state practice and wording of documents stressing the 
importance of territorial integrity can only mean that ‘peoples’ refer to all the peoples 
o f a given territory and not any part thereof. Thus, the people of France or Japan have 
the right to self-determination, but not, say, the people of Breton, except in the sense 
that they are part of the people of the French Republic and entitled to self- 
determination as part of the wider group. Harris concurs, stating emphatically that,
558 See G.A. Res. 2625.
559 See, Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-determination and Secession. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998.
560 Reference re Secession o f Quebec [1998] 1 SCR 217,284 (para. 130). It refused, however, to reach a 
conclusion on whether this constituted an accepted part of international law.
561 Higgins, Problems and Processes, 112. Higgins holds that the link o f self-determination with equal 
rights in Article 1(2) o f the UN Charter can only imply that the right of self-determination belongs to 
the peoples of states as it is the equal rights of states which are being referred to and not of individuals. 
Such an interpretation has received strong support from African states keen to safeguard their own 
borders and develop a sense of nationhood in extremely heterogeneous countries.
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“[self-determination] does not extend to claims for independence by minority groups 
in a non-colonial context.”562
In its conflict with the principle of territorial integrity, the principle of self- 
determination has arguably emerged as (or been reduced to) a continuing entitlement 
of a people “to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural status”.563 This is the 
aspect of self-determination which has come to be known as ‘internal’. This approach 
has taken inspiration from other provisions in the human rights stable, which 
guarantees to all the right to choose their government.564 For as Brownlie has pointed 
out, if  the right of a people is to have any significant meaning at all, it must be 
separate from the rights o f states and constitute a right of a people against their 
government565; thus seeing self-determination in terms of internal governance 
ostensibly preserves the right as one of ‘peoples’ rather than seeing it become purely 
absorbed into the defence of state sovereignty. The Human Rights Committee, 
moreover, has consistently stressed the obligation upon state parties to provide 
information on the fulfilment of Article 1 in their periodic reports and, perhaps more 
importantly, states have not contested their duty to do so, although it is to be admitted 
that they have not always been dutiful in doing so.566 Adding weight to the assertion 
that the principle of self-determination finds expression in the ‘internal’ dimension, a 
number of regional documents, such as the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Declaration), explicitly provide for 
this internal dimension o f self-determination.567 As a counter-balance to the
562 Hams, Cases and Materials, 113.
563 Article 1(1) o f the 1966 Covenants; http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm
564 For example, Article 21(3) UDHR commanding that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of the government; this will be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage...” Article 25 ICCPR translates this into a legally binding obligation and 
right The seeming duplication of Articles 1 and 25 ICCPR is normally considered resolved by 
asserting that Article 25 provides the detail of the free choice guaranteed by Article 1 (e.g. see Higgins, 
Problems and Processes, 121). The equating of self-determination and democracy was in fact, 
according to Hannum, the philosophical underpinning of President Wilson’s understanding o f self- 
determination (Hurst Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination, (1993) 34 Virginia Journal o f 
International Law 1,8). See also Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance* (1992) 86 
American Journal o f International Law 46. Cassese, however, appears to deny that any such right 
currently exists, commenting that the ‘consent of the governed’ is held to be “too dangerous for the 
present fabric o f  the world community.” Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples, 334).
5 Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law’.
566 See General Comment No. 12, adopted 21st session, 1984; 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm
567 14ILM 1292 (1975); “...all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and 
as they wish, their internal and external political status...”.
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absorption of the principle of self-determination within the human rights orbit, an 
interpretation of self-determination as not requiring the all-or-nothing o f 
independence has found expression in autonomy arrangements.
6.3.2. Self-determination through autonomous regimes
The apparent opportunity offered by the conception of self-determination as an on­
going right to choose one’s own government has given birth to a growing awareness 
of the role autonomous arrangements might have to play in generating a role for self- 
determination that strikes a fairer balance between the desire on the part o f non-state 
nations for self-governance and the refusal of states to compromise on territorial 
integrity. Autonomy has a good claim to be an existing tool in international law for 
resolving contested territorial claims and has been used by international law on 
numerous occasions to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable; an example being the 
Free City of Danzig (Gdansk) in the inter-bellum period. It is not surprising therefore 
that autonomy has re-emerged as a plausible pragmatic solution to regional conflict in 
the post-1990s era.
Governments are awakening to the possibilities a more nuanced approach to self- 
determination could have in diffusing ethnic conflict Indicative of movement in this 
direction is the statement by the then Minister of State at the FCO to the House of 
Lords in 1993 concerning the position of the UK Government on the status of Tibet; 
Baroness Chalker declared that, “The Government’s view is that all peoples have a 
right to self-determination but that this right can be expressed in several different 
ways” and, emphasising her point, “We do not believe that independence for Tibet is 
a realistic proposal.”568 Baroness Chalker’s comment finds its inspiration, whether 
consciously or not, in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations. As the Minister 
suggests, self-determination has never been solely equated with independence. In a 
similar vein, the Canadian delegation to the Indigenous Populations’ Working Group 
expressed an understanding of self-determination as being “exercised in a manner 
which recognizes the inter-relationship between the jurisdiction of the existing state 
and that of the indigenous community, and where the parameters of jurisdiction are
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568 Hansard., H.L., Vol. 542, col. 5, (1993); emphasis mine.
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mutually agreed upon.”569 Similar statements have been made by other governmental 
representatives in the context of the Working Group.570
The attractions of self-determination as autonomy over the participation rights 
accorded to minority groups are, from the Canadian government’s statement, clear. 
Autonomy allows a group to establish themselves as self-constituted, granting them a 
formal place in the public sphere from which it is possible to establish meaningful 
control over their own affairs. It can be a means of equality with other nations in that 
public sphere as the mutual agreement that the Canadian delegation, for example, felt 
to be necessary in self-determination as autonomy requires the consent of the 
indigenous people concerned. Autonomy can also enable autonomous groups to 
provide certain services themselves, such as the growing autonomy of Maori in New 
Zealand in the fields of health care and education or of devolution in Scotland, which 
encompasses control over all internal affairs. The development of autonomy as part of 
self-determination would be exciting for the flexibility it could offer the third type of 
nations outlined above -  those subsumed within an existing state and denied 
participation on a basis of equality with other groups assuming that they had no 
desire to representation or participation at the international level.
The re-emergence of autonomy has been welcomed by a number of academic 
commentators, who have advocated such an approach and who view territorial 
autonomy571 as a vehicle through which self-determination can regain some of its 
normative value without necessarily raising the unholy spectre of secession. Wright, 
for example, has pressed for autonomy as a means of supplementing the inadequate 
existing rights for minority groups qua groups, suggesting a legal basis in an ordinary
569 Marantz, Statement of the Observer Delegation of Canada, 5; cited in Knop, Diversity and Self- 
Determination, 257.
570 Australia’s submission to the Indigenous Populations Working Group presented a ‘post-colonial’ 
model o f self-determination, which consisted in recognising the special position of indigenous peoples, 
recognising their human rights and ensuring their full participation in the political process. Statement of 
Mr. Colin Milner on Behalf of the Australia Delegation (Geneva, 24 July 1992); cited in Knop, ibid., 
256. It is an argument that the Chair of the Working Group, Erica Daes, appears to have taken up. See 
Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/s6/Add.1 (1993).
371 Although most commentators talk simply o f ‘autonomy’, they are referring mainly to a form of 
territorial autonomy, whether explicitly stated or not; e.g. see Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, 
and Self-Determination. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996,463: “Land is the literal 
and figurative foundation of the state and o f every community that aspires to political autonomy”.
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« • * i i yinterpretation o f ‘all peoples’. Hannum, taking note of the arrival of autonomy in 
the field of conflict resolution, has suggested that a new norm of international law has 
already been created from the intersection of sovereignty, self-determination and 
human rights, guaranteeing minority groups and indigenous peoples the right to 
autonomy and to meaningful control over their own affairs, what he has termed ‘less- 
than-sovereign self-determination’.573 While Hannum’s claim that a new norm has 
crystallised seems unrealistic, the use of autonomy as an interpretation of self- 
determination is nonetheless emerging.
Such autonomy need not be territorial, despite most commentators’ assumption that it 
would necessarily be so. Non-territorial autonomy also has a history of conflict 
resolution, enabling mixed communities to inhabit the same space while allowing 
them the right to self-govemance over many issues of importance to them. The 
Ottoman millet system is the best known example of non-territorial autonomy, but it is
» I
not the only one, as the preceding chapter sought to highlight. Further, 
contemporary examples of non-territorial autonomy, by which membership is 
determined by the personality principle rather than existence on a given territory, 
exist: the Maori in New Zealand or the Sami in Scandinavia.575 Such examples are 
notable, however, as exceptions. Autonomy models as considered by international 
lawyers remain overwhelming territorial.
An expansion of the terms of self-determination to include a right to autonomy, both 
territorial and non-territorial, could be of real benefit to non-state nations in particular 
in seeking meaningful control over their own affairs. It may be all that they require, 
for an independent state is a very costly business and autonomous nations might well 
prefer to play off state fears for their territorial integrity with demands for greater 
levels of resources from central government. It is worth sounding a note of caution,
572 Wright appears to base her proposal of autonomy as a solution on the ‘equal rights of peoples’ 
proclaimed in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter; although, Higgins, as noted above, has rejected such a 
possibility of ‘peoples* taking its ordinary meaning in this context Jane Wright, ‘Minority Groups, 
Autonomy, and Self-Determination’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 605.
573 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 469.
574 For further examples, see section 5.2. John Coakley, ‘Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic 
Conflict: The Strategy of Non-territorial Autonomy* (1994) 15 International Political Science Review 
297.
575 See for the Sami approach based on Renner’s personality principle, Anne Julie Semb, ‘Sami Self- 
determination in the making?’ (2005) 11 Nations and Nationalism 531.
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however, in that autonomy will not necessarily provide the recognition for which all 
are arguably searching. Territorial autonomy in particular need not entail active 
recognition and the inclusion as an equal in societal negotiations. Autonomous 
communities risk ghettoisation. Moreover, where nations do seek some type of 
participation at the supra-state level, autonomy as currently conceived will not 
necessarily bring them this. Conversely, however, in certain cases autonomy might 
offer recognition that independence does not; a 2 nations- 1 state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict might actually achieve more in terms of recognition for the 
Palestinian people than their own state, particularly one in which their borders are 
determined unilaterally by Israel. These concerns to one side, where autonomy is the 
negotiated outcome between the non-state group concerned and the majority, it 
contains much potential for the realisation of recognition for certain non-state nations.
Those groups, however, that are truly trans-national and for whom recognition 
implicitly requires recognition of that, autonomy, even non-territorial autonomy 
within the borders of one state, cannot provide i t  For the fourth type of nations 
outlined above, autonomy is not seen as an option, not for logical reasons -  as the use 
of the personality principle in constructing Sami self-determination across the borders 
of the Scandinavian states demonstrates -  but for logistical ones. The mainstream 
understanding that autonomy is necessarily territorial renders it logistically impossible 
for trans-national or dispersed groups. It only seems logical that self-determination 
and autonomous regimes require territory, however, because of the constitutive role 
territory is widely understood to play at the international level.
6.3.3. Summary
To summarise the legal position, self-determination is both a principle of customary 
international law, applying to all peoples where a people is understood solely as the 
entire population of a given territory, and is a rule, applicable without limitation, but 
only to those accepted as bearers o f that right, namely colonial peoples and possibly 
those denied self-determination as part of the wider state. Non-state nations 
unconnected to colonialism, or minority groups, are thus not bearers of the right and 
do not fall within the definition of a people in the context of the principle. They are 
hence not entitled to self-determination except as part of the larger population of 
which they form a constituent part. While there is a possibility that groups within a
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State that are oppressed and thus prevented from exercising so-called internal self- 
determination may have the right to (external) self-determination, and the right to 
secede, this is not well-established. Romani groups within state boundaries or a 
transnational Romani entity are not entitled to self-determination, but only individual 
Roma as citizens o f a given state.
While non-state groups claiming nationhood cannot utilise the right to self- 
determination, one could however begin to build a case that groups claiming 
nationhood, where that claim is ignored, are being denied internal self-determination. 
Roma are certainly often excluded from any meaningful participation in the internal 
self-determination of a state -  a consequence of poverty, social marginalisation and 
chronic discrimination. However, even were this theory to be accepted, secession 
requires territory and many groups claiming rights of self-determination do not wish 
for secession but greater rights to autonomy and participation. The Romani nation 
does not, in any case, possess or desire territory. Nor can the Romani claim to non­
territorial nationhood reasonably make use of the emerging right to autonomy, where 
autonomy is widely understood as requiring the concentrated existence of a group on 
a defined territory.
6,4. Taking a critical approach to self-determination
Brownlie has described the core meaning of self-determination as, “the right o f a 
community which has a distinct character to have this character reflected in the 
institutions of government under which it lives”.577 While this is reflected in the legal 
status of self-determination as one of the pre-eminent principles of international law, 
and as a right, seemingly able to out-rank territorial integrity, it is not reflected in the 
scope. This section will consider why the interpretation of who qualifies for self- 
determination is so restrictive and widely perceived to be a betrayal of the spirit of 
self-determination as expressed by Brownlie.
576 Cassese provides a sobering account of the limited in-roads self-determination has made on the 
principles of state sovereignty and non-interference; Cassese, Self-Determination o f Peoples, 334-335. 
iT7 Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law’.
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The most obvious reason is that of the fear o f the de-stabilising potential of self- 
determination and the obsession in international law with secession. The second 
Commission of Jurists in the Aland Islands case famously stated in its report that to 
concede to minority groups the right to choose their own future and to secede from the 
larger community would be “to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to 
uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and 
political unity.”578 Eighty years on, this fear remains as powerful as ever. The former 
UN Secretary General, Dr. Boutrous-Boutrous Ghali, in sounding a note o f alarm at 
the seeming upsurge of nationalist claims in the early 1990s, noted that should every 
ethnic, religious or linguistic group claim self-determination, “there would be no limit 
to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become 
ever more difficult to achieve”.579
Beyond the fear of destabilisation, the events of the Second World War and the many 
ethnic conflicts that have scarred the world since has seen nationalism viewed not just 
with suspicion, but with outright hostility.580 Appeals to self-determination have been 
viewed as necessarily ethnically-based, and thus as a form of primitive tribalism, in 
contrast to the broader more liberally appealing forms o f identity which the supposed 
neutrality o f territory can offer. Knop’s analysis of the writings of two of the most
eminent international lawyers on the current stage, Thomas Franck and Rosalyn 
Higgins, brings their fear o f a world galloping out of control to the tom-tom beat of
578 The Aaland Islands Question, Report presented to the Council o f the League by the Commission o f 
Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921), at 28; cited in Hannum, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 30. The League Council’s fear entailed refusal to allow self- 
determination for the Aalands people and limited action to act as a mediator between the Aaland 
Islanders and the Finnish State. Roach, ‘Minority Rights and an Emergent Right to Autonomy: A 
Historical and Normative Assessment*.
579 UN Secretary-General Ghali, Agenda fo r Peace, Report to the Security Council, 17th June 1992, 
A/47/277- S/24 111, para. 17 Knop has used the fear of pandemonium as an interpretative tool for 
consideration of writings on self-determination, suggesting that this fear is used to shield self- 
determination from the accusation of inconsistency. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination, 99-105. 
Even taking former Secretary-General Ghali’s comment about the dangers of fragmentation into 
account, the argument that we would be in a terrible mess if  the international community actually 
applied the principle of self-determination fairly is hardly a sound basis for the application o f law.
580 This has been chartered by a number o f writers in different fields, notably Miller, On Nationalism', 
also Berman, ‘Nationalism “Good” and “Bad”: The Vicissitudes of an Obsession’ (1996) 90 
Proceedings o f  the American Society o f International Law 214.
581 For example, Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession* in BrOlmann, Lefeber and 
Zieck (eds.) Peoples and Minorities in International Law. Franck notably fails to make a distinction 
between non-violent nationalist movements that choose to work within the legal and political system in 
which they find themselves, such as the Scottish nationalist movement, and those that resort to aimed 
struggle. See also Chapter 5, supra.
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nationalist demands clearly into focus. Higgins, for example, although .renowned for 
her Yale-inspired view of international law as process, demands in the context of self- 
determination the need for legal certainty and a definition of self-determination that 
sees it reduced to a fixed rule. In so doing, she excludes all groups other than colonial 
peoples, as anything else is just ‘confused rhetoric’ and an attempt to make self- 
determination mean all things to all men.582 Yet as Knop suggests, a determination to 
establish concrete rules as to who qualifies runs the risk of “de-historiciz[ing] and de- 
particulariz[ing] identity”. But that perhaps is the point. It is possible to argue that 
at a fundamentally deep level, lawyers consider their role as being to promote order 
not chaos, that the possibility that the latter might occur is incompatible with the self- 
perception of what it is to be a lawyer, particularly an international lawyer.
While the fear of instability is a primary concern for international lawyers, a deeper 
consideration of self-determination arguably reveals the embeddedness of the 
territorial impulse in international law, such that it infused the legal understanding of 
self-determination from the outset. It is rather the perception of self-determination as 
the ability of a nation or people to choose its own destiny that has obscured much of 
the consideration of this topic. The emphasis on colonial peoples as the sole recipients 
of self-determination is noteworthy because the colonies in question corresponded 
neither to demos nor ethnos -  the original designates of self-determination in 
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century political thought.585 Although it is 
likely that the common experience o f oppression under the imperial yoke created an 
identity of sorts, this was most likely not at the fore of delegates’ minds in drawing up 
the UN Charter. Rather it seems likely that the concept of ‘peoples’ was determined at 
the outset as the people of a given territory. The age of nationalism and the myth of 
the nation-state overcame neither the fact of the state as the sole subject in
582 Higgins, Problems and Process> 128.
513 Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination, 67.
5M David Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box* (2000) 32 New York Journal 
o f International Law and Politics 335. The importance o f the self-understanding o f  lawyers in 
determining international law may explain in part the decisions o f the Human Rights Committee in 
relation to minority rights and in particular to  their decision that Article 1 o f  the Covenant is not subject 
to the individual complaint procedure under the Optional Protocol, thus forcing complainants wishing 
to allege a  violation o f their right to self-determination to rely upon Article 25 and 27, thus confirming 
their status as minorities and not peoples.
385 The point is Knop*s, Diversity and Self-Determination, 55-62.
international law, nor that the state is defined by its borders.586 The nation was only so 
much froth on the surface. Thus, wherever it fell for the future of a territory to be 
decided, it was for the population of that territory to make the decision, not a nation 
fulfilling a co-determined destiny. The desire for order arguably trumped any notion 
that de-colonisation was about the liberty of oppressed peoples.587
On a similar line of reasoning, Brilmayer has suggested that the right of self- 
determination be best understood as a form of restorative justice, as a corrective to a 
wrongful undertaking, in this case the wrongful seizing of territory.588 It was the 
territory that was being returned to those who lived in it, regardless of whether they 
corresponded to contemporary understandings o f a people or whether those that lived 
on the land wished to determine their future together with each other. It would, on this 
interpretation, be wrong to view the application of self-determination in 
decolonisation as the right of a people to freely choose their own destiny. De­
colonisation was, from this perspective, rather a process o f returning stolen property.
Thus an explanation for why colonial peoples were allowed to overcome the territorial 
imperative is that they were not. The acceptability of self-determination for colonial 
peoples and the corresponding decision to limit self-determination to them is a 
consequence of the view of colonies as distinct and separate territorial entities. De­
colonization allowed for the exercise of self-determination without raising the spectre 
of secessionist claims, as long as uti possidetis was accepted without question. As 
Knop notes, despite the statement by Judge Dillard in the Western Sahara case that “it 
is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the 
destiny of the people”, international law recognises a secessionist claim under the
586 T he principle o f  uti possidetis was w ell established long before the appearance o f  the principle o f 
self-determination. E.g. in the Continental Treaty o f  1856, in  which the countries o f  Latin America 
undertook not to  recognise any territorial transfers in the region. See Driessen, A Concept o f Nation, 
67-72.
587 See, in this regard, Castellino’s analysis o f  the Western Sahara case. Interestingly, he also notes that 
“The ideal o f  the ‘nation-state' w as meant to  be the vehicle that could contain all expressions o f  
national identity” , apparently suggesting that in part a belief in the virtue o f the nation-state model 
blinded decision-makers to the incongruence o f  nations and territory. Joshua Castellino, ‘National 
Identity & The International Law o f  Self-Determination: the Stratification o f the Western Sahara ‘S elf 
in S. Tierney (ed.), Accommodating National Identity. The Hague: Kluwer, 2000,262.
588 L ea Brilmayer, ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation’, (1991), 16 Yale 
Journal o f International Law 177.
589 See Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970), 5(6): “The territory o f  a colony or other non-self- 
governing territory has ... a status separate and distinct from the territory o f  the State administering it”.
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principle of self-determination only where the secessionist claimants have the better 
territorial claim, a point bourn out in the Court’s reasoning of the Western Sahara 
case.590 Despite the Court’s awareness of the dilemma of applying an international 
law norm designed to accommodate European models of political community to a 
nomadic Sahara, it nonetheless viewed the Western Sahara as a question of possession 
of property.591 The unit of decision was and remains the territory, not the nation(s) 
that reside(s) upon i t
While Brownlie has suggested that the emphasis on territory is simply the practical 
manifestation of the meaning of the self-determination, the above has aimed to show 
that rather, self-determination is better understood not as the right of a people to freely 
determine its own future but as the normative or moral manifestation of the right of a 
territory to regain its original borders. By institutionalising self-determination as the 
right of a territory and not of nations, its revolutionary potential was thwarted and 
self-determination was co-opted as a pillar of order in the post-war system.
A consequence of the origins of international law in the development of the rise of the 
state -  embodying that symbiotic combination of centralisation of political authority 
and the development of fixed boundaries -  is that territorial integrity, both as a 
principle of non-intervention and uti possedetis, is rooted as the meta-norm of the 
international order.592 This is perhaps the only means to understand how the freedom 
of a nation to determine its own future is itself determined by the imperative that any 
such decision must respect the indivisibility of a unit of territory. Where the political 
principle of self-determination belonged to the nation, as national self-determination, 
the legal principle has arguably never belonged to the nation but has been tied to 
territory from its very inception. At the heart of the normative stress on territorial 
integrity is the belief in capacity as the defining element of personality. For, where
590 Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination, 72-3. Cf. with the case o f Eritrea: despite its annexation by 
Ethiopia in breach o f the federalism agreement reached at independence, Eritrea had no recourse to 
self-determination and simply disappeared from  the map. For details, Dreissen, A Concept o f Nation, 
112-3.
591 Castellino, ‘National Identity &  The International Law o f  Self-Determination’, 276.
592 For consideration o f  uti possidetis as a  general principle o f  international law, see Malcolm N. Shaw, 
‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries* (1997) 8 European Journal o f International Law 478,494- 
502; Castellino, ibid, 260; and, in particular, Shaw, 'Territory in International Law’ (1982) 13 
Netherlands Yearbook o f International Law 61: “Many o f the most fundamental principles in 
international law are predicated upon the concept o f territorial exclusivity o f the stale, and are aimed at 
protecting it.”, 67.
territory is viewed as instrumental in political theory, in international law it is viewed 
as constitutive.593 It is with the nature of personality in the international order that 
Chapter 7 begins.
593 Shaw, ‘Territory in International Law ’, 63.
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Chapter 7: Recognition as Self-Determination qua 
participation
Stories do not belong to eternity. They belong to time. And out of time they grow.
Stories are the secret reservoir o f  values: change the stories individuals or nations live by and
tell themselves, and you change the individuals and nations.394
That international law came into being in order to regulate relations between states is 
well-known. As Kingsbury has pointed out, the first word of book 1 of Grotius’s 
foundational text De Jure Belli ac Pads is controversiae, thereby suggesting that the 
management of disputes is traditionally understood as the prime function of the law of 
nations.595 However, international law has also struggled with the reconciliation of the 
particular and the universal since the earliest attempts to define i t 596 The problem of 
how to reconcile the normative judgments that law requires in the face of the 
heterogeneity of social, economic, religious and political life goes to the heart of 
international law. The means of overcoming such diversity that international law 
adopted was to focus on function, which became institutionalised as territorial 
sovereignty. Personality was thus determined by fulfilling the functions of a state. Yet 
the illusion that by focusing on capacity, international law can remain neutral in the 
face of deep cultural differences has been comprehensively exposed.597
The challenges to the state-centred order that this lack of neutrality has generated have 
been met with a determination on the part of international law-makers to keep a tight 
control over access to international law-making. This resolve to keep the perceived 
threat of chaos at bay sees all entities squeezed into the dichotomy of state/ non-state, 
in which non-state claims to legitimacy are denied the recognition they seek. The 
exclusive nature of participation at the international level and the inability of those
594 Ben Okri, ‘The Joys o f Story-Telling’ in Birds o f Heaven. London: Phoenix, 1997.
595 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The International Legal Order’ in Peter Cune and M ark Tushnet (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook o f Legal Studies. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003.
396 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Confronting Difference: The Puzzling Durability o f  Gentili’s Combination o f  
Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative Judgment’ (1998) 92 American Journal o f International Law 713. 
597 See, for example, from among the considerable ‘Newstream’ literature, Armelies Riles, ‘Aspiration 
and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization o f Culture*, (1993) 106 Harvard 
Law Review 723. Riles has concluded that, “International law ...  is the creative product o f  its European 
cultural context, the codification o f European norms, and the best hope for the perpetuation o f 
European supremacy.” (733-734). More generally, see Deborah Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: 
Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law ', (1996) 65 Nordic Journal o f International Law 341.
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affected to have voice in the making o f rules that govern them has seen international 
law widely condemned, famously described as ‘unsociety\598
While rehabilitating international law in the face of such awareness is an on-going and 
enormous project well beyond the scope o f this thesis599, a necessary step in 
reforming it in the wake of the critical challenge is for international law to build itself 
upon the consent of those that it governs, by which all affected are able to participate 
in the setting of its rules. The aim of this chapter is not to make a case for 
cosmopolitan democracy but to attempt to situate claims to legitimacy in the 
international order in light of the challenges of globalization. Recognition claims are 
currently hampered by the de-centred nature o f the international order. However, the 
de-centred nature of international space and the erosion o f the exclusive Westphalian 
framework also provide opportunities for persistent claims to be ‘heard*.
Chapters 4 and 5 sought to demonstrate the importance o f recognition claims and the 
claim to original authority inherent in national demands in particular. There is urgency 
to these claims. Chapter 6 sought to demonstrate that the traditional avenues of 
international law open for claims to recognition are strictly limited by the place of 
territorial integrity as a meta-norm o f the international order, and are thus of no help 
for a non-territorial, yet legitimacy-based, claim to recognition. This chapter 
interrogates the link between territorial control and international personality, and 
seeks an understanding o f personality that gives space for legitimacy-based claims to 
recognition, without giving way to the promiscuity problem identified in Chapter 4. 
Self-determination qua participation shall be presented as the most appropriate forum 
for legitimacy-based claims to make their pitch for recognition and the openings for 
such participation is also considered. Ultimately, it shall be suggested that the very
598 Philip Allot!, Eunomia. New order fo r a new world. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
599 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser o f Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. Also, Andreas Paulus, ‘International Law After Postmodernism: Towards Renewal or Decline of 
International Law? (2001) 14 Leiden Journal o f International Law 727; and, Outi Korhonen, ‘New 
International Law: Silence, Defence or Deliverance (1996) 7 European Journal o f International Law 1.
600 There is a wealth of literature noting the need for greater democracy/ participation at the 
international level. E.g. David Held, Democracy and the Global Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995; 
Held, ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty’ (2002) 8 Legal Theory 1; D. 
Archibugi, D. Held and M. Köhler (eds.), Re-imagining Political Community. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998.
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least that is required for claims to legitimacy is the presumptive right to self- 
determination.
7.1. Recognition and Personality in International Law: 
capacity as territorial control
It has been suggested that to debate the nature of legal personality is to conduct a non­
debate.601 While on the superficial level international personality can be defined as 
those that possess rights and duties, attempting to define the nature of international 
legal personality falls prey to the same ascending/ descending disease as every other 
structure of international legal argumentation.602 Thus, Kelsen argued that legal 
personality was a “thoroughly formal concept”.603 This is undoubtedly the case; 
however, while moving away from the concept of personality as a threshold to be 
overcome is welcome, before doing so, it is worth investigating the state/ non-state 
dichotomy that continues to underpin understandings of international personality. It 
will be contested that capacity as territorial control, rather than legitimacy, is the 
foundation of the means to function fully on the international level and that 
condemning all non-territorial claims to ‘also-ran* status does a grave injustice to 
legitimacy-based claims.
7.1.1. International Personality: capacity over legitimacy
Each legal order sets down its own rules for defining a legal person. In Roman law, 
legal persons were human beings, separate from legal entities that were bearers o f 
rights and duties; there was no general term category of ‘subject* that included both 
persons and entities. The Roman distinction between factual existence and attribution 
of personality is the classification of personality that international law has arguably 
followed. In the works of the early authorities on the Law of Nations -  de Vitoria,
601 Jan Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’ in M. 
Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law Aspects o f the European Union, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998.
602 Koskenniemi, From Apology To Utopia. The Structure o f International Legal Argument. Helsinki: 
Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1989,236-245.
603 H. Kelsen, General Theory o f Law and State. Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, 1946, 
250; cited in Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’.
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Grotius, Leibniz -  international personality belongs solely to organised nations i.e. 
states.604 As human beings were natural persons of the Roman legal order, so the 
nascent states were personified as the natural persons of the Law o f Nations. The 
existence of states was, like that o f human beings, factual.605
Although historically, a number of non-state and non-territorial entities emerged as 
natural persons alongside states606, with the exception of the Papacy which continues 
to be recognised as a sovereign power on the basis of territorial sovereignty over the 
Vatican lands607, such actors disappeared as their functions were subsumed by an 
engorging state. As the state squeezed out all rivals, personality came to be defined 
not just by function, but by the defining aspect of the state: territorial exclusivity. 
According to the Arbitrator in the Island o f Palmas Case, “Sovereignty in relations 
between States signifies independence. Independence in relation to a portion of the 
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions
/Aft
of a State.” In this most cited o f cases, personality is determined as independence,
which is functional capacity in a given territory. Capacity came to be denoted by the 
effective control of territory; or in the words of Arbitrator Huber “the continuous and 
peaceful display of territorial sovereignty”. Once intended to provide a neutral frame 
in which states could co-exist peacefully, the “mission and purpose of international 
law” became, according to one senior commentator, the delimitation of the exercise of 
power on a territorial basis.609
However, while territory signifies capacity, it is necessary to distinguish two elements 
to this. The definition of sovereignty at the international level also built upon Roman 
distinctions, and territory in relation to the state signifies both ownership {dominium)
604 J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective. Volume II. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff 1969, 
1-3.
605 “The birth o f a  State is generally a purely historical event to which, if acknowledged according to 
general doctrinal requirements and standards to have in fact occurred, international law attaches a 
posteriori certain legal facts.” Verzijl, Volume II, Chapter 3,63 (italics his).
606 For example, the Papacy, (Arch-)bishoprics, Church Councils, City Leagues, Chartered Companies 
and Knightly Orders. See Verzijl, ibid.
607 Whether or not the Holy See, in the person of the Pope, has personality separate from the Vatican is 
a contested point. R. A. Graham, Vatican Diplomacy: A Study o f Church and State on the International 
Plane. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959,15-16.
608 Netherlands v. U.S. (Island o f Palmas) (1928), 2 R.I.A.A. 829.
609 Sir Robert Jennings, The Acquisition o f Territory in International Law (1963); cited by Malcolm 
Shaw, ‘Territory in International Law’ (1982) 13 Netherlands Yearbook o f International Law 61,73.
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and control (imperium).610 It is these two elements that define sovereignty and thus 
the fullest expression of personality on the international level. Recognition on the 
international level is thus reserved for entities which muster and maintain effective 
control o f territory.611
The belief in classical international law that states, as sovereign, constitute the only 
natural subjects of the international order saw all other entities designated, as in 
Roman law, objects; they were not part of the classical international legal order but 
were subject to its authority for the time that they strayed into its realm.612 The 
overarching common use of the term legal personality to incorporate both states and 
non-state entities -  a term seen to be more inclusive than separating entities out into 
subjects or objects -  should not disguise the fact that only states are understood as 
possessing full personality and all other ‘personality’ in the international order is, 
following Roman law, conceived of as attributed or derivative.
While the ICJ’s consideration of whether or not the United Nations possessed 
international personality in the 1949 Reparations fo r Injuries case saw it define a 
subject as “an entity capable of possessing international rights and duties ... [and 
having] the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims”613, which 
has since been used to extend the concept of personality to other entities and 
organisations, its circular verdict arguably did little to dispel the understanding of 
natural personality that underpins the states’ stranglehold on international law. In 
coming to its conclusion concerning the ability of the UN to bring a claim for 
damages against a member state, the Court wove a careful line between the objective 
theory of factual existence of an organisation and the will-theory that dictates that the 
personality of an international organisation is determined by the explicit will of the
6,0 Vattel, The Law o f Nations or the Principles o f Natural Law, vol. 2 (1758), 84; Grotius, De Jure 
Belli ac Pads, vol. II, Chapter III, s.4.2.; cited in Shaw, ibid., 74
611 The one possible exception to this is non-self-goveming peoples as defined by Chapter XI of the UN 
Charter, to whom the right of self-determination applies. This is arguably a consequence, as the 
previous chapter suggested, of their location within well-defined borders.
12 Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective. Volume II, Chapter 3.
613 Reparations fo r Injuries Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1949), 179; http://www.ici-cii .ora/. This 
was not, however, the first occasion in which a non-state entity was recognised as possessing 
international rights and duties. In its Advisory Opinion concerning the Jurisdiction o f the Courts o f  
Danzig, the PCI J held that the agreement between Poland and the League of Nations in creating the 
Free City of Danzig as an independent entity under the authority of the League also created the ability 
for Danzig officials to enforce their rights under the agreement. PCIJ Advisory Opinion No. 15, Ser. B., 
1928.
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founder states.614 According to the Court, the UN “was intended to exercise, and 
enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be 
explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality 
and the capacity to operate upon an international plane.”615 The consequence of 
personality is thus the ability to possess rights and duties and to enforce those rights 
by bringing claims. However, were the UN to have possessed international legal 
personality, it would arguably have already enjoyed the ability to enforce its claims. 
There is thus something inherently circular about the Court’s understanding of 
personality: the possession of rights and duties indicates personality, but to have 
personality an entity must already be exercising those rights and duties. This circle is 
squared where states are concerned by assuming existence in fact i.e. an existence 
external and prior to the legal order in question. With attributed personality, it is not 
possible to square the circle without reference to the will of states. Non-state 
legitimacy claims, therefore, are explicitly denied their claim to original authority. 
This domination is played out in recognition theory at the international level.
7.1.2. Constitutive v. Declarative Recognition
International law possesses two theories of recognition: declarative and constitutive. 
The declaratory theory of recognition makes explicit the belief that a state is not a 
creation of international law, as the legal order merely endorses the fact of existence 
and attaches legal consequences to it. The declaratory theory is endorsed by the 
Montevideo Convention, although Article 1 o f the Convention, read in isolation of 
subsequent articles, has caused much confusion. As is well known, Article 1 defines a 
state through the following attributes: a) a permanent population; b) a defined 
territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states 616 
The capacity to enter into relations with other states clearly requires that existing
614 The Court sought to maintain the impression o f combining the two by considering what the 
founding states really intended to do in creating the organization, neatly side-stepping the fact that the 
founders deliberately failed to give the UN explicit international personality. Reparations fo r Injuries, 
178-9; Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’, 244-245. 
Klabbers has suggested that the Court’s presumption that founding states would not have created an 
organisation with the tasks assigned it unless they also endowed it with international personality 
determined that it did indeed possess international personality.
615 Reparations fo r Injuries, 178; italics mine.
616 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) (1934) 165 L.N.T.S. 19. The 
Convention is widely understood to be a codification of custom; see, David Harris, Cases and 
Materials on International Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998 (5th edition), 102.
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states recognise the new entity as an equal; however, simply because other states do 
not wish to enter into relations with an emerging state does not deny in theory the 
capacity of that state -  it simply prevents that capacity from coming to fruition. 
Recognition of one state by another cannot, therefore, be constitutive. Article 3 of the 
Montevideo Convention is explicit on this point: “The political existence of the state 
is independent of recognition by the other states”.
Further, the existence of capacity in the absence of recognition is explicitly stated: 
“Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and 
independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to 
organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and 
to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.” Recognition, as so 
understood, is purely declaratory, for the position of states as natural entities stems 
from an authority that lies outside the legal realm; that is, the effective control of 
territory. However, for all attributed personality, the recognition of states of their 
possession of rights and duties is constitutive of those rights and duties and thus of 
their personality. While the declaratory theory fails to acknowledge the inherent role 
of recognition in the social existence of any entity, the constitutive theory places too 
much power in the hands of the recognisers where legitimacy-based claims are 
concerned. Neither theory thus captures the power of the recognition dialectic.
The practice o f recognition has never quite lived up to the declaratory theory, 
however. While recognition is in one sense necessarily declaratory, in that it is an 
acknowledgment of the capacity of the new entity to fulfil the rights and obligations it 
claims, it is, on the other hand, always also constitutive, because recognition is, at a 
simple level, necessary to participate in a legal order.617 As Opperiheim emphatically 
stated in his 1905 manual, “A State is and becomes an international person through 
recognition only and exclusively.”618 Personality requires an attribution of rights and 
duties by the legal order. Yet, recognition cannot be merely a verification of the 
existence of the necessary ‘objective’ criteria o f existence. Recognition is also 
necessarily constitutive of any entity.
617 According to Shaw, “recognition in itself constitutes participation in the international legal process”. 
Malcolm Shaw, International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 (4th edition), 296.
618 Oppenheim (1st ed.1905), Vol. 1 ,109.
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State practice demonstrates that states will act in withholding recognition, despite the 
formal criteria for statehood being in place, if  it is felt that to do so would be to breach 
an existing international obligation, as was the case with the non-recognition of 
Rhodesia under white rule and o f Manchuria under Japanese occupation.619 States 
have shown themselves willing to intervene and recognise the existence of a state that 
does not yet meet the Montevideo Criteria, such as the ‘early’ recognition of Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the fact that neither at the moment of their 
recognition had attained an independent defined territory with reasonably secure 
borders, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, under OSCE control, has still not done so.
Similarly, in response to the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in quick 
succession, the EC Foreign Ministers drew up guidelines for the recognition of the 
successor states, in which they explicitly acknowledged that recognition would 
depend upon ‘the political realities in each case’ and that these, in particular, ‘would 
take account o f the effects on neighbouring countries’.620 The standards laid down in 
the EC Guidelines, of democracy, acceptance of appropriate international obligations 
and commitment in good faith to negotiations, have replaced the traditional criteria of 
statehood, according to Rich, and it is undoubtedly the case that geo-political interests 
played a larger determining factor than ‘legal’ considerations concerning capacity.621
In practice, thus, it is accepted that recognition by states determines the existence of 
other entities as a member of the legal order. While the fact of existence may speak of 
capacities in the abstract, as the ICJ’s Opinion suggested, it is only in exercising those 
capacities that they become meaningful. A lack of recognition entails a severely 
restricted ability to exercise capacities. The gap between being an entity possessed of 
a will to be self-governing and personality itself can only be bridged by recognition, 
not by capacity and hence not by territory either. Recognition determines the 
existence and degree of personality. The inability to exercise the capacities associated
619 Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume 1: Peace.
England: Longman, 1992 (9th edition), §54.
620 ‘E.C. Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’ 
(1991) 62 British Yearbook on International Law 559; also, Saskia Hille, ‘Mutual Recognition of 
Croatia and Serbia* (1995) 6 European Journal o f International Law 598.
621 Roland Rich, ‘Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’ (1993) 4 
European Journal o f  International Law 36.
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with a state, as is the case, say, with Chechnya, entails that no such state exists. To 
assert that recognition is a constitutive factor in establishing personality is, however, 
to deny the existence of natural persons at the international level, but it also risks 
failing to acknowledge the special nature of legitimacy-based claims.
That the declaratory theory retains much support amongst international lawyers and in 
international opinion juris, if  not in practice, is of course unsurprising.622 The reason 
for strong adherence to it is rooted in the structure of international law itself that has 
as its foundations the belief that states are sovereign. Were states to be subject to the 
recognition of others, their personality would be contingent and one could not speak 
of sovereignty. The understanding that states are natural persons to the exclusion of 
all other political forms arguably stems from the assumption that only states are 
capable of making claims to legitimacy; this is largely so because territorial 
exclusivity prevented non-state claims from appealing to the international realm but 
determined that they must seek their accommodation with the state itself at the 
domestic level. Thus, while the declaratory theory is thus capable in principle o f 
offering non-state legitimacy-based claims the recognition they seek, it does not do 
so.
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While the resilience of the state should not be under-played623, not least because many 
continue to draw their legitimacy not just from the level o f capacity that is derived 
from the effective control of territory but also from their role as representative of the 
people who reside within that territory; any acknowledgement that non-state entities 
can and are making similar, if  not stronger, claims to legitimacy entails that the way in 
which personality and recognition are viewed at the international level requires re­
thinking. Neither theory of recognition ultimately deals with the legitimacy of a claim, 
but notes only whether or not an entity is a state. Any attempt at re-thinking 
personality should not, however, abandon the understanding that legitimacy-based 
claims are special.
622 The Badinter Commission in Opinion No. 1 held that “the effects of recognition by other states are 
purely declaratory.” (92 ILR 162,165). According to Oppenheim, the majority of states hold that 
recognition is purely a matter of political discretion rather than a question of legal process. Oppenheim, 
‘Recognition of States and Governments’, §38- §56.
623 Tierney highlights the continuing normative potential of the control of territory. Stephen Tierney, 
‘Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation- 
State’ (2005) 54 International Comparative Lew Quarterly 161,171.
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7.1.3. The Personality Gap
In addition to failing to register legitimacy-based claims, the construction of 
international personality, as many have noted , does not take adequate account of 
the nature o f the actors operating in international space. Beyond the long-running 
dispute as to whether individuals possess personality, it seems beyond question that 
international organisations such as the European Union and the WTO possess 
personality, in addition to the UN and its agencies.625 Further, private entities such as 
Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and International Non-Governmental 
Organisations (INGOs), and even to a certain extent very powerful individuals626, 
have become increasingly influential on the global scene, leading many to wonder 
whether these non-state possess a degree of legal personality. The rise of these private 
actors -  their increasing influence and power in the functioning o f the globalised 
world -  has led numerous voices to call for accountability and transparency Le. that 
corporations and INGOs yield to the standards of good governance that the latter have 
been so important m establishing. Others have emphasised the existence in fact of 
such entities as actors on the international stage; according to Franck, “What was an 
anarchic rabble of states has transformed itself into a society in which a variety of 
participants — not merely states, but also individuals, corporations, churches, regional 
and global organisations, bureaucrats and courts -  now have a voice and are 
determined to interact.”628
624 For example, Philip Alston, ‘The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and 
Globalisation1 (1997) 8 European Journal o f International Law 435. Janne Nijman, The Concept o f 
International Legal Personality. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005.
625 For legal personality of the EU, see Article 1-7 of the Constitutional Treaty and Article B Maastricht 
Treaty that require the Union to “assert its identity on the international plane”; for an argument that the 
Union has personality irrespective of explicit endorsement by the Member States, Klabbers, 
‘Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law’. Also, earlier, R. Frid, ‘The 
European Economic Community. A Member of a Specialised Agency of the United Nations1 (1993) 4 
European Journal o f International Law 239, noting the admittance of the European Community as a 
full member o f the FAO.
626 One thinks in this regard of super-wealthy or incredibly high profile individuals with political/ 
humanitarian agendas, such as George Soros or Bill Gates.
627 For an example of the role of one INGO in putting issues o f transparency and corruption on the 
global map and in acting as “an agent of normative change”, see H. Wang and J.N. Rosenau, 
‘Transparency International and Corruption as an Issue of Global Governance1 (2001) 7 Global 
Governance 25.
628 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, 
477.
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Although the Court’s 1949 Opinion can be interpreted as strongly emphasising the 
distinction between states, as natural entities, and other types of international person, 
as tools in the service of whatever states understand the international community to 
be, a number of international organisations today are no longer willing to accept their 
authority as derived from states and are claiming the ability to constitute their own 
authority. The nature of attributed personality has arguably undergone a fundamental 
change since the Court defined the concept of legal personality in 1949. The 
proliferation of MNCs, NGOs and other types of actors has rendered the state/ non­
state distinction unintelligible. For example, if the categories are determined by the 
amount of power an entity wields, there is no reason for not including MNCs and a 
handful of individuals in a category with the poorest of the poor states of the 
developing world. If it is a qualitative difference that is determinate, how is the failure 
to include those that lay claim to a similar type of power (or authority) -  minority 
groups, nations -  in the same category as states to be explained?
Moreover, the changes taking place since the post-war period involve not simply the 
influence that non-state actors now possess in determining what law is made, how it is 
interpreted and whether it is enforced, but a number of actors have stepped beyond the 
role of lobbying, advising and monitoring and have emerged as self-constituted 
entities for whom the category of non-state actor is woefully insufficient. These 
entities are not states (and arguably have no desire to become one) but can no longer 
be meaningfully placed in the same category as NGOs, for example. The most famous 
and most discussed of these constitutionalising entities is the European Union ; but 
it is not the only one. The WTO too has made claims that suggest a process of boot­
strapping constitutionalisation is underway within the organisation.630 What is notable
629 That the European Court of Justice has claimed the supremacy of EU law and that this claim has 
been accepted by the Member States in practice is well known as core to the European legal order. Van 
Gend en Loos established the doctrine of direct effect (Case 26/62, NV. Algemene Transporten 
Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 
1) laying the terrain for the claim to supremacy (Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585). 
Grainne de Burca, ‘Sovereignty and the supremacy doctrine of the European Court of Justice’ in 
Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition. Oxford: Hart, 2003.
630 The Appellate Body is steadily increasing its competence beyond a simple trade regime into areas 
such as health (EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 
Reports of the Appellate Body, adopted 13 February 1998, concerning the use of hormones in meat 
production and the possible effects on human health [otherwise known as the Hormones case]) and the 
environment (United States -  Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, Report of Appellate Body, adopted 6 November 1998, concerning US restrictions on 
the import of shrimp where harvesting techniques were harmful to the turtle population). Indeed, the
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about the nature of the respective legal orders of the EU and the WTO is that both 
organisations have claimed the ability to determine the boundaries of their own 
competences, beyond the wishes o f the states that founded them. The claims of these 
organisations should thus be understood as claims to authority above and beyond the
JTO 1
wishes of states. The inability of the current understandings of personality to take 
legitimacy-based claims seriously, and the increasingly obvious discrepancy between 
the state/ non-state distinction and the reality of actors and the types of claims they are 
advancing, suggests the need for a re-drawing o f the distinction.
7-2. Legitimacy v. capacity: a better approach to personality?
In highlighting the distinction between personality and capacity in its 1949 Opinion, 
the ICJ opened up the possibility of an alternative conception of personality. It 
dimmed, however, any light it might have shone on the issue with the circularity of its 
reasoning and instead avoided addressing the hard questions with its pronouncement 
of degrees of personality.632 This distinction shall be picked up on here.
The justification for the privileged position of the state — the essence of its claim to 
sovereignty -  is that states are the best guarantors of the aggregate interests of the 
individuals that shelter under them, as evidenced by their functional capacity, which 
itself is determined by their exclusive control of territory. However, where we accept 
that the state is being challenged both in terms of its capacity to make good on that 
claim, as well as by groups who dispute that the state is capable of representing their 
interests, the reasons for such privileging become much less obvious. The traditional 
dominance of states has occurred precisely because they were able to combine, to the 
exclusion of all other entities, functionality and legitimacy. It was this that ensured 
their dominance as political entities rather than any inherent feature of the state itself,
analysis by Deborah Cass of the Hormones Case suggests that the Appellate Body has already taken 
unto itself what has been dubbed in the European context the power o f  Kompetenz-Kompetenz—a 
claim to determine the boundaries of its own competence and hence a claim to ultimate ordering power. 
Cass, ‘The ‘Constitutionalization’ o f International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine 
of Constitutional Development in International Trade* (2001) 12 EJIL 39, at 63-64. This interpretation 
has been confirmed in Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, 
Report of Appellate Body, adopted 6 March 2006.
631 See, in particular, Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism* (2002) 65 Modem Law 
Review "iXl.
632 The Court suggested the possibility of degrees of international personality according to the nature of 
functions and rights an entity possesses. Reparations for Injuries^ 178.
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such as its existence in nature. As this exclusive dominance unravels,633 the 
distinction between the power of capacity or function and the power that stems from 
original authority becomes visible. In dividing international actors into the two 
categories of state and non-state, we blur this distinction.
Claims to personality can be divided instead into those whose claim is based upon a 
claim to original authority -  what are here termed legitimacy-based claims -  and those 
entities that source their claim to personality in the legitimacy generated by efficient 
fulfilment of their capacity -  a capacity-based claim.634 Thus, although capacity can 
itself generate a form of legitimacy, it is a qualitatively-different form of legitimacy to 
that claimed by groups of individuals seeking to make good their claim to self- 
determination.635 While a legitimacy-based claim must necessarily possess a sufficient 
degree of capacity in order to generate the claim itself,636 and while a severely 
restricted capacity quotient will restrict any ability to make good on a claim by 
limiting the ability to take possession of rights and duties, a legitimacy-based claim is 
of such importance to those that make it that it cannot be denied. However, to grant 
full personality to a group that it is not capable of bearing it risks rendering the status 
meaningless and, thus, the recognition sought will be cripplingly devalued. The 
suggestion is thus not that legitimacy-based claims be given equal status to states 
regardless of their capacity, but that they be recognised as being of the same type of 
claim as states and that thus they be considered as possessing the presumptive right to 
self-determination — a point considered in more detail below — in much the same way 
that the UN Charter views non-self-goveming peoples. A state is thus but one type of 
actor, albeit the most powerful, in the global arena, in which all entities are making
633 Whether it is actually unravelling or whether it is rather a myth that is being unravelled is arguably 
irrelevant, although the present author would opt for the latter. Further, as noted above (note 623), the 
state’s continuing ability to combine these two roles should not be under-stated.
634 Other schemes have been put forward, notably Harding’s suggestion to distinguish between 
autonomy and representation, with the degree of an entity’s legal significance dependent upon the 
degree of possession of each. While representation refers to the legitimacy of a claim, Harding fails to 
distinguish between the legitimacy that stems from original authority and that which stems from, in his 
words, ‘accountability by results’. The risk for legitimacy-based claims with limited capacity is that the 
special nature of their voice continues to be drowned out. Christopher Harding, ‘Statist assumptions, 
normative individualism and new forms of personality: evolving a philosophy of international law for 
the twenty first century’ (2001) 1 Non-State Actors and International Law 107.
635 Although it could be argued that a group claim gains its legitimacy from efficiently fulfilling its 
capacity of representing the individuals that make up the group, this ignores the nature of the actual 
claim itself i.e. that it is a political claim to self-determination.
636 This point was made earlier in chapter 5.
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claims to forms of recognition and thus to participation according to their own 
interests and capacities.
All personality therefore is a combination of functionality and legitimacy, based upon 
the understanding that each entity possesses both to varying degrees, but, importantly, 
where the source of legitimacy differs. It is suggested that what is important in 
considering personality is two factors: firstly, what the entity in question is claiming -  
the rights and duties it claims to possess, or, the capacity quotient - ,  and, secondly, 
the basis upon which they do so -  the source of the legitimacy of that claim. The 
degree of personality an entity possesses should depend upon the relationship of these 
two elements. The personality o f legitimacy-based claims should therefore be 
considered as determined by a double play of self-constitution and recognition, 
whereby the degree of personality that recognition results in depends upon both the 
degree of capacity and the degree o f the claim’s resonance among those making it.
In this dance, the recognition of different actors varies in degrees of importance. The 
recognition o f the UN General Assembly of a claim to original authority is more 
important than the denial o f that authority by, for example, the United Kingdom 
standing alone, unless of course the claim is that of Scotland. But recognition is not a 
single binary action. It is a web of connections any given entity must weave — an on­
going dialogue with every other entity.637 Recognition at the international level is 
thus, echoing the language of Tully, a multilectic rather than a dialectic.638
Claims to personality are thus stronger or weaker than others, always a matter of 
degree, depending upon the extent to which legitimacy and capacity intersect and the 
degree to which either are recognised. An actor that combines both legitimacy and 
capacity has a much stronger claim to inclusion and status than one that has one but 
not the other. But the source of legitimacy matters. A legitimacy claim by an entity 
that exists to fulfil a collective functional need is not comparable in this regard to a 
people exercising their right to collective self-govemance. The WTO has a strong 
claim to functional capacity but lacks a legitimacy which the Palestinian Authority
637 Any given entity will not need or be able to generate and maintain a relationship with all other 
entities, in much the same way that an individual in society does not have a relationship with every 
other person in that society, but maintains a potential relationship with them.
635 For recognition as multilogue rather than dialogue, see Strange Multiplicity.
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arguably possesses. The EU may claim considerable legitimacy in terms of its 
capacity, but its claim to ultimate ordering authority lacks at present the original 
authority that is vested in communities within EU borders. The process of recognition 
needs to consider the tasks that an entity fulfils in relation to the needs of individuals 
over whom a claim is being made, the needs of the international community at large, 
the ability to discharge the capacity claimed and, of course, the degree of original 
authority behind any such claim.
There is thus a qualitative difference between entities, but it is not a state/ non-state 
distinction but a distinction based on the source of legitimacy. Before considering the 
presumptive right to self-determination in more detail, it is worth examining what the 
understanding that territory (dominium) is not essential for mounting a claim to an 
imperium of degrees does to the conception of sovereignty.
7.3. Claims to original authority: the contingency of 
sovereignty
The claim to autonomy at the international level is most clearly recognised by the 
term sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty in international law owes much, as 
already suggested, to the combination of the private law concept of property 
(dominium) and the public law notion of indivisible authority (imperium).639 The 
concept of sovereignty has, then, for international lawyers been necessarily a 
territorial one. However, the claim to nationhood, as the claim to be self-governing on 
the international level, is necessarily a claim to ultimate ordering authority, even if the 
claimants have no means to make good on the claim. If the claim to original authority 
is no longer understood as exclusive to the state, where exclusive control of territory 
is no longer viewed as the hallmark of personality, and where we accept that capacity- 
based entities are also making claims to functional autonomy, how are we to continue 
to view sovereignty qua independence on the international level? Is it possible to 
separate sovereignty from its territorial connection, to divorce imperium from 
dominium, or is sovereignty now redundant?
639 See note 610.
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7.3.1. The nature of the sovereignty dilemma
Sovereignty at the international level has traditionally been understood as 
independence, which has been defined as the ability to exercise absolute authority 
within one’s own borders to the exclusion of all others.640 However, as the state is also 
widely perceived to be losing many of its traditional functions, the helpfulness of the 
concept o f sovereignty, with its absolute nature, in ordering the international is 
increasingly questioned.641 Without providing a detailed overview of the literature, it 
is suggested that there are two defining elements of the sovereignty debate. The first is 
that sovereignty belongs to states not on a descriptive basis but normatively.642 From 
this viewpoint, sovereignty is inseparable from the state. The second is that, related to 
the first, sovereignty denotes a territorial exclusivity. It is thus the competition that 
states face in the exercise of their territorial authority to the exclusion of all others that 
sees sovereignty, for some, rendered redundant.643 If the basic facets of sovereignty 
are, as Loughlin suggests, internal coherence, external independence and supremacy 
of the law, one must wonder whether sovereignty can continue to serve as a useful 
ordering concept where the state is facing challenges to its authority internally and 
externally, both in terms of capacity and legitimacy, and where those challenges 
imply that the state can no longer be viewed as the supreme law-maker.644
7.3.2. Sovereignty as speech-act
The ‘endurance of sovereignty’, according to Werner and De Wilde, is due to its 
existence as an institutional fact, allowing sovereignty to serve as the bridge between
640 Netherlands v. U.S. {Island o f Palmas) (1928), 2 R.I.A.A. 829.
641 From the many examples, Theme Panel IV: ‘The End of Sovereignty?’, 88* Annual Meeting, 
{\99A)ASIL Proceedings 71; Christoph Schreuer, ‘The Waning o f the Sovereign State: Towards a New 
Paradigm for International Law?’ (1993) 4 European Journal o f International Law 447. There are also 
many suggestions for transforming sovereignty to make it empirical reality. See Theme Panel I: 
‘Theoretical Perspectives on the Transformation of Sovereignty’, 88* Annual Meeting, (1994) ASIL 
Proceedings 1; Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
642 The index o f Oppenheim (9th edition), for example, sees ‘sovereignty’ absent as an entry, instead the 
entry is for ‘Sovereign states’.
643 For a list o f  the charges levelled against sovereignty, see Werner and De Wilde, ‘The Endurance of 
Sovereignty’ (2001) 7 European Journal o f International Relations 283; and Neil Walker, ‘Late 
Sovereignty in the European Union’, in Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition. Oxford: Hart, 2003.
644 Martin Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty*, in Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition. Oxford: 
Hart, 2003,59.
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‘is’ and ‘ought’ in nonnative discourse.645 Thus, as both fact and norm, a claim.to 
sovereignty establishes a relationship between the ‘fact’ of being independent or of 
being the ultimate authority and a set of rights and responsibilities. Further, it is the 
nature of institutional facts, that as long as they are accepted they appear immutable, 
inevitable, but as soon as the critical mass of belief is no longer present, the edifice 
collapses revealing the ‘fact’ as the social construction that it is.
An understanding of sovereignty as institutional fact is the context in which Neil 
Walker has developed a definition o f sovereignty as a discursive vehicle for ultimate 
ordering power: sovereignty as claim.646 Sovereignty is thus the claim to supreme 
ordering power, where in the object-language647 this ordering power is called 
sovereignty; it might well, however, be called something else, and Walker’s term ‘late 
sovereignty’ is intended to illustrate that in the current period, the claim is often 
couched in other terms, such as authority or, in the EU context, supremacy. Claims to 
ordering power using language other than sovereignty have similar perlocutionary 
effects to claims of sovereignty but nonetheless, according to Walker, they represent a 
less hegemonic claim, reflective of our ‘frontier* era. It is the claim to ultimate 
ordering power that is key to a new discourse of sovereignty.
Euan MacDonald has taken Walker’s concept and applied Foucault’s account o f 
power to considerable effect. According to MacDonald’s reading, Foucault conceives 
of power as “a structure of actions” in which actors act upon the actions of others, and 
in which power is not located in any particular place nor possessed by any one 
person.648 Power is thus relational and, moreover, omnipresent in all human 
relationships. However, if power is to be defined as action upon the actions of others,
645 “Institutional facts are 'facts’ like the goal scored in a soccer game, the move made in a chess game, 
etc. All these facts can only be understood on the basis of our knowledge of die rules that constitute and 
define their existence.” Wemer and De Wilde, ‘The Endurance of Sovereignty’, 291.
646 His definition, in full, is of sovereignty as “the discursive form in which a claim concerning the 
existence and character of a supreme ordering power for a particular polity is expressed, which 
supreme ordering power purports to establish and sustain the identity and status of the particular polity 
qua polity and to provide a continuing source and vehicle of ultimate authority for the juridical order of 
that polity.” Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, 3.
647 Neil Walker has used the language of Anthony Giddens* “double hermeneutic” -  that there is an 
internal relationship between what Walker terms ‘object- language’ and ‘meta- language’ -  to describe 
the same phenomenon.
648 MacDonald, 'Foucault and Law’, (unpublished paper on file with the author), citing Hindess, 
Discourses o f Power: from Hobbes to Foucault. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996,100. See also Loughlin’s 
second tenet of sovereignty: “political relationships do not derive from property relationships.” 
Loughlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty*, 59,61,62.
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those others must have the freedom to resist, for without this freedom, action is 
violence. As MacDonald concludes from this, “[t]his means that, in the ordinary 
course o f events, power relations are ambiguous, unstable, reversible”, noting 
however in addition that domination within power relations occurs where power 
proves to be relatively stable, thus reducing the margin o f liberty for those being acted 
upon i.e. it becomes institutionalised. Viewing sovereignty through the lens of 
Foucault’s discourse o f power reveals its inherent subjectivity and highlights that a 
sovereign claim is only successful to the degree that it is persuasive. MacDonald’s 
contention that sovereignty and law are inextricably linked, the one unknowable 
without the other, leads him to conclude that sovereignty is “the collective term for 
the ensemble of power relations that interact to produce the experience of being 
bound”.649
Walker’s view of sovereignty as claim and MacDonald’s Foucaultian insights lead to 
a conception of sovereignty as speech-act.650 But sovereignty is necessarily more than 
a single moment of speech-act; the claim to sovereignty is also a performance 
dialogue, in which the person or entity making the claim seeks to persuade two 
audiences -  those over whom the claim is being made, and the outside world -  of the 
‘fact’ of their authority.651 For a claim to be persuasive this performance is necessarily 
a sustained one, the claim being constantly repeated whether verbally or through 
symbolic actions or via the means by which the claim to sovereignty manifests itself, 
for example, through the issuing of legislation or the maintenance of an active police
649 MacDonald, ‘The Problem with Sovereignty’, (unpublished paper on file with the author).
650 For the classification of sovereignty as speech-act, Werner and De Wilder, Walker, taken from the 
original, J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
631A moving illustration of sovereignty as an on-going speech-act performance is the monologue 
Shakespeare gave to Richard n  as he divests himself of his sovereignty. The speech is remarkable 
because in seeming to renouncing his claim, he is in fret laying claim to his throne in dramatic fashion 
by stressing the institutional facts that identify him as King, not least the belief that only the sovereign 
can renounce his throne:
I give this heavy weight from off my head,
And this unwieldy sceptre from my hand,
The pride of kingly sway from out my heart;
With mine own tears 1 wash away my balm,
With mine own hands I give away my crown,
With mine own tongue deny my sacred state,
With mine own breath release all duteous rites.
All pomp and majesty I do forswear;
My manors, rents, revenues, I forego;
My acts, decrees, and statutes I deny: . Richard II (Act 4, Scene 1)
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force. In this way sovereignty is exercised rather than possessed; a king that does not 
play his part as king is king to no-one.
What this highlights is the relational and contingent nature of sovereignty.652 Yet 
while sovereignty can only be contingent, there is also a totalising logic at its core. 
The character of the sovereign claim is precisely that it applies to the exception in no 
longer applying to it, that it includes what is outside itself.653 This appears to make 
impossible legal pluralism or international law. Yet whilst Schmitt was right to note 
the absolute nature of a sovereign claim, the inherent nature of a claim -  what 
differentiates it from a command — is that it is only ever aspirational, and in the case 
of the sovereign claim unachievable. While an entity making a claim to ultimate 
ordering power cannot thus recognise any other such claim, in practice different legal 
orders co-exist and even co-operate. The ECJ reference procedure is a good example 
of two legal orders, both claiming supremacy, co-operating to achieve common 
aims.654 In practice, therefore, what is revealed is a permanent dialogue between 
claims to authority in the interaction of governance structures at every level.
Thus although the institutionalisation of a particular claim to supreme authority and 
the habitual obedience that attends such institutionalisation of a claim makes it appear 
absolute, and although hegemony is a fundamental essence of the sovereign claim, a 
claim to sovereignty is only successful because it is received and accepted by those 
over whom the claim is made. Even Hobbes agreed that “the power of the mighty hath 
no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people.”655 It is the symbolic aspect 
of sovereignty — the institutional arrangements, the pomp and circumstance — that is 
largely responsible for its hegemonic aspects. The systemic or structural logic of 
sovereignty forces claims to be made in the terms of existing claims; so that, the 
systemic understanding of a claim to sovereignty as an exclusive claim to regulate a 
specific territory forces all claims to be made this way. Thus, whilst it is the nature of
652 See also, Tierney, ‘Refraining Sovereignty?*, 162.
653 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995,17-18.
654 Neil Walker, ‘Flexibility within a metaconstitutional frame: reflections on the future of legal 
authority in Europe’, in G de Burca and J Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU: From 
Uniformity To Flexibility? Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000.
655 Hobbes, Behemoth or the Long Parliament (1682), cited in Lougfrlin, ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’, 
62-3.
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an institutional fact that the symbolic and structural elements appear fundamental to it 
-  the claim to absoluteness of the sovereign claim reinforcing the claim itself -  
understanding sovereignty as relational and contingent sees the actual content of the 
claim to sovereignty become indeterminate. It is defined solely by the claim itself. 
The ideological or systemic qualities o f sovereignty -  those features that particularise 
an individual claim within the power relations of that particular context -  are thus 
separated from the prior epistemic core common to all sovereignty claims. Dominium 
is thus not an inherent element o f the sovereign claim, but simply the form of one 
institutionalisation of it.
Sovereignty, then, is a question of claim, where some claims are stronger than others, 
and the strength of a claim is its acceptance both by those over whom it is made and 
by the wider world at large. The speech-act o f sovereignty is thus to be seen as taking 
place within a dialectic both between intimate others (those making the claim and 
about whom the claim is made) and with the public other (the wider world). The 
strength o f a claim is determined by the degree to which it is recognised as such.
However, if  sovereignty is simply the claim to sovereignty, where a claim is made and 
not recognised, can the claim still be said to be a sovereign one? For Walker, 
sovereignty is ultimately “about a plausible and reasonably effective claim to ultimate 
authority”.656 A claim therefore requires a degree of legitimacy to make and capacity 
to make good on a claim to ultimate ordering authority in order to be understood as a 
sovereign claim. A claim thus cannot be based purely upon self-identification; to do 
so would risk rendering the concept meaningless. A speech-act must have a certain 
conventional effect -  we must know it when we see it.657 Thus, to speak of 
sovereignty where a claim is not at least plausible would be to risk making any such 
claim worthless, and thereby render any recognition o f autonomy ineffective.
Yet sovereignty as a plausible claim does not resolve the promiscuity/ hegemony 
dilemma. As suggested above, sovereignty is the claim to autonomy -  it can be made 
by both legitimacy-based claims and capacity-based entities. Sovereignty thus does 
not necessarily speak to legitimacy in terms of original authority but can be viewed
656 Walker, *Late Sovereignty in the European Union*, 10,11-12 (italics mine).
657 Austin, How To Do Things With Words, briefly 8-11.
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solely in terms of the capacity, o f the performance of authority, of independence.658 
Where sovereignty does speak to the relationship between governed and government, 
and, externally, between governments, it is also the expression and exercise of public 
power. Yet, where the exercise of public power and the performance of independence 
correspond to legitimacy and capacity, it is the constituent power element of 
sovereignty that precedes normatively the expression of political power. In the 
language of Walker, sovereignty must be claimed before it can take institutional form. 
It is thus worth re-stressing the contingency of sovereignty, where sovereignty is 
understood to be only ever more-or-less successful in its perlocutionary effects. To do 
otherwise, risks the polar problem o f granting too much power to those who would 
recognise. While this is of little concern for entities making primarily functional 
claims, such hegemony risks denying legitimacy-based claims.
While the depth of sovereign claim can therefore be judged in terms of performance 
of autonomy by the extent o f functional jurisdiction, the authority of political organs, 
the extent o f judicial independence, by whether or not an entity is capable o f 
imagining and thus constructing an autonomous political community or culture, it is 
necessary to consider the legitimacy of a sovereign claim from a different perspective.
7.4. Re-conceptualising self-determination as participation
While capacity-based claims can make claims to ultimate ordering authority within 
their sphere of competence, thus asserting their independence from states, and while 
these entities can gain a degree of legitimacy from the efficient exercise of their 
capacity, the claim to original authority must nonetheless be viewed as a qualitatively 
different type of claim. To dispel the myth of exclusivity in the relationship between 
state and sovereignty and to acknowledge the role of recognition as the constitutive 
factor in establishing personality risks failing to acknowledge the special nature of 
legitimacy-based claims; conversely, conceding sovereignty to legitimacy-based 
claims where there is no or limited means to make good on the claim risks rendering 
recognition meaningful. It is necessary therefore to steer a course between a
658 As Walker stresses, it is important that functional entities be held to account and thus that they be 
part of constitutional imagining. See Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism*. f
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hegemonic order in which such claims are automatically misrecognised and 
promiscuous recognition in which recognition is rendered worthless. It is suggested 
that self-determination as participation, in which legitimacy-based claims are at the 
very least recognised as having presumptive claims to sovereignty, offers a means to 
achieving a recognition dialogue o f sorts without conceding too much to the charge of 
promiscuity.
Self-determination, in . mediating claims to original authority, is understood as the 
gateway to normative participation in international law. What follows is an attempt to 
work the insight of recognition as necessarily mutual and active through a re- 
conceptualisation of self-determination as participation.
7.4.1. Re-imagining a ‘people’
The limitation of a people to that of a people of a whole state or to the official 
designator of non self-governing people has rendered the principle o f self- 
determination in international law devoid o f meaning. To be meaningful, self- 
determination genuinely needs to apply to everyone and at all times. There are two 
points that thus need stressing. The first is the most important, and is that human 
beings not territory should determine normative participation in international law. A 
people cannot be limited to the ‘people’ of a given state, where a state is defined 
primarily by the territory it sits upon. The second point is that those making a claim to 
original authority cannot be dismissed without rendering claimants unfree.
The strict limitations on the right of self-determination place the overwhelming 
determining power in the hands o f the would-be recogniser Acknowledging the 
importance o f recognition for the well-being of individual members of a group thus 
requires that a more equitable balance be struck between self-declaration and the 
reaction to it. The difference in entitlement is not whether one is labelled, or labels 
oneself, a ‘people’ or a ‘nation’ or a ‘minority’, but the nature o f the claim to self- 
governance being made; so that, the claim must be one to original authority but the 
content or implications o f that claim will be unique to the group concerned. All are 
entitled to self-determination but the implications o f that in practice will vary 
according to the scope of the claim being made. What is important is that the group is
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of real importance to the lives of individuals such that they wish to exercise their 
political aspirations through it. It is the nature of the claim and not its form that is 
significant. .
Moreover, the claim to original authority need not be exclusive. Rather, self- 
determination must be open to claims other than those of nations. It has been 
suggested that the nation is the main vehicle for self-determination claims, but it does 
not perhaps have to be the only , one, although the outcome of recognition will most 
likely continue to privilege nations for the foreseeable future.659 What the presumptive 
right to self-determination would entail in this context for non-national type claims is 
the right to contest the discourse that privileges nations and to be taken seriously in so 
doing. What this also means in practice is that individuals would be capable of 
making multiple claims as part of the many encompassing groups to which we all 
belong, including multiple national claims. Thus, it would be possible for a Romani 
individual to put forward claims as part of the Hungarian nation and the Romani 
nation, for example. This is already possible for those who possess dual or multiple 
nationalities. It would also be possible that a group, such as the Roma, could make 
multiple claims, pursuing a claim at the European as well as international level, for 
example. Why should individual Roma be forced to see themselves as exclusively 
either European or as a member of a globally-scattered nation? It does not follow, 
however, that multiple claims will achieve equal recognition in terms of the content of 
that recognition.
t i!Tit'l
I
•In
*J1A*«
1« J
I iti
*4Vfr;K;Cil
S ' !
III
it::
is
i:*J
ill!
Kfi!
ill:
E&
¡ia
liil
It is obvious from the perspective of recognition that the ‘who’ of self-determination 
can only be determined by dialectic between a declaration of self-definition and the 
reaction to that declaration by others. A claim to original authority, so it is suggested, 
must be recognised, but what form that recognition takes is decided, but never fixed,
659 As Connor has observed, the principle of self-determination has made “ethnicity the ultimate 
standard of political legitimacy.” (Connor, quoted in Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self- 
Determination. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, 7). Franck has suggested that the 
monogamous relationship between the individual and their state has given way to a much more 
textured existence (Franck, ‘Personal Self-Determination: The Next Wave in Constructing Identity*, in 
A. Anghie & G. Sturgess (eds.), Legal Visions o f the 21st Century. The Hague: Kluwer, 1998). It is 
ventured that there are as many different ‘essences’ as there are moral standpoints, so that where 
Aristotle viewed man as a political animal, for others, as Skinner points out, man’s essence may be 
religious. (Quentin Skinner, *A Third Concept of Liberty*, London Review o f Books, Vol. 24 No. 7 ,4  
April 2002).
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in the process of recognition itself. As judging the legitimacy o f a claim where the 
experience of cultural difference is internal to a culture660 is inevitably hegemonic, 
and as the claim to original authority cannot be denied without rendering those 
making the claim unfree, it is suggested that it is necessary to view any such claim as 
having a presumptive right to self-determination no matter what form it may take. 
What this may mean for a group such as the Roma must now be considered.
7.4.2. Self-determination as participation
There is obviously a danger with self-determination in suggesting that all who seek it 
are entitled to claim of inciting the chaos that international lawyers so fear. Yet before 
we panic, it is worth considering that self-determination has required limitation 
because o f its territorial implications. Once one separates self-determination from 
territory, once self-determination is understood as types and degrees of participation 
rather than the exclusive control o f territory, the need to limit its application all but 
evaporates. The degree to which acknowledging the necessity of recognising 
legitimacy-based claims constitutes a problem thus depends upon how one 
conceptualises the content of self-determination.
Many commentators have decided that the best means in which to respond to the 
decline o f self-determination is to detach it from concerns of sovereignty and 
incorporate it within the human rights protection regime. Hannum contends that a 
thorough examination of the content o f self-determination reveals that developments 
in human rights norms have subsinned its normative meaning.661 Similarly, Thomas 
Franck has reformulated self-determination as the right to democratic governance, 
whereby he concludes that self-determination in its current phase is “at the core of the 
democratic entitlement”, but no more than the right to participation in the choice of 
government in a given pre-determined state. Thus, self-determination would be 
added to the inadequate protection minority groups are offered, bolstering the twin 
pillars of equality and non-discrimination which stand at the heart of the human rights
660 See Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 13; supra Chapter 4.
661 Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination (1993) 34 Virginia Journal o f International Law 1,58.
662 Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance* (1992) 86 American Journal o f 
International Law 46,52.
230
system. In this way, one could consider self-determination as a right of all to effective 
participation in the political and economic life of society.
Much of the thinking along such lines has been done by those keen to assist 
indigenous peoples in gaining the recognition they have so long been denied. Anaya, 
for example, has stressed that self-determination can and must provide indigenous 
groups with a meaningful level o f control over their own affairs.663 However, the 
decision to view self-determination as part of the panoply of human rights risks 
further diminishing its normative force. While systematic human rights abuse over a 
long period may lead to a strengthening of group identity to the point that the group 
seeks political autonomy as a nation, the demand for national recognition will 
arguably outlast human rights abuse. The claim to self-governance is thus not 
something that fits into the category of rights. Self-determination is the basis of 
political interaction, not the right to choose one’s own government.664 The core of 
self-determination is the understanding that human beings are equally entitled to 
choose their own destiny, not that they have the right to choose any particular 
government. Ultimately, good governance is no substitute for self-governance. It is 
also worth noting that the decision to view self-determination as a human right is 
frequently related to seeing self-determination as a remedy for past injustices.665 This 
is an approach, although perhaps intuitive, that is rejected here. Where self- 
determination is implicitly a claim to recognition, it is not something to be granted 
dependent upon establishing an historical wrong.
The suggestion is that self-determination should be viewed not through the lens of 
participation, although that may be the outcome, but from the perspective of freedom. 
In Chapter 4, it was suggested that misrecognition denied autonomy on the public and 
personal level, and that these were intertwined. Where self-determination is a claim to 
recognition o f the legitimacy to be self-governing, it is the right to participate in
663 “Self-Determination may be understood as a right of cultural groupings to the political institutions 
necessary to allow them to exist and develop according to their distinctive characteristics.” Anaya, ‘The 
Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims’, inKymlicka, The 
Rights o f Minority Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995,326.
664 Self-determination is thus not different in different situations, as has been suggested; it is always the 
right to self-rule, rather it is the means by which self-rule is achieved that varies. See Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ (1994) 43 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 241,249.
665 See Anaya, ‘The Contours of Self-Determination and Its Implementation’, 12-14.
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determining the rules and institutions which govern us, where cultures are both equal 
before the law and equal in determining the law. A consequence o f such an 
understanding of self-determination is that even if all the rights set down as ‘human 
rights’ were to be realised in our everyday lives, we still may not be free where public 
recognition o f our claim is withheld. By seeing self-determination as intimately tied- 
in to freedom, in both aspects, it becomes clear that it is not a right to democracy and 
nor is it subsumed by existing rights.
Crucial in any re-conceptualisation of self-determination as participation via freedom, 
is the notion that recognition is active and continual. It is not, for example, a seat in 
the General Assembly or national assembly, a title of status laid down in a human 
rights treaty or declaration, or the right to positive discrimination, blit the continuing 
right of one’s group to participate as an equal in society with others, where equal 
means implicitly and explicitly the acknowledgment that this group has something 
equally as valuable to offer in negotiation. Recognition through self-determination as 
participation needs to avoid not just the hegemony/ promiscuity problem, but also to 
mitigate the difficulty o f essentialisation in the recognition process, whereby 
recognition necessarily involves the sense of self o f the recogniser.666 Claims to 
legitimacy need to be able to contest perceptions of their claim. But a claim to 
nationhood is also the claim to recognition of the right to be self-governing. It is a 
claim to participate in the framing of the structures that govern international level as 
well as to the substantive issues that international law regulates. It is through 
participation in the process of negotiation about both procedural and substantive 
questions that one achieves recognition of the presumptive right to self-government.
In a recent article exam in ing the nature of global justice, Nancy Fraser has suggested
that challenges to the ‘Keynesian-Westphalian* frame are changing the grammar in
//(%
which discussions about justice take place. Beyond the first-order arguments over 
substance — over material distribution and public recognition -  Fraser has suggested 
that claims to justice are equally as likely to invoke ‘second-order, meta-level’
666 For example, one could argue that the international community failed to recognise Rhodesia not just 
because o f  the Black Rhodesians, but because o f the sense o f self o f  the non-recognisers.
667 Nancy Fraser, ‘Reframing Justice in a  Globalizing World* (2005) 36 New Left Review 69. What 
Fraser terms ‘representation* as being the necessary political aspect o f  recognition and redistribution, I 
term  participation, in part because representation appears to imply formality and evokes standards o f 
democratic legitimacy. Fraser, 78-79.
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questions.668 This meta-level is concerned with the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of the 
political; for without the ability to contest the right to participate, one cannot contest 
the substantive issues at all. The outcome is a form of meta-injustice, according to 
Fraser. This framing of claims to justice as taking place at two levels is helpful in 
understanding the vast majority of legitimacy-based claims to recognition. The 
emphasis on capacity, defined as effective control of territory, has insulated the 
Westphalian model of state sovereignty from other legitimacy-based claims. In order 
to have their voice heard, in order to achieve recognition, these claimants must press 
their claim at the meta-level, in which the terms of those who may take part -  
personality -  and the procedural rules in which discussions take place are set.
If a recognition claim such as that to be a non-territorial nation is a meta-level claim, 
how might the recognition dialectic be played out? It is unlikely that the Roma or 
similar claims will initially succeed in over-turning the dominant architecture that 
denies them participation. On the surface, this denies recognition of the legitimacy of 
their claim. However, as Fraser highlights, challenging the grammar is to 
simultaneously transform that grammar. By asserting a right to participate in the 
constitution of the ‘who’, such claims inevitably contest accepted procedures for 
determining the ‘who* i.e. the ‘how*. The effect, according to Fraser, is to “shift the 
burden of argument” onto those on the inside, requiring them to justify their 
privileged position.669 Claims at the meta-level thus have a de-stabilising affect, 
chipping away at the entrenched patterns o f power relations that characterise 
acknowledgments of sovereignty.670 As Sabel and Simon’s account of destabilisation 
rights at the domestic level suggests, these rights to “unsettle and open up public 
institutions” can have the effect of reversing the normal presumption in favour o f the 
status quo by loosening “the mental grip of conventional structures on the capacity to
668 See also Franck, Fairness and International Law in International law and Institutions. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995, for a similar framework within which fairness for all must be achieved, esp. 
Chapter 1. For Tully’s break-down of the nature of recognition demands, see chapter 4. 
m  Fraser, ‘Refraining Justice in a Globalizing World’, 86, 84.
670 As Unger noted, introducing the concept of destabilization rights in his 1987 work False Necessity, 
“Destabilization rights protect the citizen’s interest in breaking open the large-scale organizations or 
the extended areas of social practice that remain closed to the destabilizing effects of ordinary conflict 
and thereby sustain insulated hierarchies of power and advantage.” Cited in Charles Sabel and William 
H. Simon, ‘Destabilization Rights: how Public Law Litigation Succeeds* (2004) 117 Harvard Law 
Review 1015, 1055.
consider alternatives.”671 Such challenges at the meta-level, therefore, will raise 
awareness o f the claims themselves and motivate new claims to participate in 
challenging the hegemonic grammar. This process is already underway as we observe 
multiple and diverse ‘anti-imperial’ straggles, all o f which are challenging the 
hegemonic normative order. Further, a shift in grammar in  one context will have 
ramifications for other situations and claims, loosening the hegemonic grip.
However, this is not enough and a link to formal institutions is arguably necessary. 
Thus negotiations about the terms o f participation may include sovereignty, but the 
negotiations themselves are not the achievement of sovereignty. Conceiving of self- 
determination as recognition o f claims to original authority through the right to 
participation in an agonistic process removes the need for distinctions between 
peoples, nations and ethnic groups; rather all those who claim recognition will be 
deserving o f the perpetual opportunity to negotiate their status and rights with those 
around them.
Being able to negotiate over the definition of ‘who’ and ‘how’, with the anticipation 
of an eventual shift, can constitute a play o f recognition for a claim such as the 
Romani nation. It is this that prevents the recognition to be found in these negotiations 
about the determination of participation from becoming meaningless. Rebuffed today, 
a claim can be made again tomorrow and the grammar will shift over time.673 The 
continuous insistence of indigenous peoples before the UN, ILO, OAS and other 
international organisations that they constitute peoples in terms of entitlement to self- 
determination has moved the debate forward, both in terms of the arguments they 
have made and the resistance they have encountered; that Article 3 of the Draft 
Declaration contains the right o f indigenous peoples to self-determination is another 
step in this dance and one, that if  accepted by states, will mark a significant shift in 
the grammar, determining their participation both locally, nationally and
671 Sabel and Simon, ibid., 1075.
672 See, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below. Development, Social Movements and 
Third World Resistance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; also, Tully, ‘On Law, 
Democracy and Imperialism*, Twenty-First Annual Public Lecture, Centre for Law and Society, 
University o f Edinburgh, March 10-11,2005.
673 This is arguably what is meant by the ‘practices of freedom*. Tully, ‘The Unfreedom of the Modems 
in comparison to their ideals of Constitutional Democracy* (2002) 65 Modem Law Review 204,228.
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internationally.674 A presumptive right to self-determination, therefore, determines 
that a Romani nation be entitled to contest the terms of its participation.
However, recognition is arguably unlikely to be achieved where disputes over framing 
remain confined to international civil society. Legitimacy-based claims are already 
represented to a considerable degree in international civil society in the form of 
NGOs, but the liberal structure of civil society means that the special nature of their 
claims receives no distinctive recognition.676 The recognition that is sought, is sought 
not just from similarly disempowered entities, but from the ‘masters’ themselves. 
What are required in developing a genuine recognition dialogue are forums that 
transcend civil society.
7.5. Discursive space in international law
Various models have been put forward to answer the widely accepted need to extend 
participation in international law beyond the state-dominated architecture of the 
Westphalian scheme. Many of these suggestions have stemmed from a cosmopolitan 
understanding and have sought to extend democracy beyond the state. Without the 
scope for much detail, it is suggested that these attempts, in their framing of 
democracy as a ‘meta-political narrative’ with the potential to rise above competing 
narratives of the good life, are simply hoping to swap democracy with effective 
control of territory as the pre-ordained meta-norm of the international system. While 
the cosmopolitan vision is perhaps more attractive than personality as determined by 
territory, its claim to neutrality with respect to different values is simply liberal
• ¿5731proceduralism writ large and thus another form of hegemomc order.
674 See S. James Anaya, ‘The Contours of Self-Determination and its Implementation: Implications of 
Developments Concerning Indigenous Peoples* in G. Alfredsson and M. Starropoulou (eds.), Justice 
Pending: Indigenous Peoples and Other Good Causes. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002.
675 Fraser also makes this point.
676 See Benedict Kingsbury, ‘First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive 
Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society’ (2002) 3 Chicago 
Journal o f International Law 183, esp. 186-188.
677 See note 600; also Allan Rosas, ‘State Sovereignty and Human Rights: towards a Global 
Constitutional Project*, in D. Beetham (ed.), Politics and Human Rights. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
678 Indeed, Tully has put forward an almost compelling if bleak view of democracy as necessarily 
implicated in hegemonic (‘imperiai’) relations. Tully, ‘On Law, Democracy and Imperialism*.
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Discourses create, contain, reproduce and disseminate the ideas, relationships and 
theories through which actors understand the world and relate to one another, and, in 
so doing, “systematically form the object of which they speak”.679 It is 
communication about communication.680 The construction of the meaning o f social 
categories and relationships, identities, objects of knowledge, and conceptual 
frameworks privilege certain actors at the expense o f others.681 Power is exerted, 
according to Foucault, in discourse, but the construction of any given discourse can be 
challenged and discourses altered. Discursive space is envisaged here as the arena in 
which that can happen on a footing of equality. The remainder of this chapter puts 
forward two suggestions for conceptualising a discursive space in which a genuine 
recognition dialogue can be imagined. These two spaces address both the meta-level 
question o f the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ and the substantive questions of the ‘what’.
7.5.1. The Indigenous Peoples’ Working Group
Recognition claims are largely understood to require an institutional context in which 
the terms o f exclusion can be challenged. As suggested in the preceding section, 
contesting the ‘who’ of any discourse necessarily takes issue and seeks to alter the 
‘how’ which frames the discourse’s self-understanding. The Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples has provided one of the most interesting institutional discursive 
spaces in international law.
The Working Group, established in 1982 with the purpose of reviewing developments 
relating to the protection of rights of indigenous peoples, completed a draft 
declaration on the rights o f indigenous peoples in 1993.682 Although yet to be adopted 
by the UN -  the Working Group’s precarious position at the edge of the UN human 
rights system ensures that the declaration has some way to go to gain formal
679 Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish: The birth ofthe prison. London: Penguin, 1979,49.
680 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Chapter 8.
681 Steve Maguire and Cynthia Hardy, *The Emergence of New Global Institutions: A Discursive 
Perspective’ (2006) 27 International Organizations 7.
682 E.-I.A. Daes, ‘Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eleventh Session’,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993). The draft declaration was adopted by the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1994, reprinted in (1995) 34ILM  541. For 
the Working Group’s mandate, see http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/groups/wgip.htm
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approval683 -  the draft declaration has been widely hailed as a document of 
monumental significance. According to Williams, for example, the declaration is “one 
of the most important encounters occurring on the frontiers of international human 
rights law”.684 The reason for such enthusiasm relates in part to the substance of the 
declaration -  for example, to the now infamous inclusion of the right to self- 
determination -  but more importantly to the process by which it was drafted. Thus, 
that the declaration itself is stalled in the UN system is o f less importance than the 
process by which it was adopted.
In strict contrast to the process leading up to the adoption of ILO Convention 169 , 
indigenous peoples themselves were at the heart of the articulation of and deliberation 
over their rights.686 More importantly, these participants brought their own ideas of 
what participation and deliberation were and were allowed to present themselves and 
their stories on their own terms.687 The multitude of discourse forms and the 
principles of mutual respect and equality between all participants created a discursive 
space within which indigenous peoples could make their voices heard, on their terms, 
and challenge others’ perceptions of them. This was confirmed by participants 
themselves, who contrasted the procedures of the Working Group to the formality and 
tokenism of the ILO negotiations.688 Whereas the ILO Convention is the product of an 
organisation that viewed its role as that of standard-setting from the perspective of a 
disinterested expert, and which was not willing to moderate the rules and regulations 
of participation to take account of indigenous peoples’ demands, the Chairperson of 
the Working Group, Erica-Irene Daes, is widely perceived to have been responsible 
for providing an open and fair forum in which representatives of observer 
governments, UN agencies, NGOs, individual experts and scholars, came together
6X3 Although approved by the Sub-Commission, the Commission on Human Rights established its own 
Working Group to draw up a new draft by resolution 49/214 of 23 December 1994, and is still 
reviewing the draft.
684 Robert A. Williams, ‘Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining 
the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World’ (1990) 39 Duke Law Journal 660,700.
685 For a contrasting analysis of the procedures used to draw up the ILO Convention and the draft 
declaration, see Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002,212-274.
686 Alongside the governmental representatives, UN agencies, more than one hundred indigenous 
nations, groups and organisations were represented, totalling over 600 representatives.
687 The shift from written to oral submissions in order to recognise indigenous forms of participation, 
for example, has been widely noted. See, Maty Ellen Turpel, ‘Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples — Commentary* (1994) 1 Canadian Native Law Reporter 50.
688 Maivân Clech Lâm, ‘Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations: Thoughts Provoked by 
Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination* (1992) 25 Cornell International Law Journal 603,620-621.
with more than a hundred indigenous nations and organisations each to present their 
own perspective. Although the Working Group was formally composed of five 
independent experts drawn from the Sub-Commission, Daes shifted the process from 
one of standard-setting on the basis of existing norms to negotiations between equals, 
with the Chairperson as mediator. What is interesting is that state representatives 
followed her in this shift.689
What can the experience of the Working Group tell us about the possibilities of 
discursive space? Firstly, the role o f the Chairperson was crucial in determining the 
nature o f the drafting process in the Working Group and she made her authoritative 
role as mediator one in which she attempted to reconcile competing visions rather 
than one that, in Knop’s phrase, spoke “power to truth instead of truth to power”.690 
The importance of leadership is highlighted by the knowledge that the body was 
established as the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in order to close down 
any debate on indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination from the outset. The 
role of Kilstlaai is not an easy one, but when done well and with courage, it has the 
potential to create pockets of non-hegemonic space within the system.691
Secondly, Daes did not see the purpose of the Working Group as being to achieve a 
consensus between the competing interests. In a report to the Sub-Commission, Daes 
stressed that the draft declaration, “was more like a community” that “agreed on many 
constructive points” but where “on some matters opinions still differed.”692 Knop has 
argued persuasively that the self-understanding of an institution and its task are 
critical in determining how a voice is heard. Where the ILO saw itself as a body 
charged with technical standard-setting, storytelling and ‘rights talk’ were easily 
viewed as irrelevant in going beyond existing legal norms. The role of participants in 
such a setting is to convey facts and the institution must accommodate their concerns 
in reaching a consensus, but it need not reflect their perspectives. In not seeking a
689 A number of statements o f state delegations to the Working Group, cited in Knop, suggest that 
Daes* claim was not misplaced, talking as they do of mutual agreement as needing to be die mark of 
relations between state and indigenous peoples. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination 212-274.
690 Knop, ib id , 255.
691 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 18. Although Daes is no longer the Chair, the Working Group continues 
to follow the ethos she helped to establish.
692 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/SR-29 (1994), 12; cited in Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination 
254.
693 Knop, ib id , 212-274, esp. 215-7.
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consensus, Daes prevented a closing off of discussion and ensured that the final text 
drawn up was not viewed by those in power as a definitive interpretation of the 
negotiations. The drafting of the declaration is rather viewed as a recognition dialogue 
and one that is understood by all to be on-going.694 The self-understanding of the task 
o f such a forum is also critical in creating a genuine discursive space.
In the role of Chairperson of the Working Group, Daes’ skill and determination turned 
what was, on one level, a committee of five expert members established to draft a 
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples into a discursive forum in which the 
terms by which one is perceived and the consequences that has for one’s participation 
could be challenged, and in so doing highlighted the potential o f discursive space 
within the U.N. human rights system to challenge the hegemonic understandings of 
the ‘who’ and the ‘how’.695 The example of the European Roma Forum suggests that 
such space is not simply the preserve of the U.N. system.
7.5.2. Network Governance and the Opportunity for Discursive 
Space
An institutional setting is not however the only means by which it is possible to 
imagine discursive space at the international or transnational level. The concept of 
network and of network governance is currently much in vogue among political 
theorists, European lawyers and international relations scholars, but not, it seems, 
many international lawyers. The aim here is to suggest how experimental network 
theory may offer possibilities for recognition dialogue at the transnational level via its 
focus on practical problem-solving. Where a spotlight focus on recognition risks 
essentialising and de-contextualising identity -  a concern raised in chapter 4 -  
network regimes are presented as offering an alternative space in which legitimacy- 
based claims can contest the substantives of the discourse.
694 Indeed, despite being a temporarily constituted body, the Working Group is now a full-time 
permanent institution. See http://www.ohchr.org
695 Alston has noted the flexibility of mandate of most UN Human Rights bodies, suggesting a present 
capacity for these bodies to make of themselves genuine discursive spaces. Philip Alston, ‘Appraising 
the United Nations Human Rights Regime* in Alston (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992,5.
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The concept of network suggests a variable number of participants that differ in a near 
infinite numbers of ways joined together in a relationship of equality in the pursuit of 
a particular aim. Network theory has been established as a means of understanding the 
complex flows and interactions o f the phenomena collectively entitled globalisation. 
Whereas formal institutions were more important in the past for the provision of 
transaction frameworks and for their mediating role, according to Ladeur, a vital 
characteristic of globalisation is that it generates ‘‘more spontaneously self-generating 
flexible ways of co-ordination and co-operation”, and these flexible institutions are 
produced and exist beyond the state. Indeed, these “new forms of ‘relational’ 
heterarchical co-ordination are generated in a bottom-up, instead of a top-down, 
approach; they create self-stabilizing networks o f inter-relationships” characterised by 
their dynamism and reflexivity.696 They generate their own ‘relational rationality’ on 
the basis o f the expectations and constraints they create, as well as via their 
overlapping with other networks and the sharing of best practice. The network 
concept thus, according to Ladeur, indicates “the rise of a new logic”, a “new 
paradigm o f ‘relational rationality’”, that breaks down the division between public 
and private in accepting the potential of heterarchical relationships to self-organise 
and evolve societal norms that establish a new kind o f bindingness that emerges from 
a logic of its own.697
The understanding that these forms o f processes are developing around the state, not 
in opposition to it, and in which the state continues to play a role698 suggests a 
complex pattern of overlapping networks that is not a form of multi-level governance, 
with its implication of hierarchical relationships, but a mutli-polar structure of 
networks operating with different logics.699 It is not the network format itself that is 
important here, however, but its potential for reflexivity and the space it provides for 
discourse.
696 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Globalization and Public Governance -  A Contradiction?’ in Ladeur (ed.), 
Public Governance in the Age o f Globalization. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004,5.
697 Ladeur, ib id , 6-7,14. Ladeur gives the example of the ECJ establishing a new logic of direct effect
in Van Gend en Loos.
698 For a strong argument that states are changing not disappearing, Saskia Sassen, ‘De-Nationalized 
State Agendas and Privatized Norm-Making’ in Ladeur, Public Governance in the Age o f 
Globalization.
m  Ladeur, ‘Globalization and Public Governance -  A Contradiction?*, 14-15.
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One suggestion for harnessing the potential of network governance is democratic 
experimentalism.700 Democratic experimentalism, a term developed by Charles Sabel, 
in collaboration with a number of others, is a form of pragmatic decentralised co­
ordination intended to overcome “the destitution of our political possibilities”.701 
Although the original aim of the model was to take private sector techniques for 
generating innovation and apply them to governance in order to empower local people 
to develop appropriate solutions together for their local problems, with its reflexive 
approach and focus on practical problems, this type of model o f network governance 
offers the potential of a different type of transnational participation for legitimacy- 
based claims — one that allows, through extremely flexible participation, the 
opportunity to contribute to debate and negotiations on a near infinite range of 
substantive matters.
The central innovation of this new form of organisation is, in its inventor’s words, 
“the invention o f institutions that allow each part of a collaborative whole to reflect 
deliberately, and in a way accessible to the others, on the aptness of its ends and the 
organizational means used to prosecute them, even as those common ends are 
themselves continuously redefined by the cumulative, mutual adjustments of partial 
purposes, activities, and organizational connections.”702 Thus, democratic 
experimentalism is to “combine decentralization, by which local units are able to act 
on what they know best, and integration through iterated goal setting, by which 
proposals for improvement ... are transformed into concrete projects as alternative 
solutions are tested and compared.”703 The diverse capacities and experience of 
members are pooled and these sub-governmental units are free to set goals and to 
choose the methods to attain them, making them highly responsive to diverse and 
changing conditions in locales. Democratic experimentalism is thus local, particular, 
self-reflexive and open both in make-up and method.
700 The opportunity offered by democratic experimentalism to the questioning of defining participation 
has been identified by Govern and Baird in die context of defining Maori Treaty partners. It is from 
their work that this paper takes its inspiration. See Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird, ‘Identifying the 
Maori Treaty Partner’ (2002) 52 University o f Toronto Law Journal 39.
701 Sabel ‘Design, Deliberation and Democracy: On the New Pragmatism of Firms and Public 
Institutions’, paper presented at EUI, Florence, 15-16 December 1995,55. Michael Dorf and Charles 
Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 267,288- 
289.
702 Sabel, ‘Design, Deliberation and Democracy, 4.
703 Ibid., 49
The process begins with the simplest statement o f intention to solve a certain problem. 
The actual details and understandings of the problem take form as the actors begin to 
discuss the problem and are constantly redefined as the debate develops. 
Experimentalism is a continual process of “learning and learning anew through 
reciprocal modifications of means and ends... to achieve purposes whose very 
definition is shaped by that process itself’.704 This Meaming-by-monitoring’ does not 
require or presume a uniformity of views nor demands consensus as the outcome, 
allowing for the possibility for different groups to contribute on their own terms and 
in their own voice. Moreover, solidarity is generated on the back of the mutual 
learning process. Thus the direct participation o f any number of different types of 
actors in networks of governance debating practical transnational problems produces 
“workable cooperation by continuously exploring different understandings o f means 
and ends.”705
The constant reflexivity of the process of experimentalism suggests that this form of 
network governance offers real possibilities in terms of accepting the radical 
contingency of recognition elaborated in chapter 4. Although problem-focused, a link 
can be made between the “reciprocal determination of means and ends”706, in Dorf 
and Sabel’s words, and the Arendtian concept of identity. Experimentalism, according 
to Dorf and Sabel, sees the ambiguity of means and ends as rendering the 
intelligibility o f our own ideas and our ability to act upon them dependent upon the 
reaction and interpretation o f others; thus, “[t]he collaborative investigation of 
differences in response to doubt is ... central to self- and mutual understanding.”707 
The attractiveness of experimentalism for considerations of recognition is that it does 
not appear to require mutual recognition at the outset, but that it is in the involvement 
in discussing ends and means in response to common problems that recognition is 
generated and constantly altering in response to the changing identity of participants. 
Experimentalism is thus appealing precisely because it does not focus on recognition 
concerns but on practical problem solving, in which recognition’s continuous 
movement is incorporated within the ‘rolling self-interpretation’ of
704 ‘Design, Deliberation and Democracy’, 4,31.
705 Dorf and Sabel, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism*, 314.
706 Dorf and Sabel, ibid, 284.
707 Ibid,2Z5.
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experimentalism.708 Hie fear of some that establishing categories for recognition 
inevitably changes conditions within and amongst groups is arguably mitigated by an 
understanding of identity as inevitably a process o f acknowledgment, response and 
adaptation, on both sides.709
Further, experimentalism self-consciously opens up possibilities for wide 
participation; indeed, reconnecting large numbers of citizens with the political system 
is one of the understood aims of the theory. Moreover, Sabel explicitly understands 
experimentalism as combining freedom of expression, the defining liberty of the 
modems, with participation, the defining, liberty o f the ancients; experimentalism 
works through the interaction of the two.710 Participants are understood as gaining 
new skills by sharing in knowledge and experience, which in itself is a means of 
increasing self-esteem. However, whilst aware of the importance of open participation 
as a good in itself, the purpose of experimentalism is not recognition per se and the 
theory thus appears most vague at one of its most interesting junctures. There are 
two standards of participation: the first, “all those affected” is clear but begs the 
question of who decides which those groups are ; the second, and not necessarily 
compatible barrier, follows the analogy with the competitive world of economics, and 
is that of utility.713 That experimentalism is not concerned with participation purely 
for recognition’s sake bears clear risks. Network governance presupposes, according 
to Ladeur, “the creativity of the self-organizing potential” o f society.714 Moreover, 
networks are, like any space, sites of power and, particularly in the absence of
708 Dorf and Sabel, ibicL> 308.
709 See Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Applicability of the International Legal Concept o f ‘Indigenous 
Peoples’ in Asia* in Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell, The East Asian Challenge fo r Human Rights. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Moreover, “it seems difficult to design network-type 
processes and markets in ways that will not intensify the erosion of conventional identity-markers.” 
Benedict Kingsbury and Helen Hershkoff, ‘Crisis, Community, and Courts in Network Governance: A 
Response to Liebmann and Sabel’s Approach to Reform of Public Education' (2003) 28 N. Y. U. Rev. o f 
Law and Social Change 319,323.
710 Sabel, ‘Design, Deliberation and Democracy’, 55.
711 Sabel and his collaborators appear to have given little detailed thought to the matter of defining the 
bounds of participation; when giving an example to which democratic experimentalism might be 
applied -  that of educational reform -  he notes that consultation will be with “all those affected by 
potential measures”, without considering that, in the field of education, that could reasonably include 
the whole of society. Ibid., 51.
712 It also runs a risk that participation becomes ineffective. For a sobering account of the costs of 
public deliberation, see Jim Rossi, ‘Participation Run Amok: The Costs o f Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decision-Making’ (1997) 92 Northwestern University Law Review 173.
713 The chief fear o f the network is engaging with an incompetent or unreliable partner. Dorf and Sabel, 
‘ A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’, 309.
714 Ladeur, ‘Globalization and Public Governance -  A Contradiction?’, 19.
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guarantees of certain rights, also sites of exclusion and inequality.715 In all this 
flexibility and creativity, as Kingsbury and Hirschoff have sought to flag716, what 
becomes o f the weak and vulnerable?
The criterion of utility is affected by the level o f resources that a partner can muster. 
However, the understanding that input comes in many forms -  such as the offering of 
an alternative vocabulary -  should ensure that participants are not defined solely by 
the material resources they can offer. Although on these terms the principle of utility 
would not have offered participation rights to the Mikmaq in the case considered in 
chapter 6, the principle of ‘all those affected’ would have seen them included. The 
two principles need therefore to be taken as stand-alone principles, each capable of 
providing participation; an entity or claim would not need to satisfy both criteria. 
Such an interpretation o f the criteria would then correspond to capacity and 
legitimacy, whereby capacity-based claims would need to satisfy the utility 
requirement, even where the petition stems originally from the claim to be affected, 
and legitimacy-based claims would be able to claim participation solely on the 
grounds of being affected by the problem at issue. This is not to suggest, however, 
that such claims have little to offer.
Where existing members of a network determine that a claim to be affected by the 
problem at hand is not sufficient for membership, participation, in Sabel’s model, is to 
be monitored by the courts, before which networks must present a convincing account 
of the reasons for a complainant’s exclusion. Judicial oversight may offer a degree of 
protection where it is as open as possible to reasons for inclusion, and where it is 
particularly sensitive to the claim of inclusion of encompassing groups and the diverse 
ways in which claims are presented. In such a model, the courts will become sites of 
contestation of second-order participation. While this may read as more than a little 
utopian, there is no perfect answer to the question of how to ensure the equal 
participation o f the less powerful, but nonetheless the openness and reflexivity of the 
network format appears to offer a better platform for the vulnerable than most.
715 Benedict Kingsbuiy, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ (1998) 9 European Journal o f International Law 
599. Also, Stephen Toope, ‘Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law’ in G. Kreijen 
(ed.), State Sovereignty and International Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
7,6 Kingsbury and Hirschoff, ‘Crisis, Community, and Courts in Network Governance’; a response to 
James S. Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, ‘A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging 
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform’ (2003) 28 NYU Rev. ofL. andSoc. Change 183.
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An example of what such a network might look like at the transnational level is 
provided by the Mediterranean Action Plan, a regime for marine pollution control in 
the Mediterranean Sea Networks necessarily span state boundaries largely because of 
the trans-boundary ‘globalization of risk’717, and the environment is thus an obvious 
area in which networks will emerge. A study of the Plan has suggested that its success 
in gaining state compliance has been due to its epistemic community of experts who 
have developed a co-ordinated system of convergent policy-making, which has had a 
transformative effect on state behaviour.718 This network community could be opened 
up to include all groups affected by the environmental protection measures developed, 
and provide a forum in which legitimacy-based groups could participate in the setting 
of norms and, where necessary, contest the discourse itself. As the example suggests, 
in being transnational, such network forums will not necessarily transcend the 
particular and the determination of those affected will not necessarily be beyond the 
bounds of the ability of discursive space to cope.
Indeed, Romani organisations or bodies concerned with Romani issues under the 
auspices of international organisations participate already to a  certain extent in forms 
of network governance. For example, the OSCE Contact Point for Roma and Sinti 
Issues and the UNHCR have created a network with local and national authorities, 
Romani organisations, both local and transnational, as well as other interested 
international actors, to consider long-term solutions to the problem of Romani 
refugees caused by ethnic conflict and tension in south eastern Europe.719 The 
presence of a large Romani voice ensures not only that any solutions are acceptable to 
these representatives but that the understanding of the problem itself can be 
challenged -  a point of particular importance in the area o f asylum and return. 
Similarly, the World Bank’s partnerships with local Romani organisations, such as the 
Pakiv Fund, which supplies small grants to generate employment in Romani 
communities, see Romani organisations involved in the Bank’s informal networks
717 Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘Frontiers: National and Transnational Order’ in Ladeur (ed.)s Public 
Governance in the Age o f Globalization, 39-41.
718 Peter M. Hass, ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean pollution control* 
(1989) 43 International Organisation 377.
719 For further information, see the Contact Point’s website: http://www.osce.org/odihr/18148.html
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concerning the wider development discourse.720 Here, the Romani voice can offer 
their experience in on-going debates about the modification of understandings about 
how and what assistance should be offered to help groups out of poverty, as well as 
influence the terms of the debate itself. Participation in these networks not only allows 
Roma a degree of control over their lives, but inclusion and respect for the experience 
they can offer can make a significant contribution towards the realisation of positive 
recognition.
7.5.3. Summary
The international legal realm is, so it is widely feared, fragmenting.721 International 
regimes and institutions, international law-making, are no longer the sole preserve of 
the state. The changing nature o f governance, from the centrality o f polis to multiple 
poleis, over-lapping and inter-connected, from inter-state law to global law, offer new 
opportunities to address the exclusion of non-state legitimacy-based claims to 
recognition.
The Romani claim has been understood here as a challenge to misrecognition of 
Roma and to their characterisation as a minority, but also as a demand to be to able to 
contribute and participate in substantive discussions that affect them; as both a claim 
to original authority and as a demand for recognition that they have something to 
offer, a point worth making. This section has sought to suggest that legitimacy-based 
claims can operate at both the substantive and the procedural levels and are not 
confined to making their claims to participate at one or the other. Indeed, it is 
important that claims should not be excluded from either negotiations about original 
authority or the practical negotiations of living together. Where claims in ‘high 
negotiations’ about participation are rebuffed, claims can gain forms of recognition 
from participation in ‘lower-down’ negotiations about development plans or social 
stability, for example. In viewing contestation as occurring across a mix of ‘high’ and
720 For details o f partnerships and general involvement in Romani development, 
httn://www.worldbank.org/eca/roma/about.htm
721 The ILC established a Working Group on this question in 2002; for documents and reports of this 
group, http://untreatv.un.Org/ilc/guide/l 9.htm. Also, Maitti Koskenniemi and Pâivi Leino, 
‘Fragmentation o f International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, (2002) 15 Leiden Journal o f 
International Law  553; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple 
Modes of Thought*, paper given at Harvard Law School, 5 March 2005; Andreas Fischer-Lescano and 
Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global 
Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal o f International Law 999; Toope, ‘Emerging Patterns of Governance 
and International Law*.
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‘low’ sites, recognition claims can include both dignity concerns as well as the 
expression of practical identity.
7 . 6 .  S u m m a r y :  I n t e r n a t io n a l  L a w  a s  b o t h  h e g e m o n ic  n a r r a t i v e  
a n d  d is c u r s i v e  s p a c e
Tully has recently suggested that international law is a co-opting narrative that pulls in 
counter-imperial claims and forces them to speak the imperial narrative. In this, and 
in singling out self-determination as one of the main mechanisms by which this is 
achieved, as this thesis has sought to illustrate, he is correct. However, international 
law also contains pockets of space in which counter-hegemonic claims can make their 
case on a more equal footing. As a number of accounts have sought to stress, under 
the dual pressures of globalisation and internal critique, international law is making a 
discursive turn.723
The starting point for any re-conceptualisation of recognition as participation in 
international law is an acknowledgement of the shifting sands of law itself. The 
Critical Legal Studies movement has shown the law to be indeterminate, and in so 
doing has shown that the law cannot be a neutral ground in which the differing moral 
and political strands of society, or international society, can meet on an equal 
footing.724 To represent law as knowledge rather than judgement is to deny the 
choices that have to be made and that are made. Law is, rather, a mechanism for 
legitimating configurations of power and of articulating hidden normative 
commitments. *
One answer, according to Singer, is law as conversation.725 The importance of this 
metaphor is that while it does not resolve uncertainty, it requires that we must take
722 Tully, ‘On Law, Democracy and Imperialism*.
723 Schieder, ‘Pragmatism as a Path towards a Discursive and Open Theory of International law*
(2000) 11 European Journal o f International Law 663; Julie Brunnie, and Stephen Toope, 
‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law* 
(2000-2001) 39 Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 19. Also see Franck, Fairness in 
International Law, 477: “much of the attempt at interaction is discursive: an mterlocutionaiy process of 
exhortation, expiation, explanation, and exposition”.
724 For a good summary of CLS thought, Joseph Singer, ‘The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal 
Theory’ (1984) 94 Yale Law Journal 1.
723 Singer, ibid., 51-2.
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responsibility for what we do and for the choices we make. The acceptance that our 
beliefs can never be ‘right’ does not mean that we hold them any less fiercely. 
Acknowledging that the law can never be neutral is a first step in taking responsibility 
for ourselves and for our choices. Moreover, law as conversation can also be 
empowering. The metaphor of conversation suggests that participation can be open, 
temporary or committed, and that the law is a whole of a multitude of different 
conversations, with different participants, discussing together a particular topic in a 
particular context, both of which will develop over time and in the course of the 
conversation. Views can change, plans of action be formulated and re-formulated, 
successes assessed and plans revised and improved, all in a series of conversations 
that, like those recognition dialogues with those dearest to us, never stop.
Recognising that law is incapable o f offering a transcendental basis on which to 
discuss our opposing viewpoints means acknowledging that people must be 
considered free and equal. Thus, whereas, as Koskenniemi has convincingly argued, 
the structure of international law necessitates contestation by appeal to hegemonic 
claims727, there are benefits to playing the game. Claims of law, as opposed to claims 
of interest or privilege, constitute the claimants as members of the legal community 
that is also necessarily a political community. Claims of law at the international level, 
as a conversation of equals, require all to make the argument rather than to appeal 
directly to power, allowing the weak to make their bid for inclusion.
Further, law as conversation acknowledges that all knowledge and actions are the 
result of interaction with others: human beings do not have ideas, they form  them. To 
understand international law as a perpetual discourse of creative problem-solving in 
which the questions of the ‘who’, the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ are always implicated is 
not to give up on the concept o f law as binding; it is rather to recognise that binding
726 In Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature, Rorty refers to Sartre’s assertion that, in Rorty’s words, 
“the urge to find such necessities is the urge to be rid of one’s freedom to erect yet another alternative 
theoiy or vocabulary. Thus, the edifying philosopher... is treated as a ‘relativist’, one who lacks moral 
seriousness, because he does not jo in  in the common human hope that the burden o f choice will pass 
away.” (emphasis mine) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979,376.
727 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’ (2004) 17 Cambridge 
Review o f International Affairs 197; for Ms earlier argument, From Apology to Utopia, 422-457.
248
obligation stems from identification with norms, not with any special characteristic of 
a legal norm itself. The validity of a norm is the ongoing process o f its validation. 
Discourse stimulates and maintains identification through inclusion and reflexivity. 
However, any discourse has to be open to challenge otherwise it simply becomes a 
tool of the hegemonic power of the moment. Frag noted in his classic text, “The 
alternative to ‘foundations’ is not ‘chaos* but the joint reconstruction of social life”; 
or as Singer has put it, “[w]hen we give up the idea that the legal system has a ... 
‘rational basis’, we are not left with nothing. We are left with ourselves, and we are 
not nothing.”730 It is only an opportunity, however, if we insist on making the 
conversation of law a genuine multilogue.
To create an international multilogue is not to insist that all entities are equal in terms 
of the outcome of participation. It is rather to acknowledge the need to take all 
legitimacy-based recognition claims seriously, no matter the form they take. A first 
step must be the acknowledgment that the nature of international legal personality 
explicitly denies legitimacy-based claims. This in itself will necessarily open up 
discursive space in which recognition claims can be made and contested, re-submitted 
and re-defined, always striving for the ideal of the recognition dialogue that we will 
never achieve. The presumptive right to self-determination as participation insists 
upon the right to keep trying and the obligation of the Other to listen.
728 Friedrich V. KratochwiI, Rules, Norms and Decisions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989.
729 Gerald Frug, ‘The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law* (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 
1276.
730 Singer, ‘The Player and the Cards*, 66.
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Conclusion
Stories can be either bacteria or light: they can infect a system, or illuminate a world.731
The Romani claim to non-territorial nationhood was roundly mocked upon its first 
international appearance in Durban in 2001 by fellow members of the civil society 
gathered there. Governmental delegations ignored it. The claim's reception since has 
by and large followed this pattern, either ignored as unrealistic or scornfully dismissed 
by those keen to insist that it is purely the invention of a Romani elite. This thesis has 
sought to suggest that the claim, the particularly story of non-territorial nationhood 
that is being told by the Romani movement about the Romani people, is deserving of 
neither dismissal nor scorn.
The claim to non-territorial nationhood has been viewed here at the general level as a 
claim to recognition of an over-arching Romani identity based upon a sense of 
romanipe. It has been argued that recognition, to be genuine, must take a certain form; 
or, rather, it must not take any particular form, but must be fluid, capable o f 
acknowledging the dynamism o f identity and the impact in particular of the ever on­
going recognition dialogue with those around us on our understanding of who we are. 
Recognition has thus been characterised as participation, where participation takes 
place on terms of equality and where it acknowledges the impossibility of neutrality 
o f the dominant language of discourse. The ILO negotiations surrounding the drawing 
up of Convention 169 make clear that participation is not a universal remedy; it 
depends very much upon the type o f participation.
At the specific level of content, the Romani claim, as a claim to nationhood, has been 
understood as a claim to original authority, as the right to determine themselves what 
their role shall be. As such, it has been characterised in terms of participation at the 
international level as a legitimacy-based claim in contrast to the claims being put 
forward by non-state capacity-based entities. This type o f legitimacy has been viewed 
as qualitatively different from other types of claim — a fact that the suggestion of a 
presumptive right to self-determination has sought to acknowledge.
731 Ben Okri, ‘The Joys of Story-Telling’ in Birds ofHepven. London: Phoenix, 1997.
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The claim to non-territorial nationhood has been made consciously within the context 
of a globalising world in which the conflagration of legitimacy and capacity that the 
state represents is losing its place as the sole political and legal flame. Moreover, the 
challenges to the state arising from this proliferation of alternative sites of politics and 
law are causing the concepts o f place and space to be re-thought, so that territory is no 
longer accepted as the sole defining mark of the political. The nation-state has been a 
remarkably successful project, but its demand for exclusivity in the relation between 
people and territory requires that either the people be recast or that the territory be 
reshaped. The orderliness of territorial borders in the face of the unpredictability o f 
human beings has meant that it has largely been the people that have suffered the 
necessary re-formulation. The Romani claim acts as a reminder that we do not need to 
alter either, but rather to separate the exclusive bond between the two. The Romani 
claim, as a non-territorial nation, pushes back the boundaries of the political, 
challenging less the state itself than the continuing path-dependency of thinking about 
the organisation o f political space.
Further, the Romani claim has been situated here within a wider world of 
transformative politics that is seeking to re-claim the international arena from the neo­
liberal hegemonic discourse that currently dominates our world. The Romani claim is 
an innovative part of broader social movements that are challenging what Fraser has 
termed the ‘maldistribution, misrecognition and misrepresentation’ of the existing 
flaming o f international governance. The claim to non-territorial nationhood has 
thus been understood here as representing a self-conscious challenge to the ‘who’ and 
the ‘how’ of international participation. The claim to collective self-governance, 
represented by the principle of self-determination, is not necessarily a tool in the 
armoury of hegemony where the terms upon which it is claimed are themselves 
defied.
In addition, despite the vagueness of specific content to the Romani claim in terms of 
how a non-territorial nation might be manifested, it has been suggested that the
732 Charles Westin, ‘Temporal and Spatial Aspects ofMuIticuIturality’ in R. Baubôck and J. Randell 
(eds.), Blurred Boundaries: Migration, Ethnicity, Citizenship. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998,79.
733 Fraser, ‘Refiaming Justice in a Globalizing World* (2005) 36 New Left Review 69, 84.
251
Romani claim is well placed to take advantage o f the rise of network forms o f 
governance. Sitting outside territorially-defined space, the flexibility of the network 
format can offer legitimacy-based claims to recognition the opportunity to contest the 
‘what’ whilst simultaneously contesting the ‘how’. Via participation in network 
governance, such claims can challenge maldistribution or contribute to the framing 
and solving of the common problems we face, from environmental damage control to 
the defining of health priorities for UN-based programmes, for example.
There are thus a number o f good reasons for taking the Romani claim seriously on its 
own terms. Firstly, both as a claim to recognition, given the acknowledged harm o f 
misrecognition, and, moreover, as a claim to original authority, the legitimacy element 
o f such a claim demands that it be taken seriously. Secondly, the self-understanding o f 
the claim as offering an alternative vision of the organisation of political space is both 
genuine and plausible in light of the challenges to existing structures and 
multiplication of sites of governance. Thirdly, there is also something to be gained in 
taking the Romani claim seriously by those whose ontological security is by and large 
assured by the dominant discourse. Playing the master comes at a price, and not just to 
those whose subjugation is necessary to maintain the illusion of domination. Where 
the masters maintain their position o f domination by imposing the full weight of their 
interdependence upon others, the resistance o f the subjugated calls into question the 
very identity of those who subjugate. The ontological security of the master is 
intimately connected to the servant, whether he chooses to acknowledge it or not. 
Further, the inevitable resistance challenges not only the security of being of the 
dominant, but also the physical peace of all. The international order continues, 
erroneously, to place the attainment of peace above freedom; but peace is not found in 
the maintenance of order (nor in the use of military force), but in the inclusion and 
recognition as equals of all those who ask it. There is arguably greater stability to be 
found in acknowledging the authority of legitimacy-based claims to recognition as 
participation than in attempting to keep chaos at bay by immutably fixing territorial 
borders. Finally, there is an additional benefit to all in taking the Romani claim, and 
other similar legitimacy-based claims seriously. There is a value in the wide inclusion 
o f as many voices as possible. The fact of living together entails that we face many 
common challenges -  a situation which the prospect of dramatic global climate
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change, for example, will only make more urgent. The more alternative vocabularies 
that are heard, the best chance we will all have of weathering the challenges ahead.
In order to take the Romani claim seriously on its own terms it is necessary to 
constantly remind ourselves that any system, any discourse, is created and not 
divined; that there are no immutable givens, such as territorial borders. Law, as a 
system of power, has a strong tendency towards the hegemonic. In order to avoid any 
legal system becoming the tool of the powerful, it is necessary to work hard to keep 
the system open to the challenge of alternative vocabularies. And it is necessary to 
accept that we will never get recognition right, but it is in the trying that mutual 
respect is to be found. The Romani claim was presented as a creativity to share. The 
non-Romani world needs to think about their response to the Romani contribution to 
the debate.
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Annex
Note: The text is reproduced in its original form, with no correction o f spelling or 
syntax.
WE, THE ROMA NATION
Individuals belonging to the Roma Nation call for a representation of their Nation, 
which does not want to become a State. We ask for being recognized as a Nation, for 
the sake o f Roma and of non-Roma individuals, who share the need to deal with the 
nowadays new challenges. We, a Nation of which over half a million persons were 
exterminated in a fergotten Holocaust, a Nation of individuals too often discriminated, 
marginalized, victim of intollerance and persecutions, we have a  dream, and we are 
engaged in fulfilling i t  We are a Nation, we share the same tradition, the same 
culture, the same origin, the same language; we are a Nation. We have never looked 
for creating a Roma State. And we do not want a State today, when the new society 
and the new economy are concretely and progressively crossing-over the importance 
and the adequacy of the State as the way how individuals organize themselves.
The will to consubstantiate the concept of a Nation and the one of a State has led and 
is still leading to tragedies and wars, disasters and massacres. The history of the Roma 
Nation cuts through such a cohincidence, which is evidently not anymore adequate to 
the needs of individuals. We, the Roma Nation, offer to the individuals belonging to 
the other Nations our adequacy to the new world.
We have a dream, the political concrete dream of the rule of law being the rule for 
each and everybody, in the frame and thanks to a juridical systE9m able to assure 
democracy, freedom, liberty to each and everybody, being adequate to the changing 
world, the changing society, the changing economy. We have a dream, the one of the 
rule o f law being a method, and not a value. A pragmatic, concrete, way how 
individuals agree on rules, institutions, juridical norms, adequate to the new needs. A 
transnational Nation as the Roma one needs a transnational rule of law: this is evident; 
we do believe that such a need is shared by any individual, independently of the 
Nation he or she belongs to.
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We do know that a shy debate regarding the adequacy o f the State to the changing
needs of the global society—a global society which should not be organized J
exclusively from above—is involving prominent personalities in Europe and in the
entire UN Community.
, i
We are also convinced that the request itself of a representation for the Roma Nation 
is a great help to find an answer to the crucial question regarding the needed reforms 
of the existing international institutions and rules. Our dream is therefore of great 
actuality and it is very concrete. It is what we offer the entire world community. The 
Roma Nation, each and every individual belonging to it look for and need a world
where the international Charters on Human Rights are Laws, are perenptoiy rules, i
|
providing exigible rights. Such a will is a need for the Roma; is it so only for Roma? j
i
We are aware that the main carachteristic of the Roma Nation, the one of being a j
Nation without searching for the establishment of a State, is today a great, adequate 
resource of freedom and legality for each individual, and of the successful! 
functioning for the world community.
We have a dream, and we are engaged in the implementation of it: we offer to the 
humanity a request, the one of having a representation as a Nation, the Nation we are.
Giving an answer to such a request would let the entire humanity make a substancial
step forward. 1
We know democracy and freedom to equal the rule of law, which can be assured only 
through the creation of institutions and juridical rules adequate and constantly 
adjusted to the necessarly changing needs of individuals.
We are to offer our culture, our tradition, the resource which is in our historic refusal 
o f searching for a state: the most adequate resource of awareness to the nowadays 
world. That"s why we look for a representation, and new ways of representing 
individuals apart from their belonging to one or to another nation. Nowadays politics 
is not adequate to the nowadays needs of individuals in a changing world; and to the 
needs of all those persons still suffering starvation and violations of their fundamental 
human rights. And we offer, we propose a question, while proposing and offering a 
path, a concrete, possible, needed path, on which to start walking together.
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We, the Roma Nation, have something to share, right by asking for a representation, 
respect, implementation of the existing International Charter on Human Rights, so that 
each individual can look at them as at existing, concrete warranties for her or his 
today and future.
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